Psc 124-100, Class notes, 16-17  September

First, I try to distinguish among some members of the Realist family of theories.  Members of this family utilize the same abstract concepts, and agree upon most of the central claims, but they often -- always? -- argue with one another over their differences, which can be very important to the statesperson.  Second, I illustrate how one might re-write the chapter on the collapse of communism from a strictly Realist perspective.  This would create a somewhat different 'history' by offering different interpretation of the past.  We shall return again and again to issues raised here when we read the third segment of the BS book.

Political Realism consists of a family of closely related theories: they agree in most but not all core claims. The family includes some rather distant cousins. It may be difficult to distinguish some of these cousins from competing families, notably members of the family of Liberal theories. This is because many Liberals accept the Realist's insistence upon the primacy -- at least since Westphalia -- of the state. Thus much of the Liberals' 'handbook' of advice to statespeople also addresses what states should do. But the justification of the state differs for Liberals, as we shall see next week.

Varieties of Realism:

The members of the Realist family can, to a first approximation, be identified from the answers which they offer to these questions:

0. Can we usefully analyze international politics using an abstract concept of "power," or do we need to disaggregate "power" into its constituents? For example, is it meaningful to compare the "power" of the U.S. and al Qaida?

1. Is the state the only sort of actor we need to consider?  Actually, the state isn't the only actor possible. Realism applies to a system of any sort unitary rational entity that engages in power politics. So there were Realists long before the Westphalian system emerged. One can refer to systems of cities (in the 3rd century B.C. around the Aegean, in Renaissance Italy, in China during periods between stable dynasties). And there might be after states are supplanted by new sorts of actors. (Which sorts? Ah, that's a difficult question!)

2. Some Realists content that, in addition to states, there exist important structures of the world, namely polarity and hierarchy. These are said to shape international relations because they create a sort of environment which, at a given time and place, makes it likely that one policy succeeds in its objectives while another fails.  For instance, during the Cold War, a bi-polar system existed. That is, there were two huge alignments which might simply be called "Communist" and "Capitalist."  Balance of power is a practice, say Realists, which cannot be accomplished in bi-polar systems; it requires multi-polar systems, so that an individual state can shift its alignment to prevent an imbalance of hostile power. Thus it is inappropriate -- and stupid -- to try to shift alliances in an effort to balance power in a bi-polar environment.  States which ignore these two structures of polarity and hierarchy do so at their peril! The structures serve as constraints upon effective policies. (This view is called structural Realism.  It has few adherents outside U.S. academic circles.)

3. Why can't states develop stable, cooperative relationships over long periods? Because, as time passes, important parts of  their national interests diverge. Perhaps they began to cooperate when their governments shared nearly identical outlooks on the world.  But the basis for cooperation does not endure.  Since a state does (or should) pursue its national interest, it can't afford to continue cooperative relationships which no longer advance its interests. Perhaps the state is a member of a military alliance. But its leaders decide that it would be better off if it quit the alliance (or, like Italy with the outbreak of WW1,  switch to a competing alliance).

Does this mean that, as soon as the leaders of a state perceive that their interests require a change of policy, they should change policy? Not necessarily. They should somehow give appropriate weights to the long-term as well as the short-term consequences of changing policies. If leaders attend only to short-term considerations of complementarity of interests, they will overlook possibly more significant long-term consequences: they will contribute to making international politics chaotic; that will make the measurement of power more difficult; as a result, they will be forced to be more conservative in their power assessments, in effect, to spend more on national power than might otherwise be the case. At base, uncertainty carries its own costs. Thus, acting to make the future more predictable might, in some sense, be valuable in its own right. Leaders might be advised to perpetuate alignments even if short-term considerations suggest that they should break them to join a competing alignment. [This view is one ingredient of Neo-Realism, and often asserted in a variant of theory called "defensive realism."]

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is now 53 years old.  Its membership has grown over these years.  And its mission has changed from defending Europe against Soviet expansionism to ... well, it's not clear to what!  But NATO now sends military units outside its members' territories.  Perhaps it is therefore misleading to talk about NATO as a 53-year old alliance.  Nevertheless, 53 years (and longer!) is quite  protracted period to witness military cooperation among several of NATO's member states, e.g., U.S., Netherlands, Britain, Italy.  Realists must explain why changing national interests have not pulled the alliance apart.

4. Do / Should states seek to maximize their absolute power, or to maximize their relative power, or something else entirely? Realists such as Hans Morgenthau claimed that, when states adequately pursue their national interests, they do so by expanding their power. In their jargon, "power is the most reliable signpost of the national interest." Other Realists claim that a state might seek just enough power to perpetuate itself; it can then expend its remaining resources on such objectives as enhancing the well-being of its citizens. These are called "defensive realists." They become important after the invention of nuclear weapons: it appears to some Realists that, if a state acquires an adequate nuclear deterrent, that is sufficient to assure survival.

Can you answer these questions from the perspective of one who accepts the central claims of Political Realism? Do you find that any of the questions embarrass you: that you can't construct persuasive Realist answers?

1. Why did the U.S. implement the Marshall Plan? Was it intended to enhance the (relative) power of the U.S.?

2. Why did the Soviet Union express the Brezhnev Doctrine? Was it intended to enhance the (relative) power of the USSR?

3. Why did the {U.S., Soviet Union, respectively} deploy missiles to {Turkey, Cuba, respectively}?

4. Why did the {U.S., Soviet Union, as appropriate} compete for the allegiance or support of new African and Asian states? How can Realists understand the role of "ideological conflict" in international affairs?  What, after all, are the impacts upon state power of others' acceptance of one's ideology?

5. Why did the U.S. and Soviet Union compete in space? [Did they "compete" with military or with economic objectives?]

6. Why did the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union intervene in Vietnam?

7. When should the U.S. intervene in other parts of the world to support values such as human rights? {Bare-bones Realist: Intervene only to advance the national interest. Broader Realist: Intervene to support popular values if that support gains one (foreign as well as domestic) sympathy, because favorable "public opinion" in some situations contributes to national power.} In the 2000 presidential campaign, in a televised debate in South Carolina: G W. Bush said: The U.S. "should intervene only for strategic national interests." His opponent Sen. J. McCain said: "...It's not as simple as that. We also have values." Does this exchange show that  the elder Bush was a Realist and McCain was not (instead, perhaps a Liberal)? That depends upon whether one supports "values" for their own sake, or instrumentally for the contribution that the support of popular values will make to advancing the national interest.

The chapter on the end of the Cold War focuses upon processes and events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It divides factors into "internal" and "external."

One could write the history of the collapse of Communism from a Realist perspective, which would emphasize that:

• states are the most influential political unit in the world today
• states possess a 'national interest' [to be consistent, they really should call this the 'state interest'], and they are advised to "pursue their national interest," which (except in unusual circumstances) statespersons tend to do
• states seek to survive
• (some particularly influential realists add:) for the statesperson, the most reliable guide to advancing the national interest is to chart the state's relative power: it is rarely or never in the national interest for the state's relative power to decline.
• the composition of 'power' changes over time in relation to technology and to the purposes of the state, for instance. Realists tend to speak of components of power as 'military power,' 'economic power,' 'power over opinion' (as might be advanced by propaganda or ideological attraction), for instance. Of course, the ingredients of each component vary over time. 'Military power' today might include satellite networks as well as planes and tanks. The size of armies might not be as important as  the quality of their weapons or the professionalization of the soldiers. An so on. So it is a continuing challenge to realists to measure power appropriately, and then to translate such gross measurements into the tactics which constitute foreign policy
• one cannot rely upon other states or international organization for one's security. The world  is a 'self help' system. International law and organizations may sometimes be helpful (especially as they contribute to the perceived legitimacy of one's policies -- that is, as an ingredient in the 'power over opinion'), but it is a serious mistake to believe that they establish or maintain international order by themselves. Instead, it is states which support international laws and international organizations (for their individual purposes) that provide the sole support to any apparent international order. And these, or other states, could at any time decide to undermine that order, if it suited their purposes -- that is, if they thought that undermining international order was in their national interest.

To this list of core Realist beliefs we need to refer to the Realists' "model of man".  However, Realists are somewhat divided in their "models of man."

• Man is competitive, often aggressive; he seeks to dominate.  ("Continental" Realism, e.g., the German-U.S. scholar Hans Morgenthau)
• Man is both competitive and cooperative.  Nevertheless, at all levels of political organization, one must develop strategies to protect oneself against other men.  International political institutions (e.g., UN system, human rights "regime") are not up to this task because the conditions for a true "international society" do not exist -- at least not yet. ("British" Realism, e.g., Edward Hallett Carr).

These two different models of man generate different emphases in the family of Realist theories.  We'll encounter several of these in the course of this semester, e.g., defensive realism, structural realism, neo-realism.

Realists attempt to derive advice for statesmen from their claims about how the world works, and how it might work.  Among these pieces of advice are:

• In doing calculations about power, statespersons should focus first on other states' capabilities, not their (current) intentions.
• Because the international system is a "self-help" system, the superior policy is balance of power, when conditions enable that policy to be implemented (but they largely did not during the bipolar, 2-bloc Cold War).
• Beware of the hegemony [preponderant power] of any state!  Even though its intentions may seem benign, and even though accommodating oneself to its role of leadership may bring one's own state enhanced security in the short run and greater wealth, one must expect that sooner or later, the hegemonic state will make demands in pursuit of its national interest that are harmful to one's own national interest.
• The security dilemma is real, and constitutes a serious challenge.  
• For the statesperson, there exists a constant tension between "doing good" and "acting effectively."  Morality may urge one policy, but a contradictory policy may be more supportive of the national interest.  The statesperson should, in such a case, choose the policy which best advances the national interest.  Some Realists even believe that all political ideologies serve to blind or excuse to the statesperson the fact that he or she must, at times, do evil things in pursuit of the national interest!

Could you use the claims and concepts above to relate the information in Chapter 5 of BS?

Here is what the author of that chapter emphasizes:

• The Soviet Union voluntarily withdrew its control over the evolution of the states of Eastern Europe, those which were members of the Warsaw Pact via repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine and encouragement by Gorbachev to the peoples of Eastern Europe to undertake their own economic reforms, as the Soviet Union was experimenting with perestroika.
• The leaders in Moscow tolerated ethnic and nationalist movements within the Soviet Union even as they acquired the objective of secession. (Soviet leaders had long vacillated in their treatment of nationalities within the Soviet Union: some times they had heavy-handedly encouraged assimilation; at other times they respected national and ethnic identities and even development of these so long as the populace remained complaint Soviet citizens.)
• The leaders in the Kremlin even pulled back from using force to repress movements by nationalities to secede from the Soviet Union. A few people were killed by Interior Ministry troops in Tblisi, Georgia; a handful were killed fighting over control of television stations in the Baltic republics; three were (perhaps not intentionally) crushed by tanks during the abortive coup attempt against Gorbachev in 1991. And the issues disputed -- whether or not the Soviet Union would remain a centralized, fairly authoritarian multinational state; whether the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would sustain its historic role dominating government and advancing human progress (in the Marxist view) -- were truly profound. It turned out that very few people in the Soviet Union were willing to fight to defend its very existence. (On the other hand, had the Soviet Union faced a foreign threat, lots of its citizens would likely have "rallied around the flag" as they did in World War 2.) Compare that, in the US Civil War, when populations were much smaller, over 23,000 casualties resulted from a single 3-day battle at Antietem; 51,000 from the 3-day battle at Gettysburg. And so on for four years. The troops knew that each battle would likely be a bloodbath, yet most of them continued fighting.
• During the period from 1985 (perhaps earlier) to the end of 1991 when the Soviet Union was officially dissolved, not only the political elite but also informed Soviet citizens realized that the relative power -- by almost any measure -- of their country was declining. Few among the elite and very few others railed against this decline, and almost no one offered any constructive suggestions about how to reverse this trend.

So we ask the political Realist, please account for these facts. He or she has some answers -- which you may or may not find adequate:

• The Soviet Union was not really a state at all; it was a multinational empire, much like the empires of France and Britain except that the center exercised much tighter control. So what we witnessed in the late 1980s was not the disintegration of a state but the collapse of the last European empire.
• Russia (technically, the largest republic in the former Soviet Union) emerged from the disintegration of the Soviet Union with its boundaries unchanged. Russia was and is the state. Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Republic in the late 1980s deliberately wrecked the Soviet Union in order to advance the national interest of Russia (and, not merely incidentally, to undermine the power of his enemy Mikhail Gorbachev, leader of the Soviet Union, an empire).
• The Eastern European allies of the Soviet Union had become a drag on Soviet economic development. Indeed, its allies and client states around the world (such as Cuba) cost a great deal and did not seem to contribute much to Soviet power.
• Gorbachev let things get out of hand. He never intended for Soviet power to erode. Nor did he initially wish to see the Communist Party lose power. The dissolution of the Soviet Union is fundamentally an example of bad statesmanship, or imprudent leadership. A more skillful leader would not have let this process unfold, at least not as far as it did. Political realism makes no claims that statespersons are all effective champions of the national interest. They may misread the national interest in concrete situations. They may miscalculate. They may set in motion powerful trends whose consequences they cannot foresee. In short, they may lose control. So the instance of the dissolution of the Soviet Union does not illustrate serious mistakes in realist theory, only seriously defective leadership by one leader.

Are these responses persuasive? Do Realists manage to tell us a convincing story about the collapse of one of the world's greatest empires (if not states), quickly and with little violence, in the absence of war? Do the 'facts of the case' instead persuade us that states do not, above all else, seek to survive?

In the coming weeks, we'll put liberals and Marxists to the test, too.