A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z


Bac, Mehmet; "Incomplete Information and Incentives to Free Ride"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 4; September, 1996; 419-432; #3180.

[Bachrach, Yoram]; Aziz, Haris; Elkind, Edith; Paterson, Mike; "False-name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games"; Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research; Vol. 40; 2011; 57-93; #5690.

[Bachrach, Yoram]; Zuckerman, Michael; Faliszewski, Piotr; Elkind, Edith; "Manipulating the Quota in Weighted Voting Games"; Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 180/181; 2012; 1-19; #5680.

Bac, Mehmet; Bag, Kanti; "Committee Decisions with Partisans and Side-transfers"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 52, No. 3; May, 2002; 267-286; #4022.

Bade, Sophie; "Electoral Competition with Uncertainty Averse Parties"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 72, No. 1; 2011; 12-29; #5692.

Badger, Wade W.; "Political Individualism, Positional Preferences, and Optimal Decision-Rules"; Probability Models of Collective Decision Making; edited by Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg; Columbus, Ohio; Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company; 1972; 34-59; #1364.

[Bag, Kanti]; Bac, Mehmet; "Committee Decisions with Partisans and Side-transfers"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 52, No. 3; May, 2002; 267-286; #4022.

Bag, Parimal Kanti; "Efficient Allocation of a "Pie": Divisible Case of King Solomon's Dilemma"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 12, No. 1; January, 1996; 21-41; #3367.

Baharad, Eyal; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; "Extended Preferences and Freedom of Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 4; August, 2000; 629-637; #3670.

Baharad, Eyal; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; “Essential Alternatives and Set-Dependent Preferences—An Axiomatic Approach”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 45, No. 2; April, 2003; 121-129; #4405.

Baharad, Eyal; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; "The Borda Rule, Condorcet Consistency and Condorcet Stability"; Economic Theory; Vol. 22, No. 3; October, 2003; 685-688; #4101.

Baharad, Eyal; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; “The Inverse Plurality Rule — an Axiomatization”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, No. 1; October, 2005; 173-178; #4452.

Baharad, Eyal; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; “Approval Voting Reconsidered”; Economic Theory; Vol. 26, No. 3; 2005; 619-628; #4629.

Baharad, Eyal; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; “On the Selection of the Same Winner by All Scoring Rules”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 3; June, 2006; 597-601; #4504.

Baharad, Eyal; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; “Scoring Rules: an Alternative Parameterization”; Economic Theory; Vol. 30, No. 1; 2007; 187-190; #4840.

Baharad, Eyal; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; “The Costs of Implementing the Majority Principle: The Golden Voting Rule”; Economic Theory; Vol. 31, No. 1; 2007; 69-84; #4727.

Baharad, Eyal; Neeman, Zvika; “Robustness Against Inefficient Manipulation”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 29, No. 1; July, 2007; 55-67; #4599.

Baharad, Eyal; Ben-Yashar, Ruth; "The Robustness of the Optimal Weighted Majority Rule to Probability Distortion"; Public Choice; Vol. 139, No. 1-2; April, 2009; 53-59; #5031.

Baharad, Eyal; Nitzan, Shmuel; "Condorcet vs. Borda in Light of a Dual Majoritarian Approach"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 71, No. 2; August, 2011; 151-162; #5658.

Baharad, Eyal; Goldberger, Jacob; Koppel, Moshe; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; "Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 72, No. 1; January, 2012; 113-130; #5640.

Bahyrycz, Anna; "Construction of Systems of Sets Related to the Plurality Functions"; Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications; Vol. 388, No. 1; 2012; 39-47; #5711.

Baigent, Nick; "Social Choice Correspondences"; Recherches Economiques de Louvain; Vol. 46, No. 2; 1980; 125-138; #911.

Baigent, Nick; "Decompositions of Minimal Liberalism"; Economics Letters; Vol. 7, No. 1; 1981; 29-32; #1016.

Baigent, Nick; "Social Choice and Merit Goods"; Economics Letters; Vol. 7, No. 4; 1981; 301-305; #1017.

Baigent, Nick; "A Reformulation of Chichilnisky's Impossibility Theorem"; Economics Letters; Vol. 16, No. 1/2; 1984; 23-25; #290. [See critique by Le Breton and Uriarte; reply by Baigent and Huang; and rejoinder by Le Breton and Uriarte]

Baigent, Nick; "Anonymity and Continuous Social Choice"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 14, No. 1; 1985; 1-4; #849.

Baigent, Nick; "Metric Rationalisation of Social Welfare Functions According to Principles of Social Choice"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 13, No. 1; February, 1987; 59-65; #1430.

Baigent, Nick; "Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice"; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 102, No. 1; February, 1987; 161-169; #1624.

Baigent, Nick; "Twitching Weak Dictators"; Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 47, No. 4; 1987; 407-411; #2126.

Baigent, Nick; "Some Further Remarks on Preference Proximity"; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 104, No. 1; February, 1989; 191-193; #2227. [Reply to the comment by Nitzan: #2351]

Baigent, Nick; Huang, P.; "Topological Social Choice: Reply to Le Breton and Uriarte"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 2; April, 1990; 141-146; #2161. [See Rejoinder by Le Breton and Uriarte.]

Baigent, Nick; "Transitivity and Consistency"; Economics Letters; Vol. 33, No. 4; August, 1990; 315-317; #2279.

Baigent, Nick; Xu, Yongsheng; "Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Approval Voting"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 21, No. 1; February, 1991; 21-29; #2306.

Baigent, Nick; "Manipulability of Choice Aggregations"; Economic Letters; Vol. 38, No. 2; 1992; 195-198; #2968.

Baigent, Nick; "Behind the Veil of Preference"; Japanese Economic Review; Vol. 46, No. 1; March, 1995; 88-101; #2937.

Baigent, Nick; "A Unified Perspective on Resource Allocation: Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium, the Core and Social Choice: Discussion"; Social Choice Re-Examined, Vol. 1; edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 175-178; #3157. [discussion of paper by Chichilnisky]

Baigent, Nick; Klamler, Christian; "Transitive Closure, Proximity and Intransitivities"; Economic Theory; Vol. 23, No. 1; December, 2003; 175-181; #4109.

Baigent, Nick; Eckert, Daniel; “Abstract Aggregations and Proximity Preservation: An Impossibility Result”; Theory and Decision; Vol. 56, No. 4; 2004; 359-366; #4293.

Baik, Kyung Hwan; “Contests with Group-specific Public-good Prizes”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 1; January, 2008; 103-117; #4687.

Bailey, Martin J.; "The Possibility of Rational Social Choice in an Economy"; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 87, No. 1; February, 1979; 37-56; #1034.

Bailey, Ralph W.; "The Number of Weak Orderings of a Finite Set"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 4; August, 1998; 559-562; #3292.

Baker, Gordon E.; "Whatever Happened to the Reapportionment Revolution in the United States?"; Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences; edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart; New York; Agathon Press; 1986; 257-276; #2217.

Baker, Keith Michael; Condorcet, From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics; Chicago; University of Chicago Press; 1975; #2876.

Balasko, Yves; Crès, Hervé; "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 75, No. 2; August, 1997; 237-270; #3346.

Balasko, Yves; Crès, Hervé; "Condorcet Cycles in Bipartite Populations"; Economic Theory; Vol. 12, No. 2; September, 1998; 313-334; #3661.

Baleiras, Rui Nuno; "Electoral Defeats and Local Political Expenditure Cycles"; Economics Letters; Vol. 56, No. 2; 17 October 1997; 201-207; #3162.

Baliga, Sandeep; "Implementation in Economic Environments with Incomplete Information: the Use of Multi-stage Games"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 27, No. 2; May, 1999; 173-183; #3664.

Baliga, Sandeep; Brusco, Sandro; "Collusion, Renegotiation and Implementation"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 1; January, 2000; 69-83; #3587.

Balinski, Michel L.; Young, Hobart Peyton; "The Quota Method of Apportionment"; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 82, No. 7; August-September, 1975; 701-730; #2117.

Balinski, Michel L.; Young, Hobart Peyton; "On Huntington Methods of Apportionment"; SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics; Vol. 33, No. 4; December, 1977; 607-618; #3061.

Balinski, Michel L.; Young, Hobart Peyton; "Apportionment Schemes and the Quota Method"; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 84, No. 6; June-July, 1977; 450-455; #2116. [Addendum: Vol. 84, No. 7; August-September, 1977; 542]

Balinski, Michel L.; Young, Hobart Peyton; "The Jefferson Method of Apportionment"; SIAM Review; Vol. 20, No. 2; April, 1978; 278-284; #3060.

Balinski, Michel L.; Young, Hobart Peyton; "Stability, Coalitions and Schisms in Proportional Representation Systems"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 72, No. 3; September, 1978; 848-858; #2704. [See comment by Tullock and reply by Balinski and Young]

Balinski, Michel L.; Young, Hobart Peyton; "Criteria for Proportional Representation"; Operations Research; Vol. 27, No. 1; January-February, 1979; 80-95; #2482.

Balinski, Michel L.; Young, Hobart Peyton; "Quotatone Apportionment Methods"; Mathematics of Operations Research; Vol. 4, No. 1; February, 1979; 31-38; #2879.

Balinski, Michel L.; Young, Hobart Peyton; "Letter to the Editor"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 73, No. 2; June, 1979; 552-553; #2705. [Reply to comment by Tullock on a paper by Balinski and Young]

Balinski, Michel L.; Young, Hobart Peyton; "The Webster Method of Apportionment"; Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A.; Vol. 77, No. 1, part 1; 1980; 1-4; #2844.

Balinski, Michel L.; Young, Hobart Peyton; Fair Representation; New Haven; Yale University Press; 1982; #414. [See review by Lucas]

Balinski, Michel L.; Young, Hobart Peyton; "The Apportionment of Representation"; Fair Allocation; edited by Hobart P. Young; Providence; AMS; 1985; 1-29; #850.

Balinski, Michel L.; "The Problem with Apportionment"; Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan; Vol. 36, No. 3; September, 1993; 134-148; #3133.

Balinski, Michel L.; Ramírez, Victoriano; "Parametric Methods of Apportionment, Rounding and Production"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 37, No. 2; March, 1999; 107-122; #3653.

Balinski, Michel L.; Laraki, Rida; “A Theory of Measuring, Electing, and Ranking”; Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA; Vol. 104, No. 21; 2007; 8720-8725; #4817. [electronic]

Balinski, Michel L.; Jennings, Andrew; Laraki, Rida; "Monotonic Incompatibility Between Electing and Ranking"; Economics Letters; Vol. 105, No. 2; 2009; 145-147; #5300.

Balinski, Michel L.; Laraki, Rida; Majority Judgment. Measuring, Ranking, and Electing; MIT Press; Cambridge, MA; 2010; #5442.

Ball, Richard; "Discontinuity and Non-existence of Equilibrium in the Probabilistic Spatial Voting Model"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 4; August, 1999; 533-555; #3572.

Ballester, Miguel Ángel; De Miguel, Juan R.; "Extending an Order to the Power Set: The Leximax Criterion"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 1; August, 2003; 63-71; #4173.

Ballester, Miguel Ángel; De Miguel, Juan R.; “On Freedom of Choice and Infinite Sets: The Suprafinite Rule”; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 42, No. 3; 2006; 291-300; #4864.

[Ballester, Miguel Ángel]; Arlegi, Ricardo; Besada, M.; De Miguel, Juan R.; Nieto, Jorge; Vázquez, C.; “On the Equivalence of the Two Existing Extensions of the Leximax Criterion to the Infinite Case”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 54, No. 3; December, 2007; 238-243; #4885.

Ballester, Miguel Ángel; Rey-Biel, Pedro; "Does Uncertainty Lead to Sincerity? Simple and Complex Voting Mechanisms"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 3; September, 2009; 477-494; #5162.

[Ballester, Miguel Ángel]; Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge;"On Ranking Opportunity Distributions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 1; January, 2010; 3-31; #4758.

Ballester, Miguel A.; Haeringer, Guillaume; "A Characterization of the Single-peaked Domain"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 2; February, 2011; 305-322; #5402.

Balzer, Wolfgang; Dreier, Volker; "The Structure of the Spatial Theory of Elections"; British Journal of the Philosophy of Science; Vol. 50, No. 4; December, 1999; 613-638; #3667.

Banaschewski, Bernhard; Nelson, Evelyn; "Completions of Partially Ordered Sets"; SIAM Journal on Computing; Vol. 11, No. 3; August, 1982; 521-528; #298.

Bandelt, Hans-Jürgen; "Networks with Condorcet Solutions"; European Journal of Operational Research; Vol. 20, No. 3; June, 1985; 314-326; #1083.

Bandelt, Hans-Jürgen; Labbé, Martine; "How Bad Can a Voting Location Be?"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 3, No. 2; July, 1986; 125-145; #1071.

Bandelt, Hans-Jürgen; Meletiou, Gerasimos C.; "An Algebraic Setting for Near-unanimity Consensus"; Order; Vol. 7, No. 2; 1990; 169-178; #3063.

Bandelt, Hans-Jürgen; Meletiou, Gerasimos C.; "The Algebra of Majority Consensus"; Algebra Universalis; Vol. 29, No. 4; 1992; 546-555; #3062.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Coalitional Power Structure Without the Pareto Principle"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 2, No. 1; 1982; 55-64; #3066.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Threats, Counterthreats and Strategic Manipulation for Non-binary Group Decision Rules"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 2, No. 2; March, 1982; 145-155; #1512.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; Deb, Rajat; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "The Structure of Coalitional Power Under Probabilistic Group Decision Rules"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol.27, No. 2; August, 1982; 366-375; #313.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "On a Class of Strictly Non-manipulable Collective Choice Rules"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 4, No. 1; February, 1983; 79-86; #185.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Manipulation of Non-imposed, Non-oligarchic Nonbinary Group Decision Rules"; Economics Letters; Vol. 11, Nos. 1/2; 1983; 69-73; #191.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Coalitional Manipulation and the Pareto Rule"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 29, No. 2; April, 1983; 359-363; #204.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "The Impossibility of a Weakly Path Independent Paretian Liberal"; Economics Letters; Vol. 11, No. 4; 1983; 319-325; #198.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Multivalued Rules and Conditional Nonmanipulability. Two Possibility Theorems"; Economics Letters; Vol. 13, No. 1; 1983; 37-44; #206.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Limited Resoluteness and Strategic Voting: The Case of Linear Sincere Preference Orderings"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 6, No. 1; October, 1983; 109-117; #243.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "On a Pareto Optimal and Rational Choice"; Economic Journal; Vol. 93; Supplement: Conference Papers, 1983; 1983; 115-122; #3749.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; Deb, Rajat; "Strategic Voting for Weakly Binary Group Decision Functions: The Case of Linear Individual Orderings"; Social Choice and Welfare; edited by Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Maurice Salles; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1983; 227-238; #981.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "On the Frontier Between Possibility and Impossibility Theorems in Social Choice"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 32, No. 1; February, 1984; 52-66; #278.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Pareto Optimality and the Decisive Power Structure with Expansion Consistency Conditions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 35, No. 2; April, 1985; 366-375; #378.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Resolution of Paradoxes in Social Choice"; Microeconomic Theory; edited by Larry Samuelson; Boston; Kluwer-Nijhoff; 1986; 99-120; #1487.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; Denicolò, Vincenzo; "Teoremi di impossibilità per funzioni di scelta sociale debolmente coerenti"; ["Impossibility Theorems for Weakly Consistent Social Choice Functions"]; Economia et Politica; Vol. 3, No. 2; August, 1986; 303-309; #1882.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Rationality, Path Independence and the Power Structure"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 40, No. 2; December, 1986; 338-348; #1339.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Manipulation of Voting Mechanisms"; The Logic of Multiparty Systems; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Dordrecht; Kluwer; 1987; 79-96; #2099.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Extension of an Order on a Set to the Power Set: Some Further Observations"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 15, No. 1; February, 1988; 81-85; #1959.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Weak Strategy Proofness: the Case of Nonbinary Social Choice Functions"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 27, No. 3; November, 1989; 193-205; #3065.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Sequential Path Independence and Social Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 3; July, 1990; 209-220; #2327.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; Samuelson, Larry; "Weakly Implementable Social Choice Rules"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 33, No. 2; September, 1992; 135-151; #3064.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Choice Procedures and Rational Selections"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 80; 1998; 49-66; #3684.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; Sengupta, Kunal; “Intransitive Indifference and Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 46, No. 3; 2004; 311-326; #4294.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; Sengupta, Kunal; “Rational Choice and von Neumann-Morgenstern's Stable Set: The Case of Path-dependent Procedures”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 3; December, 2006; 611-619; #4551.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Introduction (Special issue in honor of Prasanta K. Pattanaik)"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 549-558; #5512.

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Choice Procedures and Power Structure in Social Decisions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 597-608; #5515.

Banerjee, Asis Kumar; "Fuzzy Preferences and Arrow-Type Problems in Social Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 11, No. 2; April, 1994; 121-130; #2626.

Banerjee, Asis Kumar; "Choice between Opportunity Sets: A Characterization of Welfarist Behaviour"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 30, No. 3; December, 1995; 293-305; #2624.

Banerjee, Asis Kumar; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "A Note on a Property of Maximal Sets and Choice in the Absence of Universal Comparability"; Economics Letters; Vol. 51, No. 2; May, 1996; 191-195; #2623.

Banerjee, Kuntal; “On the Equity-efficiency Trade off in Aggregating Infinite Utility Streams”; Economic Letters; Vol. 93, No. 1; 2006; 63-67; #4850.

Banerjee, Kuntal; “On the Extension of the Utilitarian and Suppes-Sen Social Welfare Relations to Infinite Utility Streams”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 2; October, 2006; 327-339; #4534.

Banerjee, Kuntal; Mitra, Tapan; “On the Continuity of Ethical Social Welfare Orders on Infinite Utility Streams”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 1; January, 2008; 1-12; #4693.

Banerjee, Samiran; "An Alternative Proof of the Hurwicz (1972) Impossibility Theorem"; Economics Letters; Vol. 44, No. 4; April, 1994; 397-401; #2625.

Banerjee, Suryapratim; Konishi, Hideo; Sönmez, Tayfun; "Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 1; January, 2001; 135-153; #3734.

Banerji, D.; "Choice and Order: or First Things First"; Economica; Vol. 31, No. 122; May, 1964; 158-167; #431.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; "Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 4; March, 1985; 295-306; #788.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; Gasmi, F.; "Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 4, No. 2; June, 1987; 133-152; #1534.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; Bordes, Georges A.; "Voting Games, Indifference, and Consistent Sequential Choice Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 5, No. 1; March, 1988; 31-44; #1941.

[Banks, Jeffrey S.]; Austen-Smith, David; "Electoral Accountability and Incumbency"; Models of Strategic Choice in Politics; Ordeshook, Peter C., ed.; Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press; 1989; 121-148; #2572.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; "A Model of Electoral Competition with Incomplete Information"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 50, No. 2; April, 1990; 309-325; #2166.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; "Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information"; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 105, No. 2; May, 1990; 445-464; #2570.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; Sundaram, Rangarajan K.; "Repeated Games, Finite Automata, and Complexity"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 2, No. 2; June, 1990; 97-117; #2569.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; Bordes, Georges A.; Le Breton, Michel; "Covering Relations, Closest Orderings and Hamiltonian Bypaths in Tournaments"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 8, No. 4; October, 1991; 355-363; #2322.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; Signaling Games in Political Science; Chur, Switzerland; Harwood Academic; 1991; #2568.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; "Two-sided Uncertainty in the Monopoly Agenda Setter Model"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 50, No. 3; March, 1993; 429-444; #4067.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; Sundaram, Rangarajan K.; "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Repeated Elections Model"; Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation: Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics.; Barnett, William A.; Hinich, Melvin J.; Schofield, Norman J., editors; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1993; 295-311; #2565.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; "Acyclic Social Choice from Finite Sets"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 3; June, 1995; 293-310; #2393.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; "Singularity Theory and Core Existence in the Spatial Model"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 24, No. 6; 1995; 523-536; #2567.

[Banks, Jeffrey S.]; Austen-Smith, David; "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 90, No. 1; March, 1996; 34-45; #2566.

[Banks, Jeffrey S.]; Austen-Smith, David; "Cycling of Simple Rules in the Spatial Model"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 4; August, 1999; 663-672; #3580.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; Duggan, John; "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 94, No. 1; March, 2000; 73-88; #4134.

[Banks, Jeffrey S.]; Austen-Smith, David; Rustichini, Aldo; "Introduction to Political Science"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 103, No. 1; March, 2002; 1-10; #4044.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; Duggan, John; Le Breton, Michel; “Social Choice and Electoral Competition in the General Spatial Model”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 126, No. 1; 2006; 194-234; #4654.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; Duggan, John; “Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates”; Social Choice and Strategic Decisions; edited by David Austen-Smith and John Duggan; Springer; Berlin; 2005; 15-56; #4630.

Banks, Jeffrey S.; Duggan, John; “A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 2; April, 2006; 285-304; #4479.

Banzhaf, John F. (III); "Weighted Voting Doesn't Work"; Rutgers Law Review; Vol. 19; Winter, 1965; 317-343; #1153.

Banzhaf, John F. (III); "One Man, ? Votes: Mathematical Analysis of Voting Power and Effective Representation"; George Washington Law Review; Vol. 36, No. 4; May, 1968; 808-823; #1432.

Banzhaf, John F. (III); "One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College"; Villanova Law Review; Vol. 14; Winter, 1968; 304-332; #1174.

Banzhaf, John F. (III); "Multimember Electoral Districts - Do They Violate the `One Man, One Vote' Principle?"; Yale Law Journal; Vol. 75; July, 1976; 1309-1388; #1173.

Barbanel, Julius B.; "Game-theoretic Algorithms for Fair and Strongly Fair Cake Division with Entitlements"; Colloquium Mathematicum; Vol. 69, No. 1; 1995; 59-73; #3465.

Barbanel, Julius B.; Taylor, Alan D.; "Preference Relations and Measures in the Context of Fair Division"; Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society; Vol. 123, No. 7; July, 1995; 2061-2070; #3464.

Barbanel, Julius B.; "Super Envy-free Cake Division and Independence of Measures"; Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications; Vol. 197, No. 1; 1 January 1996; 54-60; #3471.

Barbanel, Julius B.; "On the Possibilities for Partitioning a Cake"; Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society; Vol. 124, No. 11; November, 1996; 3443-3451; #3463.

Barbanel, Julius B.; Zwicker, William S.; "Two Applications of a Theorem of Dvoretsky, Wald, and Wolfovitz to Cake Division"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 43, No. 2; September, 1997; 203-207; #3404.

Barbanel, Julius B.; "Partition Ratios, Pareto Optimal Cake Division and Related Notions"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 32, No. 4; December, 1999; 401-428; #3644.

Barbara, Daniel; Garcia-Molina, Hector; "The Reliability of Voting Mechanisms"; IEEE Transactions on Computers; Vol. 36, No. 10; October, 1987; 1197-1208; #1909.

Barberà, Salvador; "Manipulation of Social Decision Functions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 15, No. 2; August, 1977; 266-278; #433.

Barberà, Salvador; "The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave Too Much to Chance"; Econometrica; Vol. 45, No. 7; October, 1977; 1573-1588; #432.

Barberà, Salvador; Sonnenschein, Hugo F.; "Preference Aggregation with Randomized Social Orderings"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 18, No. 2; August, 1978; 244-254; #8.

Barberà, Salvador; "Nice Decision Schemes"; Decision Theory and Social Ethics; edited by Hans W. Gottinger and Werner Leinfellner; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1978; 101-118; #1117.

Barberà, Salvador; "Majority and Positionalist Voting in a Probabilistic Framework"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 46(2), No. 143; April, 1979; 379-389; #1030.

Barberà, Salvador; "A Note on Group Strategy-proof Decision Schemes"; Econometrica; Vol. 47, No. 3; May, 1979; 637-640; #9.

Barberà, Salvador; "Stable Voting Schemes"; Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 23, No. 2; October, 1980; 267-274; #10.

Barberà, Salvador; "Pivotal Voters: A New Proof of Arrow's Theorem"; Economics Letters; Vol. 6; December, 1980; 13-16; #2032.

Barberà, Salvador; Dutta, Bhaskar; "Implementability via Protective Equilibria"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 10, No. 1; June, 1982; 49-65; #2679.

Barberà, Salvador; "Pivotal Voters: A Simple Proof of Arrow's Theorem"; Social Choice and Welfare; edited by Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Maurice Salles; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1983; 31-35; #973.

Barberà, Salvador; "Strategy-proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem"; International Economic Review; Vol. 24, No. 2; June, 1983; 413-418; #220.

Barberà, Salvador; Valenciano, Federico; "Collective Probabilistic Judgements"; Econometrica; Vol. 51, No. 4; July, 1983; 1033-1046; #199.

Barberà, Salvador; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Extending an Order on a Set to the Power Set: Some Remarks on Kannai and Peleg's Approach"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 32, No. 1; February, 1984; 185-191; #1306.

Barberà, Salvador; Barrett, C. Richard; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "On Some Axioms for Ranking Sets of Alternatives"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 33, No. 2; August, 1984; 301-308; #376.

Barberà, Salvador; Dutta, Bhaskar; "General, Direct and Self-implementation of Social Choice Functions via Protective Equilibria"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 11, No. 2; April, 1986; 109-127; #825.

Barberà, Salvador; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Rationalizability of Stochastic Choice in Terms of Random Orderings"; Econometrica; Vol. 54, No. 3; May, 1986; 707-715; #1665.

Barberà, Salvador; Jackson, Matthew O.; "Maximin, Leximin, and the Protective Criterion: Characterizations and Comparisons"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 46, No. 1; October, 1988; 34-44; #2080.

Barberà, Salvador; Peleg, Bezalel; "Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes with Continuous Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 1; January, 1990; 31-38; #2150.

Barberà, Salvador; Sonnenschein, Hugo F.; Zhou, Lin; "Voting by Committees"; Econometrica; Vol. 59, No. 3; May, 1991; 595-609; #2258.

Barberà, Salvador; Gul, Faruk; Stacchetti, Ennio; "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 61, No. 2; December, 1993; 262-289; #2678.

[Barberà, Salvador]; Alcalde, Jose; "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems"; Economic Theory; Vol. 4, No. 3; May, 1994; 417-435; #2677.

Barberà, Salvador; Jackson, Matthew O.; "A Characterization of Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 11, No. 3; July, 1994; 241-252; #2399.

Barberà, Salvador; "Probabilistic Collective Decisions and Judgments" (Spanish); Current perspectives in Logic and Philosophy of Science (Spanish); Filosofía; Siglo XXI España Ed.; Madrid; 1994; 475-491; #3068.

Barberà, Salvador; Jackson, Matthew O.; "Strategy-Proof Exchange"; Econometrica; Vol. 63, No. 1; January, 1995; 51-87; #2676.

Barberà, Salvador; "Sur les fonctions de choix non manipulables" (Notes on Strategy Proof Social Choice Functions. With English summary.); Revue d'Economie Politique; Vol. 106, No. 1; January-February, 1996; 61-81; #2674.

Barberà, Salvador; Jackson, Matthew O.; Neme, Alejandro; "Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 18, No. 1; January, 1997; 1-21; #2673.

Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; "Voting under Constraints"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 76, No. 2; October, 1997; 298-321; #3067.

Barberà, Salvador; "Notes on Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions"; Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. 2; Edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 26-45; #2778. [see discussion by Moulin]

Barberà, Salvador; Bogomolnaia, Anna; van der Stel, Hans; "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 35, No. 2; March , 1998; 89-103; #3327.

Barberà, Salvador; Massò, Jorgi; Serizawa, Shigehiro; "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 25, No. 2; November, 1998; 272-291; #3479.

Barberà, Salvador; Massò, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; "Maximal Domains of Preferences Preserving Strategy-proofness for Generalized Median Voter Schemes"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 2; February, 1999; 321-336; #3418.

Barberà, Salvador; Dutta, Bhaskar; Sen, Arunava; “Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 101, No. 2; 2001; 374-394; [Corrigendum: Vol. 120, No. 2 (2005), p. 275]; #4295.

Barberà, Salvador; "An Introduction to Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 4; July, 2001; 619-653; #3776.

Barberà, Salvador; Maschler, Michael; Shalev, Jonathan; "Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 37, No. 1; October, 2001; 40-78; #3960.

Barberà, Salvador; Beviá, Carmen; "Self-selection Consistent Functions"; Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 105, No. 2; August, 2002; 263-277; #4049.

Barberà, Salvador; Jackson, Matthew O.; “Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions”; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 119, No. 3; August, 2004; 1011-1048; #4285.

Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; “Voting by Committees under Constraints”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 122, No. 2; 2005; 185-205; #4296.

Barberà, Salvador; Beviá, Carmen; “Locating Public Facilities by Majority: Stability, Consistency and Group Formation”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 56, No. 1; 2006; 185-200; #4857.

Barberà, Salvador; Coelho, Danilo; "How to Choose a Non-controversial List with k Names"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 1; June, 2008; 79-96; #4931.

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Barberà, Salvador; Ehlers, Lars; "Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 559-574; #5513.

Barberà, Salvador; Moreno, Bernardo; "Top Monotonicity: A Common Root for Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and the Median Voter Result"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 73, No. 2; November, 2011; 345-359; #5642.

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Barrett, C. Richard; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Aggregation of Fuzzy Preferences"; Multiperson Decision Making Models using Fuzzy Sets and Possibility Theory; edited by Janusz Kacprzyk and Mario Fedrizzi; Dordrecht; Kluwer Academic Publ.; 1990; 155-162; #3026.

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Berg, Sven; Nurmi, Hannu; "Making Choices in the Old-Fashioned Way"; Economia della scelte pubbliche; Vol. 2; 1988; 95-113; #3923.

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[Berg, Sven]; Gehrlein, William V.; "The Effect of Social Homogeneity on Coincidence Probabilities for Pairwise Proportional Lottery and Simple Majority Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 9, No. 4; October, 1992; 361-372; #3085.

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Berg, Sven; Nurmi, Hannu; "Special Issue: Group Decision Quality and Social Choice Theory"; Group Decision and Negotiation; Vol. 5, Issue 3; May, 1996; 207-209; #3449.

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Berg, Sven; Paroush, Jacob; "Collective Decision Making in Hierarchies"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 35, No. 3 May, 1998; 233-244; #3328.

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Berg, Sven; Perlinger, Thommy; “Single-peaked Compatible Preference Profiles: Some Combinatorial Results”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 1; August, 2006; 89-102; #4524.

Berga, Dolors; "Strategy-Proofness and Single-Plateaued Preferences"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 35, No. 2 March, 1998; 105-210; #3329.

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Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; “On Exiting after Voting”; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 34, No. 1; 2006; 33-54; #4781.

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[Berga, Dolors]; Barberà Salvador; Moreno, Bernardo; "Individual Versus Group Strategy-proofness: When Do They Coincide?"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 145, No. 5; 2010; 1648-1674; #5428.

[Bergantiños, Gustavo]; Berga, Dolors; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; “Stability and Voting by Committees with Exit”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 23, No. 2; October, 2004; 229-247; #4255.

[Bergantiños, Gustavo]; Berga, Dolors; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; “On Exiting after Voting”; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 34, No. 1; 2006; 33-54; #4781.

[Bergantiños, Gustavo]; Berga, Dolors; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; “An Undominated Nash Equilibrium for Voting by Committees with Exit”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 54, No. 2; 2007; 152-175; #4710.

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[Bernardo Herránz, José Miguel]; Girón González-Torre, Fco. Javier; "The Mathematics of Electoral Systems"; Revista de la Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales (Esp.); Vol. 101, No. 1; 2007; 21-33; [Spanish]; #5132.

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Bernhardt, Dan; Campuzano, Larissa; Squintani, Francesco; Câmara, Odilon; "On the Benefits of Party Competition"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 66, No. 2; 2009; 685-707; #5198.

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Bernholz, Peter; "Letter to the Editor"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 68, No. 4; December, 1974; 1689-1692; #2554. [Comment on a paper by Riker and Brams; see reply by Riker and Brams]

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Bernholz, Peter; " 'Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence': Comment"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 69; No. 3; September, 1975; 961-962; #936. [Comment on Koehler; see reply by Koehler]

Bernholz, Peter; "Reply to Nicholas Miller: Logrolling and the Arrow Paradox: A Note"; Public Choice; Vol. 26; Summer, 1976; 117-118; #1282. [Reply to Miller comment on Bernholz paper]

Bernholz, Peter; "Prisoner's Dilemma, Logrolling and Cyclical Group Preferences"; Public Choice; Vol. 29; Spring, 1977; 73-84; #1145.

Bernholz, Peter; "A General Social Dilemma: Profitable Exchange and Intransitive Group Preferences"; Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 40, No. 1-2; 1980; 1-23; #142.

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Bernholz, Peter; "Externalities as a Necessary Condition for Cyclical Social Preferences"; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 97, No. 4; November, 1982; 699-705; #143.

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Bezembinder, Thom; Acker, Peter van; "Factual Versus Representational Utilities and Their Interdimensional Comparisons"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 4, No. 2; June, 1987; 79-104; #1531. [Erratum: Vol. 4, No. 3; September, 1987; 240.]

Bezembinder, Thom; "Problems of Content and Structure in Utilities for Social Choice"; Progress in Mathematical Psychology, I; edited by Edward E. Roskam and Reinhard Suck; Amsterdam; North Holland; 1987; 467-483; #1962.

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Border, Kim C.; "Social Welfare Functions for Economic Environments With and Without the Pareto Principle"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 29, No. 2; April, 1983; 205-216; #205.

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Border, Kim C.; "More on Harsanyi's Utilitarian Cardinal Welfare Theorem"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 4; March, 1985; 279-281; #790.

Bordes, Georges A.; "Consistency, Rationality, and Collective Choice"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 43(3), No. 135; October, 1976; 447-457; #460.

[Bordes, Georges A.]; Blair, Douglas H.; Kelly, Jerry S.; Suzumura, Kotaro; "Impossibility Theorems Without Collective Rationality"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 13, No. 3; December, 1976; 361-379; #450.

Bordes, Georges A.; Salles, Maurice; "Sur l'impossibilité des Fonctions de Décision Collective: Un Commentaire et un Résultat"; Revue d'Économie Politique; Vol. 88, No. 3; May-June, 1978; 442-448; #1641.

Bordes, Georges A.; "Some More Results on Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice"; Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences; edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1979; 175-197; #991.

Bordes, Georges A.; "Individualisme, ordinalisme et bien-être social"; Annales de l'Institute National de la Statistique et des Studes Economiques; Vol. 41; January-March, 1981; 41-66; #12.

Bordes, Georges A.; "Procédures d'agrégation et fonctions de choix"; Analyse et Agrégation des Préférences; edited by Pierre Batteau, Eric Jacquet-Lagrèze and Bernard Monjardet; Paris; Economica; 1981; 45-74; #1608.

Bordes, Georges A.; "On the Possibility of Reasonable Consistent Majoritarian Choice: Some Positive Results"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 31, No. 1; October, 1983; 122-132; #223.

[Bordes, Georges A.]; Banks, Jeffrey S.; "Voting Games, Indifference, and Consistent Sequential Choice Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 5, No. 1; March, 1988; 31-44; #1941.

Bordes, Georges A.; Le Breton, Michel; "Arrovian Theorems with Private Alternatives Domains and Selfish Individuals"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 47, No. 2; April, 1989; 257-281; #2248.

Bordes, Georges A.; Le Breton, Michel; "Arrovian Theorems for Economic Domains. The Case where There are Simultaneously Private and Public Goods"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 1; January, 1990; 1-17; #2148.

Bordes, Georges A.; Le Breton, Michel; "Arrovian Theorems for Economic Domains: Assignments, Matchings and Pairings"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 3; July, 1990; 193-208; #2326.

Bordes, Georges A.; Tideman, T. Nicolaus; "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in the Theory of Voting"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 30, No. 2; March, 1991; 163-186; #3074.

[Bordes, Georges A.]; Banks, Jeffrey S.; Le Breton, Michel; "Covering Relations, Closest Orderings and Hamiltonian Bypaths in Tournaments"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 8, No. 4; October, 1991; 355-363; #2322.

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Bordes, Georges A.; Hammond, Peter J.; Le Breton, Michel; “Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments”; Journal of Public Economic Theory; Vol. 7, No. 1; February, 2005; 1-25; #4836.

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Bordley, Robert F.; "A Precise Method for Evaluating Election Schemes"; Public Choice; Vol. 46, No. 2; 1985; 113-123; #776.

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[Borm, Peter]; Otten, Gert-Jan; Storcken, Antonius J. A.; Tijs, Stef; "Decomposable Effectivity Functions"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 33, No. 3; June, 1997; 277-289; #3375.

[Borm, Peter]; Quant, Marieke; Reijnierse, Hans; Voorneveld, Mark; “On a Compromise Social Choice Correspondence”; Top; Vol. 11, No. 2; 2003; 311-324; #4357.

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[Borm, Peter]; Dimitrov, Dinko; Hendrickx, Ruud; Sung, Shao Chin; “Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 2; April, 2006; 421-433; #4485.

[Borm, Peter]; Ju, Yuan; Ruys, Pieter; “The Consensus Value: a New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 4; June, 2007; 685-703; #4588.

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Bosi, Gianni; Candeal-Hero, Juan Carlos; Induráin-Eraso, Esteban; Zudaire, Margarita; “Existence of Homogeneous Representations of Interval Orders on a Cone in a Topological Vector Space”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 1; February, 2005; 45-61; #4268.

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Bosmans, Kristof; Schokkaert, Erik; "Equality Preference in the Claims Problem: a Questionnaire Study of Cuts in Earnings and Pensions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 4; November, 2009; 533-557; #5166.

Bosmans, Kristof; Esposito, Lucio; Lambert, Peter J.; "New Perspectives on a More-or-less Familiar Poverty Index"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 2; February, 2011; 241-247; #5399.

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Bossert, Walter; "Maximin Welfare Orderings with Variable Population Size"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 1; January, 1990; 39-45; #2151.

Bossert, Walter; "On Intra- and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 8, No. 3; July, 1991; 207-219; #2312.

Bossert, Walter; Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Strategy-proofness of Social Welfare Functions: The Use of the Kemeny Distance Between Preference Orderings"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 9, No. 4; October, 1992; 345-360; #3055.

Bossert, Walter; Weymark, John A.; "Generalized Median Social Welfare Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 10, No. 1; January, 1993; 17-33; #2491.

Bossert, Walter; Weymark, John A.; "An Alternative Characterization of Paretian Generalized Median Social Welfare Functions"; Mathematical Modelling in Economics: Essays in Honor of Wolfgang Eichhorn; Erwin Diewert, Klaus Spremann, and Frank Stehling, editors; Berlin; Springer-Verlag; 1993; 65-74; #3137.

Bossert, Walter; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Xu, Yongsheng; "Ranking Opportunity Sets: An Axiomatic Approach"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 63, No. 2; August, 1994; 326-345; #2724.

Bossert, Walter; "Disagreement Point Monotonicity, Transfer Responsiveness, and the Egalitarian Bargaining Solution"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 11, No. 4; October, 1994; 381-392; #2376.

Bossert, Walter; Tan, Guofu; "An Arbitration Game and the Egalitarian Bargaining Solution"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 1; February, 1995; 29-41; #2379.

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; "Intertemporal Population Ethics: Critical-Level Utilitarian Principles"; Econometrica; Vol. 63, No. 6 November, 1995; 1303-1320; #2684.

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; "Leximin Population Ethics"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 31, No. 2; April, 1996; 115-131; #2683.

[Bossert Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; "Quasi-Orderings and Population Ethics"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 2; April, 1996; 129-150; #3176.

Bossert, Walter; Fleurbaey, Marc; "Redistribution and Compensation"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 3; June, 1996; 343-355; #2757.

Bossert, Walter; "Opportunity Sets and Individual Well-being"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 1; January, 1997; 97-112; #2429.

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; "Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Birth-Date Dependent Classical Principles"; Japanese Economic Review; Vol. 48, No. 3; September, 1997; 267-292; #3352.

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; "Birth-date Dependent Population Ethics: Critical-level Principles"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 77, No. 2; December, 1997; 260-284; #3345.

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; "Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Classical Utilitarian Principles"; Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. 2; Edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 137-162; #2786. [see discussion by Thomson]

Bossert, Walter; "Comments on 'The Empirical Acceptance of Compensation Axioms' "; Freedom in Economics, New Perspectives in Normative Analysis; Edited by Jean-François Laslier, Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Laslier, and Alain Trannoy; Routledge; 1998; 282-284; #3526. [Comment on paper by Schokkaert and Devooght.]

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; "Rationalizable Solutions to Pure Population Problems"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 3; May, 1999; 395-407; #3440.

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; "Information Invariance in Variable-population Social-Choice Problems"; International Economic Review; Vol. 40, No. 2; May, 1999; 403-422; #3706.

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; "Functional Equations and Population Ethics"; Aequationes Mathematicae; Vol. 58, No. 3; 1999; 272-284; #3698.

Bossert,Walter; "Welfarism and Information Invariance"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 2; February, 2000; 321-336; #3617.

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; "The Value of Limited Altruism"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 95, No. 1; November, 2000; 37-70; #3822.

Bossert, Walter; Peters, Hans; "Multi-attribute Decision-Making in Individual and Social Choice"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 40, No. 3; November, 2000; 327-339; #3818.

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; "Population Ethics and the Existence of Value Functions"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 82, No. 2; November, 2001; 301-308; #4061.

Bossert, Walter; Fleurbaey, Marc; "Equitable Insurance Premium Schemes"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 1; January, 2002; 113-125; #3895.

Bossert, Walter; Peters, Hans; "Efficient Solutions to Bargaining Problems with Uncertain Disagreement Points"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 3; July, 2002; 489-502; #3882.

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; "Rationalizable Variable-population Choice Functions"; Economic Theory Vol. 19, No. 2; October, 2002; 355-378; #4045.

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; “Utilitarianism and the Theory of Justice”; In Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1; Edited by K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura; North-Holland; 2002; 543-596; #4401.

Bossert, Walter; Sprumont, Yves; “Efficient and Non-deteriorating Choice”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 45, No. 2; 2003; 131-142; #4300.

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; “The Axiomatic Approach to Population Ethics”; Politics, Philosophy & Economics; Vol. 2, Issue 3; October, 2003; 342-381; #4622.

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; “Multi-profile Welfarism: A Generalization”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 2; April, 2005; 253-267; #4278. [Correction: Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, No. 1; October, 2005; 227-228]

Bossert, Walter; Sprumont, Yves; Suzumura, Kotaro; “Maximal-element Rationalizability”; Theory and Decision; Vol. 58, No. 4; 2005; 325-350; #4655.

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; “Anonymous Single-profile Welfarism”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 2; October, 2006; 279-287; #4530.

Bossert, Walter; Sprumont, Yves; Suzumura, Kotaro; “Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains Without Full Transitivity”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 3; December, 2006; 435-458; #4552.

Bossert, Walter; D'Ambrosio, Conchita; “Dynamic Measures of Individual Deprivation”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 1; January, 2007; 77-88; #4557.

[Bossert, Walter]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; “Variable-population Extensions of Social Aggregation Theorems”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 4; June, 2007; 567-589; #4591.

Bossert, Walter; Sprumont, Yves; Suzumura, Kotaro; “Ordering Infinite Utility Streams”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 135, No. 1; July, 2007; 579-589; #4886.

Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro; “A Characterization of Consistent Collective Choice Rules”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 138, No. 1; January, 2008; 311-320; #4878.

Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro; "Multi-profile Intergenerational Social Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 3; September, 2011; 493-509; #5508.

Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro; "Rationality, External Norms, and the Epistemic Value of Menus"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 729-741; #5525.

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[Bouroche, Jean-Marie]; Tenenhaus, Michel; Dupont-Gatelmand, Catherine; "L'analyse canonique des préférences"; Analyse et Agrégation des Préférences; edited by Pierre Batteau, Eric Jacquet-Lagrèze and Bernard Monjardet; Paris; Economica; 1981; 213-231; #1612.

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Bouton, Laurent; Castanheira, Micael; "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation"; Econometrica; Vol. 80, No. 1; January, 2012; 43-87; #5621.

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Bouyssou, Denis; Marchant, Thierry; Pirlot, Marc; "A Conjoint Measurement Approach to the Discrete Sugeno Integral"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 85-109; #5011.

[Bovens, Luc]; Beisbart, Claus; “Welfarist Evaluations of Decision Rules for Boards of Representatives”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 29, No. 4; December, 2007; 581-608; #4686.

Bowen, Bruce D.; "Toward an Estimate of the Frequency of Occurrence of the Paradox of Voting in U. S. Senate Roll Call Votes"; Probability Models of Collective Decision Making; edited by Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg; Columbus, Ohio; Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company; 1972; 181-203; #1367.

Bowman, V. J.; Colantoni, Claude S.; "The Extended Condorcet Criterion: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for the Transitivity of Majority Decision"; Journal of Mathematical Sociology; Vol. 2, No. 2; July, 1972; 267-283; #1334.

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Bowman, V. J.; Colantoni, Claude S.; "Transitive Majority Rule and the Theorem of the Alternative"; Operations Research; Vol. 22, No. 3; May-June, 1974; 488-496; #79.

Boylan, Richard T.; McKelvey, Richard D.; "Voting Over Economic Plans"; American Economic Review; Vol. 85, No. 4; September, 1995; 860-871; #2421.

Boylan, Richard T.; "An Optimal Auction Perspective on Lobbying"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 1; January, 2000; 55-68; #3586.

Boyle, Elette; Echenique, Federico; "Sequential Entry in Many-to-one Matching Markets"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 1; June, 2009; 87-99; #5141.

Bradley, Richard; “Bayesian Utilitarianism and Probability Homogeneity”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 2; April, 2005; 221-251; #4277.

Bradley, Richard; “Reaching a Consensus”; Social Choice and Welfare; December, 2007; Vol. 29, No. 4; 609-632; #4682.

Braham, Matthew; Steffen, Frank; “The Chairman's Paradox Revisited”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 2; February, 2007; 231-253; #4570.

Brams, Steven J.; O'Leary, Michael K.; "An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 64, No. 2; June, 1970; 449-470; #1212. [see note by Mayer, comment by Brams and O'Leary, and rejoinder by Mayer]

Brams, Steven J.; O'Leary, Michael K.; "PROVOTE: A Computer Program for the Probabilistic Analysis of Voting Bodies"; Behavioral Analysis; Vol. 16, No. 3; May-June, 1971; 261-263; #1769.

Brams, Steven J.; O'Leary, Michael K.; "Comment on Mayer's 'A Note on "An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies" '"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 65, No. 3; September, 1971; 766; #1213. [See Mayer's rejoinder.]

Brams, Steven J.; Riker, William H.; "Models of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies"; Mathematical Applications in Political Science, VI; edited by James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd; Charlottesville, Va.; University Press of Virginia; 1972; 79-124; #1770.

Brams, Steven J.; "A Cost/Benefit Analysis of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies"; Probability Models of Collective Decision Making; edited by Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg; Columbus, OH; Charles E. Merrill; 1972; 101-124; #1771.

[Brams, Steven J.]; Riker, William H.; "The Paradox of Vote Trading"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 67, No. 4; December, 1973; 1235-1247; #1168. [See comment by Tullock, reply by Riker and Brams, comment by Bernholz, and reply by Riker and Brams]

Brams, Steven J.; "Positive Coalition Theory: The Relationship Between Postulated Goals and Derived Behavior"; Political Science Annual IV: An International Review; edited by Cornelius P. Cotter; Indianapolis, IN; Bobbs-Merrill; 1973; 3-40; #1772.

Brams, Steven J.; Davis, Morton D.; "Models of Resource Allocation in Presidential Campaigning: Implications for Democratic Representation"; Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences; Vol. 219; November 9, 1973; 105-123; #1773.

Brams, Steven J.; Davis, Morton D.; "The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 68, No. 1; March, 1974; 113-134; #1775. [See comment by Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook and reply by Brams and Davis]

Brams, Steven J.; Riker, William H.; "Letter to the Editor"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 68, No. 4; December, 1974; 1688-1689; #1774. [Reply to comment by Tullock on paper by Riker and Brams]

[Brams, Steven J.]; Riker, William H.; "Letter to the Editor"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 68, No. 4; December, 1974; 1692; #2657. [Reply to comment by Bernholz on paper by Riker and Brams]

Brams, Steven J.; Davis, Morton D.; "Comment on `Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College'"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 69, No. 1; March, 1975; 155-156; #1776. [Reply to comment by Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook on a paper by Brams and Davis]

Brams, Steven J.; Garriga-Picó, José E.; "Bandwagons in Coalition Formation: The 2/3's Rule"; American Behavioral Scientist; Vol. 18, No. 4; March/April, 1975; 472-496; #1777.

Brams, Steven J.; Affuso, Paul J.; "Power and Size: A New Paradox"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 7, Nos. 1/2; February/May, 1976; 29-56; #156.

Brams, Steven J.; Zagare, Frank C.; "Deception in Simple Voting Games"; Social Science Research; Vol. 6, No. 3; September, 1977; 257-272; #1675.

Brams, Steven J.; "When is it Advantageous to Cast a Negative Vote?"; Mathematical Economics and Game Theory: Essays in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern; edited by R. Henn and O. Moeschlin; Berlin; Springer Verlag; 1977; 564-572; #1673.

Brams, Steven J.; Lake, Mark; "Power and Satisfaction in a Representative Democracy"; Game Theory and Political Science; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook; New York; New York University Press; 1978; 529-562; #1758.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Approval Voting"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 72, No. 3; September, 1978; 831-847; #1545. [See comment by Tullock and reply by Brams and Fishburn]

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Letter to the Editor"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 73, No. 2; June, 1979; 552; #1547. [Reply to comment by Tullock on paper by Brams and Fishburn]

Brams, Steven J.; "Approval Voting: A Practical Reform for Multicandidate Elections"; National Civic Review; Vol. 68, No. 10; November, 1979; 549-553, 560; #1669. [See comments by Hallett and by Olmsted, then reply by Brams]

Brams, Steven J.; "Letter"; National Civic Review; Vol. 69, No. 5; May, 1980; 247; #1778. [Response to Hallett and to Olmsted on paper by Brams]

Brams, Steven J.; "Approval Voting in Multicandidate Elections"; Policy Studies Journal; Vol. 9, No. 1; Autumn, 1980; 102-108; #1667.

[Brams, Steven J.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Expected Utility and Approval Voting"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 26, No. 2; April, 1981; 136-142; #1549.

[Brams, Steven J.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Deducing Simple Majorities from Approval Voting Ballot Data"; Social Science Research; Vol. 10, No. 3; September, 1981; 256-266; #1551.

[Brams, Steven J.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Approval Voting, Condorcet's Principle and Runoff Elections"; Public Choice; Vol. 37, No. 3; 1981; 89-114; #60.

[Brams, Steven J.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Efficacy, Power and Equity Under Approval Voting"; Public Choice; Vol. 37, No. 3; 1981; 425-434; #1050.

Brams, Steven J.; "One Candidate, One Vote"; Archway: The Magazine of Arts and Sciences at New York University; Vol. 2; Winter, 1981; 10-14; #1671.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Reconstructing Voting Processes: The 1976 House Majority Leader Election"; Political Methodology; Vol. 7, Nos. 3 & 4; 1981; 95-108; #1548.

Brams, Steven J.; "The AMS Nomination Procedure is Vulnerable to `Truncation of Preferences'"; Notices of the American Mathematical Society; Vol. 29, No. 2; February, 1982; 136-138; #350.

Brams, Steven J.; "Strategic Information and Voting Behavior"; Society; Vol. 19, No. 6; September/October, 1982; 4-11; #1672.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election"; Electoral Studies; Vol. 1, No. 3; December, 1982; 333-346; #1552.

Brams, Steven J.; Davis, Morton D.; "Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 3, No. 4; December, 1982; 373-388; #1781.

Brams, Steven J.; "Approval Voting: One Candidate, One Vote"; Representation and Redistricting Issues in the 1980s; edited by Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay and Howard Scarrow; Lexington; Lexington; 1982; 137-142; #1668.

[Brams, Steven J.]; Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.); Davis, Morton D.; "Power and Satisfaction in an Ideologically Divided Voting Body"; Power, Voting and Voting Power; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Würzburg-Vienna; Physica Verlag; 1982; 239-255; #1420.

Brams, Steven J.; Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.); "The Entry Problem in a Political Race"; Political Equilibrium; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle; Boston; Kluwer-Nijhoff; 1982; 181-195; #1779.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; Approval Voting; Boston; Birkhäuser; 1982; #1048. [See review by Nurmi, review by Kilgour, and critique by Margolis] [Second edition; Springer; New York; 2007]

Brams, Steven J.; "Approval Voting: A Better Way to Elect a President?"; Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences; Vol. 403; May 26, 1983; 111-120; #1782.

Brams, Steven J.; "Run Jesse Jackson, But Under Approval Voting"; PS; Vol. 16, No. 4; Fall, 1983; 711-712; #1783.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "America's Unfair Elections"; The Sciences; Vol. 23; November-December, 1983; 28-34; #1403.

Brams, Steven J.; "Comparison Voting"; Modules in Applied Mathematics: Vol. 2, Political and Related Models; edited by Steven J. Brams, William F. Lucas and Philip D. Straffin, Jr.; New York; Springer Verlag; 1983; 32-65; #1670.

Brams, Steven J.; Lucas, William F.; Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.), Modules in Applied Mathematics: Vol. 2, Political and Related Models; Springer Verlag; 1983; #306.

Brams, Steven J.; Spatial Models of Electoral Competition; Lexington, Massachusetts; Comap; 1983; #216.

[Brams, Steven J.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Paradoxes of Preferential Voting"; Mathematics Magazine; Vol. 56, No. 4; September, 1983; 207-214; #1539.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "The Electoral Innovation Debate: Prospects for Approval Voting"; Creativity and Innovation Network; Vol. 10, No. 1; January-March, 1984; 21-26; #1556.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Approval Voting"; Eastern Review; February, 1984; 27-34; #1553.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Approval Voting: One Candidate, One Vote"; Newsletter, C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at NYU; Vol. 2, No. 1; 1984; 6-9 & 12; #1554.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Letter to the Editor"; The Sciences; Vol. 24; July/August, 1984; 4-5; #1557.

[Brams, Steven J.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Manipulability of Voting by Sincere Truncation of Preferences"; Public Choice; Vol. 44, No. 3; 1984; 397-410; #770.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "A Careful Look at `Another Look at Approval Voting'"; Polity; Vol. 17, No. 1; Fall, 1984; 135-143; #1555. [Comment on a paper by Arrington and Brenner]

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 3; October, 1984; 211-229; #791.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Some Logical Defects of the Single Transferable Vote"; Choosing an Electoral System; edited by Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman; New York; Praeger; 1984; 147-151; #1564.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "A Note on Variable-Size Legislatures to Achieve Proportional Representation"; Choosing an Electoral System; edited by Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman; New York; Praeger; 1984; 175-177; #1576.

Brams, Steven J.; Affuso, Paul J.; "New Paradoxes of Voting Power on the EC Council of Ministers"; Electoral Studies; Vol. 4, No. 2; August, 1985; 187-191; [Addendum: Vol. 4, No. 2; December, 1985; p. 290]; #1784.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Comment: The Problem of Strategic Voting Under Approval Voting"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 79, No. 3; September, 1985; 816-818; #777. [Comment on a paper by Niemi; see also Niemi's reply and a rejoinder by Brams and Fishburn]

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Rejoinder: The Problem of Strategic Voting Under Approval Voting"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 79, No. 3; September, 1985; 819; #778. [Rejoinder to a reply by Niemi to a Brams and Fishburn comment on a paper by Niemi]

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Approval Voting"; TWA Ambassador; November, 1986; 17-18; #1559.

Brams, Steven J.; Felsenthal, Dan S.; Maoz, Zeev; "New Chairman Paradoxes"; Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior: Essays in Honor of Anatol Rapoport; edited by Andreas Diekmann and Peter Mitter; Heidelberg; Physica-Verlag; 1986; 243-256; #1785.

Brams, Steven J.; Felsenthal, Dan S.; Maoz, Zeev; "Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting"; Theory and Decision: Essays in Honor of Werner Leinfellner; edited by Gerald Eberlein and Hal Berghel; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1987; 223-233; #1786.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Approval Voting"; The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions; edited by Vernon Bogdanor; Oxford; Basil Blackwell; 1987; 27; #1937.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; Merrill, Samuel (III); "The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen"; Public Choice; Vol. 59, No. 2; November, 1988; 121-131; #1788. [Comment on paper by Saari and Van Newenhizen; see response by Saari and Van Newenhizen; and rejoinder by Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill]

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; Merrill, Samuel (III); "Rejoinder to Saari and Van Newenhizen"; Public Choice; Vol. 59, No. 2; November, 1988; 149; #2078. [Rejoinder to response by Saari and Van Newenhizen to comment by Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill on paper by Saari and Van Newenhizen]

Brams, Steven J.; Nagel, Jack H.; "Approval Voting in Practice"; Public Choice; Vol. 71, No. 1-2; August, 1991; 1-17; #4167.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Coalition Voting"; Mathematical and Computer Modelling; Vol. 16, Nos. 8-9; September, 1992; 15-26; #3076.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Yes-No Voting"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 10, No. 1; January, 1993; 35-50; #2464.

Brams, Steven J.; Taylor, Alan D.; "An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol"; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 102, No. 1; January, 1995; 9-18; #3240.

Brams, Steven J.; Taylor, Alan D.; Zwicker, William S.; "Old and New Moving-knife Schemes"; Mathematical Intelligencer; Vol. 17, No. 4; Fall, 1995; 30-35; #3400.

Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc; "Bargaining Procedures that Induce Honesty"; Group Decision and Negotiation; Vol. 5, Issue 3; May, 1996; 239-262; #3452.

[Brams, Steven J.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-majority Voting Games"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 4; September, 1996; 397-417; #3075.

Brams, Steven J.; Taylor Alan D.; Fair Division; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1996; #2716. [see reviews by Rubinstein and Lucas]

Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc; Zwicker, William S.; "Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions"; Electoral Studies; Vol. 16; September, 1997; 359-377; #3924.

Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc; Zwicker, William S.; "The Paradox of Multiple Elections"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 2; February, 1998; 211-236; #3204.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Fair Division of Indivisible Items Between Two People with Identical Preferences Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and Equity"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 2; February, 2000; 247-267; #3613.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "A Nail-biting Election"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 3; July, 2001; 409-414; #3763.

Brams, Steven J.; "Review of Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them [Nurmi]"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 4; July, 2001; 835-838; #3786.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; “Voting Procedures”; In Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1; Edited by K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura; North-Holland; 2002; 173-236; #4395.

Brams, Steven J.; Edelman, Paul H.; Fishburn, Peter C.; “Fair Division of Indivisible Items”; Theory and Decision; Volume 55, Number 2; September 2003; 147-180; #4626.

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; “Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3; December, 2005; 457-474; #4469.

Brams, Steven J.; Sanver, M. Remzi; “Critical Strategies Under Approval Voting: Who Gets Ruled In and Who Gets Ruled Out”; Electoral Studies; Vol. 25, No. 2; June, 2006; 287-305; #4770.

Brams, Steven J.; Jones, Michael A.; Klamler, Christian; “Better Ways to Cut a Cake”; Notices of the American Mathematical Socity; Vol. 53, No. 11; 2006; 1314-1321; #4847.

Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc; Sanver, M. Remzi; “A Minimax Procedure for Electing Committees”; Public Choice; Vol. 132, Nos. 3-4; 2007; 401-420; #4767.

Brams, Steven J.; Gehrlein, William V.; Roberts, Fred S.; Editors; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Springer; Berlin; 2009; #5004.

Brams, Steven J.; Gehrlein, William V.; Roberts, Fred S.; "Preface"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; v-x; #5005.

Brams, Steven J.; Sanver, M. Remzi; "Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 215-237; #5017.

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Brandt, Felix; "Some Remarks on Dodgson's Voting Rule"; Mathematical Logic Quarterly; Vol. 55, No. 4; 2009; 460-463; #5311.

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[Brekke, Kjell Arne]; Asheim, Geir B.; "Sustainability When Capital Management Has Stochastic Consequences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 4; October, 2002; 921-940; #3987.

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[Butler, David]; Bogdanor, Vernon; Electoral Systems and Their Political Consequences; Cambridge University Press; 1984; #289.


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