A BC D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Caballe, Jordi; Esteban, Joan; “Stochastic Dominance and Absolute Risk Aversion”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 1; January, 2007; 89-110; #4562.

Cagliozzi, Roberto; "La scelta sociale e l'agenda fissa. Una nota" (Social Choice Theory and Fixed Agenda: A Note); Economia Politica; Vol. 11, No. 1; April, 1994; 39-57; #2651. [see comment by Denicolò and rejoinder by Cagliozzi]

Cagliozzi, Roberto; "La scelta sociale e l'agenda fissa. Commento alla replica." (Social Choice Theory and Fixed Agenda: A Rejoinder); Economia Politica; Vol. 11, No. 1; April, 1994; 67-69; #2652. [rejoinder to Denicolò comment on paper by Cagliozzi]

Caillaud, Bernard; Tirole, Jean; "Parties as Political Intermediaries"; The Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 117, No. 4; November, 2002; 1453-1489; #4094.

Callander, Steven; “Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting”; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 74, No. 3; 2007; 653-684; #4715.

Callander, Steven; "Majority Rule when Voters Like to Win"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 64, No. 2; 2008; 393-420; #5084.

[Callaos, B.]; Callaos, N.; Lesso, W.; "Mathematical Solution to the Voter Paradox"; Applied Systems and Cybernetics: Vol. II Systems Concepts, Models and Methodology; edited by George E. Lasker; Elmsford NY; Pergamon; 1981; 841-847; #324.

Callaos, N.; Lesso, W.; Callaos, B.; "Mathematical Solution to the Voter Paradox"; Applied Systems and Cybernetics: Vol. II Systems Concepts, Models and Methodology; edited by George E. Lasker; Elmsford NY; Pergamon; 1981; 841-847; #324.

Calvert, Randall L.; Models of Imperfect Competition in Politics; Chur, Switzerland; Harwood Academic Publishers; 1986; #2725.

Calvert, Randall L.; "Reciprocity among Self-Interested Actors: Uncertainty, Asymmetry, and Distribution"; Models of Strategic Choice in Politics; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook; Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press; 1989; 269-293; #2514.

Calvert, Randall L.; "Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence"; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 29, No. 1; February, 1985; 69-95; #4105.

Calvo, Emilio; García, Iñaki; Gutiérrez, Esther; "Scoring Rules: a Cooperative Game-theoretic Approach"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 3; May, 1999; 491-512; #3446.

Camacho, Antonio; Sonstelie, Jon C.; "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utilities: A Note"; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 82, No. 3; May/June, 1974; 60-61; #469.

Camacho, Antonio; "Societies and Social Decision Functions"; Developments in the Methodology of Social Sciences; edited by Werner Leinfellner and E. Köhler; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1974; #1106.

Camacho, Antonio; Societies and Social Decision Functions; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1982; #303.

Camacho, Antonio; "Individual Cardinal Utility, Interpersonal Comparisons, and Social Choice"; Recent Developments in the Foundations of Utility and Risk Theory; Daboni, L.; Montesano, A.; Lines, M., editors; Dordrecht; Reidel; 1986; 185-200; #3097.

Camacho, Antonio; "Review of Nitzan and Paroush's Collective Decision Making"; Journal of Economic Literature; Vol. 26, No. 1; March, 1988; 97-98; #1966.

Cameron, C. M.; Enelow, James M.; "Asymmetric Policy Effects, Campaign Contributions and the Spatial Theory of Elections"; Mathematical and Computer Modelling; Vol. 16, No. 8-9; September, 1992; 117-132; #2841.

Caminker, Evan H.; "Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts"; Michigan Law Review; Vol. 97, No. 8; August, 1999; 2297-2380; #3837.

Campbell, Colin D.; Tullock, Gordon; "A Measure of the Importance of Cyclical Majorities"; Economic Journal; Vol. 75, No. 304; December, 1965; 853-857; #470.

Campbell, Colin D.; Tullock, Gordon; "The Paradox of Voting - A Possible Method of Calculation"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 60, No. 3; September, 1966; 684-685; #471.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Voting and Social Choice"; American Economist; Vol. 14, No. 1; Spring, 1970; 35-44; #1217. [see comment by Broaddus]

Campbell, Donald E.; "Social Choice and Intensity of Preference"; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 81, No. 1; January/February, 1973; 211-218; #472.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Income Distribution under Majority Rule and Alternative Taxation Criteria"; Public Choice; Vol. 22, No. 22; Summer, 1975; 23-35; #2603.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Voting Equilibrium in a Simple Tax Model"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 11, No. 1; August, 1975; 147-154; #2617.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Democratic Preference Functions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 12, No. 2; April, 1976; 259-272; #473.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Computational Criteria for Voting Systems"; British Journal of Political Science; Vol. 7, Part 1; January, 1977; 85-98; #941.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Realization of Choice Functions"; Econometrica; Vol. 46, No. 1; January, 1978; 171-180; #46.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Rationality from a Computational Standpoint"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 9, No. 3; July, 1978; 255-266; #333.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Manipulation of Social Choice Rules by Strategic Nomination of Candidates"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 10, Nos. 1,2,3,4; January, 1979; 247-263; #1295.

Campbell, Donald E.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Anonymity Conditions in Social Choice Theory"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 12, No. 1; March, 1980; 21-39; #312.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Algorithms for Social Choice Functions"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 47(3), No. 148; April, 1980; 617-627; #183.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Some Strategic Properties of Plurality and Majority Voting"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 13, No. 2; June, 1981; 93-107; #1315.

Campbell, Donald E.; "On the Derivation of Majority Rule"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 14, No. 2; June, 1982; 133-140; #1318.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Impossibility Theorems and Infinite Horizon Planning"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 2, No. 4; December, 1985; 283-293; #826.

Campbell, Donald E.; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; "Social Compromise and Social Metrics"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 3, No. 1; June, 1986; 1-16; #869.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Revealed Social Preference"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol 4, No. 3; September, 1987; 225-234; #1720.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Redistribution of Wealth when Knowledge is Dispersed"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 5, No. 4; November, 1988; 281-286; #2020.

Campbell, Donald E.; "A Characterization of Simple Majority Rule for Restricted Domains"; Economics Letters; Vol. 28, No. 4; 1988; 307-310; #2245.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Equilibrium and Efficiency with Property Rights and Local Consumption Externalities"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 6, No. 3; July, 1989; 189-302; #2181.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Wilson's Theorem for Economic Environments and Continuous Social Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; October, 1989; Vol. 6, No. 4; 315-323; #2144.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Arrow's Theorem for Economic Environments and Effective Social Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; October, 1989; Vol. 6, No. 4; 325-329; #2145.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Intergenerational Social Choice without the Pareto Principle"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 50, No. 2; April, 1990; 414-423; #2169.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Can Equity Be Purchased at the Expense of Efficiency? An Axiomatic Inquiry"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 51, No. 1; June, 1990; 32-47; #2604.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Transitive Social Choice in Economic Environments"; International Economic Review; Vol. 33, No. 2; May, 1992; 341-352; #2261.

Campbell, Donald E.; "The Arrow and Plott Independence Conditions"; Economics Letters; Vol. 39, No. 2; June, 1992; 143-146; #2264.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Public Goods and Arrovian Social Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 9, No. 3; July, 1992; 173-183; #2263.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Implementation of Social Welfare Functions"; International Economic Review; Vol. 33, No. 3; August, 1992; 525-533; #2262.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Quasitransitive Intergenerational Choice for Economic Environments"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 21, No. 3; 1992; 229-247; #2265.

Campbell, Donald E.; Equity, Efficiency, and Social Choice; Oxford; Clarendon Press; 1992; #3421.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Euclidean Individual Preference and Continuous Social Preference"; European Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 9, No. 4; November, 1993; 541-550; #2620.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "t or 1 ­− t. That is the Trade-Off"; Econometrica; Vol. 61, No. 6; November, 1993; 1355­1365; #2436.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Arrow's Choice Axiom"; Economics Letters; Vol. 44, No. 4; April, 1994; 381-384; #2680.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Trade-Off Theory"; American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings; Vol. 84, No. 2; May, 1994; 422-426; #2353.

Campbell, Donald E.; Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi; "A Foundation for Pareto Aggregation"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 64, No. 1; October, 1994; 277-285; #2646.

Campbell, Donald E.; "A Foundation for Pareto Optimality in Spatial Models"; European Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 10, No. 3; October, 1994; 441-448; #2664.

Campbell, Donald E.; "A Power Structure Version of Sen's Paretian Liberal Theorem"; Seoul Journal of Economics; Vol. 7, No. 3; Autumn, 1994; 269-278; #2675.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Nondictatorially Independent Pairs"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 1; February, 1995; 75-86; #2382.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Lebesgue Measure and Social Choice Trade-offs"; Economic Theory; Vol. 5, No. 3; May, 1995; 445­459; #2437.

[Campbell, Donald E.]; Bordes, Georges A.; Le Breton, Michel; "Arrow's Theorem for Economic Domains and Edgeworth Hyperboxes"; International Economic Review; Vol. 36, No. 2; May, 1995; 441-454; #2634.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Nonbinary Social Choice for Economic Environments"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 3; June, 1995; 245-54; #2605.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Asymptotic Density and Social Choice Trade-Offs"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 29, No. 3; June, 1995; 181­194; #2438.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Social Choice Trade-off for an Arbitrary Measure With Application to Uncertain or Fuzzy Agenda"; Economics Letters; Vol. 50, No. 1; January, 1996; 99­104; #2439.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Independent Social Choice Correspondences"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 41, No. 1; July, 1996; 1­11; #2443.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Trade-offs in the Spatial Model of Resource Allocation"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 60, No. 1; April, 1996; 1­19; #2442.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Continuous-Valued Social Choice"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 25, No. 2; 1996; 195­211; #2440.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences"; International Economic Review; Vol. 37, No. 4; November, 1996; 803-824; #2445.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Social Ranking of Alternatives with and without Coalition Formation"; Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy; edited by Norman J. Schofield; Boston/Dordrecht/London; Kluwer Academic Publishers; 1996; 63-78; #2455.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Sharper Impossibility Theorems for Economic Environments"; In Social Choice and Political Economy; Norman Schofield, editor; Boston; Kluwer Pub. Co.; 1996; 63-78; #3601.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Sen's Theorem and Externalities"; Economica; Vol. 64, No. 255; August, 1997; 375-386; #2950.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Relaxing Pareto Optimality in Economic Environments"; Economic Theory; Vol. 10, No. 1; June, 1997; 115-130; #2980.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Preference Aggregation"; Mathematica Japonica; Vol. 45, No. 3; 1997; 573-593; #3039.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "The Possibility-Impossibility Boundary in Social Choice"; Social Choice Re-examined; Vol. 1; edited by K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen and K. Suzumura; London; Macmillan; 1997; 179-204; #2444.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Quasitransitive Social Preference: Why Some Very Large Coalitions Have Very Little Power," Economic Theory; Vol. 12, No. 1; July, 1998; 147-162; #3273 .

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Incompatibility of Strategy-Proofness and the Condorcet Principle"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 4; August, 1998; 583-592; #3295.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "A Democratic Principle and Strategy-Proofness"; Journal of Public Economic Theory; Vol. 1, No. 4; October, 1999; 465-473; #3563.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Information and Preference Aggregation"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 1; January, 2000; 3-24; #3582. [Correction: Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 3; June, 2005; 395-396]

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Weak Independence and Veto Power"; Economics Letters; Vol. 66, No. 2; February, 2000; 183-189; #3600.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "A Simple Characterization of Majority Rule"; Economic Theory; Vol 15, No. 3; May, 2000; 689-700; #3721.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "A Trade-Off Result for Preference Revelation"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 34, No. 1; August, 2000; 129-142; #3720.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Non-monotonicity Does Not Imply the No-show Paradox"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 3; July, 2002; 513-515; #3863.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "A Leximin Characterization of Strategy-Proof and Non-resolute Social Choice Procedures"; Economic Theory; Vol. 20, No. 4; November, 2002; 809-829; #4143.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Are Serial Condorcet Rules Strategy-proof?"; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 7, No. 4; February, 2003; 385-410; #4016.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "On the Arrow and Wilson Impossibility Theorems"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 2; April, 2003; 273-281; #4007.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "A Strategy-proofness Characterization of Majority Rule"; Economic Theory; Vol. 22, No. 3; October, 2003; 557-568; #4111.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; “Extraneous Alternatives and Strategy-proofness”; Japanese Economic Review; Vol. 54, No. 4; 2003; 439-451; #4301.

Campbell, Donald E.; "Review of Social Choice Mechanisms"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 3; December, 2003; 529-530; [Review of book by Danilov and Sotskov]; #4196.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Social Choice Rules with Vetoers"; Economics Letters; Vol. 82, Issue 2; February, 2004; 245-248; #4157.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; “Social Welfare Functions Generating Social Choice Rules That Are Invulnerable to Manipulation”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 51, No. 1; 2006; 81-89; #4656.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; “Social Welfare Functions That Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but Not Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 29, No. 1; July, 2007; 69-82; #4600.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; “Pareto, Anonymity, and Independence: Four Alternatives”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 29, No. 1; July, 2007; 83-104; #4598.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Pareto, Anonymity, or Neutrality, but not IIA: Countably Many Alternatives"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 261-270; #5019.

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Gains from Manipulating Social Choice Rules"; Economic Theory; Vol. 40, No. 3; September, 2009; 349-371; #5134.

Campbell, Russell B.; "The Apportionment Problem"; in Applications of Discrete Mathematics; Edited by John G. Michaels and Kenneth H. Rosen; McGraw-Hill, Inc.; New York; 1991; 2-18; #3750.

Campos Rodríguez, Clara M.; Moreno Pérez, José A.; "Relaxation of the Condorcet and Simpson Conditions in Voting Location"; European Journal of Operational Research; Vol. 145, No. 3; March, 2003; 673-683; #4018.

Candeal-Haro, Juan Carlos; Induráin-Eraso, Esteban; "The Mobius Strip and a Paradox of Social Choice Theory" (Spanish); Proceedings of the XVth Portuguese-Spanish Conference on Mathematics, Vol. III (Portuguese); Évora; Univ. Évora; 1991; 119-124; #2827.

Candeal-Haro, Juan Carlos; Induráin-Eraso, Esteban; Uriarte, José Ramón; "Some Issues Related to the Topological Aggregation of Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 9, No. 3; July, 1992; 213-227; #2746.

Candeal-Haro, Juan Carlos; Induráin-Eraso, Esteban; "The Mobius Strip and a Social Choice Paradox"; Economics Letters; Vol. 45, No. 3; 1994; 407-412; #2826.

Candeal-Haro, Juan Carlos; Induráin-Eraso, Esteban; "Aggregation of Preferences From Algebraic Models on Groups"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 2; March, 1995; 165-173; #2415.

Candeal-Haro, Juan Carlos; Chichilnisky, Graciela; Induráin-Eraso, Esteban; "Topological Aggregation of Preferences: The Case of a Continuum of Agents"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 2; April, 1997; 333-343; #2529.

Candeal-Haro, Juan Carlos; Induráin-Eraso, Esteban; Uriarte, José Ramón; "Some Issues Related to the Topological Aggregation of Preferences: Addendum"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 2; April, 1997; 359-361; #2532.

[Candeal-Hero, Juan Carlos]; Bosi, Gianni; Induráin-Eraso, Esteban; Zudaire, Margarita; “Existence of Homogeneous Representations of Interval Orders on a Cone in a Topological Vector Space”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 1; February, 2005; 45-61; #4268.

Cantala, David; "Choosing the Level of a Public Good When Agents Have an Outside Option"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 3; June, 2004; 491-514; #4226.

Cantillon, Estelle; Rangel, Antonio; "A Graphical Analysis of Some Basic Results in Social Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 3; July, 2002; 587-611; #3869.

Caplin, Andrew; Nalebuff, Barry; "On 64% Majority Rule"; Econometrica; Vol. 56, No. 4; July, 1988; 787-814; #2068.

Caplin, Andrew; Nalebuff, Barry; "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem"; Econometrica; Vol. 59, No. 1; January, 1991; 1-23; #2257.

Caplin, Andrew; Nalebuff, Barry; "Competition among Institutions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 72, No. 2; February, 1997; 306-342; #3382.

Cappelen, Alexander W.; Tungodden, Bertil; “Local Autonomy and Interregional Equality”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 3; April, 2007; 443-460; #4577.

Cardona-Coll, Daniel; "Voting by Veto and the Role of the Compromise Function"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 33, No. 2; April, 1997; 101-113; #3373.

Cardona-Coll, Daniel; Ponsati, Clara; “Bargaining One-Dimensional Social Choices”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 137, No. 1; November, 2007; 627-651; #4896. 

[Carey, George W.]; Kendall, Willmoore; "The `Intensity' Problem and Democratic Theory"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 62, No. 1; March, 1968; 5-24; #741.

Cariani, Fabrizio; Pauly, Marc; Snyder, Josh; "Decision Framing in Judgement Aggregation"; Synthese; Vol. 163, No. 1; 2008; 1-24; #5091.

Carreras Escobar, Francesco; "Contributions to the Study of Electoral Spaces"; Publicacions de la Secció de Matemàtiques. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona; Vol. 26, No. 1; 1982; 17-110; #396.

Carreras Escobar, Francesco; "A Characterization of Shapley Index of Power via Automorphisms"; Stochastica; Vol. 8, No. 2; 1984; 171-179; #2480.

Carreras Escobar, Francesco; "Restricted Voting Games" (Spanish); Proceedings of the XIIth Portuguese-Spanish Conference on Mathematics, Vol. III (Portuguese) Braga; 1987; 18-23; #2499.

Carreras Escobar, Francesco; "Normalization of Weighted-Majority Games" (Spanish); Proceedings of the XIVth Spanish-Portuguese Conference on Mathematics, Vol. I--III (Spanish) Puerto de la Cruz; 1989; 783-787; #2500.

Carreras Escobar, Francesco; "Filtrations, Values and Voting Discipline"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 20, No. 4; 1992; 357-376; #2498.

Carreras Escobar, Francesco; Freixas, Josep; “On Power Distribution in Weighted Voting”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 2; April, 2005; 269-282; #4279.

Carroll, Lewis: See Dodgson, Charles Lutwidge

Carstairs, Andrew M.; A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe; London; Allen and Unwin; 1980; #383.

Carter, Cyril; "Some Properties of Divisor Methods for Legislative Apportionment and Proportional Representation"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 76, No. 3; September, 1982; 575-584; #1703.

Carter, Cyril; "Admissible and Sincere Strategies under Approval Voting"; Public Choice; Vol. 64, No. 1; January, 1990; 43-55; #2222.

Carter, Ian; "Interpersonal Comparisons of Freedom"; Economics and Philosophy; Vol. 11, No. 1; April, 1995; 1-23; #2594.

Carter, Ian; "Choice, Freedom, and Freedom of Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 1; February, 2004; 61-81; #4201.

Cartwright, B.; Littlechild, S.; Sawyer, J.; "Individual Preferences, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare"; Social Choice; edited by Bernhardt Lieberman; New York; Gordon and Breach; 1971; 301-317; #1187.

[Carty, R. K.]; Blais, André; "The Impact of Electoral Formulae on the Creation of Majority Governments"; Electoral Studies; Vol. 6, No. 3; December, 1987; 209-218; #3558.

[Carty, R. K.]; Blais, André; "The Effectiveness of Plurality Rule"; British Journal of Political Science; Vol. 18, No. 4; October, 1988; 550-553; #2030.

Carvajal, Andrés; “Individually Rational Collective Choice”; Theory and Decision; Vol. 62, No. 4; 2007; 355-374; #4820.

Casajus, André; "Networks and Outside Options"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 32, No. 1; January, 2009; 1-13; #4965.

Casamatta, Georges; De Donder, Philippe; “On the Influence of Extreme Parties in Electoral Competition with Policy-motivated Candidates”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, No. 1; October, 2005; 1-29; #4442.

Casamatta, Georges; Sand-Zantman, Wilfried; “Citizen Candidacy with Asymmetric Information”; Topics in Theoretical Economics (electronic); Vol. 5, Art. 3; 2005; 41 pp.; #4635.

Casella, Alessandra; “Storable Votes”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 51, No. 2; 2005; 391-419; #4302.

Casella, Alessandra; Gelman, Andrew; Palfrey, Thomas R.; “An Experimental Study of Storable Votes”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 57, No. 1; 2006; 123-154; #4749.

Cason, Timothy N.; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Sjöström, Tomas; Yamato, Takehiko; “Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work?”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 57, No. 2; 2006; 206-235; #4848.

Cassel, Carol A.; "The Nonpartisan Ballot in the United States"; Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences; edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart; New York; Agathon Press; 1986; 226-241; #2214.

[Casstevens, Harold T. (II)]; Marz, Roger H.; Casstevens, Thomas W.; "The Hunting of the Paradox"; Public Choice; Vol. 15; Summer, 1973; 97-102; #1196.

[Casstevens, Thomas W.]; Marz, Roger H.; Casstevens, Harold T. (II); "The Hunting of the Paradox"; Public Choice; Vol. 15; Summer, 1973; 97-102; #1196.

Castellan, N. John; "Paradoxes in Individual and Group Decision Making: A Plea for Models"; in Castellan, N. John; Individual and Group Decision Making; (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1993); #2422.

Cebula, Richard J.; Kafoglis, Milton Z.; "In Search of Optimum `Relative Unanimity'"; Public Choice; Vol. 40, No. 2; 1983; 195-201; #1968. [See comment by Brooks and reply by Cebula and Kafoglis]

Cebula, Richard J.; Kafoglis, Milton Z.; "In Search of Optimum `Relative Unanimity': Reply"; Public Choice; Vol. 54, No. 3; August, 1987; 289-290; #1967. [Reply to comment by Brooks on paper by Cebula and Kafoglis]

Çengelci, Murat Ali; Sanver, M. Remzi; “Is Abstention an Escape from Arrow's Theorem?”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 3; April, 2007; 439-442; #4576.

Cervone, Davide P.; Gehrlein, William V.; Zwicker, William S.; “Which Scoring Rule Maximizes Condorcet Efficiency under IAC?”; Theory and Decision; Vol. 58, No. 2; 2005; 145-185; #4636.

[Chakravarty, Satya R.]; Barua, Rana; Roy, Sonali; “On the Coleman Indices of Voting Power”; European Journal of Operations Research; Vol. 171, No. 1; 2006; 273-289; #4632.

Chakravarty, Satya R.; Kanbur, Ravi; Mukherjee, Diganta; “Population Growth and Poverty Measurement” Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 3; June, 2006; 471-483; #4506.

Chakravorti, Bhaskar; "Far-sightedness and the Voting Paradox"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 84, No. 2; February, 1999; 216-226; #3459.

Chakravorti, Bhaskar; Conley, John P.; Taub, Bart; "Probabilistic Cheap Talk"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 2; April, 2002; 281-294; #3889.

Chakravorti, Bhaskar; Corchón, Luis C.; Wilkie, Simon; “Credible Implementation”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 57, No. 1; 2006; 18-36; #4849.

Chamberlain, Gary; Rothschild, Michael; "A Note on the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 25, No. 1; August, 1981; 152-162; #165.

Chamberlin, John R.; Cohen, Michael D.; "A Linear Inequality Method of Establishing Certain Social Choice Conjectures"; Public Choice; Vol. 33, No. 2; 1978; 5-16; #81.

Chamberlin, John R.; Cohen, Michael D.; "Toward Applicable Social Choice Theory: A Comparison of Social Choice Functions Under Spatial Model Assumptions"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 72, No. 4; December, 1978; 1341-1356; #1676.

Chamberlin, John R.; Courant, Paul N.; "Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions: Proportional Representation and the Borda Rule"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 77, No. 3; September, 1983; 718-733; #233.

Chamberlin, John R.; Cohen, Jerry L.; Coombs, Clyde H.; "Social Choice Observed: Five Presidential Elections of the American Psychological Association"; Journal of Politics; Vol. 46, No. 2; May, 1984; 479-502; #1723.

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