A B CD E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z


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Dagan, Nir; "New Characterization of Old Bankruptcy Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 1; January, 1996; 51-59; #2764.

Dagan, Nir; Volij, Oscar; Winter, Eyal; "A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 4; October, 2002; 811-823; #3981.

D'Agostino, Marcello; Dardanoni, Valentino; "What's so Special about Euclidean Distance? A Characterization with Applications to Mobility and Spatial Voting"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 2; August, 2009; 211-233; #5148.

Dahl, Geir; Minken, Harald; "A Note on Permutations and Rank Aggregation"; Mathematical and Computer Modelling; Vol. 52, No. 1-2; 2010; 380-385; #5467.

Dahm, Matthias; Porteiro, Nicolás; “Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 4; May, 2008; 531-559; #4918.

[Dalen, Hendrik P. van]; Letterie, Wilko; Swank, Otto H.; "When Policy Advisors Cannot Reach a Consensus"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 3; May, 2000; 439-461; #3624.

[Dalkiran, Nuh Aygun]; Barlo, Mehmet; "Epsilon-Nash Implementation"; Economics Letters; Vol. 102, No. 1; 2009; 36-38; #5325.

Dall'Aglio, Giorgio; "Decisioni di gruppo: Il paradosso di Arrow"; Conferenze del Seminario di Matematica dell'Universita di Bari; No. 120; 1970; 18pp; #80.

Dalton, Patricio S.; Ghosal, Sayantan; "Decisions with Endogenous Frames"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 4; April, 2012; 585-600; #5560.

[D'Ambrosio, Conchita]; Bossert, Walter; “Dynamic Measures of Individual Deprivation”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 1; January, 2007; 77-88; #4557.

[Dandurova, Helena]; Anderson, Lowell Bruce; Falk, James E.; Yeganova, Lana; "Relationships Between Borda Voting and Zermelo Ranking"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 32, No. 3; March, 2009; 355-365; #4986.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; "Models of Group Choice"; Izvestija Akademii Nauk CCCP: Technicheskaja kibernetica; Vol. 1; 1983; 143-164; #1642.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; "The Structure of Binary Rules for Aggregating Preferences"; Matekon; Vol. 21, No. 4; Summer, 1985; 44-65; #780.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; "Aggregation of Dichotomous Preferences"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 13, No. 1; February, 1987; 49-58; #1477.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; Sotskov, A. I.; "Stable Blocking in Mechanisms of Social Choice"; Ekonomika i Matematicheski Metody; Vol. 23, No. 5; 1987; 888-898; #2058.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; Sotskov, A. I.; "Coalition-Stable Mechanisms of Group Choice"; Ekonomika i Matematicheski Metody; Vol. 24, No. 1; 1988; 113-124; #1969.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; Sotskov, A. I.; "Stable Blocking in Social Choice Mechanisms"; Matekon; Vol. 25, No. 1; Fall, 1988; 38-53; #2259.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; Sotskov, A. I.; "Coalition-Stable Social Choice Mechanisms"; Matekon; Vol. 25, No. 2; Winter, 1988-1989; 45-61; #2229.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; Mekhanizmy gruppovogo vybora [Mechanisms for Group Choice]; Moscow; 1991; #3536.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; "Implementation via Nash Equilibria"; Econometrica; Vol. 60, No. 1; January, 1992; 43-56; #2642.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; Sotskov, A. I.; "Implementation of Group Choice Correspondences by Coalitional Equilibria"; Matekon; Vol. 29, No. 1; Fall, 1992; 5-26; #2641.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; Sotskov, A. I.; "On Strongly Consistent Social Choice Functions"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 22, No. 4; 1993; 327-346; #2640.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; "The Structure of Non-manipulable Social Choice Rules on a Tree"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 27, No. 2; April, 1994; 123-131; #2639.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; Sotskov, Alexander I.; Social Choice Mechanisms; Springer; Berlin; 2002; #4073. [See review by Campbell]

Danilov, Vladimir I.; Koshevoy, Gleb A.; “Mathematics of Plott Choice Functions”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 49, No. 3; 2005; 245-272; #4308.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; Koshevoy, Gleb A.; “A New Characterization of the Path Independent Choice Functions”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 51, No. 2; 2006; 238-245; #4657.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; Koshevoy, Gleb A.; "Choice Functions and Extensive Operators"; Order; Vol. 26, No. 1; 2009; 69-94; #5323.

Danilov, Vladimir I.; Karzanov, Alexander V.; Koshevoy, Gleb; "Condorcet Domains of Tiling Type"; Discrete Applied Mathematics; Vol. 160, No. 7-8; 2012; 933-940; #5702.

[Danziger, Leif]; Ben-Yashar, Ruth; "Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 47, No. 4-5; August, 2011; 440-447; #5655.

Dardanoni, Valentino; "Income Distribution Dynamics: Monotone Markov Chains Make Light Work"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 2; March, 1995; 181-192; #2417.

Dardanoni, Valentino; "A Pedagogical Proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 1; January, 2001; 107-112; #3731.

Dardanoni, Valentino; Lambert, Peter J.; "Horizontal Inequity Comparisons"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 4; July, 2001; 799-816; #3783.

[Dardanoni, Valentino]; D'Agostino, Marcello; "What's so Special about Euclidean Distance? A Characterization with Applications to Mobility and Spatial Voting"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 2; August, 2009; 211-233; #5148.

Darmann, Andreas; Klamler, Christian; Pferschy, Ulrich; "Maximizing the Minimum Voter Satisfaction on Spanning Trees"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 58, No. 2; September, 2009; 238-250; #5382.

Darmann, Andreas; Klamler, Christian; Pferschy, Ulrich; "A Note on Maximizing the Minimum Voter Satisfaction on Spanning Trees"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 60, No. 1; July, 2010; 82-85; #5355.

Das, Sreejith; "Criticality in Games with Multiple Levels of Approval"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 3; September, 2011; 373-395; #5502.

Dasgupta, Indraneel; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; “ `Regular' Choice and the Weak Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference”; Economic Theory; Vol. 31, No. 1; 2007; 35-50; #4828.

Dasgupta, Indraneel; "Contraction Consistent Stochastic Choice Correspondence"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 643-658; #5519.

Dasgupta, Manabendra; Deb, Rajat; "Fuzzy Choice Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 8, No. 2; April, 1991; 171-182; #2339.

Dasgupta, Manabendra; Deb, Rajat; "F-Decomposable Social Aggregation Rules and Acyclic Choice"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 23, No. 1; January, 1994; 33-44; #2621.

Dasgupta, Manabendra; Deb, Rajat; "Transitivity and Fuzzy Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 3; June, 1996; 305-318; #2690.

Dasgupta, Manabendra; Deb, Rajat; "Acyclicity of Fuzzy Preferences"; in Current Trends in Economics: Theory and Applications; Alkan, Ahmet, Aliprantis, Charalambos, Yannelis, Nicholas (eds); Springer; 1999; 133-140; #3709.

Dasgupta, Partha; Hammond, Peter J.; Maskin, Eric S.; "Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 46(2), No. 143; April, 1979; 181-216; #119.

Dasgupta, Partha; "Decentralization and Rights"; Economica; Vol. 47, No. 186; May, 1980; 107-123; #120.

Dasgupta, Partha; "Lives and Well-Being"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 5, Nos. 2/3; August, 1988; 103-126; #2004.

Dasgupta, Partha; Maskin, Eric; "On the Robustness of Majority Rule"; Journal of the European Economic Association; Vol. 6, No.5; September, 2008; 949-973; #5049.

Dasgupta, Samit; "On the Size of Minimum Super Arrovian Domains"; SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics; Vol. 12, No. 4; October, 1999; 524-534; # 3603. [Extends and sharpens results in paper by Fishburn and Kelly]

Da Silveira, Bernardo S.; De Mello, João M. P.; "Campaign Advertising and Election Outcomes: Quasi-natural Experiment Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in Brazil"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 78, No. 2; 2011; 590-612; #5698.

[Daudt, Hans]; Rae, Douglas W.; "The Ostrogorski Paradox: A Peculiarity of Compound Majority Decision"; European Journal of Political Research; Vol. 4, No. 4; December, 1976; 391-398; #336.

Daudt, Hans; Rae, Douglas W.; "Social Contract and the Limits of Majority Rule"; Democracy, Consensus and Social Conflict; edited by Pierre Birnbaum, Jack Lively and Geraint Parry; London; Sage; 1978; 335-357; #1868.

Dave, Chetan; Dodds, Stefan; "Nosy Preferences, Benevolence, and Efficiency"; Southern Economic Journal; Vol. 78, No. 3; January, 2012; 878-894; #5638.

Daugherty, Zajj; Eustis, Alexander K.; Minton, Gregory; Orrison, Michael E.; "Voting, the Symmetric Group, and Representation Theory"; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 116, No. 8; 2009; 667-687; #5189.

[Davidovitz, Liema]; Amiel, Yoram; Cowell, Frank; Polovin, Avraham; “Preference Reversals and the Analysis of Income Distributions”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 2; February, 2008; 305-330; #4701.

[Davis, C.]; Birnberg, Jacob G.; Pondy, Louis; "Effect of Three Voting Rules on Resource Allocation"; Management Science; Vol. 16, No. 6; 1970; 356-372; #1136.

[Davis, J. R.]; Uslaner, Eric M.; "The Paradox of Vote Trading: Effects of Decision Rules and Voting Strategies on Externalities"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 69, No. 3; September, 1975; 929-942; #1434.

[Davis, Morton D.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Models of Resource Allocation in Presidential Campaigning: Implications for Democratic Representation"; Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences; Vol. 219; November 9, 1973; 105-123; #1773.

[Davis, Morton D.]; Brams, Steven J.; "The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 68, No. 1; March, 1974; 113-134; #1775. [See comment by Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook and reply by Brams and Davis]

[Davis, Morton D.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Comment on `Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College'"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 69, No. 1; March, 1975; 155-156; #1776. [Reply to comment by Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook on a paper by Brams and Davis]

[Davis, Morton D.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 3, No. 4; December, 1982; 373-388; #1781.

[Davis, Morton D.]; Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.); Brams, Steven J.; "Power and Satisfaction in an Ideologically Divided Voting Body"; Power, Voting and Voting Power; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Würzburg; Physica-Verlag; 1982; 239-255; #1420.

Davis, Otto A.; Hinich, Melvin J.; "On the Power and Importance of the Mean Preference in a Mathematical Model of Democratic Choice"; Public Choice; Vol. 5; Fall, 1968; 59-72; #1139.

Davis, Otto A.; Hinich, Melvin J.; Ordeshook, Peter C.; "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 64, No. 2; June, 1970; 426-448; #1095.

Davis, Otto A.; Hinich, Melvin J.; "Some Extensions to a Mathematical Model of Democratic Choice"; Social Choice; edited by Bernhardt Lieberman; New York; Gordon and Breach; 1971; 323-347; #1188.

Davis, Otto A.; DeGroot, Morris H.; Hinich, Melvin J.; "Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule"; Econometrica; Vol. 40, No. 1; January, 1972; 147-157; #1015.

Davis, Otto A.; Hinich, Melvin J.; "Spatial Competition under Constrained Choice"; Probability Models of Collective Decision Making; edited by Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg; Columbus, Ohio; Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company; 1972; 358-377; #1374.

Davis, Richard G.; "Comment on Arrow and the `New Welfare' Economics"; Economic Journal; Vol. 68, No. 272; December, 1958; 834-835; #479. [Comment on paper by Mishan; see reply by Mishan]

[Day, W. H. E.]; Bock, H.-H.; Kubicka, E.; Kubicki, G.; McMorris, Fred R.; "Attainable Results in Committee Elections"; Mathematical and Computer Modelling; Vol. 30, Nos. 1-2; July, 1999; 75-87; #3696.

[Day, W. H. E.]; Bock, H.-H.; McMorris, Fred R.; "A Characterization of a Family of Consensus Rules for Committee Elections"; Applied Mathematics Letters; Vol. 14, No. 3; April, 2001; 307-311; #3945.

[Day, W. H. E.]; Bock, H.-H.; McMorris, Fred R.; "Strategy-proof Consensus Rules for Committee Elections"; Mathematical and Computer Modelling; Vol. 37, No. 1-2; January, 2003; 29-37; #4017.

[Dean, Richard A.]; Johnson, Mark R.; “Locally Complete Path Independent Choice Functions and Their Lattices”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 42, No. 1; July, 2001; 53-87; #4833.

[Dean, Richard A.]; Johnson, Mark R.; “Designer Path Independent Choice Functions”; Economic Theory; Vol. 26, No. 3; 2005; 729-740; #4665.

Dearden, James A.; "Efficiency and Exclusion in Collective Action Allocations"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 34, No. 2; October, 1997; 153-174; #3353.

Deb, Rajat; "On Constructing Generalized Voting Paradoxes"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 43(2), No. 134; June, 1976; 347-351; #13.

[Deb, Rajat]; Blau, Julian H.; "Social Decision Functions and Veto"; Econometrica; Vol. 45, No. 4; May, 1977; 871-879; #456.

Deb, Rajat; "On Schwartz's Rule"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 16, No. 1; October, 1977; 103-110; #2.

Deb, Rajat; "k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto"; Econometrica; Vol. 49, No. 4; July, 1981; 899-909; #3.

[Deb, Rajat]; Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "The Structure of Coalitional Power Under Probabilistic Group Decision Rules"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol.27, No. 2; August, 1982; 366-375; #313.

Deb, Rajat; "Binariness and Rational Choice"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 5, No. 1; August, 1983; 97-106; #212.

[Deb, Rajat]; Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Strategic Voting for Weakly Binary Group Decision Functions: The Case of Linear Individual Orderings"; Social Choice and Welfare; edited by Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Maurice Salles; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1983; 227-238; #981.

Deb, Rajat; Kelsey, David; "On Constructing a Generalized Ostrogorski Paradox: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 14, No. 2; October, 1987; 161-174; #1970.

[Deb, Rajat]; Dasgupta, Manabendra; " Fuzzy Choice Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 8, No. 2; April, 1991; 171-182; #2339.

[Deb, Rajat]; Basu, Kaushik; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Soft Sets: An Ordinal Formulation of Vagueness with Some Applications to the Theory of Choice"; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 45, No. 1; 1992; 45-58; #2970.

[Deb, Rajat]; Dasgupta, Manabendra; "F-Decomposable Social Aggregation Rules and Acyclic Choice"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 23, No. 1; January, 1994; 33-44; #2621.

Deb, Rajat; "Waiver, Effectivity and Rights as Game Forms"; Economica; Vol. 61, No. 242; May, 1994; 167-78; #2447.

Deb, Rajat; "Rationalizing Choice Probabilities using Random Utility Model: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition"; Choice, Welfare, and Development: A Festschrift in Honour of Amartya K. Sen; edited by Kaushik Basu, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, and Kotaro Suzumura; Oxford; Clarendon Press; 1995; 65-75; #2796.

Deb, Rajat; Weber, Shlomo; Winter, Eyal; "The Nakamura Theorem for Coalition Structures of Quota Games"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 25, No. 2; 1996; 189-198; #3476.

[Deb, Rajat]; Dasgupta, Manabendra; "Transitivity and Fuzzy Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 3; June, 1996; 305-318; #2690.

Deb, Rajat; "Game Forms versus Social Choice Rules as Models of Rights: Discussion"; Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. 2; Edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 96-99; #2783. [discussion of paper by Hammond]

Deb, Rajat; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Razzolini, Laura; "Game Forms, Rights, and the Efficiency of Social Outcomes"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 72, No. 1; January, 1997; 74-95; #2689.

Deb, Rajat; Ohseto, Shinji; "Strategy-proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies: a Note"; Economic Theory; Vol. 14, No. 3; 1999; 685-689; #3701.

[Deb, Rajat]; Dasgupta, Manabendra; "Acyclicity of Fuzzy Preferences"; in Current Trends in Economics: Theory and Applications; Alkan, Ahmet, Aliprantis, Charalambos, Yannelis, Nicholas (eds); Springer; 1999; 133-140; #3709.

Deb, Rajat; Ghosh, Indranil K.; Seo, Tae Kun; "Welfare Asymptotics of the Pivotal Mechanism for Excludable Public Goods"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 43, No. 2; March, 2002; 209-224; #4039.

Deb, Rajat; "Rights as Alternative Game Forms"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 1; February, 2004; 83-111; #4202.

Deb, Rajat; Seo, Tae Kun; "Rothschild and Stiglitz's Mean Preserving: Revisited"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 659-668; #5520.

De Baets, B.; De Meyer, H.; De Schuymer, B.; “Cyclic Evaluation of Transitivity of Reciprocal Relations”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 2; April, 2006; 217-238; #4475.

Debord, Bernard; "An Axiomatic Characterization of Borda's k-choice Function"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 9, No. 4; October, 1992; 337-343; #3143.

DeBruin, Gert P.; "On Voting Procedures for Decision-Making on Public Goods"; European Journal of Political Research; Vol. 13, No. 2; June, 1985; 187-205; #2134.

de Clippel, Geoffroy; “An Axiomatization of the Nash Bargaining Solution”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 29, No. 2; September, 2007; 201-210; #4603.

De Donder, Philippe; Le Breton, Michel; Truchon, Michel; "Choosing from a Weighted Tournament"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 40, No. 1; July, 2000; 85-109; #3802.

De Donder, Philippe; "Majority Voting Solution Concepts and Redistributive Taxation"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 4; August, 2000; 601-627; #3669.

[De Donder, Philippe]; Casamatta, Georges; “On the Influence of Extreme Parties in Electoral Competition with Policy-motivated Candidates”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, No. 1; October, 2005; 1-29; #4442.

[De Donder, Philippe]; Casamatta, Georges; Cremer, Helmuth; "Repeated Electoral Competition over Nonlinear Income Tax Schedules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 4; October, 2010; 535-574; #5246.

[De Donder, Philippe]; Anesi, Vincent; "Secondary Issues and Party Politics: An Application to Environmental Policy"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 3; April, 2011; 519-546; #5410.

De Dreu, Carsten K. W.; Steinel, Wolfgang; “Social Decision Making in Fuzzy Situations: Motivated Information Processing and Strategic Choice”; In Social Psychology and Economics, edited by De Cremer, David; Zeelenberg, Marcel; Murnighan, J. Keith; Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; Mahwah, N.J.; 2006; 55-77; #4890.

Deegan, John (Jr.); Packel, Edward W.; "A New Index of Power for Simple n-Person Games"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 7, Issue 2; 1979; 113-123; #1440.

[Deegan, John (Jr.)]; Packel, Edward W.; "An Axiomated Family of Power Indices for Simple n-Person Games"; Power, Voting and Voting Power; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Würzburg-Vienna; Physica Verlag; 1982; 213-221; #1417.

Deegan, John (Jr.); Packel, Edward W.; "To The (Minimal Winning) Victors Go The (Equally Divided) Spoils: A New Power Index for Simple n-Person Games"; Modules in Applied Mathematics: Vol. 2, Political and Related Models; edited by Steven J. Brams, William F. Lucas and Philip D. Straffin (Jr.); New York; Springer Verlag; 1983; 239-255; #1762.

Deeman, Adrian M. A. Van; Coalition Formation and Social Choice; Kluwer; Dordrecht; 1997; #3535.

Deemen, Adrian M. A. Van; "The Probability of the Paradox of Voting for Weak Preference Orderings"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 2; February, 1999; 171-182; #3410.

De Grazia, Alfred; "Mathematical Derivation of an Electoral System"; Isis; Vol. 44, Parts 1 & 2, Nos. 135-136; June, 1953; 42-51; #3144.

[DeGroot, Morris H.]; Davis, Otto A.; Hinich, Melvin J.; "Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule"; Econometrica; Vol. 40, No. 1; January, 1972; 147-157; #1015.

Dekel, Eddie; "An Axiomatic Characterization of Preferences Under Uncertainty: Weakening the Independence Axiom"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 40, No. 2; December, 1986; 304-318; #1696.

de la Vega, Casilda Lasso; Urrutia, Ana; de Sarachu, Amaia; "Characterizing Multidimensional Inequality Measures Which Fulfil the Pigou-dalton Bundle Principle"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 2; July, 2010; 319-329; #5234.

DellaVigna, Stefano; LiCalzi, Marco; "Learning to Make Risk Neutral Choices in a Symmetric World"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 41, No. 1; January, 2001; 19-37; #3817.

Dellis, Arnaud; Oak, Mandar P.; “Approval Voting with Endogenous Candidates”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 54, No. 1; 2006; 47-76; #4638.

Dellis, Arnaud; Oak, Mandar; “Policy Convergence under Approval and Plurality Voting: the Role of Policy Commitment”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 29, No. 2; September, 2007; 229-245; #4609.

Dellis, Arnaud; "Would Letting People Vote for Multiple Candidates Yield Policy Moderation?"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 144, No. 2; March, 2009; 772-801; #5080.

Dellis, Arnaud; "Weak Undominance in Scoring Rule Elections"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 59, No. 1; 2010; 110-119; #5291.

Dellis, Arnaud; D'Evelyn, Sean; Sherstyuk, Katerina; "Multiple Votes, Ballot Truncation and the Two-party System: an Experiment"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 2; July, 2011; 171-200; #5495.

DeLong, Howard; A Refutation of Arrow's Theorem; University Press of America; Lanham, MD; 1991; #2708

[del Pozo, Mónica]; Gómez, Daniel; González-Arangüena, Enrique; Manuel, Conrado; Owen, Guillermo; Tejada, Juan; “Centrality and Power in Social Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 46, No. 1; August, 2003; 27-54; #4427.

del Río, Coral; Ruiz-Castillo, Javier; "Intermediate Inequality and Welfare"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 2; February, 2000; 223-239; #3611.

Delver, Robert; Monsuur, Herman; "Stable Sets and Standards of Behaviour"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 3; July, 2001; 555-570; #3772.

DeMaio, Gerald; Muzzio, Douglas; "The 1980 Election and Approval Voting"; Presidential Studies Quarterly; Vol. 9, No. 3; Summer, 1981; 341-363; #1677.

DeMaio, Gerald; Muzzio, Douglas; Sharrard, George; "Approval Voting: The Empirical Evidence"; American Politics Quarterly; Vol. 11, No. 3; July, 1983; 365-374; #1678.

[Demange, Gabrielle]; Alkan, Ahmet; Gale, David; "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice"; Econometrica; Vol. 59, No. 4; July, 1991; 1023-1039; #3564.

Demange, Gabrielle; "Majority Relation and Median Representative Ordering"; SERIEs; Vol. 3, No. 1-2; March, 2012; 95-109; #5619.

[De Mello, João M. P.]; Da Silveira, Bernardo S.; "Campaign Advertising and Election Outcomes: Quasi-natural Experiment Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in Brazil"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 78, No. 2; 2011; 590-612; #5698.

De Meur, Gisèle; Hubaut, Xavier; "Fair Models of Political Fairness"; European Journal of Political Research; Vol. 14, Nos. 1-2; 1986; 237-252; #2133.

De Meur, Gisèle; "Simplexes and Elections"; Methods of Operations Research; Vol. 54; Verlag Anton Hain; 1986; 485-496; #1478.

De Meur, Gisèle; Gassner, Marjorie; "Problems of Equity in Multiparty Representational Systems: What We Want and What We Can't"; The Logic of Multiparty Systems; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Dordrecht; Kluwer; 1987; 391-404; #2076.

De Meyer, Bernard; Mongin, Philippe; "A Note on Affine Aggregation"; Economics Letters; Vol. 47, No. 2; February, 1995; 177-183; #2582.

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DeMeyer, Frank; Plott, Charles R.; "A Welfare Function Using `Relative Intensity of Preference' "; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 85, No. 1; February, 1971; 179-186; #481.

[De Meyer, H.]; De Baets, B.; De Schuymer, B.; “Cyclic Evaluation of Transitivity of Reciprocal Relations”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 2; April, 2006; 217-238; #4475.

[De Miguel, Juan R.]; Ballester, Miguel Ángel; "Extending an Order to the Power Set: The Leximax Criterion"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 1; August, 2003; 63-71; #4173.

[De Miguel, Juan R.]; Ballester, Miguel Ángel; “On Freedom of Choice and Infinite Sets: The Suprafinite Rule”; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 42, No. 3; 2006; 291-300; #4864.

[De Miguel, Juan R.]; Arlegi, Ricardo; Ballester, Miguel A.; Besada, M.; Nieto, Jorge; Vázquez, C.; “On the Equivalence of the Two Existing Extensions of the Leximax Criterion to the Infinite Case”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 54, No. 3; December, 2007; 238-243; #4885.

Demuynck, Thomas; Lauwers, Luc; "Nash Rationalization of Collective Choice over Lotteries"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 57, No. 1; January, 2009; 1-15; #5043.

[Deng, Xiaotie]; Chin, Francis Y. L.; Fang, Qizhi; Zhu, Shanfeng; “Approximate and Dynamic Rank Aggregation”; Theoretical Computer Science; Vol. 325, No. 3; 2004; 409-424; #4305.

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[Denicolò, Vincenzo]; Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Teoremi di impossibilità per funzioni di scelta sociale debolmente coerenti"; ["Impossibility Theorems for Weakly Consistent Social Choice Functions"]; Economia et Politica; Vol. 3, No. 2; August, 1986; 303-309; #1882.

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[Donaldson, David]; Blackorby, Charles; Bossert, Walter; “Anonymous Single-profile Welfarism”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 2; October, 2006; 279-287; #4530.

[Donaldson, David]; Blackorby, Charles; Bossert, Walter; “Variable-population Extensions of Social Aggregation Theorems”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 4; June, 2007; 567-589; #4591.

Donaldson, David; Pendakur, Krishna; "Index-number Tests and the Common-scaling Social Cost-of-living Index"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 3; March, 2012; 407-429; #5549.

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[Duggan, John]; Austen-Smith, David; Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks; Springer; 2005; #4541. [see review by Penn.]

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Dutta, Bhaskar; "Multivalued Social Choice Functions and Strategic Manipulation With Counter Threats"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 2, No. 2; March, 1982; 113-122; #1510.

[Dutta, Bhaskar]; Barberà, Salvador; "Implementability via Protective Equilibria"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 10, No. 1; June, 1982; 49-65; #2679.

Dutta, Bhaskar; "Further Results on Voting With Veto"; Social Choice and Welfare; edited by Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Maurice Salles; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1983; 239-250; #982.

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Dutta, Bhaskar; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "On Enforcing Socially Best Alternatives of Binary Group Decision Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 4; March, 1985; 283-293; #796.

Dutta, Bhaskar; "Review of Moulin's The Strategy of Social Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 2, No. 1; May, 1985; 87-88; #1177.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Panda, Santosh C.; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Exact Choice and Fuzzy Preferences"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 11, No. 1; February, 1986; 53-68; #3745.

[Dutta, Bhaskar]; Barberà, Salvador; "General, Direct and Self-implementation of Social Choice Functions via Protective Equilibria"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 11, No. 2; April, 1986; 109-127; #825.

Dutta, Bhaskar; "Fuzzy Preferences and Social Choice"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 13, No. 3; 1987; 215-229; #1825.

Dutta, Bhaskar; "Covering Sets and a New Condorcet Choice Correspondence"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 44, No. 1; February, 1988; 63-80; #1972.

Dutta, Bhaskar; "On the Tournament Equilibrium Set"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 4; November, 1990; 381-383; #2273.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Sen, Arunava; "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 58, No. 1; January, 1991; 121-128; #2293.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Esteban, J.; "Social Welfare and Equality"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 9, No. 4; October, 1992; 267-276; #3142.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Sen, Arunava; "Implementing Generalized Condorcet Social Choice Functions via Backward Induction"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 10, No. 2; April, 1993; 149-160; #2364.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Sen, Arunava; "Bayesian Implementation: The Necessity of Infinite Mechanisms"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 64, No. 1; October, 1994; 130-141; #2696.

Dutta, Bhaskar; "Welfare Economics: Introduction"; Welfare Economics; Dutta, Bhaskar, editor; Oxford; Oxford University Press; 1994; 1-27; #2694.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Sen, Arunava; Vohra, Rajiv; "Nash Implementation through Elementary Mechanisms in Economic Environments"; Economic Design; Vol. 1, No. 2; April, 1995; 173-203; #3122.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Sen, Arunava; "Ranking Opportunity Sets and Arrow Impossibility Theorems: Correspondence Results"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 71, No. 1; October, 1996; 90-101; #2695.

Dutta, Bhaskar; "Review of Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification [Kuran, Timur]"; The Indian Economic and Social History Review; Vol. 33, No. 4; October-December, 1996; 486-487; #2976. [review of book by Kuran]

Dutta, Bhaskar; "Reasonable Mechanisms and Nash Implementation"; Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. 2; Edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 3-23; #2776. [see discussion by Peleg]

Dutta, Bhaskar; Laslier, Jean-François; "Comparison Functions and Choice Correspondences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 4; August, 1999; 513-532; #3571.

Dutta, Bhaskar; "Amartya Sen and the Mathematics of Collective Choice"; Current Science; Vol. 76, No. 6; 1999; 726-729; #3660.

[Dutta, Bhaskar]; Barberà, Salvador; Sen, Arunava; “Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 101, No. 2; 2001; 374-394; [Corrigendum: Vol. 120, No. 2 (2005), p. 275]; #4295.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Jackson, Matthew O.; Le Breton, Michel; "Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures"; Econometrica; Vol. 69, No. 4; July, 2001; 1013-1037; #3848.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Jackson, Matthew O.; Le Breton, Michel; "Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 103, No. 1; March 1, 2002; 190-218; #3853.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Peters, Hans; Sen, Arunava; "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 106, No. 2; October, 2002; 392-416; #4144.

Dutta, Bhaskar; “Inequality, Poverty and Welfare”; In Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1; Edited by K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura; North-Holland; 2002; 597-633; #4402.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Jackson, Matthew O.; Networks and Groups: Models of Strategic Formation; Springer; 2003; [See review by Bhattacharya]; #4383.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Jackson, Matthew O.; Le Breton, Michel; “Equilibrium Agenda Formation”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 23, No. 1; August, 2004; 21-57; #4241.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Jackson, Matthew O.; Le Breton, Michel; “The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems”; Social Choice and Strategic Decisions; edited by David Austen-Smith and John Duggan; Springer; Berlin; 2005; 163-199; #4659.

[Dutta, Bhaskar]; De Sinopoli, Francesco; Laslier, Jean-François; “Approval Voting: Three Examples”; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 35, No. 1; 2006; 27-38; #4738.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Peters, Hans; Sen, Arunava; “Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 1; January, 2007; 163-179; #4563.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Peters, Hans; Sen, Arunava; “Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 4; May, 2008; 701-702; #4926.

Dutta, Bhaskar; Sen, Arunava; "Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 74, No. 1; 2012; 154-169; #5707.

Dutta, Indranil; Foster, James E.; Mishra, Ajit; "On Measuring Vulnerability to Poverty"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 743-761; #5526.

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Dyer, James S.; Sarin, Rakesh K.; "Group Preference Aggregation Rules Based on Strength of Preference"; Management Science; Vol. 25, No. 9; September, 1979; 822-832; #1643.

[Dyer, James S.]; Jia, Jianmin; "Decision Making Based on Risk-Value Tradeoffs"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 59-72; #5009.

Dziubiski, Marcin; Roy, Jaideep; "Electoral Competition in 2-Dimensional Ideology Space with Unidimensional Committment"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 1; January, 2011; 1-24; #5388.

[Dziubinski, Marcin]; Brusco, Sandro; Roy, Jaideep; "The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 74, No. 2; March, 2012; 447-469; #5613.


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