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[Ebert, Udo]; Cowell, Frank A.; “Complaints and Inequality”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 23, No. 1; August, 2004; 71-89; #4243.

Ebert, Udo; “Social Welfare, Inequality, and Poverty When Needs Differ”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 23, No. 3; December, 2004; 415-448; #4264.

Ebert, Udo; Tillmann, Georg; “Distribution-neutral Provision of Public Goods”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 29, No. 1; July, 2007; 107-124; #4596.

Ebert, Udo; "Taking Empirical Studies Seriously: The Principle of Concentration and the Measurement of Welfare and Inequality"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 32, No. 4; May, 2009; 555-574; #4997.

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[Eckert, Daniel]; Baigent, Nick; “Abstract Aggregations and Proximity Preservation: An Impossibility Result”; Theory and Decision; Vol. 56, No. 4; 2004; 359-366; #4293.

Eckert, Daniel; Klamler, Christian; Mitlöhner, Johann; “Condorcet Efficiency, Information Costs, and the Performance of Scoring Rules”; Central European Journal of Operations Research; Vol. 13, No. 1; 2005; 37-44; #4317.

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[Eckert, Daniel]; Klamler, Christian; “Antipodality in Committee Selection”; Economics Bulletin; Vol. 4, No. 1; 2008; 1-5; #4759.

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[Eckert, Daniel]; Herzberg, Frederik; "Impossibility Results for Infinite-electorate Abstract Aggregation Rules"; Journal of Philosophical Logic; Vol. 41, No. 1; 2012; 273-286; #5709.

[Eckert, Daniel]; Herzberg, Frederik; "The Model-Theoretic Approach to Aggregation: Impossibility Results for Finite and Infinite Electorates"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 64, No. 1; July, 2012; 41-47; #5589.

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[Edelman, Paul H.]; Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.; “Fair Division of Indivisible Items”; Theory and Decision; Volume 55, Number 2; September 2003; 147-180; #4626.

Edelman, Paul H.; “Voting Power and At-large Representation”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 47, No. 2; 2004; 219-232; #4318.

[Edelman, Paul H.]; Alon, Noga; "The Inverse Banzhaf Problem"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 3; March, 2010; 371-377; #5179.

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[Edward, Julian]; Dougherty,  Keith L.; “The Pareto Efficiency and Expected Costs of K-majority Rules”; Politics, Philosophy & Economics; Vol. 3, No. 2; June, 2004; 161-189; #4284.

[Edward, Julian]; Dougherty, Keith L.; "Voting for Pareto Optimality: A Multidimensional Analysis"; Public Choice; Vol. 151, No. 3-4; June, 2012; 655-678; #5598.

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Eguia, Jon X.; "Voting Blocs, Party Discipline and Party Formation"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 73, No. 1; September, 2011; 111-135; #5650.

Eguia, Jon X.; "A Spatial Theory of Party Formation"; Economic Theory; Vol. 49, No. 3; April, 2012; 549-570; #5606.

Ehlers, Lars; "Probabilistic Allocation Rules and Single-dipped Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 2; April, 2002; 325-348; #3872.

Ehlers, Lars; "Strategy-Proof Allocation When Preferences Are Single-Plateaued"; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 7, No. 1; June, 2002; 105-115; #4062.

Ehlers, Lars; "Resource-Monotonic Allocation When Preferences Are Single-Peaked"; Economic Theory; August, 2002; Vol. 20, No. 1; 113-131; #4054.

Ehlers, Lars; Peters, Hans; Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Strategy-Proof Probablistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 10, No. 2; August, 2002; 408-434; #4064.

Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina; Pápai, Szilvia; "Strategy-Proofness and Population-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 38, No. 3; November, 2002; 329-339; #4141.

Ehlers, Lars; “Multiple Public Goods, Lexicographic Preferences, and Single-Plateaued Preference Rules” Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 43, No. 1; April, 2003; 1-27; #4407.

Ehlers, Lars; Weymark, John A.; "Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice"; Economic Theory; Vol. 22, No. 2; September, 2003; 233-243; #4127.

Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina; "Coalitional Strategy-Proof and Resource-Monotonic Solutions for Multiple Assignment Problems"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 2; October, 2003; 265-280; #4184.

Ehlers, Lars; Peters, Hans; Storcken, Antonius J. A.; “Threshold Strategy-proofness: On Manipulability in Large Voting Problems”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 49, No. 1; 2004; 103-116; #4319.

Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina; “Efficient Priority Rules”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 55, No. 2; 2006; 372-384; #4862.

Ehlers, Lars; Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Arrow's Possibility Theorem for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 64, No. 2; November, 2008; 533-547; #5074.

Ehlers, Lars; Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Oligarchies in Spatial Environments"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 45, No. 3-4; 2009; 250-256; #5324.

[Ehlers, Lars]; Barberà, Salvador; "Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 559-574; #5513.

Ehlers, Lars; "A Characterization of the Uniform Rule without Pareto-Optimality"; SERIEs; Vol. 2, No. 4; December, 2011; 447-452; #5638.

Ehrgott, Matthias; Nickel, Stefan; "On the Number of Criteria Needed to Decide Pareto Optimality"; Mathematical Methods of Operations Research; Vol. 55, No. 3; 2002; 329-345; #4147.

[Eichenberger, Reiner]; Stadelmann, David; Portmann, Marco; "Evaluating the Median Voter Model's Explanatory Power"; Economics Letters; Vol. 114, No. 3; March, 2012; 312-314; #5612.

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Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori; "Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index without the Efficiency Axiom"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 73, No. 2; November, 2011; 615-621; #5643.

[Eisenberg, Bennett]; Baryshnikov, Yuliy M.; Stengle, Gilbert; "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for the Existence of the Limiting Probability of a Tie for First Place"; Statistics & Probability Letters; Vol. 23, No. 3; 15 May 1995; 203-209; #3550.

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[Elkind, Edith]; Aziz, Haris; Bachrach, Yoram; Paterson, Mike; "False-name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games"; Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research; Vol. 40; 2011; 57-93; #5690.

Elkind, Edith; Faliszewski, Piotr; Slinko, Arkadii; "Cloning in Elections: Finding the Possible Winners"; Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research; Vol. 42; 2011; 529-573; #5717.

[Elkind, Edith]; Zuckerman, Michael; Faliszewski, Piotr; Bachrach, Yoram; "Manipulating the Quota in Weighted Voting Games"; Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 180/181; 2012; 1-19; #5680.

Elsholtz, Christian; List, Christian; “A Simple Proof of Sen's Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions”; Elemente der Mathematik; Vol. 60, No. 2; 2005; 45-56; #4639.

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Elster, Jon; Hylland, Aanund; editors; Foundations of Social Choice Theory; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1986; #897. [See review by Dummett]

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[Ely, Jeffrey C.]; Chung, Kim-Sau; "Implementation with Near-complete Information"; Econometrica; Vol. 71, No. 3; May, 2003; 857-871; #4113.

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[Endriss, Ulle]; Geist, Christian; "Automated Search for Impossibility Theorems in Social Choice Theory: Ranking Sets of Objects"; Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research; Vol. 40; 2011; 143-174; #5731.

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Enelow, James M.; Hinich, Melvin J.; "A New Approach to Voter Uncertainty in the Downsian Spatial Model"; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 25, No. 3; August, 1981; 483-493; #1097.

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Enelow, James M.; Hinich, Melvin J.; "The Theory of Predictive Mappings"; Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting; edited by James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1990; 167-178; #2808.

Enelow, James M.; Hinich, Melvin J.; editors; Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1990; #2731.

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[Enelow, James M.]; Lin, Tse-Min; Dorussen, Han; "Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting"; Public Choice; Vol. 98, Nos. 1-2; January, 1999; 59-82; #3559.

Engström, Per; "Bling Bling Taxation and the Fiscal Virtues of Hip Hop"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 1; June, 2011; 139-147; #5493.

Engstrom, Richard L.; McDonald, Michael D.; "The Effect of At-Large Versus District Elections on Racial Representation in U. S. Municipalities"; Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences; edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart; New York; Agathon Press; 1986; 203-225; #2213.

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Epstein, David; "Uncovering some Subtleties of the Uncovered Set: Social Choice Theory and Distributive Politics"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 1; January, 1998; 81-93; #3191.

Epstein, Gil S.; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; "Political Culture and Monopoly Price Determination"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 1; August, 2003; 1-19; #4170.

Epstein, Gil S.; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; “Reduced Prizes and Increased Effort in Contests”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 3; June, 2006; 447-453; #4507.

Epstein, Gil S.; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; “The Politics of Randomness”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 2; October, 2006; 423-433; #4539.

Eraslan, Hülya; McLennan, Andrew; “Strategic Candidacy for Multivalued Voting Procedures”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 117, No. 1; 2004; 29-54; #4320.

[Eraslan, Hülya]; Bond, Philip; "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 77, No. 2; 2010; 459-490; #5258.

[Erdamar, Bora]; Can, Burak; Sanver, M. Remzi; "Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 67, No. 2; August, 2009; 123-144; #5387.

Erdélyi, Gábor; Nowak, Markus; Rothe, Jörg; "Sincere-strategy Preference-based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control"; Mathematical Logic Quarterly; Vol. 55, No. 4; 2009; 425-443; #5195.

Erdem, Orhan; Sanver, M. Remzi; “Minimal Monotonic Extensions of Scoring Rules”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, No. 1; October, 2005; 31-42; #4443.

Ergin, Haluk I.; "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities"; Econometrica; Vol. 70, No. 6; November, 2002; 2489-2497; #4148.

Erlander, Sven; “Welfare, Freedom of Choice and Composite Utility in the Logit Model”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 3; June, 2005; 509-525; #4437.

Erlei, Mathias; "Heterogeneous Social Preferences"; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Vol. 65, No. 3-4; March, 2008; 436-457; #5070.

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Eskridge, William N. (Jr.); "Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation"; Virginia Law Review; Vol. 74, No. 2; March, 1988; 275-338; #3431.

[Esposito, Lucio]; Bosmans, Kristof; Lambert, Peter J.; "New Perspectives on a More-or-less Familiar Poverty Index"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 2; February, 2011; 241-247; #5399.

[Esteban, Joan]; Dutta, Bhaskar; "Social Welfare and Equality"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 9, No. 4; October, 1992; 267-276; #3142.

[Esteban, Joan]; Caballe, Jordi; “Stochastic Dominance and Absolute Risk Aversion”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 1; January, 2007; 89-110; #4562.

Esty, Warren W.; "Votes or Competitions Which Determine a Winner by Estimating Expected Plurality"; Journal of the American Statistical Association; Vol. 87, No. 418; June, 1992; 373-375; #2266.

[Eustis, Alexander K.]; Daugherty, Zajj; Minton, Gregory; Orrison, Michael E.; "Voting, the Symmetric Group, and Representation Theory"; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 116, No. 8; 2009; 667-687; #5189.

Evan, S.; Paz, A.; "A Note on Cake Cutting"; Discrete Applied Mathematics; Vol. 7, No. 3; March, 1984; 285-296; #3462.

Evans, Geoffrey; Heath, Anthony; "A Tactical Error in the Analysis of Tactical Voting: A Response to Niemi, Whitten and Franklin"; British Journal of Political Science; Vol. 23, Part 1; January, 1993; 131-137; #2890. [comment on paper by Niemi, Whitten, and Franklin; see their reply and a rejoinder by Evans and Heath]

Evans, Geoffrey; Heath, Anthony; "Tactical Voting: Concepts, Measurement and Findings"; British Journal of Political Science; Vol. 24, Part 4; October, 1994; 557-561; #2893. [Rejoinder to Franklin, Niemi, and Whitten reply to Evans and Heath comment on a paper by Niemi, Whitten, and Franklin]

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