A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z


[Fackrell, Mark]; Costa, Andre; Taylor, Peter G.; “Two Issues Surrounding Parrondo's Paradox”; Advances in dynamic games; Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games; Vol. 7; Birkhäuser Boston; Boston, MA; 2005; 599-609; #4783.

Fagen, Richard R.; "Some Contributions of Mathematical Reasoning to the Study of Politics"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 60, No. 4; December, 1961; 888-900; #485.

Fahrenberger, Theresa C.; Gersbach, Hans; "Minority Voting and Long-Term Decisions"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 69, No. 2; July, 2010; 329-345; #5337.

Fahrenberger, Theresa C.; Gersbach, Hans; "Preferences for Harmony and Minority Voting"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 63, No. 1; January, 2012; 1-13; #5626.

Faith, Roger L.; Buchanan, James M.; "Towards a Theory of Yes-No Voting"; Public Choice; Vol. 37, No. 2; 1981; 231-245; #1267.

Falcó, Edurne; García-Lapresta, José Luis; "A Distance-based Extension of the Majority Judgement Voting System"; Acta Universitatis Matthiae Belii. Series Mathematics; Vol. 18; 2011; 17-27; #5696.

Faliszewski, Piotr; Hemaspaandra, Edith; Hemaspaandra, Lane A.; Rothe, Jörg; "Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control"; Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research; Vol. 35; 2009; 275-341; #5191.

Faliszewski, Piotr; Hemaspaandra, Edith; Hemaspaandra, Lane A.; "How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?"; Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research; Vol. 35; 2009; 485-532; #5190.

Faliszewski, Piotr; Hemaspaandra, Edith; Hemaspaandra, Lane A.; Rothe, Jörg; "The Shield That Never Was: Societies with Single-peaked Preferences Are More Open to Manipulation and Control"; Information and Computation; Vol. 209, No. 2; 2011; 89-107; #5426.

Faliszewski, Piotr; Hemaspaandra, Edith; Hemaspaandra, Lane A.; "Multimode Control Attacks on Elections"; Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research; Vol. 40; 2011; 305-351; #5689.

[Faliszewski, Piotr]; Elkind, Edith; Slinko, Arkadii; "Cloning in Elections: Finding the Possible Winners"; Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research; Vol. 42; 2011; 529-573; #5717.

[Faliszewski, Piotr]; Zuckerman, Michael; Bachrach, Yoram; Elkind, Edith; "Manipulating the Quota in Weighted Voting Games"; Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 180/181; 2012; 1-19; #5680.

[Falk, James E.]; Anderson, Lowell Bruce; Dandurova, Helena; Yeganova, Lana; "Relationships Between Borda Voting and Zermelo Ranking"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 32, No. 3; March, 2009; 355-365; #4986.

[Fallahnejad, R.]; Hosseinzadeh, Lotfi, F.; "A Note on 'A Solution Method to the Problem Proposed by Wang in Voting Systems' "; Applied Mathematical Sciences (Ruse); Vol. 5, No. 61-64; 2011; 3051-3055; #5684.

Fallon, Richard H., Jr.; “Should We All Be Welfare Economists?”; Michigan Law Review; Vol. 101, No. 4; February, 2003; 979-1025; #4625.

[Falmagne, Jean-Claude]; Doignon, Jean-Paul; "Matching Relations and the Dimensional Structure of Social Choices"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 7, No. 3; June, 1984; 211-229; #294.

[Falmagne, Jean-Claude]; Doignon, Jean-Paul; Regenwetter, Michel; "Combinatoric and Geometric Aspects of Some Probabilistic Choice Models - A Review"; Beliefs, Interactions and Preferences in Decision Making; Edited by Mark J. Machina and Bertrand Munier; Kluwer Academic Publishers; Dordrecht; 1999; 179-203; #3812.

Falmange, Jean-Claude; Ovchinnikov, Serge V.; "Mediatic Graphs"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 325-343; #5024.

Fang, Fang; Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.; Whinston, Andrew B.; "Proper Scoring Rules with Arbitrary Value Functions"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 46, No. 6; 2010; 1200-1210; #5447.

[Fang, Qizhi]; Chin, Francis Y. L.; Deng, Xiaotie; Zhu, Shanfeng; “Approximate and Dynamic Rank Aggregation”; Theoretical Computer Science; Vol. 325, No. 3; 2004; 409-424; #4305.

Fansten, Michel; "L'échec électoral est une science exacte"; [Failure of an election is scientifically predictable]; Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines; No. 185; 2009; 69-112; #5200.

Fara, Rudolf; Salles, Maurice; “An Interview with Michael Dummett: From Analytical Philosophy to Voting Analysis and Beyond”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 2; October, 2006; 347-364; #4529.

Farber, Daniel A.; Frickey, Philip P.; "The Jurisprudence of Public Choice"; Texas Law Review; Vol. 65, No. 5; April, 1987; 873-927; #3268.

Farber, Daniel A.; Frickey, Philip P.; "Legislative Intent and Public Choice"; Virginia Law Review; Vol. 74, No. 2; March, 1988; 423-469; #3435.

Farber, Daniel A.; "Democracy and Disgust: Reflections on Public Choice"; Chicago-Kent Law Review; Vol. 65, No. 1; 1989; 161-176; #3279.

Farebrother, R. W.; "The Theory of Committee Decisions and the Double Median Method"; Computational Statistics and Data Analysis; Vol. 5, No. 4; September, 1987; 437-442; #1904.

Farkas, Daniel; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; "The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment"; Econometrica; Vol. 47, No. 5; September, 1979; 1305-1306; #1266. [Builds on a paper by Sen]

Farquharson, Robin; "Sur une généralisation de la notion d'équilibrium"; Comptes Rendus de L'Académie des Sciences (Série A); Tome 240, No. 1; 3 January 1955; 46-48; #486.

Farquharson, Robin; "Straightforwardness in Voting Procedures"; Oxford Economic Papers; Vol. 8; 1956; 80-89; #1036.

Farquharson, Robin; "Strategic Information in Games and Voting"; Information Theory; edited by Colin Cherry; London; Buttersworths; 1956; 47-52; #1037.

[Farquharson, Robin]; Dummett, Michael; "Stability in Voting"; Econometrica; Vol. 29, No. 1; January, 1961; 33-43; #483.

Farquharson, Robin; "Sophisticated Voting and an Example Due to M. Kreweras"; La Décision; Colloque du CNRS; Aix-en-Provence; 1969; 115-122; #1159.

Farquharson, Robin; Theory of Voting; New Haven; Yale University Press; 1969; #487. [See exegesis by Niemi]

Farrell, Michael J.; "Liberalism in the Theory of Social Choice"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 43(1), No. 133; February, 1978; 3-10; #488.

Fatima, Shaheen S.; Wooldridge, Michael; Jennings, Nicholas R.; "An Approximation Method for Power Indices for Voting Games. Innovations in Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiations"; Studies in Computational Intelligence, Vol. 319,; Springer; Berlin; 2010; 179-193; #5700.

Faulí-Oller, Ramon; Ok, Efe A.; Ortuño-Ortín, Ignacio; “Delegation and Polarization of Platforms in Political Competition”; Economic Theory; Vol. 22, No. 2; 2003; 289-309; #4321.

Favardin, Pierre; Lepelley, Dominique; “Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 3; June, 2006; 485-509; #4509.

Fearon, James D.; "Self-Enforcing Democracy"; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 126, No. 4; November, 2011; 1661-1708; #5646.

[Featherston, Fran]; Chamberlin, John R.; "Selecting a Voting System"; Journal of Politics; Vol. 48, No. 2; May, 1985; 347-369; #2045.

Fedderke, Johannes; "Optimal Sets of Candidates"; Economics and Politics; Vol. 22, No. 2; July, 2010; 127-150; #5336.

Fedderson, Timothy; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information"; Econometrica; Vol. 65, No. 5; September, 1997; 1029-1058; #3245.

Feddersen, Timothy; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 92, No. 1 ; March, 1998; 23-35; #3324.

Feddersen, Timothy; "Review of Making Votes Count [Cox]"; Journal of Economic Literature; Vol. 36, No. 4 December, 1998; 2169-2170; #3323. [Review of book by Cox]

Feddersen, Timothy; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; "Elections, Information Aggregation, and Strategic Voting"; Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA ; Vol. 96, No. 19; September, 1999; 10572-10574; #3647.

Feddersen, Timothy J.; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; "Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 93, No. 2; June, 1999; 381-398; #3566.

[Feddersen, Timothy]; Austen-Smith, David; “Deliberation and Voting Rules”; Social Choice and Strategic Decisions; edited by David Austen-Smith and John Duggan; Springer; Berlin; 2005; 269-316; #4628.

Feddersen, Timothy; Sandroni, Alvaro; “The Calculus of Ethical Voting”; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 35, No. 1; 2006; 1-25; #4739.

Fedrizzi, Mario; Ostasiewicz, Walenty; "Group Decisions: A Review of Contributions in Fuzzy Set Theory"; Rivista di Matematica per le Scienza Economiche e Sociali; Vol. 8, No. 1; 1985; 21-37; #845.

Fedrizzi, Mario; "Group Decisions and Consensus: A Model in the Context of Fuzzy Set Theory"; Rivista di Matematica per le Scienza Economiche e Sociali; Vol. 9, No. 1; 1986; 53-61; #1691.

[Fedrizzi, Mario]; Kacprzyk, Janusz; "A `Soft' Measure of Consensus in the Setting of Partial (Fuzzy) Preferences"; European Journal of Operational Research; Vol. 34, No. 3; March, 1988; 316-325; #1984.

Fedrizzi, Mario; Kacprzyk, Janusz; "On Measuring Consensus in the Setting of Fuzzy Preference Relations"; Non-Conventional Preference Relations in Decision Making; edited by Janusz Kacprzyk and M. Roubens; Berlin; Springer Verlag; 1988; 129-141; #2113.

[Fedrizzi, Mario]; Nurmi, Hannu; Kacprzyk, Janusz; "Vague Notions in the Theory of Voting"; Multiperson Decision Making Models Using Fuzzy Sets and Possibility Theory; edited by Janusz Kacprzyk and Mario Fedrizzi; Dordrecht; Kluwer Academic Publishers; 1990; 43-52; #2934.

[Fedrizzi, Mario]; Kacprzyk, Janusz; Multiperson Decision Making Models Using Fuzzy Sets and Probability Theory; Kluwer Academic Publishers; Dordrecht; 1990; #3167.

[Fedrizzi, Mario]; Kacprzyk, Janusz; Nurmi, Hannu; "Group Decision Making and Consensus Under Fuzzy Preferences and Fuzzy Majority"; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 49, No. 1; July 10, 1992; 21-31; #2933.

Fedrizzi, Mario; Kacprzyk, Janusz; Nurmi, Hannu; "How Different are Social Choice Functions: A Rough Sets Approach"; Quality & Quantity; Vol. 30, No. 1; 1996; 87-99; #2957.

Fedrizzi, Michele; "On a Consensus Measure in a Group MCDM Problem"; Multiperson Decision Making Models Using Fuzzy Sets and Probability Theory; Kacprzyk, Janusz and Fedrizzi, Mario, editors; Kluwer Academic Publishers; Dordrecht; 1990; 231-241; #3173.

Feinberg, Yossi; "An Incomplete Cooperation Structure for a Voting Game Can Be Strategically Stable"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 24, Nos. 1-2; July-Aug, 1998; 2-9; #3388.

Feix, Marc R.; Lepelley, Dominique; Merlin, Vincent R.; Rouet, Jean-Louis; "The Probability of Conflicts in a U.S. Presidential Type Election"; Economic Theory; Vol. 23, No. 2; January, 2004; 227-257; #4126.

Feix, Marc R.; Lepelley, Dominique; Merlin, Vincent R.; Rouet, Jean-Louis; “On the Voting Power of an Alliance and the Subsequent Power of its Members”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 2; February, 2007; 181-207; #4568.

Feix, Marc R.; Lepelley, Dominique; Merlin, Vincent; Rouet, Jean-Louis; "On the Probability to Act in the European Union"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 197-211; #5016.

Feld, Scott L.; "A Reconceptualization of the Problem of Collective Decisions"; Journal of Mathematical Sociology; Vol. 5, No. 2; 1977; 257-271; #1484.

[Feld, Scott L.]; Grofman, Bernard; Owen, Guillermo; "Thirteen Theorems in Search of a Truth"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 15, No. 3; September, 1983; 261-278; #273.

Feld, Scott L.; Grofman, Bernard; "The Accuracy of Group Majority Decisions in Groups with Added Members"; Public Choice; Vol. 42, No. 3; 1984; 273-275; #754.

Feld, Scott L.; Grofman, Bernard; "Partial Single-Peakedness: An Extension and Clarification"; Public Choice; Vol. 51, No. 1; 1986; 71-80; #1023.

Feld, Scott L.; Grofman, Bernard; "On the Possibility of Faithfully Representative Committees"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 80, No. 3; September, 1986; 863-879; #1404.

Feld, Scott L.; Grofman, Bernard; Hartley, Richard; Kilgour, D. Marc; Miller, Nicholas R.; Noviello, Nicolas; "The Uncovered Set in Spatial Voting Games"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 23, No. 2; September, 1987; 129-155; #1905.

Feld, Scott L.; Grofman, Bernard; "The Borda Count in n-Dimensional Issue Space"; Public Choice; Vol. 59, No. 2; 1988; 167-176; #2074.

[Feld, Scott L.]; Schofield, Norman J.; Grofman, Bernard; "The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 82, No. 1; March, 1988; 195-211; #2014.

Feld, Scott L.; Grofman, Bernard; "Majority Rule Outcomes and the Structural Debate in One-Issue-at-a-Time Decision-Making"; Public Choice; Vol. 59, No. 3; 1988; 239-252; #2085.

Feld, Scott L.; Grofman, Bernard; Miller Nicholas R.; "Centripetal Forces in Spatial Voting: On the Size of the Yolk"; Public Choice; Vol. 59, No. 1; October, 1988; 37-50; #2109.

[Feld, Scott L.]; Owen, Guillermo; Grofman, Bernard; "Proving a Distribution-Free Generalization of the Condorcet Jury Theorem"; Mathematical Social Science; Vol. 17, No. 1; February, 1989; 1-16; #2256.

Feld, Scott L.; Grofman, Bernard; Miller, Nicholas R.; "Limits on Agenda Control in Spatial Voting Games. Formal Theories of Politics: Mathematical Modelling in Political Science"; Mathematical and Computer Modelling; Vol. 12, No. 4-5; 1989; 405-416; #2469.

Feld, Scott L.; Grofman, Bernard; "A Theorem Concerning Shapley-Owen Power Scores and the Radius of the Yolk in Two Dimensions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 1; January, 1990; 71-74; #2154.

[Feld, Scott L.]; Miller, Nicholas R.; Grofman, Bernard; "Cycle Avoiding Trajectories, Strategic Agendas, and the Duality of Memory and Foresight: An Informal Exposition"; Public Choice; Vol. 64, No. 3; March, 1990; 265-277; #2284.

[Feld, Scott L.]; Miller, Nicholas R.; Grofman, Bernard; "The Structure of the Banks Set"; Public Choice; Vol. 66, No. 3; September, 1990; 243-255; #2290.

Feld, Scott L.; Grofman, Bernard; "Voting in One's Head as a Source of Nearly Transitive Individual Preferences Over Multi-Dimensional Issues"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 23, No. 1-4; 1990; 257-263; #2468.

Feld, Scott L.; Grofman, Bernard; "The Half-Win Set and the Geometry of Spatial Voting Games: Research Note"; Public Choice; Vol. 70, No. 2; May, 1991; 245-250; #2302.

[Feld, Scott L.]; Grofman, Bernard; "Group Decision Making over Multidimensional Objects of Choice"; Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes; Vol. 52, No. 1; June, 1992; 39-63; #3101.

Feld, Scott L.; Grofman, Bernard; "Stability Induced by 'No-Quibbling' "; Group Decision and Negotiation; Vol. 5, Issue 3; May, 1996; 283-294; #3454.

Feld, Scott L.; Merrill, Samuel, III; Grofman, Bernard; "Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Directional Models of Two-Candidate Spatial Competition"; Public Choice; Vol. 98, Nos. 3-4; March, 1999; 369-383; #3560.

[Feld, Scott L.]; Owen, Guillermo; Lindner, Ines; Grofman, Bernard; Ray, Leonard; “A Simple ‘Market Value’ Bargaining Model for Weighted Voting Games: Characterization and Limit Theorems”; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 35, No. 1; 2006; 111-128; #4734.

[Feld, Scott L.]; Grofman, Bernard; Brunell, Thomas; "Towards a Theory of Bicameralism: The Neglected Contributions of the Calculus of Consent"; Public Choice; Vol. 152, No. 1-2; July, 2012; 147-161; #5585.

Feldman, Allan M.; "A Very Unsubtle Version of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem"; Economic Inquiry; Vol. 12, No. 4; December, 1974; 534-546; #363. [See comment by Stevens]

Feldman, Allan M.; Weiman, David; "Envy, Wealth and Class Heirarchies"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 11, No. 1; February, 1979; 81-91; #714.

Feldman, Allan M.; "Nonmanipulable Multi-Valued Social Decision Functions"; Public Choice; Vol. 34, Issue 2; 1979; 177-188; #139.

Feldman, Allan M.; "Manipulating Voting Procedures"; Economic Inquiry; Vol. 17, No. 3; July, 1979; 452-474; #2930.

Feldman, Allan M.; "Manipulation and the Pareto Rule"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 21, No. 3; December, 1979; 473-482; #141.

Feldman, Allan M.; "Strongly Nonmanipulable Multi-valued Collective Choice Rules"; Public Choice; Vol. 35, Issue 4; 1980; 503-509; #140.

Feldman, Allan M.; Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory; Boston; Martinus Nijhoff; 1980; #713.

[Feldman, Allan M.]; Diba, Behzad; "Utility Functions for Public Outputs and Majority Voting"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 25, Nos. 1-2; November, 1984; 235-243; #3104.

Feldman, Allan M.; "A Model of Majority Voting and Growth in Government Expenditure"; Public Choice; Vol. 46, No. 1; 1985; 3-17; #3103.

Feldman, Allan M.; Kee, Kyung-Ho; "Existence of Electoral Equilibria with Probabilistic Voting"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 35, No. 2; March, 1988; 205-227; #2110.

Fellman, Johan; "Discontinuous Transformations, Lorenz Curves and Transfer Policies"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 2; August, 2009; 335-342; #5154.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Maoz, Zeev; Rapoport, Amnon; "Comparing Voting Systems in Genuine Elections: Approval-Plurality versus Selection-Plurality"; Social Behavior; Vol. 1, No. 1; September, 1986; 41-53; #1913.

[Felsenthal, Dan S.]; Brams, Steven J.; Maoz, Zeev; "New Chairman Paradoxes"; Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior: Essays in Honor of Anatol Rapoport; edited by Andreas Diekmann and Peter Mitter; Heidelberg; Physica-Verlag; 1986; 243-256; #1785.

[Felsenthal, Dan S.]; Brams, Steven J.; Maoz, Zeev; "Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting"; Theory and Decision: Essays in Honor of Werner Leinfellner; edited by Gerald Eberlein and Hal Berghel; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1987; 223-233; #1786.

[Felsenthal, Dan S.]; Rapoport, Amnon; Maoz, Zeev; "Microcosms and Macrocosms: Seat Allocation in Proportional Representation Systems"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 24, No. 1; January, 1988; 11-33; #1912.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Maoz, Zeev; "A Comparative Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Voting Under the Plurality and Approval Procedures"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 33, No. 2; 1988; 116-130; #2062.

[Felsenthal, Dan S.]; Rapoport, Amnon; Maoz, Zeev; "Proportional Representation: An Empirical Evaluation of Single-Stage, Non-ranked Voting Procedures"; Public Choice; Vol. 59, No. 2; November, 1988; 151-165; #3006.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; "On Combining Approval with Disapproval Voting"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 34, No. 1; January, 1989; 53-60; #2079.

[Felsenthal, Dan S.]; Rapoport, Amnon; "Efficacy in Small Electorates under Plurality and Approval Voting"; Public Choice; Vol. 64, No. 1; January, 1990; 57-71; #3005.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Maoz, Zeev; Rapoport, Amnon; "The Condorcet-Efficiency of Sophisticated Voting Under the Plurality and Approval Procedures"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 35, No. 1; January, 1990; 24-33; #3020.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Topics in Social Choice: Sophisticated Voting, Efficacy, and Proportional Representation; New York; Praeger; 1990; #3239.

[Felsenthal, Dan S.]; Rapoport, Amnon; Maoz, Zeev; "Sincere versus Strategic Voting Behavior in Small Groups"; Laboratory Research in Political Economy; Palfrey, Thomas R., editor; Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press; 1991; 201-235; #3004.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé; "After Two Centuries, Should Condorcet's Voting Procedure be Implemented?"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 37, No. 4; October, 1992; 250-274; #3242.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé; "Sequential Voting by Veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin Algorithm more Versatile"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 33, No. 3; November, 1992; 223-240; #3229.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Maoz, Zeev; Rapoport, Amnon; "An Empirical Evaluation of Six Voting Procedures: Do They Really Make Any Difference?"; British Journal of Political Science; Vol. 23, Part 1; January, 1993; 1-28; #3019.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé; "Postulates and Paradoxes of Relative Voting Power - A Critical Re-appraisal"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 38, No. 2; March, 1995; 195-229; #2461.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé; "Who Ought to be Elected and Who is Actually Elected? - An Empirical Investigation of 92 Elections under Three Procedures"; Electoral Studies; Vol. 14, No. 2; June, 1995; 143-169; #3540.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé; "The Weighted Voting Rule In the EU Council of Ministers, 1958-1995 - Intentions and Outcomes"; Electoral Studies; Vol. 16, No. 1; March, 1997; 33-47; #3541.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; "Setting the Record Straight: A Note on Sophisticated Voting under Borda's Method"; Public Choice; Vol. 89, Nos. 1-2; October, 1996; 17-25; #3106. [Erratum: Vol. 91, Nos. 3-4, June 1997, p. 433]

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé; "Alternative Forms of the Shapley Value and the Shapley-Shubik Index"; Public Choice; Vol. 87, Nos. 3-4; 1996; 313-318; #3232.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshe; "Ternary Voting Games"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 26, No. 3; 1997; 335-351; #3105.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshe; Zwicker, William S.; "The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a priori Voting Power"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 44, No. 1; January 1998; 83-116; #3359.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshe; "The Product Paradox of Voting Power"; Public Choice; Vol. 96, Nos. 1-2; July, 1998; 81-92; #3358.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshe; The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes; Northampton, MA; Edward Elgar Pub; 1998; #3595.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé; "Minimizing the Mean Majority Deficit: the Second Square-root Rule"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 37, No. 1; January, 1999; 25-37; #3657.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé; "The Treaty of Nice and Qualified Majority Voting"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 3; July, 2001; 431-464; #3765.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé; "Annexations and Alliances: When Are Blocs Advantageous a Priori?"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 2; April, 2002; 295-312; #3870.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé; “Analysis of Qm Rules in the Draft Constitution for Europe Proposed by the European Convention, 2003"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 23, No. 1; August, 2004; 1-20; #4240.

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé; “Voting Power Measurement: A Story of Misreinvention”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3; December, 2005; 485-506; #4471.

Feltkamp, Javier Arin V.; "Lorenz Undominated Allocations for Tu-games: the Weighted Coalitional Lorenz Solutions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 4; October, 2002; 869-884; #3984.

[Feng, Yi]; Chen, Baizhu; "Economic Development and the Transition to Democracy - A Formal Model"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 1; January, 1999; 1-16; #3312.

Ferejohn, John A.; Grether, David M.; "On a Class of Rational Social Decision Procedures"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 8, No. 4; August, 1974; 471-482; #490.

Ferejohn, John A.; Grether, David M.; "Weak Path Independence"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 14, No. 1; February, 1977; 19-31; #491.

Ferejohn, John A.; Grether, David M.; "Some New Impossibility Theorems"; Public Choice; Vol. 30; Summer, 1977; 35-42; #6.

Ferejohn, John A.,"Decisive Coalitions in the Theory of Social Choice"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 15, No. 2; August, 1977; 301-306; #4.

Ferejohn, John A.; "The Distribution of Rights in Society"; Decision Theory and Social Ethics, Issues in Social Choice; edited by Hans W. Gottinger and Werner Leinfellner; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1978; 119-131; #712.

Ferejohn, John A.; Fiorina, Morris P.; Weisberg, Herbert F.; "Toward a Theory of Legislative Decision"; Game Theory and Political Science; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook; New York; New York University Press; 1978; 165-190; #1747.

Ferejohn, John A.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Representations of Binary Decision Rules by Generalized Decisiveness Structures"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 21, No. 1; August, 1979; 28-45; #887.

Ferejohn, John A.; Fiorina, Morris P.; Packel, Edward W.; "Nonequilibrium Solutions for Legislative Systems"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 25, No. 2; March, 1980; 140-148; #886.

Ferejohn, John A.; Grether, David M.; Matthews, Steven A.; Packel, Edward W.; "Continuous-Valued Binary Decision Procedures"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 47(4), No. 149; July, 1980; 787-796; #5.

Ferejohn, John A.; Grether, David M.; McKelvey, Richard D.; "Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 49(3), No. 157; July, 1982; 439-446; #888.

Ferejohn, John A.; Grether, David M.; "On the Properties of Stable Decision Procedures"; Political Equilibrium; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle; Boston; Kluwer-Nijhoff; 1982; 107-117; #1357.

Ferejohn, John A.; McKelvey, Richard D.; "Von-Neumann-Morgenstern Solution Social Choice Functions: An Impossibility Theorem"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 29, No. 1; February, 1983; 109-119; #201.

Ferejohn, John A.; Packel, Edward W.; "Continuous Social Decision Procedures"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 6, No. 1; October, 1983; 65-73; #240.

Ferejohn, John A.; McKelvey, Richard D.; Packel, Edward W.; "Limiting Distributions for Continuous State Markov Voting Models"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 1; May, 1984; 45-67; #889.

Ferejohn, John A.; "Incumbant Performance and Electoral Control"; Public Choice; Vol. 50, Nos. 1-3; 1986; 5-25; #2835. [see comment by Ledyard and comment by Slutsky]

[Ferejohn, John A.]; Baron, David P.; "The Power to Propose"; Models of Strategic Choice in Politics; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook; Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press; 1989; 343-366; #2517.

Ferejohn, John A.; "The Spatial Model and Elections"; Information, Participation, and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective; Grofman, Bernard, editor; Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press; 1993; 107-214; #3107.

[Ferejohn, John A.]; Satz, Debra; "Rational Choice and Social Theory"; The Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 91, No. 2; February, 1994; 71-87; #3113.

[Fernández, Francisco R.]; Monroy, Luisa; "Stable Sets and Cores for Multi-criteria Simple Games and for Their Extensions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 39, Number 1; June, 2012; 1-22; #5566.

[Fernández García, J. R.]; Bilbao, J. M.; Jiménez, N.; López, J. J.; "Voting Power in the European Union Enlargement"; European Journal of Operational Research; Vol. 143, No. 1; November, 2002; 181-196; #4023.

[Fernández García, J. R.]; Algaba, E.; Bilbao, J. M.; López, J. J.; “Computing Power Indices in Weighted Multiple Majority Games”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 46, No. 1; 2003; 63-80; #4291.

[Fernández García, J. R.]; Bilbao, J. M.; Jiménez, N.; López, J. J.; "The Banzhaf Power Index for Ternary Bicooperative Games"; Discrete Applied Mathematics; Vol. 158, No. 9; 2010; 967-980.; #5259.

[Ferrara, Massimiliano]; Stefanescu, Anton; “Implementation of Voting Operators”; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 42, No. 3; 2006; 315-324; #4863.

[Ferraris, Leo]; De Sinopoli, Francesco; Iannantuoni, Giovanna; "The Effect of Ideology on Policy Outcomes in Proportional Representation Systems"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 62, No. 2; 2011; 87-90; #5686.

Fey, Mark; Kim, Jaehoon; "The Swing Voter's Curse: Comment"; American Economic Review; Vol. 92, No. 4; September, 2002; 1264-1268; #4072.

[Fey, Mark]; Duggan, John; “Electoral Competition with Policy-motivated Candidates”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 51, No. 2; 2005; 490-522; #4315.

Fey, Mark; "A Note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with Supermajority Voting Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 1; February, 2003; 27-32; #3989.

Fey, Mark; “May’s Theorem with an Infinite Population”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 23, No. 2; October, 2004; 275-293; #4257.

Fey, Mark; “An Application of Asymptotic Density to Characterizing Voting Rules”; Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications; Vol. 31; 2005; 29-37; #4640.

[Fey, Mark]; Duggan, John; “Repeated Downsian Electoral Competition”; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 35, No. 1; 2006; 39-69; #4737.

Fey, Mark; "Choosing from a Large Tournament"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 2; August, 2008; 301-309; #4944.

[Fey, Mark]; Scott, Alex; "The Minimal Covering Set in Large Tournaments"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 1; January, 2012; 1-9; #5527.

[Fianu, Emmanuel Senyo]; Herzberg, Frederik; Lauwers, Luc; van Liedekerke, Luc; "Addendum to L. Lauwers and L. Van Liedekerke, 'Ultraproducts and Aggregation'"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 46, No. 2; 2010; [original article is in Journal of Mathematical Economics 24 (3) (1995) 217-237]; 277-278; #5477.

[Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria]; Alonso-Meijide, José M.; Casas-Méndez, Balbina; Holler, Manfred J.; Nohn, Andreas; "Axiomatizations of Public Good Indices with a Priori Unions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 3; September, 2010; 517-533; #5245.

[Figueira, José Rui]; Ben Abdelaziz, Fouad; Meddeb, Olfa; “On the Manipulability of the Fuzzy Social Choice Functions”; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 159, No. 2; 2008; 177-184; #4792.

Fine, Ben J.; Fine, Kit; "Social Choice and Individual Ranking,I"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 41(3), No. 127; July, 1974; 302-322; #494.

Fine, Ben J.; Fine, Kit; "Social Choice and Individual Ranking,II"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 41(4), No. 128; October, 1974; 459-475; #495.

Fine, Ben J.; "A Note on 'Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability' "; Econometrica; Vol. 43, No. 1; January, 1975; 173-174; #492.

Fine, Ben J.; "Individual Liberalism in a Paretian Society"; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 83, No. 6; December, 1975; 1277-1281; #493.

Fine, Ben J.; "On the Relationship Between True Preference and Actual Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 4; November, 1995; 353-361; #2408.

Fine, Ben J.; "Reconciling Interpersonal Comparability and the Intensity of Preference for the Utility Sum Rule"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 3; June, 1996; 319-325; #2755.

Fine, Kit; "Some Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Representative Decision on Two Alternatives"; Econometrica; Vol. 40, No. 6; November, 1972; 1083-1090; #496.

Fine, Kit; "Conditions for the Existence of Cycles under Majority and Non-Minority Rules"; Econometrica; Vol. 41, No. 5; September, 1973; 888-899; #497.

[Fine, Kit]; Fine, Ben J.; "Social Choice and Individual Ranking,I"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 41(3), No. 127; July, 1974; 302-322; #494.

[Fine, Kit]; Fine, Ben J.; "Social Choice and Individual Ranking,II"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 41(4), No. 128; October, 1974; 459-475; #495.

Fink, A. M.; "A Note on the Fair Division Problem"; Mathematics Magazine; Vol. 37, No. 5; November, 1964; 341-342; #3470.

Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca; "Membership Rules and Stability of Coalition Structures in Positive Externality Games"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 32, No. 3; March, 2009; 389-406; #4988.

Fiorina, Morris P.; Plott, Charles R.; "Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 72, No. 2; June, 1978; 575-598; #3090.

[Fiorina, Morris P.]; Ferejohn, John A.; Weisberg, Herbert F.; "Toward a Theory of Legislative Decision"; Game Theory and Political Science; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook; New York; New York University Press; 1978; 165-190; #1747.

[Fiorina, Morris P.]; Ferejohn, John A.; Packel, Edward W.; "Nonequilibrium Solutions for Legislative Systems"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 25, No. 2; March, 1980; 140-148; #886.

Fiorina, Morris P.; Shepsle, Kenneth A.; "Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General Possibility of a Science of Politics"; Political Equilibrium; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle; Boston; Kluwer-Nijhoff; 1982; 49-64; #1355.

[Fiorini, Samuel]; Doignon, Jean-Paul; “The Approval-voting Polytope: Combinatorial Interpretation of the Facet”; Recherche opérationnelle et aide à la décision; Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines. Mathematics and Social Sciences; No. 161; 2003; 29-39; #4313.

Fiorini, Samuel; Fishburn, Peter C.; “Weak Order Polytopes”; Discrete Mathematics; Vol. 275, No. 1-3; 2004; 111-127; #4322.

[Fiorini, Samuel]; Doignon, Jean-Paul; “The Facets and the Symmetries of the Approval-voting Polytope”; Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series B; Vol. 92, No. 1; 2004; 1-12; #4874.

[Fischel, Daniel R.]; Easterbrook, Frank H.; "Voting in Corporate Law"; The Journal of Law and Economics; Vol. 26, No. 2; June, 1983; 395-427; #3426.

Fischer, Dietrich; Schotter, Andrew; "The Inevitability of the `Paradox of Redistribution' in the Allocation of Voting Weights"; Public Choice; Vol. 33, No. 2; 1978; 49-67; #83. [see comment by Holler]

[Fischer, Felix]; Brandt, Felix; "Computing the Minimal Covering Set"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 56, No. 2; September, 2008; 254-68; #5051.

[Fischer, Felix]; Brandt, Felix; Harrenstein, Paul; "The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets"; Mathematical Logic Quarterly; Vol. 55, No. 4; 2009; 444-459; #5312.

[Fischer, Felix]; Brandt, Felix; Harrenstein, Paul; Mair, Maximilian; "A Computational Analysis of the Tournament Equilibrium Set"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 4; April, 2010; 597-609; #5212.

[Fischer, Justina A. V.]; Bjørnskov, Christian; Dreher, Axel; “Cross-country Determinants of Life Satisfaction: Exploring Different Determinants Across Groups in Society”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 1; January, 2008; 119-173; #4688.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Preferences, Summation and Social Welfare Functions"; Management Science; Vol. 16, No. 3; November, 1969; 179-186; #498.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "The Irrationality of Transitivity in Social Choice"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 15, No. 2; March, 1970; 119-123; #499.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Concise Proof and Infinite Voters"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 2, No. 1; March, 1970; 103-106; #501.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Intransitive Individual Preference and Transitive Majorities"; Econometrica; Vol. 38, No. 3; May, 1970; 482-489; #502.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Comments on Hansson's 'Group Preferences' "; Econometrica; Vol. 38, No. 6; November, 1970; 933-935; #500.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Suborders on Commodity Spaces"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 2, No. 4; December, 1970; 321-328; #503.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Conditions for Simple Majority Decision with Intransitive Individual Indifference"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 2, No. 4; December, 1970; 354-367; #1171.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Should Social Choice be Based on Binary Comparisons?"; Journal of Mathematical Sociology; Vol. 1, No. 1; January, 1971; 133-142; #504.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "The Theory of Representative Majority Decision"; Econometrica; Vol. 39, No. 2; March, 1971; 273-284; #1194.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "The Theorem of the Alternative in Social Choice Theory"; Operations Research; Vol. 19, No. 6; October, 1971; 1323-1330; #1537.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "A Comparative Analysis of Group Decision Methods"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 16, No. 6; November, 1971; 538-544; #748.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Conditions on Preferences that Guarantee a Simple Majority Winner"; Journal of Mathematical Sociology; Vol. 2, No. 1; January, 1972; 105-112; #1221.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "A Location Theorem for Single-Peaked Preferences"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 4, No. 1; February, 1972; 94-97; #1220.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Lotteries and Social Choices"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 5, No. 2; October, 1972; 189-207; #505.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Even Chance Lotteries in Social Choice Theory"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 3, No. 1; October, 1972; 18-40; #506.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Mathematics of Decision Theory; The Hague; Mouton; 1972; #507.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Social Choice Functions in Group Decision Theory"; Decision and Risk Analysis: Powerful New Tools for Management; edited by Arthur Lesser, Jr.; Hoboken, N. J.; Stevens Institute of Technology; 1972; 161-195; #1538.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "A Proof of May's Theorem P(m,4)=2P(m,3)"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 18, No. 3; May, 1973; 212; #1193.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Transitive Binary Social Choices and Intraprofile Conditions"; Econometrica; Vol. 41, No. 4; July, 1973; 603-615; #509.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Voter Concordance, Simple Majorities and Group Decision Methods"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 18, No. 5; September, 1973; 364-376; #1160.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Summation Social Welfare Functions"; Econometrica; Vol. 41, No. 6; November, 1973; 1183-1196; #510.

Fishburn, Peter C.; The Theory of Social Choice; Princeton; Princeton University Press; 1973; #508.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Social Choice Functions"; SIAM Review; Vol. 16, No. 1; January, 1974; 63-90; #511.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Single-peaked Preferences and Probabilities of Cyclical Majorities"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 19, No. 1; January, 1974; 21-27; #1568.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "On the Sum-of-Ranks Winner When Losers are Removed"; Discrete Mathematics; Vol. 8, No. 1; March, 1974; 25-30; #1541.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Majority Voting on Risky Investments"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 8, No. 1; May, 1974; 85-99; #1223.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Simple Voting Systems and Majority Rule"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 19, No. 3; May, 1974; 166-176; #1192.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Subset Choice Conditions and the Computation of Social Choice Sets"; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 88, No. 2; May, 1974; 320-329; #751.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Paradoxes of Voting"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 68, No. 2; June, 1974; 537-548; #750.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Impossibility Theorems Without the Social Completeness Axiom"; Econometrica; Vol. 42, No. 4; July, 1974; 695-704; #513.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "On Collective Rationality and a Generalized Impossibility Theorem"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 41(4), No. 128; October, 1974; 445-457; #512.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Choice Functions on Finite Sets"; International Economic Review; Vol. 15, No. 3; October, 1974; 729-749; #514.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Aspects of One-Stage Voting Rules"; Management Science; Vol. 21, No. 4; December, 1974; 422-427; #1560.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "A Probabilistic Model of Social Choice: A Comment"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 42(2), No. 130; April, 1975; 297-301; #593. [Comment on a paper by Intriligator]

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Three-Valued Representative Systems"; Mathematical Systems Theory; Vol. 9, No. 3; 1975; 265-280; #1040.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Semiorders and Choice Functions"; Econometrica; Vol. 43, Nos. 5-6; September-November, 1975; 975-977; #516.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Gehrlein, William V.; "An Analysis of Simple Two-Stage Voting Systems"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 21, No. 1; January, 1976; 1-12; #1561.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Dictators on Blocks: Generalizations of Social Choice Impossibility Theorems"; Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series B; Vol. 20, No. 2; April, 1976; 153-170; #515.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Gehrlein, William V.; "An Analysis of Voting Procedures with Nonranked Voting"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 22, No. 3; May, 1976; 178-185; #1562.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; "Condorcet's Paradox and Anonymous Preference Profiles"; Public Choice; Vol. 26; Summer, 1976; 1-18; #1276.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Gehrlein, William V.; "Borda's Rule, Positional Voting and Condorcet's Simple Majority Principle"; Public Choice; Vol. 28; 1976; 79-88; #1231.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; "The Probability of the Paradox of Voting: A Computable Solution"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 13, No. 1; August, 1976; 14-25; #1569.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Gehrlein, William V.; "Win Probabilities and Simple Majorities in Probabilistic Voting Situations"; Mathematical Programming; Vol. 11, No. 1; August, 1976; 28-41; #1575.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Gehrlein, William V.; "Collective Rationality versus Distribution of Power for Binary Social Choice Functions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 15, No. 1; June, 1977; 72-91; #752.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Gehrlein, William V.; "Towards a Theory of Elections with Probabilistic Preferences"; Econometrica; Vol. 45, No. 8; November, 1977; 1907-1924; #55.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Condorcet Social Choice Functions"; SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics; Vol. 33, No. 3; November, 1977; 469-489; #1161.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Models of Individual Preference and Choice"; Synthese; Vol.36, No. 3; November, 1977; 285-395; #56.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; "The Effects of Abstentions on Election Outcomes"; Public Choice; Vol. 33, No. 2; 1978; 69-82; #1570.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; "Coincidence Probabilities for Simple Majority and Positionalist Voting Rules"; Social Science Research; Vol. 7, No. 3; September, 1978; 272-283; #1063.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Approval Voting"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 72, No. 3; September, 1978; 831-847; #1545. [See comment by Tullock and reply by Brams and Fishburn]

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; "Probabilities of Election Outcomes for Large Electorates"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 19, No. 1; October, 1978; 38-49; #58.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Axioms for Approval Voting: Direct Proof"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 19, No. 1; October, 1978; 180-185; #57. [Corrigendum: Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 45, No. 1; 1988; 212]

Fishburn, Peter C.; "A Strategic Analysis of Nonranked Voting Systems"; SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics; Vol. 35, No. 3; November, 1978; 488-495; #1546.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Acceptable Social Choice Lotteries"; Decision Theory and Social Ethics; edited by Hans W. Gottinger and Werner Leinfellner; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1978; 133-152; #1118.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Transitivity"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 46(1), No. 142; January, 1979; 163-173; #63.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Letter to the Editor"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 73, No. 2; June, 1979; 552; #1547.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; "Proportions of Profiles with a Majority Candidate"; Computers and Mathematics With Applications; Vol. 5, No. 2; 1979; 117-124; #1571.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Ferejohn, John A.; "Representations of Binary Decision Rules by Generalized Decisiveness Structures"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 21, No. 1; August, 1979; 28-45; #887.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; "Effects of Abstentions on Voting Procedures in Three-Candidate Elections"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 24, No. 5; September, 1979; 346-354; #1572.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Heights of Representative Systems"; Discrete Applied Mathematics; Vol. 1, No. 3; November, 1979; 181-199; #1041.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Gehrlein, William V.; Maskin, Eric S.; "A Progress Report on Kelly's Majority Conjectures"; Economics Letters; Vol. 2, No. 4; 1979; 313-314; #1573.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Gehrlein, William V.; Maskin, Eric S.; "Condorcet Proportions and Kelly's Conjectures"; Discrete Applied Mathematics; Vol. 1, No. 4; December, 1979; 229-252; #925.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Symmetric and Consistent Aggregation With Dichotomous Voting"; Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences; edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1979; 201-218; #992.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Campbell, Donald E.; "Anonymity Conditions in Social Choice Theory"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 12, No. 1; March, 1980; 21-39; #312.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; "Robustness of Positional Scoring Over Subsets of Alternatives"; Applied Mathematics and Optimization; Vol. 6, No. 3; 1980; 241-255; #1542.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Gehrlein, William V.; "The Paradox of Voting: Effects of Individual Indifference and Intransitivity"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 14, No. 1; August, 1980; 83-94; #62.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Symmetric Social Choices and Collective Rationality"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 1, No. 1; September, 1980; 1-9; #59.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Deducing Majority Candidates from Election Data"; Social Science Research; Vol. 9, No. 3; September, 1980; 216-224; #1566.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Gehrlein, William V.; "Social Homogeneity and Condorcet's Paradox"; Public Choice; Vol. 35, Issue 4; 1980; 403-419; #61.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Inverted Orders for Monotone Scoring Rules"; Discrete Applied Mathematics; Vol. 3, No. 1; February, 1981; 27-36; #1543.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Brams, Steven J.; "Expected Utility and Approval Voting"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 26, No. 2; April, 1981; 136-142; #1549.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; "Constant Scoring Rules for Choosing One Among Many Alternatives"; Quality and Quantity; Vol. 15, No. 2; April, 1981; 203-210; #1563.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Brams, Steven J.; "Deducing Simple Majorities from Approval Voting Ballot Data"; Social Science Research; Vol. 10, No. 3; September, 1981; 256-266; #1551.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Brams, Steven J.; "Approval Voting, Condorcet's Principle and Runoff Elections"; Public Choice; Vol. 37, No. 3; 1981; 89-114; #60.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Brams, Steven J.; "Efficacy, Power and Equity Under Approval Voting"; Public Choice; Vol. 37, No. 3; 1981; 425-434; #1050.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Majority Committees"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 25, No. 2; October, 1981; 255-268; #357.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Reconstructing Voting Processes: The 1976 House Majority Leader Election"; Political Methodology; Vol. 7, Nos. 3 & 4; 1981; 95-108; #1548.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees"; SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics; Vol. 41, No. 3; December, 1981; 499-502; #1550.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; "Scoring Rule and Majority Agreements for Large Electorates with Arbitrary Preferences"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 2, No. 1; January, 1982; 23-33; #1509.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Monotonicity Paradoxes in the Theory of Elections"; Discrete Applied Mathematics; Vol. 4, No. 2; April, 1982; 119-134; #315.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Dominant Strategies and Restricted Ballots with Variable Electorates"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 2, No. 4; June, 1982; 383-395; #1521.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Gehrlein, William V.; "Majority Efficiencies for Simple Voting Procedures"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 14, No. 2; June, 1982; 141-153; #1319.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Relative Probabilities of Majority Winners Under Partial Information"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 3, No. 1; July, 1982; 73-78; #1527.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; Gopinath, B.; Lagarias, J. C.; "Optimal Pairs of Score Vectors for Positional Scoring Rules"; Applied Mathematics and Optimization; Vol. 8, No. 4; August, 1982; 309-324; #1544.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Rubinstein, Ariel; "Time Preference"; International Economic Review; Vol. 23, No. 3; October, 1982; 677-694; #325.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election"; Electoral Studies; Vol. 1, No. 3; December, 1982; 333-346; #1552.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; Approval Voting; Boston; Birkhäuser; 1982; #1048. [See review by Nurmi, review by Kilgour, and critique by Margolis] [Second edition; Springer; New York; 2007]

Fishburn, Peter C.; "A New Characterization of Simple Majority"; Economics Letters; Vol. 13, No. 1; 1983; 31-35; #219.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; "Scoring Rule Sensitivity to Weight Selection"; Public Choice; Vol. 40, No. 3; 1983; 249-261; #249.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Brams, Steven J.; "Paradoxes of Preferential Voting"; Mathematics Magazine; Vol. 56, No. 4; September, 1983; 207-214; #1539.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Research in Decision Theory: A Personal Perspective"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 5, No. 2; September, 1983; 129-148; #210.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "America's Unfair Elections"; The Sciences; Vol. 23; November-December, 1983; 28-34; #1403.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Dimensions of Election Procedures: Analyses and Comparisons"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 15, No. 4; December, 1983; 371-397; #247.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "The Electoral Innovation Debate: Prospects for Approval Voting"; Creativity and Innovation Network; Vol. 10, No. 1; January-March, 1984; 21-26; #1556.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Approval Voting"; Eastern Review; February, 1984; 27-34; #1553.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Approval Voting: One Candidate, One Vote"; Newsletter, C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at NYU; Vol. 2, No. 1; 1984; 6-9 & 12; #1554.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Probabilities of Dominant Candidates Based on First Place Votes"; Discrete Applied Mathematics; Vol. 7, No. 2; February, 1984; 131-140; #1574.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice"; SIAM Journal on Algebraic and Discrete Methods; Vol. 5, No. 2; June, 1984; 263-275; #287.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "On Harsanyi's Utilitarian Cardinal Welfare Theorem"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 17, No. 1; July, 1984; 21-28; #1110.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Letter to the Editor"; The Sciences; Vol. 24; July/August, 1984; 4-5; #1557.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Gehrlein, William V.; "Powers of Subgroups in Voting Bodies"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 2; August, 1984; 85-95; #797.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Probabilistic Social Choice Based on Simple Voting Comparisons"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 51(4), No. 167; October, 1984; 683-692; #765.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "A Careful Look at 'Another Look at Approval Voting' "; Polity; Vol. 17, No. 1; Fall, 1984; 135-143; #1555. [Comment on a paper by Arrington and Brenner]

Fishburn, Peter C.; Brams, Steven J.; "Manipulability of Voting by Sincere Truncation of Preferences"; Public Choice; Vol. 44, No. 3; 1984; 397-410; #770.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 3; October, 1984; 211-229; #791.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Some Logical Defects of the Single Transferable Vote"; Choosing an Electoral System; edited by Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman; New York; Praeger; 1984; 147-151; #1564.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "A Note on Variable-Size Legislatures to Achieve Proportional Representation"; Choosing an Electoral System; edited by Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman; New York; Praeger; 1984; 175-177; #1576.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Comment: The Problem of Strategic Voting Under Approval Voting"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 79, No. 3; September, 1985; 816-818; #777. [Comment on a paper by Niemi; see also Niemi's reply and a rejoinder by Brams and Fishburn]

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Rejoinder: The Problem of Strategic Voting Under Approval Voting"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 79, No. 3; September, 1985; 819; #778. [Rejoinder to a reply by Niemi to a Brams and Fishburn comment on a paper by Niemi]

Fishburn, Peter C.; Gehrlein, William V.; "The Power of a Cohesive Subgroup within a Voting Body"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 2, No. 3; December, 1985; 197-206; #827.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Rubinstein, Ariel; "Algebraic Aggregation Theory"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 38, No. 1; February, 1986; 63-77; #831.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Rubinstein, Ariel; "Aggregation of Equivalence Relations"; Journal of Classification; Vol. 3, No. 1; 1986; 61-65; #1540. [ See comment by Barthélemy.]

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Empirical Comparisons of Voting Procedures"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 31, No. 2; April, 1986; 82-88; #1565.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; Ord, J. Keith; "The Limiting Distribution of a Measure of Voting Power of Subgroups"; Communications in Statistics (A); Vol. 15, No. 2; 1986; 571-577; #1567.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Hwang, F. K.; Lee, Hikyu; "Do Local Majorities Force a Global Majority?"; Discrete Mathematics; Vol. 61, No. 2-3; 1986; 165-179; #1389.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; "Division of Power in Legislatures with Two Cohesive Subgroups"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 3, No. 2; July, 1986; 119-124; #1070.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Little, John D. C.; "TIMS Tests Voting Method"; OR/MS Today; Vol. 13, No. 5; October, 1986; 14-15; #1558.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Approval Voting"; TWA Ambassador; November, 1986; 17-18; #1559.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Social Choice and Pluralitylike Electoral Systems"; Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences; edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart; New York; Agathon Press; 1986; 193-202; #2212.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Review of Arrow and Hylland's Social Choice and Multicriterion Decision Making"; Journal of Classification; Vol. 4, No. 1; 1987; 129-131; #2083.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Gehrlein, William V.; "Aggregation Theory for SSB Utility Functionals"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 42, No. 2; August, 1987; 352-369; #1625.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Approval Voting"; The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions; edited by Vernon Bogdanor; Oxford; Basil Blackwell; 1987; 27; #1937.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Interprofile Conditions and Impossibility; Chur, Switzerland; Harwood Academic Publishers; 1987; #1536.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Rubinstein, Ariel; "Reply"; Journal of Classification; Vol. 5, No. 1; 1988; 88; #2066. [to comment by Barthélemy]

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; Merrill, Samuel (III); "The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen"; Public Choice; Vol. 59, No. 2; November, 1988; 121-131; #1788. [Comment on paper by Saari and Van Newenhizen; see response by Saari and Van Newenhizen; and rejoinder by Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill]

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; Merrill, Samuel (III); "Rejoinder to Saari and Van Newenhizen"; Public Choice; Vol. 59, No. 2; November, 1988; 149; #2078. [Rejoinder to response by Saari and Van Newenhizen to comment by Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill on paper by Saari and Van Newenhizen]

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Fair Cost Allocation Schemes"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 1; January, 1990; 57-69; #2153.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "A Note on Nanson's Rule: A Note"; Public Choice; Vol. 64, No. 1; January, 1990; 101-102; #2223. [Comment on paper by Niou]

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; "Linear Extension Majority Cycles on Partial Orders"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 23, Nos. 1-4; 1990; 311-322; #3035.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Gehrlein, William V.; "Linear Extension Majority Cycles for Small (n 9) Partial Orders"; Computers & Mathematics with Applications; Vol. 20, No. 2; 1990; 41-44; #3079.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Ewacha, Kevin; Gehrlein, William V.; "Linear Extension Majority Cycles in Height-1 Orders"; Order; Vol. 6, No. 4; 1990; 313-318; #3078.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Multiperson Decision Making: a Selective Review"; Multiperson Decision Making Models Using Fuzzy Sets and Possibility Theory; edited by Janusz Kacprzyk and Mario Fedrizzi; Dordrecht; Kluwer Academic Publ.; 1990; 3-27; #3077.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Signed Orders and Power Set Extensions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 56, No. 1; February, 1992; 1-19; #3108.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Notes on Craven's Conjecture"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 9, No. 3; July, 1992; 259-262; #2747. [conjecture appeared in book by Craven; see also paper by Kelly and further remarks by Craven]

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Coalition Voting"; Mathematical and Computer Modelling; Vol. 16, Nos. 8-9; September, 1992; 15-26; #3076.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Yes-No Voting"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 10, No. 1; January, 1993; 35-50; #2464.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Brams, Steven J.; "Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-majority Voting Games"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 4; September, 1996; 397-417; #3075.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Acyclic Sets of Linear Orders"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 1; January, 1997; 113-124; #2430.

Fishburn, Peter C.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Super-Arrovian Domains with Strict Preferences"; SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics; Vol. 10, No. 1; February, 1997; 83-95; #2446. [These results were extended and shapened in a paper by Samit Dasgupta.]

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Fair Division of Indivisible Items Between Two People with Identical Preferences Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and Equity"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 2; February, 2000; 247-267; #3613.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; "A Nail-biting Election"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 3; July, 2001; 409-414; #3763.

Fishburn, Peter C.; "Acyclic Sets of Linear Orders: A Progress Report"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 2; April, 2002; 431-447; #3877.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; “Voting Procedures”; In Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1; Edited by K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura; North-Holland; 2002; 173-236; #4395.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; Edelman, Paul H.; “Fair Division of Indivisible Items”; Theory and Decision; Volume 55, Number 2; September 2003; 147-180; #4626.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Fiorini, Samuel; “Weak Order Polytopes”; Discrete Mathematics; Vol. 275, No. 1-3; 2004; 111-127; #4322.

Fishburn, Peter C.; “Subcyclic Sets of Linear Orders”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 2; April, 2005; 199-210; #4275.

[Fishburn, Peter C.]; Brams, Steven J.; “Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3; December, 2005; 457-474; #4469.

Fisher, Ronald C.; "Arrow, Kenneth (Joseph)"; Thinkers of the Twentieth Century; edited by Roland Turner; Chicago and London; St. James Press; 1987 (second edition); 27-29; #3322.

Fishkin, James S.; "Review of On Democracy"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 93, No. 3; September, 1999; 698-699; #3569. [Review of book by Dahl]

Fisichella, Domenico; "The Double-Ballot System as a Weapon against Anti-System Parties"; Choosing an Electoral System; edited by Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman; New York; Praeger; 1984; 181-189; #1599.

FitzRoy, Felix R.; "Review of Collective Choice and Social Welfare [Sen]"; Kyklos; Vol. 24, No. 4; 1971; 815-818; #517.

[Flament, Claude]; Barthélemy, Jean-Pierre; Monjardet, Bernard; "Ordered Sets and Social Sciences"; Ordered Sets; edited by Ivan Rival; Dordrecht; Reidel; 1982; 721-758; #2037.

Fleckinger, Pierre; “Bayesian Improvement of the Phantom Voters Rule: An Example of Dichotomic Communication”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 55, No. 1; January 2008; 1-13; #4877.

Fleischer, I.; "Numerical Representation of Utility"; Journal of the Society of Industrial and Applied Mathematics; Vol. 9, No. 1; 1961; 48-50; #1427.

[Fleischer, Lisa K.]; Coppersmith, Don; Rurda, Atri; "Ordering by Weighted Number of Wins Gives a Good Ranking for Weighted Tournaments"; ACM Transaction on Algorithms; Vol. 6, No. 3; 2010; Art. 55; 13 pp; #5461.

Fleming, J. Marcus; "A Cardinal Concept of Welfare"; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 66, No. 3; August, 1952; 366-384; #518.

Fleming, J. Marcus; "Cardinal Welfare and Individualistic Ethics: A Comment"; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 65, No. 4; August, 1957; 355-357; #519.

Fleurbaey, Marc; "Equal Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome?"; Economics and Philosophy; Vol. 11, No. 1; April, 1995; 25-55; #2597.

Fleurbaey, Marc; "Equality and Responsibility"; European Economic Review; Vol. 39, Nos. 3-4; April, 1995; 683-689; #3109.

Fleurbaey, Marc; "The Requisites of Equal Opportunity"; Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics; edited by Barnett, William A.; Hervé Moulin; Maurice Salles; Norman Schofield; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1995; 37-53; #2548.

[Fleurbaey, Marc]; Bossert, Walter; "Redistribution and Compensation"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 3; June, 1996; 343-355; #2757.

Fleurbaey, Marc; Maniquet, François; "Fair Allocation with Unequal Production Skills: The No Envy Approach to Compensation"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 32, No. 1; August, 1996; 71-93; #2596.

Fleurbaey, Marc; "Review of H. Peyton Young's Equity: In Theory and Practice"; Economics and Philosophy; Vol. 13, No. 1; April, 1997; 128-131; #2829. [review of book by Young (2729)]

Fleurbaey, Marc; "Review of Theories of Distributive Justice [Roemer]"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 2; February, 1998; 313-319; #3210. [review of book by Roemer]

[Fleurbaey, Marc]; Laslier, Jean-François; Gravel, Nicolas; Trannoy, Alain; editors; Freedom in Economics, New Perspectives in Normative Analysis; Routledge; 1998; #3503.

[Fleurbaey, Marc]; Laslier, Jean-François; Gravel, Nicolas; Trannoy, Alain; "Introduction and Overview"; Freedom in Economics, New Perspectives in Normative Analysis; Edited by Jean-François Laslier, Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Laslier, and Alain Trannoy; Routledge; 1998; 1-13; #3504.

Fleurbaey, Marc; "Equality Among Responsible Individuals"; Freedom in Economics, New Perspectives in Normative Analysis; Edited by Jean-François Laslier, Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Laslier, and Alain Trannoy; Routledge; 1998; 206-234; #3520. [See comment by Gevers.]

Fleurbaey, Marc; Maniquet, François; "Cooperative Production with Unequal Skills: The Solidarity Approach to Compensation"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 4; August, 1999; 569-583; #3574.

[Fleurbaey, Marc]; Bossert, Walter; "Equitable Insurance Premium Schemes"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 1; January, 2002; 113-125; #3895.

Fleurbaey, Marc; Trannoy, Alain; "The Impossibility of a Paretian Egalitarian"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 2; October, 2003; 243-263; #4183.

Fleurbaey, Marc; "On the Informational Basis of Social Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 2; October, 2003; 347-384; #4188.

Fleurbaey, Marc; Tungodden, Bertil; Chang, Howard F.; "Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle: A Comment"; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 111, Issue 6; December, 2003; 1382-1385; [Comment on paper by Kaplow and Shavell; see reply by Kaplow and Shavell; #4231.

Fleurbaey, Marc; Suzumura, Kotaro; Tadenuma, Koichi; “Arrovian Aggregation in Economic Environments: How Much Should We Know about Indifference Surfaces?”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 124, No. 1; 2005; 22-44; #4660.

Fleurbaey, Marc; Maniquet, François; Fair Social Orderings When Agents Have Unequal Production Skills”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 1; February, 2005; 93-127; #4271.

Fleurbaey, Marc; Suzumura, Kotaro; Tadenuma, Koichi; “The Informational Basis of the Theory of Fair Allocation”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 2; April, 2005; 311-341; #4281.

Fleurbaey, Marc; Mongin, Philippe; “The News of the Death of Welfare Economics Is Greatly Exaggerated”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3; December, 2005; 381-418; #4466.

Fleurbaey, Marc; “Two Criteria for Social Decisions”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 134, No. 1; 2007; 421-447; #4814.

Fleurbaey, Marc; “Social Choice and the Indexing Dilemma”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 29, No. 4; December, 2007; 633-648; #4683.

Fleurbaey, Marc; Maniquet, François; “Fair Social Orderings”; Economic Theory; Vol. 34, No. 1; 2008; 25-45; #4793.

Fleurbaey, Marc; "Review of Kaplow's The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 1; June, 2009; 173-176; #5146.

Fleurbaey, Marc; "Two Variants of Harsanyi's Aggregation Theorem"; Economics Letters; Vol. 105, No. 3; 2009; 300-302; #5294.

Fleurbaey, Marc; Tungodden, Bertil; "The Tyranny of Non-aggregation versus the Tyranny of Aggregation in Social Choices: A Real Dilemma"; Economic Theory; Vol. 44, No. 3; September, 2010; 399-414; #5349.

Fodor, János C.; Ovchinnikov, Sergei V.; "On Aggregation of T-transitive Fuzzy Binary Relations"; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 72, No. 2; June 9, 1995; 135-145; #2862.

Fogarty, T. M.; "A Limited Possibility Result for Social Choice Under Majority Voting"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 14, No. 4; December, 1982; 361-372; #1322.

Foley, Duncan; "Resource Allocation and the Public Sector"; Yale Economic Essays; Vol. 7, No. 1; Spring, 1967; 45-98; #3787.

[Fong, Pohan]; Diermeier, Daniel; "Bargaining over the Budget"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 3; April, 2011; 565-589; #5412.

[Fong, Pohan]; Baron, David P.; Diermeier, Daniel; "A Dynamic Theory of Parliamentary Democracy"; Economic Theory; Vol. 49, No. 3; April, 2012; 703-738; #5607.

Fono, Louis Aimé; Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel; “Fuzzy Strict Preference and Social Choice”; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 155, No. 3; 2005; 372-389; #4661.

Fono, Louis Aimé; Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel; “Utility Function of Fuzzy Preferences on a Countable Set under Max-*-transitivity”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 4; June, 2007; 667-683; #4590.

Fono, Louis Aimé; Salles, Maurice; "Continuity of Utility Functions Representing Fuzzy Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 669-682; #5521.

Forges, Françoise ; "Review of Cooperation: Game-Theory Approaches [edited by S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell]"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 4; August, 1998; 593-596; #3296.

Forges, Françoise; “Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 2; April, 2006; 403-419; #4484.

Forman, Robin; Laing, James D.; "Metastability and Solid Solutions of Collective Decisions"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 2, No. 4; June, 1982; 397-420; #1522.

[Formby, John P.]; Beckman, Steven R.; Smith, W. James; Zheng, Buhong; "Envy, Malice and Pareto Efficiency: An Experimental Examination"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 2; April, 2002; 349-367; #3873.

Foroughi, A. A.; Jones, D. F.; Tamiz, M.; “A Selection Method for a Preferential Election”; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 163, No. 1; 2005; 107-116; #4323.

Forsythe, Robert; Myerson, Roger B.; Rietz, Thomas A.; Weber, Robert J.; "An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 10, No. 3; July, 1993; 223-247; #2736.

Fort, Rodney; Bunn, Douglas N.; "Whether One Votes and How One Votes"; Public Choice; Vol. 95, Nos. 1-2; April, 1998; 51-62; #3326.

[Foster, James E.]; Stevens, Dana N.; "The Possibility of Democratic Pluralism"; Economica; Vol. 45, No. 180; November, 1978; 401-406; #369.

Foster, James E.; Greer, Joel; Thorbecke, Erik; "A Class of Decomposable Poverty Measures"; Econometrica; Vol. 52, No. 3; May, 1984; 761-766; #3112.

Foster, James E.; Shorrocks, Anthony F.; "Poverty Orderings"; Econometrica; Vol. 56, No. 1; January, 1988; 173-177; #3110.

Foster, James E.; Shorrocks, Anthony F.; "Inequality and Poverty Orderings"; European Economic Review; Vol. 32, Nos. 2-3; March, 1988; 654-661; #3111.

Foster, James E.; Shorrocks, Anthony F.; "Poverty Orderings and Welfare Dominance"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 5, Nos. 2/3; August, 1988; 179-198; #2005.

Foster, James E.; Ok, Efe A.; "Lorenz Dominance and the Variance of Logarithms"; Econometrica; Vol. 67, No. 4; July, 1999; 901-907; #3714.

[Foster, James E.]; Dutta, Indranil; Mishra, Ajit; "On Measuring Vulnerability to Poverty"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 743-761; #5526.

Fountain, John; "Bowley's Analysis of Bilateral Monopoly and Sen's Liberal Paradox in Collective Choice Theory: A Note"; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 94, No. 3; June, 1980; 809-812; #167.

Fountain, John; Suzumura, Kotaro; "Collective Choice Rules Without the Pareto Principle"; International Economic Review; Vol. 23, No. 2; June, 1982; 299-308; #364.

Fountain, John; "A Production Theory Perspective on Collective Choice Theory"; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 99, No. 4; November, 1984; 673-691; #389.

[Fragnelli, Vito]; Ambrosino, Daniela; Marina, Maria E.; “Resolving an Insurance Allocation Problem: A Procedural Approach”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 3; June, 2006; 625-643; #4508.

[Fragnelli, Vito]; Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquín; "Two-sided Market Situations with Existing Contracts"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 2; February, 2010; 295-313; #5175.

[François, Patrick]; Creedy, John; "Higher Education and Progressive Taxation: Equity, Efficiency and Majority Voting"; Journal of Economic Studies; Vol. 19, No. 4; 1992; 17-30; #3165.

[Frank, Arthur Q.]; Niemi, Richard G.; "Sophisticated Voting Under the Plurality Procedure"; Political Equilibrium; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle; Boston; Kluwer-Nijhoff; 1982; 151-172; #1358.

[Frank, Arthur Q.]; Niemi, Richard G.; "Sophisticated Voting Under the Plurality Procedure: A Test of a New Definition"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 19, No. 2; September, 1985; 151-162; #1328.

[Franklin, Mark]; Niemi, Richard G.; Whitten, Guy; "Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1989 British General Election"; British Journal of Political Science; Vol. 22, Part 2; April, 1992; 229-254; #2892. [see comment by Evans and Heath, reply by Franklin, Niemi, and Whitten, and rejoinder by Evans and Heath]

Franklin, Mark; Niemi, Richard G.; Whitten, Guy; "The Two Faces of Tactical Voting"; British Journal of Political Science; Vol. 24, Part 4; October, 1994; 549-557; #2956. [Reply to Evans and Heath comment on paper by Niemi, Whitten, and Franklin; see rejoinder by Evans and Heath]

Frederickson, Jesper S.; Machol, Robert E.; "Reduction of Paradoxes in Subjectively Judged Competitions"; European Journal of Operational Research; Vol. 35, No. 1; April, 1988; 16-29; #1974.

Freixas, Josep; Zwicker, William S.; "Weighted Voting, Abstention, and Multiple Levels of Approval"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 3; December, 2003 399-431; #4191.

Freixas, Josep; “Banzhaf Measures for Games with Several Levels of Approval in the Input and Output”; Contributions to the Theory of Games; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 137; 2005; 45-66; #4641.

[Freixas, Josep]; Carreras-Escobar, Francesco; “On Power Distribution in Weighted Voting”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 2; April, 2005; 269-282; #4279.

Freixas, Josep; Pons, Montserrat; “Circumstantial Power: Optimal Persuadable Voters”; European Journal of Operations Research; Vol. 186, No. 3; 2008; 1114-1126; #4775.

Freixas, Josep; Molinero, Xavier; "On the Existence of a Minimum Integer Representation for Weighted Voting Systems"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 166; 2009; 243-260; #5115.

Freixas, Josep; Molinero, Xavier; "On the Existence of a Minimum Integer Representation for Weighted Voting Systems"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 166; 2009; 243-260; #5207.

Freixas, Josep; Zwicker, William S.; "Anonymous Yes-No Voting with Abstention and Multiple Levels of Approval"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 67, No. 2; November, 2009; 428-444; #5380.

Freixas, Josep; "Probabilistic Power Indices for Voting Rules with Abstention"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 64, No. 1; July, 2012; 89-99; #5594.

Freixas, Xavier; "A Cardinal Approach to Straightforward Probabilistic Mechanisms"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 34, No. 2; December, 1974; 227-251; #771.

[French, Simon]; Vassiloglu, M.; "Arrow's Theorem and Examination Assessment"; British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology; Vol. 35, Part 2; November, 1982; 183-192; #1647.

French, Simon; Decision Theory: An Introduction to the Mathematics of Rationality; New York; Halsted Press; 1986; [Chapter 8: Group Decisions and Social Choice]; #1648.

Frey, Bruno S.; "Review of Pattanaik's Voting and Collective Choice" [In German]; Kyklos; Vol. 25, No. 4; 1972; 895-896; #520.

Frey, Bruno S.; "Do People Care About Democracy? Comment"; Public Choice; Vol. 91, No. 1; April, 1997; 53-55; #3377. [Comment on paper by Weck-Hannemann and Güth]

Frey, Bruno S.; "Tullock Challenges: Happiness, Revolutions, and Democracy"; Public Choice; Vol. 148, No. 3-4; September, 2011; 269-281; #5651.

Frey, Bruno S.; Stutzer, Alois; "The Use of Happiness Research for Public Policy"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 4; April, 2012; 659-674; #5565.

[Frickey, Philip P.]; Farber, Daniel A.; "The Jurisprudence of Public Choice"; Texas Law Review; Vol. 65, No. 5; April, 1987; 873-927; #3268.

[Frickey, Philip P.]; Farber, Daniel A.; "Legislative Intent and Public Choice"; Virginia Law Review; Vol. 74, No. 2; March, 1988; 423-469; #3435.

Friedgut, Ehud; Kalai, Gil; Keller, Nathan; Nisan, Noam; "A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives"; SIAM Journal on Computing; Vol. 40, No. 3; 2011; 934-952; #5727.

Friedland, Edward I.; Cimbala, Stephen J.; "Process and Paradox: The Significance of Arrow's Theorem"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 4, No. 1; September, 1973; 51-64; #521.

Friedman, David; "Many, Few, One: Social Harmony and the Shrunken Choice Set"; American Economic Review; Vol. 70, No. 1; March, 1980; 225-232; #148.

Friedman, Jane; McGrath, Lynn; Parker, Cameron; “Achievable Hierarchies in Voting Games”; Theory and Decision; Vol. 61, No. 4; 2006; 305-318; #4743.

[Friedman, Jane]; Bean, Dwight; Parker, Cameron; "Simple Majority Achievable Hierarchies"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 65, No. 4; December, 2008; 285-302; #5066.

Friedman, Jane; Parker, Cameron; "Can an Asymmetric Power Structure Always Be Achieved?"; Communicating Mathematics; edited by Timothy Y Chow and Daniel C. Isakson; American Mathematical Society; Providence, RI; 2009; 87-98; #5199.

[Friedman, Jane]; Bean, Dwight R.; Parker, Cameron; "Proportional Quota Weighted Voting System Hierarchies"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 3; March, 2010; 397-410; #5181.

Fristrup, Peter; Keiding, Hans; "A Note on Asymptotical Strategy-Proofness"; Economic Letters; Vol. 31, No. 4; December, 1989; 307-312; #2235.

Fristrup, Peter; Keiding, Hans; "Minimal Manipulability and Interjacency for Two-Person Social Choice Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 3; May, 1998; 455-467; #3258.

Fristrup, Peter; Keiding, Hans; "Strongly Implementable Social Choice Correspondences and the Supernucleus"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 2; April, 2001; 213-226; #3754.

Frohock, Fred M.; "Rationality, Morality and Impossibility Theorems"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 74, No. 2; June, 1980; 373-384; #1385.

Frohock, Fred M.; Rational Association; Syracuse; Syracuse University Press; 1987; #1258. [See review by Grafstein]

[Fu, King Sun]; Blin, Jean-Marie; Whinston, Andrew B.; "Application of Pattern Recognition to Some Problems in Economics"; Techniques of Optimization; edited by A. V. Balakrishnan; New York; Academic Press; 1972; 3-20; #1827.

[Fu, King Sun]; Blin, Jean-Marie; Moberg, Kenneth B.; Whinston, Andrew B.; "Optimization Theory and Social Choice"; Proceedings of the Sixth Hawaiian International Conference on Systems Sciences. Supplement on Urban and Regional Systems: Modelling Analysis and Decision Making; edited by Art Lew; Western Periodicals Co.; 1973; 158-161; #1649.

Fu, Qiang; Lu, Jingfeng; "Micro Foundations of Multi-prize Lottery Contests: a Perspective of Noisy Performance ranking"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 3; March, 2012; 497-517; #5554.

Fuchs-Seliger, Susanne; "Duality in the Theory of Social Choice"; Selected Topics in Operations Research and Mathematical Economics; edited by Gerald Hammer and Diethard Pallaschke; Berlin; Springer Verlag Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems No. 226; 1984; 193-204; #295.

Fuchs-Seliger, Suzanne; "Rational Budgeters in the Theory of Social Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 3, No. 3; September, 1986; 161-176; #1072.

Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.; "Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems"; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Vol. 81, No. 2; February, 2012; 606-612; #5634.

Fujiwara, Takako; "Collective Choice Rules and Bargaining Solutions"; Keio Economic Studies; Vol. 25, No. 1; 1988; 39-49; #3552.

[Fujiwara, Toru]; Nakanishi, Toru; Watanabe, Hajime; "A Linkable Group Signature and its Application to Secret Voting"; Information Processing Society of Japan. Transactions; Vol. 40, No. 7; 1999; 3085-3096; #3909.


A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z