A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z


Gabbay, Dov M.; Szalas, Andrzej; "Voting by Eliminating Quantifiers"; Studia Logica; Vol. 92, No. 3; 2009; 365-379; #5299.

Gächter, Simon; Riedl, Arno; “Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims: Normative Judgments and Actual Negotiations”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 3; December, 2006; 571-594; #4549.

Gaertner, Wulf; "Zum Problem der Existenz von Sozialen Wohlfahrtsfunktionen im Sinne von Arrow"; Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft; Vol. 133, No. 1; January, 1977; 61-74; #1345.

Gaertner, Wulf; Heinecke, Achim; "On Two Sufficient Conditions for Transitivity of the Social Preference Relation"; Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 37, Nos. 1-2; April, 1977; 61-66; #88.

Gaertner, Wulf; "über Kenneth Arrows allgemeines Unmöglichkeits theorem und einige Auswege aus dem Dilemma"; Jahrbüch für Sozialwissenschaft; Vol. 29, No. 3; 1978; 288-310; #1635.

Gaertner, Wulf; "Some Remarks on the Optimal Choice Function Concept"; Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik; Vol. 192, No. 6; 1978; 556-566; #1638.

Gaertner, Wulf; Heinecke, Achim; "Cyclically Mixed Preferences - A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Transitivity of the Social Preference Relation"; Decision Theory and Social Ethics; edited by Hans W. Gottinger and Werner Leinfellner; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1978; 169-186; #1119.

Gaertner, Wulf; "An Analysis and Comparison of Several Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Transitivity Under the Majority Decision Rule"; Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences; edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1979; 91-112; #985. [See comment by Weddepohl]

Gaertner, Wulf; Krüger, Lorenz; "Self-Supporting Preferences and Individual Rights: The Possibility of a Paretian Liberal"; Economica; Vol. 48, No. 189; February, 1981; 17-28; #168.

Gaertner, Wulf; "Rawlsianism, Utilitarianism and Profiles of Extended Orderings"; Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft; Vol. 137, No. 1; March, 1981; 78-96; #1636.

Gaertner, Wulf; Salles, Maurice; "Procédures d'agrégation avec domaines restreints et théorèmes d'existence"; Analyse et agrégation des préférences; edited by Pierre Batteau, Eric Jacquet-Lagrèze and Bernard Monjardet; Paris; Economica; 1981; 75-122; #1360.

Gaertner, Wulf; "Envy-Free Rights Assignments and Self-Oriented Preferences"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 2, No. 2; March, 1982; 199-208; [Erratum: Vol. 3, No. 3; October, 1982; p. 311.]; #1633.

Gaertner, Wulf; Krüger, Lorenz; "The Mixed Libertarian Claim: A Possibility Among Impossibility Results"; Economics Letters; Vol. 10, Nos. 3/4; 1982; 211-215; #326.

Gaertner, Wulf; Krüger, Lorenz; "How to Reconcile Individual Rights With Collective Action"; Philosophy of Economics; edited by Wolfgang Stegmüller; Springer Verlag; 1982; 280-304; #338.

Gaertner, Wulf; "Equity- and Inequity- Type Borda Rules"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 4, No. 2; April, 1983; 137-154; #275.

[Gaertner, Wulf]; Krüger, Lorenz; "Alternative Libertarian Claims and Sen's Paradox"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 15, No. 3; September, 1983; 211-229; #272.

Gaertner, Wulf; "Societal Opposition on Ethical Grounds and the Liberal Paradox"; Economics Letters; Vol. 15, Nos. 1/2; 1984; 47-51; #276.

Gaertner, Wulf; "Justice Constrained Libertarian Claims and Pareto Efficient Collective Decisions"; Erkenntnis; Vol. 23, No. 1; May, 1985; 1-17; #1637.

Gaertner, Wulf; "Pareto, Interdependent Rights Exercising and Strategic Behavior"; Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 46, Supplemental No. 5; December, 1986; 79-98; #1634.

Gaertner, Wulf; "Über kollecktive Entscheidungen, Wohlfahrt und Verteilungsgerechtigkeit"; Wissenschaftkollege Jahrbuch 1985/86; edited by Peter Wapnewski; Berlin; Siedler Verlag; 1987; 119-132; #1632.

Gaertner, Wulf; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "An Interview with Amartya Sen"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 5, No. 1; March, 1988; 69-79; #1943.

Gaertner, Wulf; "Binary Inversions and Transitive Majorities"; Measurement in Economics: Theory and Applications of Economic Indices; Eichhorn, Wolfgang, editor; Heidelberg; Physica; 1988; 153-167; #2868.

Gaertner, Wulf; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; editors; Distributive Justice and Inequality; New York; Berlin; London and Tokyo; Springer; 1988; #2819.

Gaertner, Wulf; "Positionalist Aggregation Functions and Distributive Justice"; Optimal Decisions in Markets and Planned Economies; Quandt, Richard E.; Triska, Dusan, editors; Boulder, Colo. and London; Westview Press; 1990; 173-188; #2834.

Gaertner, Wulf; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Suzumura, Kotaro; "Individual Rights Revisited"; Economica; Vol. 59, No. 234; May, 1992; 161-177; #1981.

Gaertner, Wulf; "Review of An Essay on Rights [Steiner, Hillel]"; The Economic Journal; Vol. 105, No. 433; 1995; 1656-1658; #2883. [review of book by Steiner]

Gaertner, Wulf; Xu, Yongsheng; "Optimization and External Reference: A Comparison of Three Axiomatic Systems"; Economics Letters; Vol. 57, No. 1; 28 November 1997; 57-62; #3307.

Gaertner, Wulf; "The Functions of Social Choice Theory: Discussion"; Social Choice Re-Examined, Vol. 1; edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 10-14; #3149. [discussion of a paper by Arrow]

Gaertner, Wulf; Xu, Yongsheng; "On Rationalizability of Choice Functions: A Characterization of the Median"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 4; August, 1999; 629-638; #3578.

Gaertner, Wulf; Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 2001; [See review by Razzolini and review by Merlin]; #4150.

Gaertner, Wulf; Jungeilges, Jochen; "Evaluation via Extended Orderings: Empirical Findings from Western and Eastern Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 1; January, 2002; 29-55; #3891.

Gaertner, Wulf; “Domain Restrictions”; In Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1; Edited by K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura; North-Holland; 2002; 131-170; #4394.

Gaertner, Wulf; Xu, Yongsheng; "Procedural Choice"; Economic Theory; Vol. 24, No. 2; August, 2004; 335-349; #4163.

Gaertner, Wulf; “De Jure Naturae et Gentium: Samuel von Pufendorf's Contribution to Social Choice Theory and Economics”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3; December, 2005; 231-241; #4458.

Gaertner, Wulf; A Primer in Social Choice Theory; Oxford; Oxford University Press; 2006; #4705. [See review by Baujard.]

[Gaertner, Wulf]; Amiel, Yoram; Cowell, Frank A.; "To Be or Not to Be Involved: a Questionnaire-experimental View on Harsanyi's Utilitarian Ethics"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 32, No. 2; February, 2009; 299-316; #4983.

Gaertner, Wulf; Xu, Yongsheng; "Reference-dependent Rankings of Sets in Characteristics Space"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 717-728; #5524.

Gaertner, Wulf; Xu, Yongsheng; "A General Scoring Rule"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 63, No. 3; May, 2012; 193-196; #5602.

Gagliarducci, Stefano; Nannicini, Tommaso; Naticchioni, Paolo; "Electoral Rules and Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test"; American Economic Journal: Economic Policy; Vol. 3, No. 3; August, 2011; 144-174; #5654.

Gajdos, Thibault; Weymark, John A.; “Multidimensional Generalized Gini Indices”; Economic Theory; Vol. 26, No. 3; 2005; 471-496; #4662.

Gajdos, Thibault; Kandil, Feriel; "The Ignorant Observer"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 2; August, 2008; 193-232; #4939.

Galam, Serge; “Contrarian Deterministic Effects on Opinion Dynamics: ‘The Hung Elections Scenario’”; Physica A. Statistical Mechanics and its Applications; Vol. 333, No. 1-4; 2004; 453-460; #4324.

Galambos, Ádám; Reiner, Victor; “Acyclic Sets of Linear Orders via the Bruhat Orders”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 2; February, 2008; 245-264; #4696.

[Galderisi, Peter]; Goetze, David; "Explaining Collective Action with Rational Models"; Public Choice; Vol. 62, No. 1; July, 1989; 25-39; #2346.

[Gale, David]; Alkan, Ahmet; Demange, Gabrielle; "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice"; Econometrica; Vol. 59, No. 4; July, 1991; 1023-1039; #3564.

[Galeotti, Gianluigi]; Breton, Albert; "Is Proportional Representation Always the Best Electoral Rule?"; Public Finance; Vol. 40, No. 1; 1985; 1-16; #779.

Gallego, Maria E.; Schofield, Norman; Kilgour, D. Marc; "Guest Editors' Introduction to the Special Issue on the Political Economy of Elections and Bargaining"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 3; April, 2011; 355-364; #5404.

[Gallego, Maria E.]; Schofield, Norman; Ozdemir, Ugur; Zakharov, Alexei; "Competition for Popular Support: A Valence Model of Elections in Turkey"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 3; April, 2011; 451-482; #5408.

Gallego, Maria E.; Scoones, David; "Intergovernmental Negotiation, Willingness to Compromise, and Voter Preference Reversals"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 3; April, 2011; 591-610; #5413.

Galton, Francis; "One Vote, One Value"; Nature; Vol. 75; 28 February 1907; 414; #1224.

Galton, Francis; "Vox Populi"; Nature; Vol. 75; 7 March 1907; 450-451; #106.

Galton, Francis; "The Ballot Box"; Nature; Vol. 75; 28 March 1907; 509-510; #118.

Gambarelli, Gianfranco; "Common Behavior of Power Indices"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 12, Issue 4; 1983; 237-244; #262.

Gambarelli, Gianfranco; Uristani, Angelo; "Multicameral Voting Cohesion Games"; Central European Journal of Operations Research; Vol. 17, No. 4; 2009; 433-460; #5436.

Gandjour, Afschin; "Mutual Dependency Between Capabilities and Functionings in Amartya Sen's Capability approach"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 2; August, 2008; 345-350; #4947.

Gans, Joshua S.; Smart, Michael; "Majority Voting with Single-Crossing Preferences"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 59, No. 2; February, 1996; 219-237; #4068.

[García, Estefanía]; Jimeno, José L.; Pérez, Joaquín; "An Extension of the Moulin No Show Paradox for Voting Correspondences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 3; September, 2009; 343-359; #5155.

[García, Estefanía]; Jimeno, José L.; Pérez, Joaquín; "Extensions of the Young and Levenglick Result about the Inconsistency of Condorcet Voting"Correspondences; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 62, No. 1; July, 2011; 25-27; #5661.

[García, Iñaki]; Calvo, Emilio; Gutiérrez, Esther; "Scoring Rules: a Cooperative Game-theoretic Approach"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 3; May, 1999; 491-512; #3446.

[García-Lapresta, José Luis]; Llamazares, Bonifacio; "Aggregation of Fuzzy Preferences: Some Rules of the Mean"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 4; August, 2000; 673-690; #3673.

García-Lapresta, José Luis; Llamazares, Bonifacio; "Majority Decisions Based on Difference of Votes"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 35, No. 3; June, 2001; 463-481; #3846.

[Garcia-Lapresta, José Luis]; Rodríguez-Palmero, Carlos; “Maximal Elements for Irreflexive Binary Relations on Compact Sets”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 43, No. 1; January, 2002; 55-60; #4897.

Garcia-Lapresta, José Luis; Martinez-Panero, Miguel; “Borda Count versus Approval Voting: A Fuzzy Approach”; Public Choice; Vol. 112, No. 1-2; July, 2002; 167-184; #4837.

García-Lapresta, José Luis; “A General Class of Simple Majority Decision Rules Based on Linguistic Opinions”; Information Sciences; Vol. 176, No. 4; 2006; 352-365; #4785.

García-Lapresta, José Luis; Marley, A. A. J.; Martínez-Panero, Miguel; "Characterizing Best-Worst Voting Systems in the Scoring Context"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 3; March, 2010; 487-496; #5187.

[García-Lapresta, José Luis]; Falcó, Edurne; "A Distance-based Extension of the Majority Judgement Voting System"; Acta Universitatis Matthiae Belii. Series Mathematics; Vol. 18; 2011; 17-27; #5696.

[Garcia Mesa, Nuris]; Ruiz Shulcloper, José; Ponce de León Senti, Eunice; López, Nancy; Barros Barreras, Maria Amelia; Cobo Monzón, Eldis; "ALVOT: A System of Programs of Voting Algorithms for Classification"; Revista Ciencias Matemáticas; Vol. 7, No. 1; 1986; 83-95; #1910.

[Garcia-Molina, Hector]; Barbara, Daniel; "The Reliability of Voting Mechanisms"; IEEE Transactions on Computers; Vol. 36, No. 10; October, 1987; 1197-1208; #1909.

[García-Sanz, María D.]; Alcantud, José C. R.; "Paretian Evaluation of Infinite Utility Streams: An Egalitarian Criterion"; Economics Letters; Vol. 106, No. 3; 2010; 209-211; #5281.

Gärdenfors, Peter; "Positionalist Voting Functions"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 4, No. 1; September, 1973; 1-24; #522.

Gärdenfors, Peter; "Manipulation of Social Choice Functions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 13, No. 2; October, 1976; 217-228; #523.

Gärdenfors, Peter; "A Concise Proof of a Theorem on the Manipulation of Social Choice Functions"; Public Choice; Vol. 32; Winter, 1977; 137-142; #122.

Gärdenfors, Peter; "Fairness Without Interpersonal Comparisons"; Theoria; Vol. 44, Part 2; 1978; 57-74; #3788.

Gärdenfors, Peter; "On Definitions of Manipulation of Social Choice Functions"; Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences; edited by Jeam-Jacques Laffont; Amsterdam; North Holland; 1979; 29-36; #123.

Gärdenfors, Peter; "Rights, Games and Social Choice"; Noûs; Vol. 15, No. 3; September, 1981; 341-356; #653.

Gärdenfors, Peter; "On the Information about Individual Utilities Used in Social Choice"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 4, No. 3; July, 1983; 219-228; #237.

Gärdenfors, Peter; Pettit, Philip; "The Impossibility of a Paretian Loyalist"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 27, No. 3; November, 1989; 207-216; #3032.

Gardner, Roy; "The Borda Game"; Public Choice; Vol. 30; Summer, 1977; 43-50; #965.

Gardner, Roy; "The Strategic Inconsistency of Paretian Liberalism"; Public Choice; Vol. 35, No. 2; 1980; 241-252; #180.

[Gardner, Roy]; Breyer, Friedrich; "Liberal Paradox, Game Equilibrium and Gibbard Optimum"; Public Choice; Vol. 35, No. 4; 1980; 469-481; #90.

Gardner, Roy; "The Borda Game: A Correction"; Public Choice; Vol. 37, No. 2; 1981; 375-376; #2896. [correction to his earlier paper]

Gardner, Roy; "Variation of the Electorate: Veto and Purge"; Public Choice; Vol. 40, No. 3; 1983; 237-247; #248.

Gardner, Roy; "Rationing, Bargaining, and Voting in 2-Sided Markets?"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 2, No. 1; May, 1985; 39-48; #798.

Garg, Dinesh; Narahari, Y.; Gujar, Sujit; "Foundations of Mechanism Design: a Tutorial. I. Key Concepts and Classical Results"; Sādhanā; Vol. 33, No. 2; 2008; 83-130; #5095.

Garg, Dinesh; Narahari, Y.; Gujar, Sujit; "Foundations of Mechanism Design: a Tutorial. II. Advanced Concepts and Results"; Sādhanā; Vol. 33, No. 2; 2008; 131-174; #5094.

Garman, Mark; Kamien, Morton; "The Paradox of Voting: Probability Calculations"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 13, No. 4; July, 1968; 306-316; #524.

Garrett, Geoffrey M.; McLean, Iain; Machover, Moshé; "Power, Power Indices, and Blocking Power: A Comment on Johnston"; British Journal of Political Science; Vol. 25, Part 4; October, 1995; 563-568; #3231.

[Garriga-Picó, José E.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Bandwagons in Coalition Formation: The 2/3's Rule"; American Behavioral Scientist; Vol. 18, No. 4; March/April, 1975; 472-496; #1777.

[Gasmi, F.]; Banks, Jeffrey S.; "Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 4, No. 2; June, 1987; 133-152; #1534.

Gasparini, Leonardo C.; "On the Measurement of Unfairness an Application to High School Attendance in Argentina"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 4; October, 2002; 795-810; #3980.

Gaspart, Frédéric; "Objective Measures of Well-being and the Cooperative Production Problem"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 1; January, 1998; 95-112; #3192.

Gaspart, Frédéric; "A General Concept of Procedural Fairness for One-stage Implementation"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 2; October, 2003; 311-322; #4186.

[Gassner, Marjorie]; De Meur, Gisèle; "Problems of Equity in Multiparty Representational Systems: What We Want and What We Can't"; The Logic of Multiparty Systems; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Dordrecht; Kluwer; 1987; 391-404; #2076.

Gauthier, David P.; "Social Choice and Distributive Justice"; Philosophia; Vol. 7, No. 2; June, 1978; 239-253; #1054.

Gavious, Arieh; Mizrahi, Shlomo; "A Continuous Time Model of the Bandwagon Effect in Collective Action"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 1; January, 2001; 91-105; #3730.

Gavious, Arieh; Mizrahi, Shlomo; "A Signaling Model of Peaceful Political Change"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 1; February, 2003; 119-136; #3995.

Geanakoplos, John; “Three Brief Proofs of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem”; Economic Theory; Vol. 26, No. 1; 2005; 211-215; #4663.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "An Analysis of Simple Two-Stage Voting Systems"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 21, No. 1; January, 1976; 1-12; #1561.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "An Analysis of Voting Procedures with Nonranked Voting"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 22, No. 3; May, 1976; 178-185; #1562.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Borda's Rule, Positional Voting and Condorcet's Simple Majority Principle"; Public Choice; Vol. 28; 1976; 79-88; #1231.

Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Condorcet's Paradox and Anonymous Preference Profiles"; Public Choice; Vol. 26; Summer, 1976; 1-18; #1276.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Win Probabilities and Simple Majorities in Probabilistic Voting Situations"; Mathematical Programming; Vol. 11, No. 1; August, 1976; 28-41; #1575.

Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "The Probability of the Paradox of Voting: A Computable Solution"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 13, No. 1; August, 1976; 14-25; #1569.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Collective Rationality versus Distribution of Power for Binary Social Choice Functions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 15, No. 1; June, 1977; 72-91; #752.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Towards a Theory of Elections with Probabilistic Preferences"; Econometrica; Vol. 45, No. 8; November, 1977; 1907-1924; #55.

Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "The Effects of Abstentions on Election Outcomes"; Public Choice; Vol. 33, No. 2; 1978; 69-82; #1570.

Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Coincidence Probabilities for Simple Majority and Positionalist Voting Rules"; Social Science Research; Vol. 7, No. 3; September, 1978; 272-283; #1063.

Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Probabilities of Election Outcomes for Large Electorates"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 19, No. 1; October, 1978; 38-49; #58.

Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Proportions of Profiles with a Majority Candidate"; Computers and Mathematics With Applications; Vol. 5, No. 2; 1979; 117-124; #1571.

Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Effects of Abstentions on Voting Procedures in Three-Candidate Elections"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 24, No. 5; September, 1979; 346-354; #1572.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; Maskin, Eric S.; "A Progress Report on Kelly's Majority Conjectures"; Economics Letters; Vol. 2, No. 4; 1979; 313-314; #1573. [Conjectures are from a paper by Kelly]

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; Maskin, Eric; "Condorcet Proportions and Kelly's Conjectures"; Discrete Applied Mathematics; Vol. 1, No. 4; December, 1979; 229-252; #925. [Conjectures are from a paper by Kelly]

Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Robustness of Positional Scoring Over Subsets of Alternatives"; Applied Mathematics and Optimization; Vol. 6, No. 3; 1980; 241-255; #1542.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "The Paradox of Voting: Effects of Individual Indifference and Intransitivity"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 14, No. 1; August, 1980; 83-94; #62.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Social Homogeneity and Condorcet's Paradox"; Public Choice; Vol. 35, Issue 4; 1980; 403-419; #61.

Gehrlein, William V.; "Expected Probability of Condorcet's Paradox"; Economics Letters; Vol. 7, No. 1; 1981; 33-37; #1493.

Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Constant Scoring Rules for Choosing One Among Many Alternatives"; Quality and Quantity; Vol. 15, No. 2; April, 1981; 203-210; #1563.

Gehrlein, William V.; "Borda Efficiency of Constant Scoring Rules with Large Electorates"; R.A.I.R.O. - Recherche Operationelle; Vol. 15, No. 3; Août, 1981; 287-296; #1765.

Gehrlein, William V.; "Single-stage Election Procedures for Large Electorates"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 8, No. 3; October, 1981; 263-275; #64.

Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Scoring Rule and Majority Agreements for Large Electorates with Arbitrary Preferences"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 2, No. 1; January, 1982; 23-33; #1509.

Gehrlein, William V.; "Condorcet Efficiency and Constant Scoring Rules"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 2, No. 2; March, 1982; 123-130; #1511.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Majority Efficiencies for Simple Voting Procedures"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 14, No. 2; June, 1982; 141-153; #1319.

Gehrlein, William V.; Gopinath, B.; Lagarias, J. C.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Optimal Pairs of Score Vectors for Positional Scoring Rules"; Applied Mathematics and Optimization; Vol. 8, No. 4; August, 1982; 309-324; #1544.

Gehrlein, William V.; "Condorcet's Paradox"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 15, No. 2; June, 1983; 161-197; #202.

Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Scoring Rule Sensitivity to Weight Selection"; Public Choice; Vol. 40, No. 3; 1983; 249-261; #249.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Powers of Subgroups in Voting Bodies"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 2; August, 1984; 85-95; #797.

Gehrlein, William V.; "Condorcet Efficiency of Constant Scoring Rules For Large Electorates"; Economics Letters; Vol. 19, No. 1; 1985; 13-15; #857.

Gehrlein, William V.; "The Condorcet Criterion and Committee Selection"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 10, No. 3; December, 1985; 199-209; #799.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "The Power of a Cohesive Subgroup within a Voting Body"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 2, No. 3; December, 1985; 197-206; #827.

Gehrlein, William V.; "Weighted Scoring Rules, the Impartial Culture Condition, and Homogeneity"; Quality and Quantity; Vol. 20, No. 1; February, 1986; 85-107; #1766.

Gehrlein, William V.; Ord, J. Keith; Fishburn, Peter C.; "The Limiting Distribution of a Measure of Voting Power of Subgroups"; Communications in Statistics (A); Vol. 15, No. 2; 1986; 571-577; #1567.

Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Division of Power in Legislatures with Two Cohesive Subgroups"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 3, No. 2; July, 1986; 119-124; #1070.

Gehrlein, William V.; "A Comparative Analysis of Measures of Social Homogeneity"; Quality and Quantity; Vol. 21, No. 3; June, 1987; 219-232; #1767.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Aggregation Theory for SSB Utility Functionals"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 42, No. 2; August, 1987; 352-369; #1625.

Gehrlein, William V.; "Probability Calculations for Transitivity of the Simple Majority Rule"; Economics Letters; Vol. 27, No. 4; 1988; 311-315; #2129.

Gehrlein, William V.; "The Probability of Intransitivity of Pairwise Comparisons in Individual Preference"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 17, No. 1; February, 1989; 67-75; #3037.

Gehrlein, William V.; "The Expected Likelihood of Transitivity for a Probabilistic Chooser"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 23, No. 1-4; 1990; 235-246; #3036.

Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Linear Extension Majority Cycles on Partial Orders"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 23, Nos. 1-4; 1990; 311-322; #3035.

Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Linear Extension Majority Cycles for Small (n 9) Partial Orders"; Computers & Mathematics with Applications; Vol. 20, No. 2; 1990; 41-44; #3079.

Gehrlein, William V.; "Probability Calculations for Transitivity of Simple Majority Rule with Anonymous Voters"; Public Choice; Vol. 66, No. 3; September, 1990; 253-259; #2821.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Ewacha, Kevin; Fishburn, Peter C.; "Linear Extension Majority Cycles in Height-1 Orders"; Order; Vol. 6, No. 4; 1990; 313-318; #3078.

Gehrlein, William V.; "The Expected Likelihood of Transitivity of Preference"; Psychometrika; Vol. 55, No. 4; December, 1990; 695-706; #2910.

Gehrlein, William V.; "Condorcet Efficiency of Simple Voting Rules for Large Electorates"; Economic Letters; Vol. 40, No. 1; September, 1992; 61-66; #3034.

Gehrlein, William V.; Berg, Sven; "The Effect of Social Homogeneity on Coincidence Probabilities for Pairwise Proportional Lottery and Simple Majority Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 9, No. 4; October, 1992; 361-372; #3085.

Gehrlein, William V.; "The Expected Likelihood of Transitivity for Probabilistic Choosers with Single-peaked Preferences"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 25, No. 2; February, 1993; 143-155; #2905.

Gehrlein, William V.; "Condorcet Efficiency of Two Stage Constant Scoring Rules"; Quality & Quantity; Vol. 27, No. 1; February, 1993; 95-101; #3147.

Gehrlein, William V.; "Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity"; Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics; edited by Barnett, William A.; Hervé Moulin; Maurice Salles; Norman Schofield; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1995; 127-143; #2551.

Gehrlein, William V.; Lepelley, Dominique; "Condorcet's Paradox under the Maximal Culture Condition"; Economics Letters; Vol. 55, No. 1; 15 August 1997; 85-89; #3086.

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Gehrlein, William V.; Lepelley, Dominique; "The Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and the Probability of Electing the Condorcet Loser"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 29, No. 3; April, 1998; 271-283; #3399.

Gehrlein, William V.; "The Sensitivity of Weight Selection on the Condorcet Efficiency of Weighted Scoring Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 3; May, 1998; 351-358; #3251.

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[Gehrlein, William V.]; Lepelley, Dominique; "Strong Condorcet Efficiency of Scoring Rules"; Economics Letters; Vol. 68, No. 2; August, 2000; 157-164; #3814.

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Gehrlein, William V.; “The Effectiveness of Weighted Scoring Rules When Pairwise Majority Rule Cycles Exist” Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 47, No. 1; 2004; 69-85; #4325.

[Gehrlein,William V.]; Cervone, Davide P.; Zwicker, William S.; “Which Scoring Rule Maximizes Condorcet Efficiency under IAC?”; Theory and Decision; Vol. 58, No. 2; 2005; 145-185; #4636.

Gehrlein, William V.; “The Sensitivity of Weight Selection for Scoring Rules to Profile Proximity to Single-peaked Preferences”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 1; January, 2006; 191-208; #4494.

Gehrlein, William V.; Lepelley, Dominique; "The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 67, No. 3; 2009; 267-293; #5306.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Brams, Steven J.; Roberts, Fred S.; Editors; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Springer; Berlin; 2009; #5004.

[Gehrlein, William V.]; Brams, Steven J.; Roberts, Fred S.; "Preface"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; v-x; #5005.

Gehrlein, William V.; "Condorcet's Paradox with Three Alternatives"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 183-196; #5015.

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[Gehrlein, William V.]; Diss, Mostapha; "Borda's Paradox with Weighted Scoring Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 1; January, 2012; 121-136; #5535.

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Grofman, Bernard; "Abstention in Two-Candidate and Three-Candidate Elections When Voters Use Mixed Strategies"; Public Choice; Vol. 34, No. 2; 1979; 189-200; #1270.

Grofman, Bernard; Scarrow, Howard A.; "Iannucci and Its Aftermath: The Application of the Banzhaf Index to Weighted Voting in New York State"; Applied Game Theory; Steven J. Brams; Andrew Schotter; and Gerhard Schwödiauer, eds.; Vienna; Physica Verlag; 1979; 168-183; #3266.

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[Grofman, Bernard]; Owen, Guillermo; "To Vote or Not to Vote: The Paradox of Nonvoting"; Public Choice; Vol. 42, No. 3; 1984; 311-325; #2878.

Grofman, Bernard; "The General Irrelevance of the Zero Sum Assumption in the Legislative Context"; Coalitions and Collective Action; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Vienna; Physica-Verlag; 1984; 99-112; #1457.

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Grofman, Bernard; Uhlander, Carole; "Metapreferences and the Reasons for Stability in Social Choice: Some Thoughts on Broadening and Clarifying the Debate"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 19, No. 1; July, 1985; 31-50; #1327.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Feld, Scott L.; "Partial Single-Peakedness: An Extension and Clarification"; Public Choice; Vol. 51, No. 1; 1986; 71-80; #1023.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Feld, Scott L.; "On the Possibility of Faithfully Representative Committees"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 80, No. 3; September, 1986; 863-879; #1404.

Grofman, Bernard; Lijphart, Arend; Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences; New York; Agathon Press; 1986; #2299.

Grofman, Bernard; Owen, Guillermo; "Review Essay: Condorcet Models, Avenues for Future Research"; Information Pooling and Group Decision Making; Edited by Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen; Greenwich, CT; JAI Press; 1986; 93-102; #2089.

Grofman, Bernard; Owen, Guillermo; editors; Information Pooling and Group Decision Making; Greenwich, CT; JAI Press; 1986; #2095.

Grofman, Bernard; Owen, Guillermo; Noviello, Nicholas; Glazer, Amihai; "Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 81, No. 2; June, 1987; 539-552; #1627.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Feld, Scott L.; Hartley, Richard; Kilgour, D. Marc; Miller, Nicholas R.; Noviello, Nicolas; "The Uncovered Set in Spatial Voting Games"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 23, No. 2; September, 1987; 129-155; #1905.

Grofman, Bernard; "Black, Duncan"; The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 1; Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman; London; Macmillan; 1987; 250-251; #1920.

Grofman, Bernard; "Carroll, Lewis"; The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 1; Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman; London; Macmillan; 1987; 371-372; #1922.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Schofield, Norman J.; Feld, Scott L.; "The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 82, No. 1; March, 1988; 195-211; #2014.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Glazer, Amihai; "Limitations of the Spatial Model?"; Public Choice; Vol. 58, No. 2; 1988; 161-167; #2084.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Feld, Scott L.; "The Borda Count in n-Dimensional Issue Space"; Public Choice; Vol. 59, No. 2; 1988; 167-176; #2074.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Feld, Scott L.; "Majority Rule Outcomes and the Structural Debate in One-Issue-at-a-Time Decision-Making"; Public Choice; Vol. 59, No. 3; 1988; 239-252; #2085.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Feld, Scott L.; Miller Nicholas R.; "Centripetal Forces in Spatial Voting: On the Size of the Yolk"; Public Choice; Vol. 59, No. 1; October, 1988; 37-50; #2109.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Owen, Guillermo; Feld, Scott L.; "Proving a Distribution-Free Generalization of the Condorcet Jury Theorem"; Mathematical Social Science; Vol. 17, No. 1; February, 1989; 1-16; #2256.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Feld, Scott L.; Miller, Nicholas R.; "Limits on Agenda Control in Spatial Voting Games. Formal Theories of Politics: Mathematical Modelling in Political Science"; Mathematical and Computer Modelling; Vol. 12, No. 4-5; 1989; 405-416; #2469.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Glazer, Amihai; Owen, Guillermo; "A Model of Candidate Convergence Under Uncertainty About Voter Preferences"; Mathematical and Computer Modelling; Vol. 12, No. 4-5; 1989; 471-478; #2870.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Feld, Scott L.; "A Theorem Concerning Shapley-Owen Power Scores and the Radius of the Yolk in Two Dimensions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 1; January, 1990; 71-74; #2154.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Feld, Scott L.; "Voting in One's Head as a Source of Nearly Transitive Individual Preferences Over Multi-Dimensional Issues"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 23, No. 1-4; 1990; 257-263; #2468.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Miller, Nicholas R.; Feld, Scott L.; "Cycle Avoiding Trajectories, Strategic Agendas, and the Duality of Memory and Foresight: An Informal Exposition"; Public Choice; Vol. 64, No. 3; March, 1990; 265-277; #2284.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Miller, Nicholas R.; Feld, Scott L.; "The Structure of the Banks Set"; Public Choice; Vol. 66, No. 3; September, 1990; 243-255; #2290.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Feld, Scott L.; "The Half-Win Set and the Geometry of Spatial Voting Games: Research Note"; Public Choice; Vol. 70, No. 2; May, 1991; 245-250; #2302.

Grofman, Bernard; Feld, Scott L.; "Group Decision Making over Multidimensional Objects of Choice"; Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes; Vol. 52, No. 1; June, 1992; 39-63; #3101.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Feld, Scott L.; "Stability Induced by 'No-Quibbling' "; Group Decision and Negotiation; Vol. 5, Issue 3; May, 1996; 283-294; #3454.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Merrill, Samuel (III); "Modeling Large Electorates with Fourier Series, With Applications to Nash Equilibria in Proximity and Directional Models of Spatial Competition"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 4; October, 1997; 545-562; #2774.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Regenwetter, Michel; "Choosing Subsets: A Size-Independent Probabilistic Model and the Quest for a Social Welfare Ordering"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 3; May, 1998; 423-443; #3256.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Merrill, Samuel (III); "Conceptualizing Voter Choice for Directional and Discounting Models of Two-Candidate Spatial Competition in Terms of Shadow Candidates"; Public Choice; Vol. 95, No. 3-4; June, 1998; 219-231; #3340.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Merrill, Samuel (III); Feld, Scott L..; "Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Directional Models of Two-Candidate Spatial Competition"; Public Choice; Vol. 98, Nos. 3-4; March, 1999; 369-383; #3560.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Merrill, Samuel (III); A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1999; #3723.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Regenwetter, Michel; Marley, A. A. J.; "A General Concept of Majority Rule"; Mathematical Social Science; July, 2002; Vol. 43, No. 3; 405-428; #4060.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Regenwetter, Michel; Marley, A. A. J.; "On the Model Dependence of Majority Preference Relations Reconstructed from Ballot; or Survey Data"; Mathematical Social Science; July, 2002; Vol. 43, No. 3; 451-466; #4059.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Regenwetter, Michel; Adams, James; "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An Alternative View of Majority Cycles and Social Homogeneity"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 53, No. 2; September, 2002; 153-186; #3965.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Regenwetter, Michel; Marley, A.A.J.; "General Concepts of Value Restriction and Preference Majority"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 1; August, 2003; 149-173; #4178.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Tsetlin, Ilia; Regenwetter, Michel; "The Impartial Culture Maximizes the Probability of Majority Cycles"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 3; December, 2003 387-398; #4190

Grofman, Bernard; “Downs and Two-party Convergence”; Annual Review of Political Science; Vol. 7; May, 2004; 25-46; #4287.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Owen, Guillermo; Lindner, Ines; Feld, Scott L.; Ray, Leonard; “A Simple ‘Market Value’ Bargaining Model for Weighted Voting Games: Characterization and Limit Theorems”; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 35, No. 1; 2006; 111-128; #4734.

[Grofman, Bernard]; Owen, Guillermo; “Two-stage Electoral Competition in Two-party Contests: Persistent Divergence of Party Positions”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 3; June, 2006; 547-569; #4511.

Grofman, Bernard; Brunell, Thomas; Feld, Scott L.; "Towards a Theory of Bicameralism: The Neglected Contributions of the Calculus of Consent"; Public Choice; Vol. 152, No. 1-2; July, 2012; 147-161; #5585.

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Groseclose, Tim; “'One and a Half Dimensional' Preferences and Majority Rule”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 2; February, 2007; 321-35; #4564.

[Großer, Jens]; Goeree, Jacob K.; “Welfare Reducing Polls”; Economic Theory; Vol. 31, No. 1; 2007; 51-68; #4728.

Grossman, N. B.; "Party Distances and Coalition Governments: A New Model"; Coalitions and Collective Action; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Vienna; Physica-Verlag; 1984; 127-136; #1459.

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