A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z


Haake, Claus-Jochen; Raith, Matthias G.; Su, Francis Edward; "Bidding for Envy-freeness: a Procedural Approach to N-player Fair-division Problems"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 4; October, 2002; 723-749; #3975.

[Haake, Claus-Jochen]; Dimitrov, Dinko; “A Note on the Paradox of Smaller Coalitions”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 4; May, 2008; 571-579; #4920.

Haake, Claus-Jochen; Trockel, Walter; "On Maskin Monotonicity of Solution Based Social Choice Rules"; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 14, No. 1-2; 2010; 17-25; #5287.

Haan, Marco A.; Kooreman, Peter; "How Majorities Can Lose the Election: Another Voting Paradox"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 3; June, 2003; 509-522; #4089.

Haddad, Labib; Un outil incomparable: l'ultrafiltre.; (French) [The ultrafilter: A peerless tool]; Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications; Vol. 31; 2005; 131-176; #4643.

Hadjiat, M.; "Construction et étude axiomatique d'une procédure d'agrégation des préférences individuelles.; Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines; No. 52; 1975; 21-34; #2488.

Haefele, Edwin T.; "Coalitions, Minority Representation and Vote-Trading Probabilities"; Public Choice; Vol. 8; Spring, 1970; 75-90; #1227.

Haefele, Edwin T.; "A Utility Theory of Representative Government"; American Economic Review; Vol. 61, No. 3; June, 1971; 350-367; #1228.

[Haeringer, Guillaume]; Ballester, Miguel A.; "A Characterization of the Single-peaked Domain"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 2; February, 2011; 305-322; #5402.

Hagen, Ole; "Utility and Morality"; Mathematical Economics and Game Theory; edited by Rudolf Henn and Otto Moeschlin; Vol. 141 in Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems; Berlin; Springer Verlag; 1977; 588-604; #77.

Hahn, Volker; “Fairness and Voting”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 4; June, 2007; 591-605; [See erratum, Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 607] #4585.

[Hahn, Volker]; Gersbach, Hans; “Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers Be Published?”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 4; May, 2008; 655-683; #4924.

Hahn, Volker; "Committees, Sequential Voting and Transparency"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 56, No. 3; 2008; 366-385; #5116.

Hahn, Volker; Muhe, Felix; "Committees and Reciprocity"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 57, No. 1; January, 2009; 26-47; #5046.

Hahn, Volker; "Reciprocity and Voting"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 67, No. 2; 2009; 467-480; #5270.

[Haimanko, Ori]; Einy, Ezra; "Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index without the Efficiency Axiom"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 73, No. 2; November, 2011; 615-621; #5643.

Hajduková, Jana; "Condorcet Winner Configurations of Linear Networks"; Optimization; Vol. 59, No. 3-4; 2010; 461-475; #5455.

Hall, Darwin; "Kenneth Arrow's Example Considered"; Metroeconomica; Vol. 29, Fasc. I-II-III; Gennaio-Dicembre, 1978; 191-194; #1104.

[Haller, Hans]; Gersbach, Hans; "Bargaining Power and Equilibrium Consumption"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 4; November, 2009; 665-690; #5172.

[Haller, Hans]; Gersbach, Hans; "Groups, Collective Decisions and Markets"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 146, No. 1; 2011; 275-299; #5417.

[Haller, Hans]; Gersbach, Hans; "Bargaining cum Voice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 2; February, 2011; 199-225; #5397.

[Hallett, George Hervey (Jr.)]; Hoag, Clarence Gilbert; Proportional Representation; New York; Macmillan; 1926; #1033.

Hallett, George Hervey (Jr.); "Reply to Approval Voting"; National Civic Review; Vol. 69, No. 1; January, 1980; 10-12; #1794. [Comment on Brams; see response by Brams]

Hallett, George Hervey (Jr.); "Proportional Representation with the Single Transferable Vote: A Basic Requirement for Legislative Elections"; Choosing an Electoral System; edited by Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman; New York; Praeger; 1984; 113-125; #1594.

Hamada, Koichi; "A Simple Majority Rule on the Distribution of Income"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 6, No. 3; June, 1973; 243-264; #1229.

Hamiache, Gérard; “A Value for Games with Coalition Structures”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 1; January, 2006; 93-105; #4074.

Hamiache, Gérard; "Graph Monotonic Values"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 2; July, 2011; 287-307; #5499.

Hamiache, Gérard; "A Matrix Approach to TU Games with Coalition and Communication Structures"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 1; January, 2012; 85-100; #5532.

Hamlin, Alan P.; "Rights, Indirect Utilitarianism, and Contractarianism"; Economics and Philosophy; Vol. 5, No. 2; October, 1989; 167-187; #2236.

Hamlin, Alan P.; "Review of An Essay on Rights [Steiner, Hillel]"; Economica; Vol. 62, No. 247; 1995; 417-418; #2993. [review of book by Steiner]

Hamlin, Alan P.; "Review of Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory [Condorcet]"; Journal of Economic Literature; Vol. 34, No. 3; September, 1996; 1334-1335; #3098. [review of book edited by McLean and Hewitt]

Hamlin, Alan P.; "Review of Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification [Kuran, Timur]"; The Economic Journal; Vol. 106, No. 438; September, 1996; 1435-1437; #2984. [review of book by Kuran]

[Hamlin, Alan P.]; Brennan, Geoffrey; "Expressive Voting and Electoral Equilibrium"; Public Choice; Vol. 95, No. 1-2 April, 1998; 149-175; #3301.

Hammond, Peter J.; "A Note on Extreme Inequality Aversion"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 11, No. 3; December, 1975; 465-467; #3487.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Equity, Arrow's Condition and Rawls' Difference Principle"; Econometrica; Vol. 44, No. 4; July, 1976; 793-804; #535.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Why Ethical Measures Need Interpersonal Comparisons"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 7, No. 4; October, 1976; 263-274; #910.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Dynamic Restrictions on Metastatic Choice"; Economica; Vol. 44, No. 176; November, 1977; 337-350; #3485.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Economic Welfare with Rank Order Price Weighting"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 45 (2), No. 140; June, 1978; 381-384; #3489.

[Hammond, Peter J.]; Dasgupta, Partha; Maskin, Eric S.; "Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 46(2), No. 143; April, 1979; 181-216; #119.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Equity in Two Person Situations: Some Consequences"; Econometrica; Vol. 47, No. 5; September, 1979; 1127-1135; #717.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Dual Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility and the Welfare Economics of Income Distribution"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 7, No. 1; February, 1977; 51-71; #3488. [Corrigendum, Vol. 14, No. 1; August, 1980; 105-106.]

Hammond, Peter J.; "Ex-ante and Ex-post Welfare Optimality under Uncertainty"; Economica; Vol. 48, No. 191; August, 1981; 235-250; #3486.

Hammond, Peter J.; "The Economics of Justice and the Criterion of Wealth Maximization"; Yale Law Journal; Vol. 91, No. 7; June, 1982; 1493-1507; #3551. [Review of book by Posner]

Hammond, Peter J.; "Liberalism, Independent Rights and the Pareto Principle"; Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science; edited by Jonathan Cohen, Jerzy Los, Helmut Pfeiffer and Klaus-Peter Podewski; Amsterdam; North Holland; 1982; 607-620; #319.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Utilitarianism, Uncertainty and Information"; Utilitarianism and Beyond; edited by Amartya K. Sen and Bernard Williams; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1982; 85-102; #1948.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Ex-Post Optimality as a Dynamically Consistent Objective for Collective Choice Under Uncertainty"; Social Choice and Welfare; edited by Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Maurice Salles; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1983; 175-205; #979.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Welfare Economics"; Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare; edited by George Feiwel; Albany; SUNY Press; 1985; 405-434; #1977.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Consequentialist Social Norms for Public Decisions"; Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow: Vol. 1 Social Choice and Public Decision-Making; edited by Walter P. Heller, Ross M. Starr and David A. Starrett; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1986; 3-27; #1398.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Social Choice: The Science of the Impossible?"; Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy; edited by George R. Feiwel; Basingstoke; Macmillan; 1987; 116-131; #1875.

Hammond, Peter J.; "On Reconciling Arrow's Theorem of Social Choice with Harsanyi's Fundamental Utilitarianism"; Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy; edited by George R. Feiwel; Basingstoke; Macmillan; 1987; 179-221; #1878.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Consequentialist Demographic Norms and Parenting Rights"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 5, No. 2/3; August, 1988; 127-145; #3483.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Consequentialism and the Independence Axiom"; Risk, Decision and Rationality; Munier, Bertrand R., editor; Dordrecht; Kluwer Academic; 1988; 503-515; #2979.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Independence of Irrelevant Interpersonal Comparisons"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 8, No. 1; February, 1991; 1-19; #2295.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They Are and Should Be Made"; in J. Elster and J.E. Roemer, editors; Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1991; 200-254; #3494.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Harsanyi's Utilitarian Theorem: A Simpler Proof and Some Ethical Connotations"; in Reinhardt Selten, editor; Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John Harsanyi; Berlin; Springer-Verlag; 1992; 305-319; #3495.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Social Choice of Individual and Group Rights"; Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics; edited by Barnett, William A.; Hervé Moulin; Maurice Salles; Norman Schofield; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1995; 55-77; #2549.

[Hammond, Peter J.]; Coles, Jeffrey L.; "Walrasian Equilibrium without Survival: Existence, Efficiency, and Remedial Policy"; Choice, Welfare, and Development: A Festschrift in Honour of Amartya K. Sen; edited by Kaushik Basu, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, and Kotaro Suzumura; Oxford; Clarendon Press; 1995; 32-64; #2795.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Consequentialist Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics"; In Ethics, Rationality, and Economic Behaviour; Edited by Francesco Farina, Frank Hahn, and Stefano Vannucci; Oxford; Clarendon Press; 1996; 92-118; #3638.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Game Forms versus Social Choice Rules as Models of Rights"; Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. 2; Edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 82-95; #2782. [see discussion by Deb]

Hammond, Peter J.; "Progress in the Theory of Social Choice and Distributive Justice"; in Inequality and Taxation: Research on Economic Inequality, vol. 7; edited by Sourushe Zandvakili; JAI Press; Greenwich, Conn; 1997; 87-106; #3650.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Difficulties with the Social Choice Rule Approach to Rights: Some Comments on Brunel and Salles"; Freedom in Economics, New Perspectives in Normative Analysis; Edited by Jean-François Laslier, Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Laslier, and Alain Trannoy; Routledge; 1998; 112-115; #3513. [Comment on paper by Brunel and Salles.]

Hammond, Peter J.; "Rights, Free Exchange and Widespread Externalities"; Freedom in Economics, New Perspectives in Normative Analysis; Edited by Jean-François Laslier, Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Laslier, and Alain Trannoy; Routledge; 1998; 139-157; #3516. [See comment by Villar.]

[Hammond, Peter J.]; d'Aspremont, Claude; "An Interview with John C. Harsanyi"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 3; July, 2001; 389-401; #3761.

Hammond, Peter J.; "Equal Rights to Trade and Mediate"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 2; October, 2003; 181-193; #4180.

[Hammond, Peter J.]; Bordes, Georges A.; Le Breton, Michel; “Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments”; Journal of Public Economic Theory; Vol. 7, No. 1; February, 2005; 1-25; #4836.

Hammond, Thomas H.; Thomas, Paul A.; "Invisible Decisive Coalitions in Large Hierarchies"; Public Choice; Vol. 66, No. 2; August, 1990; 101-116; #2173.

[Hammond, Thomas H.]; Miller, Gary J.; "Committees and the Core of the Constitution"; Public Choice; Vol. 66, No. 3; September, 1990; 201-227; #2282.

Hanany, Eran; "The Ordinal Nash Social Welfare Function"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 44, No. 5-6; April, 2008; 405-422; #5063.

Hansen, Jes Winther; “Uncertainty and the Size of Government”; Economics Letters; Vol. 88, No. 2; 2005; 236-242; #4790.

Hansen, Pierre; Thisse, Jacques-Francois; "Outcomes of Voting and Planning: Condorcet, Weber and Rawls Locations"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 16, No. 1; August, 1981; 1-15; #1085.

Hansen, Thomas J.; Prince, Barry L.; "The Paradox of Voting: An Elementary Solution for the Case of Three Alternatives"; Public Choice; Vol. 15; Summer, 1973; 103-117; #1195.

Hanson, Roger A.; Rice, Peter M.; "Committees, Representation and Policy Outcomes"; Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences; Vol. 219; November 9, 1973; 91-104; #1807.

Hansson, Bengt; "Fundamental Axioms for Preference Relations"; Synthese; Vol. 18, No. 4; October, 1968; 423-442; #537.

Hansson, Bengt; "Choice Stuctures and Preference Relations"; Synthese; Vol. 18, No. 4; October, 1968; 443-458; #536.

Hansson, Bengt; "Group Preferences"; Econometrica; Vol. 37, No. 1; January, 1969; 50-54; #538. [See comment by Fishburn]

Hansson, Bengt; "Voting and Group Decision Functions"; Synthese; Vol. 20, No. 4; December, 1969; 526-537; #539.

Hansson, Bengt; "Transitivity and Topological Structure of the Preference Space"; Proceedings of the First Scandinavian Logic Symposium; Uppsala; University of Uppsala; 1970; 3-18; #540.

Hansson, Bengt; "The Independence Condition in the Theory of Social Choice"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 4, No. 1; September, 1973; 25-49; #542.

Hansson, Bengt; Sahlquist, H.; "A Proof Technique for Social Choice with Variable Electorate"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 13, No. 2; October, 1976; 193-200; #20.

Hansson, Bengt; "The Existence of Group Preference Functions"; Public Choice; Vol. 28; Winter, 1976; 89-98; #541.

Hansson, Ingemar; Stuart, Charles; "Voting Competitions with Interested Politicians: Platforms do not Converge to the Preferences of the Median Voter"; Public Choice; Vol. 44, No. 3; 1984; 431-441; #1578.

Hansson, Sven Ove; "Individuals and Collective Actions"; Theoria; Vol. 52, Parts 1-2; 1986; 87-97; #2034.

Hansson, Sven Ove; "A Note on the Typology of Rights"; Changing Positions; edited by Paul Needham and Jan Odelstad; Uppsala; University of Uppsala; 1986; 47-57; #2035.

Hansson, Sven Ove; "Rights and the Liberal Paradoxes"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 5, No. 4; November, 1988; 287-302; #2021.

Hansson, Sven Ove; "A Procedural Model of Voting"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 32, No. 3; 1992; 269-301; #2466.

Hansson, Sven Ove; "The Difference Model of Voting"; Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic; Vol. 33, No. 4; Fall, 1992; 576-592; #2306.

Hansson, Sven Ove; "Social Choice with Procedural Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 2; April, 1996; 215-230; #2981.

Hansson, Sven Ove; "What are Opportunities and Why Should They Be Equal?"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 2; April, 2004; 305-316; #4213.

[Hansson, Sven Ove]; Edvardsson, Karin; “When Is a Goal Rational?”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 2; April, 2005; 343-361; #4282.

Hansson, Sven Ove; “Social Decisions about Risk and Risk-taking”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 29, No. 4; December, 2007; 649-663; #4684.

Hanusa, Christopher R. H.; "Ensuring Every Candidate Wins under Positional Voting"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 2; August, 2009; 311-333; #5153.

Hara, Chiaki; Shinotsuka, Tomoichi; Suzumura, Kotaro; Xu, Yongsheng; "Continuity and Egalitarianism in the Evaluation of Infinite Utility Streams"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 2; August, 2008; 179-191; #4938.

Hardin, Christopher S.; "Agreement in Circular Societies"; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 117, No. 1; 2010; 40-49; #5476.

Hardin, Russell; "Collective Choice as an Agreeable n-Prisoner's Dilemma"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 16, No. 5; September, 1971; 472-481; #1894.

Hardin, Russell; "Infinite Regress and Arrow's Theorem"; Ethics; Vol. 90, No. 3; April, 1980; 383-390; #1978.

Hardin, Russell; Collective Action; Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University Press; 1982; #1447.

Hardin, Russell; One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict; Princeton; Princeton University Press; 1995; #2818.

Hare, Thomas; The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal; Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer; 1859; #1803.

Harel, Alon; Nitzan, Shmuel; "The Libertarian Resolution of the Paretian Liberal Paradox"; Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 47, No. 4; 1987; 337-352; #2127.

[Harel, Alon]; Shayo, Moses; "Non-consequentialist Voting"; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Vol. 81, No. 1; January, 2012; 299-313; #5623.

[Harper, William L.]; Eells, Ellery; "Ratifiability, Game Theory, and the Principle of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives"; Australasian Journal of Philosophy; Volume 69, No. 1; March, 1991; 1-19; #2838.

[Harrenstein, Paul]; Brandt, Felix; Fischer, Felix; "The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets"; Mathematical Logic Quarterly; Vol. 55, No. 4; 2009; 444-459; #5312.

[Harrenstein, Paul]; Brandt, Felix; Fischer, Felix; Mair, Maximilian; "A Computational Analysis of the Tournament Equilibrium Set"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 4; April, 2010; 597-609; #5212.

[Harrenstein, Paul]; Brandt, Felix; "Set-Rationalizable Choice and Self-Stability"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 146, No. 4; July, 2011; 1721-1731; #5678.

Harrison, Glenn W.; McDaniel, Tanga; "Voting Games and Computational Complexity"; Oxford Economic Papers; Vol. 60, No. 3; July, 2008; 546-565; #5059.

Harrison, Ross; "No Paradox in Democracy"; Political Studies; Vol. 18, No. 4; December, 1970; 514-517; #1979.

Harsanyi, John C.; "Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking"; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 61, No. 5; October, 1953; 434-435; #743.

Harsanyi, John C.; "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility"; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 63, No. 4; August, 1955; 309-321; #543.

Harsanyi, John C.; "Ethics in Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives"; Mind; Vol. 69, No. 267; July, 1958; 305-316; #544.

Harsanyi, John C.; "On the Rationality Postulates Underlying the Theory of Cooperative Games"; Journal of Conflict Resolution; Vol. 5, No. 2; June, 1961; 179-196; #1887.

Harsanyi, John C.; "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 7, No. 1; January, 1962; 67-80; #1888.

Harsanyi, John C.; "Measurement of Social Power in n-Person Reciprocal Power Situations"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 7, No. 1; January, 1962; 81-91; #1889.

Harsanyi, John C.; "A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations"; Econometrica; Vol. 34, No. 3; July, 1966; 613-634; #1890.

Harsanyi, John C.; "Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories"; World Politics; Vol. 21, No. 4; July, 1969; 513-538; #1892.

Harsanyi, John C.; "Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 69, No. 2; June, 1975; 594-606; #744.

Harsanyi, John C.; "Non-Linear Social Welfare Functions, or Do Welfare Economists Have a Special Exemption from Bayesian Rationality"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 6, No. 3; August, 1975; 311-332; #1207.

Harsanyi, John C.; "Non-Linear Social Welfare Functions: A Rejoinder to Professor Sen"; Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences; edited by Robert E. Butts and Jaakko Hintikka; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1977; 293-296; #1206. [Comment on paper by Sen; see reply by Sen]

Harsanyi, John C.; Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1977; #745. [see review by Weymark]

Harsanyi, John C.; "Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics"; American Economic Review; Vol. 68, No. 2; May, 1978; 223-228; #746.

Harsanyi, John C.; "A Solution Theory For Noncooperative Games and Its Implication For Cooperative Games"; Game Theory and Political Science; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook; New York; New York University Press; 1978; 39-95; #1744.

Harsanyi, John C.; "Bayesian Decision Theory, Rule Utilitarianism, and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 11, No. 3; September, 1979; 289-317; #747.

Harsanyi, John C.; "Utilitarian Morality in a World of Very Half-hearted Altruists"; Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow: Vol. 1 Social Choice and Public Decision-Making; edited by Walter P. Heller, Ross M. Starr and David A. Starrett; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1986; 57-73; #1400.

Harsanyi, John C.; "Equality, Responsibility, and Justice as Seen from a Utilitarian Perspective"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 31, Nos. 2-3; September, 1991; 141-158; #2985.

Harsanyi, John C.; "A Theory of Prudential Values and a Rule Utilitarian Theory of Morality"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 4; November, 1995; 319-333; #2406.

Harsanyi, John C.; "Utilities, Preferences, and Substantive Goods"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 1; January, 1997; 129-145; #2432.

Harstad, Bard; "Strategic Delegation and Voting Rules"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 94, No. 1-2; February, 2010; 102-113; #5344.

[Hart, Albert]; Pommerehne, Werner W.; Schneider, Friedrich; "Tragic Choices and Collective Decision-Making: An Empirical Study of Voter Preferences for Alternative Collective Decision-Making Mechanisms"; Economic Journal; Vol. 107, No. 442; May, 1997; 618-635; #3376.

Hart, Sergiu; Kurz, Mordecai; "Stable Coalition Structures"; Coalitions and Collective Action; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Vienna; Physica-Verlag; 1984; 235-258; #1467.

Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu; Cooperation: Game-Theory Approaches; Berlin; Springer Verlag; 1997; #3419. [see review by Forges]

[Hartley, Richard]; Feld, Scott L.; Grofman, Bernard; Kilgour, D. Marc; Miller, Nicholas R.; Noviello, Nicolas; "The Uncovered Set in Spatial Voting Games"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 23, No. 2; September, 1987; 129-155; #1905.

Hartley, Richard; Kilgour, D. Marc; "The Geometry of the Uncovered Set in the Three-Voter Spatial Model"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 14, No. 2; October, 1987; 175-183; #1891.

[Hartmann, Stephan]; Beisbart, Claus; "Welfarist Evaluations of Decision Rules under Interstate Utility Dependencies"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 2; February, 2010; 315-344; #5176.

Hartmann, Stephan; Pigozzi, Gabriella; Sprenger, Jan; "Reliable Methods of Judgement Aggregation"; Journal of Logic and Computation; Vol. 20, No. 2; 2010; 603-617; #5283.

Hartvigsen, David; “Vote Trading in Public Elections”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 52, No. 1; 2006; 31-48; #4756.

Harvey, Charles M.; "Aggregation of Individuals' Preference Intensities into Social Preference Intensity"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 1; January, 1999; 65-79; #3315.

Hasen, Richard L.; "High Court Wrongly Elected: A Public Choice Model of Judging and Its Implications for the Voting Rights Act"; North Carolina Law Review; Vol. 75, No. 4; April, 1997; 1305-1367; #3284.

Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; "Strategy-proofness Versus Efficiency on the Cobb-Douglas Domain of Exchange Economies"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 3; October, 2008; 457-473; #4954.

Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; Saitoh, Hiroki; "Domain Expansion of the Pivotal Mechanism"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 3; March, 2010; 455-470; #5185.

Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; Saitoh, Hiroki; "Strategy-proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: a Relationship Between Equity and Efficiency"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 3; March, 2012; 473-480; #5552.

Hatfield, John William; "Strategy-proof, Efficient, and Nonbossy Quota Allocations"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 3; September, 2009; 505-515; #5164.

Hatsumi, Kentaro; Serizawa, Shigehiro; "Coalitionally Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies with Homogeneous Indivisible Goods"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 3; September, 2009; 423-447; #5160.

Hattori, Yuichi; Tokumaru, Hideketsu; "A Theory of Collective Choice Rule with a Subordinate Relation as a Variable" (Japanese); Systems and Control; Vol. 28, No. 3; 1984; 185-193; #288.

Hattori, Yuichi; Tokumaru, Hidekatsu; "Winning Subordinations in Collective Choice Rule With Subordinate Relation as a Variable" (Japanese); Systems and Control; Vol. 29, No. 6; 1985; 389-397; #858.

Hattori, Yuichi; Tokumaru, Hidekatsu; "Improvement of Collective Choice Rule With Subordinate Relation as a Variable. Proposals of Two Rules" (Japanese); Systems and Control; Vol. 29, No. 7; 1985; 477-483; #864.

Hattori, Yuichi; Tokumaru, Hidekatsu; "Subordinate Relations That Cause Equal Influence - The Case of Three or Four Constituents" (Japanese); Systems and Control; Vol. 29, No. 8; 1985; 545-552; #859.

Hattori, Yuichi; Tokumaru, Hidekatsu; "Collective Choice Rules With Transitive Subordinate Relations" (Japanese); Systems and Control; Vol. 29, No. 12; 1985; 815-822; #881.

Haunsperger, Deanna B.; Melville, Duncan J.; "Voting Power When Using Preference Ballots"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 4; September, 1996; 457-465; #3183.

Haunsperger, Deanna B.; "Aggregated Statistical Rankings Are Arbitrary"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 2; April, 2003; 261-272; #4006.

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