A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z


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Maaser, Nicola F.; Napel, Stefan; “Equal Representation in Two-tier Voting Systems”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 3; April, 2007; 401-420; #4574.

Maaser, Nicola F.; "Review of Hartmut Kliemt: Philosophy and Economics I. Methods and Models"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 2; July, 2010; 345-350; #5237.

Maaser, Nicola F.; Napel, Stefan; "A Note on the Direct Democracy Deficit in Two-Tier Voting"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 63, No. 2; March, 2012; 174-180; #5616.

Maassen, Hans; Bezembinder, Thom; "Generating Random Weak Orders and the Probability of a Condorcet Winner"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 3; July, 2002; 517-532; #3864.

Maccheroni, Fabio; Marinacci, Massimo; "How to Cut a Pizza Fairly: Fair Division with Decreasing Marginal Evaluations"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 3; June, 2003; 457-465; #4085.

[Maceli, John C.]; Lucas, William F.; "Discrete Partition Function Games"; Game Theory and Political Science; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook; New York; New York University Press; 1978; 191-213; #1748.

Macey, Jonathan R.; "Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory"; Virginia Law Review; Vol. 74, No. 2; March, 1988; 471-518; #3436.

Machina, Mark; Parks, Robert P.; "On Path-Independent Randomized Choice"; Econometrica; Vol. 49, No. 5; September, 1981; 1345-1347; #28.

[Machol, Robert E.]; Frederickson, Jesper S.; "Reduction of Paradoxes in Subjectively Judged Competitions"; European Journal of Operational Research; Vol. 35, No. 1; April, 1988; 16-29; #1974.

[Machover, Moshé ]; Felsenthal, Dan S.; "After Two Centuries, Should Condorcet's Voting Procedure be Implemented?"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 37, No. 4; October, 1992; 250-274; #3242.

[Machover, Moshé]; Felsenthal, Dan S.; "Sequential Voting by Veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin Algorithm more Versatile"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 33, No. 3; November, 1992; 223-240; #3229.

[Machover, Moshé]; Felsenthal, Dan S.; "Postulates and Paradoxes of Relative Voting Power - A Critical Re-appraisal"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 38, No. 2; March, 1995; 195-229; #2461.

[Machover, Moshé]; Felsenthal, Dan S.; "Who Ought to be Elected and Who is Actually Elected? - An Empirical Investigation of 92 Elections under Three Procedures"; Electoral Studies; Vol. 14, No. 2; June, 1995; 143-169; #3540.

[Machover, Moshé]; Garrett, Geoffrey M.; McLean, Iain;"Power, Power Indices, and Blocking Power: A Comment on Johnston"; British Journal of Political Science; Vol. 25, Part 4; October, 1995; 563-568; #3231.

[Machover, Moshé]; Felsenthal, Dan S.;"Alternative Forms of the Shapley Value and the Shapley-Shubik Index"; Public Choice; Vol. 87, Nos. 3-4; 1996; 313-318; #3232.

[Machover, Moshé]; Felsenthal, Dan S.; "The Weighted Voting Rule In the EU Council of Ministers, 1958-1995 - Intentions and Outcomes"; Electoral Studies; Vol. 16, No. 1; March, 1997; 33-47; #3541.

[Machover, Moshé]; Felsenthal, Dan S.; "Ternary Voting Games"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 26, No. 3; 1997; 335-351; #3105.

[Machover, Moshé]; Felsenthal, Dan S.; Zwicker, William S.; "The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a priori Voting Power"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 44, No. 1; January 1998; 83-116; #3359.

[Machover, Moshé]; Felsenthal, Dan S.; "The Product Paradox of Voting Power"; Public Choice; Vol. 96, Nos. 1-2; July, 1998; 81-92; #3358.

[Machover, Moshé]; Felsenthal, Dan S.; The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes; Northampton, MA; Edward Elgar Pub; 1998; #3595.

[Machover, Moshé]; Felsenthal, Dan S.; "Minimizing the Mean Majority Deficit: the Second Square-root Rule"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 37, No. 1; January, 1999; 25-37; #3657.

[Machover, Moshé]; Felsenthal, Dan S.; "The Treaty of Nice and Qualified Majority Voting"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 3; July, 2001; 431-464; #3765.

Machover, Moshé; "Review of Simple Games, Desirability Relations, Trading, Pseudoweightings"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 3; July, 2001; 617-618; #3775. [Review of book by Taylor and Zwicker]

[Machover, Moshé]; Felsenthal, Dan S.; "Annexations and Alliances: When Are Blocs Advantageous a Priori?"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 2; April, 2002; 295-312; #3870.

[Machover, Moshé]; Felsenthal, Dan S.; “Analysis of Qm Rules in the Draft Constitution for Europe Proposed by the European Convention, 2003"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 23, No. 1; August, 2004; 1-20; #4240.

[Machover, Moshé]; Felsenthal, Dan S.; “Voting Power Measurement: A Story of Misreinvention”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3; December, 2005; 485-506; #4471.

[Machover, Moshé]; Chang, Pao-Li; Chua, Vincent C.H.; "L. S. Penrose's Limit Theorem: Tests by Simulation"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 51, No. 1; January 2006; 90-106; #5136.

[Maharaj, Bhargav]; Chakravarty, Satya R.; "Measuring Ethnic Polarization"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 3; September, 2011; 431-452; #5505.

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MacIntyre, Ian D. A.; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "The Sure-Thing Rule and Strategic Voting Under Minimally Binary Group Decision Functions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 25, No. 3; December, 1981; 338-352; #45.

MacIntyre, Ian D. A.; "`The Liberal Paradox: A Generalisation' by D. Kelsey"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol 4, No. 3; September, 1987; 219-223; #1719.

MacIntyre, Ian D. A.; "Justice, Liberty, Unanimity and the Axioms of Identity"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 24, No. 3; 1988; 225-237; #2063.

MacIntyre, Ian D. A.; "Two-person and Majority Continuous Aggregation in 2-good Space in Social Choice: A Note"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 44, No. 2; April, 1998; 199-209; #3405.

MacIntyre, Ian D. A.; "|N| Cheers for Democracy"; Synthese; Vol. 131, No. 2; May, 2002; 259-274; #3954.

[Mack, Verena]; Shikano, Susumu; "When Does the Second-Digit Benford's Law-Test Signal an Election Fraud? Facts or Misleading Test Results"; Jahrbucher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik; Vol. 231, No. 5-6; November, 2011; 719-732; #5644.

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MacKay, Alfred F.; Wong, Edward; "Preference Anarchy"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 11, No. 4; December, 1979; 457-463; #1310.

MacKay, Alfred F.; "Impossibility and Infinity"; Ethics; Vol. 90, No. 3; April, 1980; 367-382; #1989.

MacKay, Alfred F.; Arrow's Theorem: The Paradox of Social Choice; New Haven; Yale University Press; 1980; #953. [see review by Urbach]

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MacRae, Duncan (Jr.); "Normative Assumptions in the Study of Public Choice"; Public Choice; Vol. 16; Fall, 1973; 27-41; #1289.

Magdalou, Brice; Moyes, Patrick; "Deprivation, Welfare and Inequality"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 32, No. 2; February, 2009; 253-273; #4981.

[Mair, Maximilian]; Brandt, Felix; Fischer, Felix; Harrenstein, Paul; "A Computational Analysis of the Tournament Equilibrium Set"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 4; April, 2010; 597-609; #5212.

Mair, Peter; "Districting Choices under the Single Transferable Vote"; Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences; edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart; New York; Agathon Press; 1986; 289-307; #2219.

Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Sen, Arunava; “Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules”; Econometrica; Vol. 72, No. 2; 2004; 523-540; #4338.

Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Sen, Arunava; “Top-Pair and Top-Triple Monotonicity”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 1; August, 2006; 175-187; #4526.

[Majumdar, Manabi]; Subramanian, S.; "On Measuring Deprivation Adjusted for Group Disparities"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 2; April, 2002; 265-280; #3888.

Majumdar, Mukul; Peleg, Bezalel; "An Axiomatization of the Walras Correspondence in Infinite Dimensional Spaces"; International Economic Review; Vol. 38, No. 4; November, 1997; 853-864; #3351.

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Majumdar, Tapas; "Sen's Theorem in Transitivity of Majority Decisions: An Alternate Approach"; Growth and Choice; edited by Tapas Majumdar; Bombay; Oxford University Press; 1969; 26-29; #1236.

Majumdar, Tapas; "Amartya Sen's Algebra of Collective Choice"; Sankya; Vol. 35, Ser. B, Part 4; December, 1973; 533-542; #585.

Makdissi, Paul; Mussard, Stéphane; “Analyzing the Impact of Indirect Tax Reforms on Rank-dependent Social Welfare Functions: a Positional Dominance Approach”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 3; April, 2008; 385-399; #4908.

[Makino, Kazuhisa]; Boros, Endre; Elbassioni, Khaled; Gurvich, Vladimir A.; "On Effectivity Functions of Game Forms"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 68, No.; March, 2010; 512-31; #5341.

Makinson, David; "Combinatorial Versus Decision-theoretic Components of Impossibility Theorems"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 40, No. 2; March, 1996; 181-189; #3349.

[Maksa, Gyula]; Münnich, Ákos; Mokken, Robert J.; "Collective Judgement: Combining Individual Value Judgements"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 37, No. 3; May, 1999; 211-233; #3658.

Mala, József "On λ-majority Voting Paradoxes"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 37, No. 1; January, 1999; 39-44; #3497.

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Malawski, Marcin; "Values of Majority Voting Games with Distrust Operators"; Applicationes Mathematicae; Vol. 29, No. 1; 2002; 117-126; #3964.

Malawski, Marcin; "Equal Treatment, Symmetry and Banzhaf Value Axiomatizations"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 31, No. 1; October, 2002; 47-67; #4032.

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[Malishevski, Andrei V.]; Aizerman, Mark A.; "General Theory of Best Variants Choice: Some Aspects"; IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control; Vol. AC-26, No. 5; October, 1981; 1030-1041; #1844.

Malishevski, Andrei V.; "Rationality Preserving in Two-Stage Mechanisms of Optimal Choice"; Data Analysis and Expert Estimations in Management Systems; Moscow; Institute of Control Sciences; 1985; 51-61; #1863.

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Malishevski, Andrei V.; "Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains: Discussion"; Social Choice Re-Examined, Vol. 1; edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 97-100; #3154. [discussion of a paper by Le Breton]

Malishevski, Andrei V.; "Generalized Utility Based on Values of Opportunity Sets"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 80; 1998; 11-26; #3682.

Mandle, Jay; Mandle, Jon; "Elections as a Public Good"; Challenge; Vol. 42, No. 5; September-October, 1999; 50-62; #3840.

[Mandle, Jon]; Mandle, Jay; "Elections as a Public Good"; Challenge; Vol. 42, No. 5; September-October, 1999; 50-62; #3840.

Mandler, Michael; "Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility and the Policy Paralysis Problem"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 1; January, 2000; 95-115; #3589.

[Maniquet, François]; Fleurbaey, Marc; "Fair Allocation with Unequal Production Skills: The No Envy Approach to Compensation"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 32, No. 1; August, 1996; 71-93; #2596.

[Maniquet, François]; Fleurbaey, Marc; "Cooperative Production with Unequal Skills: The Solidarity Approach to Compensation"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 4; August, 1999; 569-583; #3574.

Maniquet, François; "Review: A Guide for the Young Economist: Writing and Speaking Effectively about Economics [Thomson]"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 2; April, 2003; 351-352; #4010.

Maniquet, François; "Implementation of Allocation Rules under Perfect Information"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 2; October, 2003; 323-346; #4187.

Maniquet, François; “On the Equivalence Between Welfarism and Equality of Opportunity”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 23, No. 1; August, 2004; 127-147; #4248.

[Maniquet, François]; Fleurbaey, Marc; “Fair Social Orderings When Agents Have Unequal Production Skills”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 1; February, 2005; 93-127; #4271.

Maniquet, François; Sprumont, Yves; “Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-rival Environments”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 120, No. 2; 2005; 155-174; #4339.

[Maniquet, François]; Fleurbaey, Marc; “Fair Social Orderings”; Economic Theory; Vol. 34, No. 1; 2008; 25-45; #4793.

Maniquet, François; Sprumont, Yves; "Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: An Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 68, No. 1; January, 2010; 275-302; #5377.

[Maniquet, François]; Bochet, Olivier; "Virtual Nash implementation with Admissible Support"; Journal Mathematical Economics; Vol. 46, No. 1; 2010; 99-108; #5479.

[Maniquet, Francois]; Goertz, Johanna M. M.; "On the Informational Efficiency of Simple Scoring Rules"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 146, No. 4; July, 2011; 1464-1480; #5659.

Manjunath, Vikram; "Group Strategy-Proofness and Voting between Two Alternatives"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 63, No. 3; May, 2012; 239-242; #5603.

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[Manuel, Conrado]; Gómez, Daniel; González-Arangüena, Enrique; Owen, Guillermo; del Pozo, Mónica; Tejada, Juan; “Centrality and Power in Social Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 46, No. 1; August, 2003; 27-54; #4427.

[Manzi, Cecilia]; Grilli di Cortona, Pietro; Pennisi, Aline; Ricca, Federica; Simeone, Bruno; Evaluation and Optimization of Electoral Systems; SIAM; Philadelphia, PA; 1999; #3695.

Mao, Wen; "On the Inconsistent Behavior in Voting for Incumbents and for Term Limitation"; Economic Theory; Vol. 17, No. 3; May, 2001; 701-720; #3849.

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[Maoz, Zeev]; Brams, Steven J.; Felsenthal, Dan S.; "New Chairman Paradoxes"; Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior: Essays in Honor of Anatol Rapoport; edited by Andreas Diekmann and Peter Mitter; Heidelberg; Physica-Verlag; 1986; 243-256; #1785.

[Maoz, Zeev]; Brams, Steven J.; Felsenthal, Dan S.; "Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting"; Theory and Decision: Essays in Honor of Werner Leinfellner; edited by Gerald Eberlein and Hal Berghel; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1987; 223-233; #1786.

[Maoz, Zeev] Rapoport, Amnon; Felsenthal, Dan S.; "Microcosms and Macrocosms: Seat Allocation in Proportional Representation Systems"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 24, No. 1; January, 1988; 11-33; #1912.

[Maoz, Zeev]; Felsenthal, Dan S.; "A Comparative Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Voting Under the Plurality and Approval Procedures"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 33, No. 2; 1988; 116-130; #2062.

[Maoz, Zeev]; Rapoport, Amnon; Felsenthal, Dan S.; "Proportional Representation: An Empirical Evaluation of Single-Stage, Non-ranked Voting Procedures"; Public Choice; Vol. 59, No. 2; November, 1988; 151-165; #3006.

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[Marinacci, Massimo]; Maccheroni, Fabio; "How to Cut a Pizza Fairly: Fair Division with Decreasing Marginal Evaluations"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 3; June, 2003; 457-465; #4085.

Mariotti, Marco; "Nash Bargaining Theory When the Number of Alternatives Can be Finite"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 3; May, 1998; 413-421; #3255.

Mariotti, Marco; "An Ethical Interpretation of the Nash Choice Rule"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 49, No. 2; September, 2000; 151-157; #3820.

Mariotti, Marco; "Maximal Symmetry and the Nash Solution"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 1; January, 2000; 45-53; #3585.

Mariotti, Marco; "Inequality Aversion, Impartiality and Utilitarianism"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 2; April, 2004; 291-304; #4212.

Mariotti, Marco; Veneziani, Roberto; "'Non-interference' Implies Equality"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 32, No. 1; January, 2009; 123-128; #4973.

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[Marley, A. A. J.]; Regenwetter, Michel; Grofman, Bernard; "On the Model Dependence of Majority Preference Relations Reconstructed from Ballot; or Survey Data"; Mathematical Social Science; July, 2002; Vol. 43, No. 3; 451-466; #4059.

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[Marley, A. A. J.]; García-Lapresta, José Luis; Martínez-Panero, Miguel; "Characterizing Best-Worst Voting Systems in the Scoring Context"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 3; March, 2010; 487-496; #5187.

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Maroševi, Tominslav; Scitovski, Rudolf; "An Application of a Few Inequalities among Sequences in Electoral Systems"; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 194, No. 2; 2007; 480-485; #5131.

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[Marshall, Emily]; Hodge, Jonathan K.; Patterson, Geoff; "Gerrymandering and Convexity"; College Mathematics Journal; Vol. 41, No. 4; 2010; 312-324; #5454.

[Martel, Jean-Marc]; Jabeur, Khaled; Guitouni, Adel; "Deriving a Minimum Distance-Based Collective Preorder: A Binary Mathematical Programming Approach"; OR Spectrum; Vol. 34, No. 1; January, 2012; 23-42; #5637.

Martin, Mathieu; "A Note on the Non-emptiness of the Stability Set"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 3; May, 2000; 559-565; #3630.

Martin, Mathieu; Merlin, Vincent; “On the Characteristic Numbers of Voting Games”; International Game Theory Review; Vol. 8, No. 4; 2006; 643-654; #4742.

Martin, Mathieu; Merlin, Vincent R.; "The Stability Set as a Social Choice Correspondence"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 44, No. 1; September, 2002; 91-113; #4036.

Martin, Wade E.; Shields, Deborah J.; Tolwinski, Boleslaw; Kent, Brian; "An Application of Social Choice Theory to U.S.D.A. Forest Service Decision Making"; Journal of Policy Modeling; Vol. 18, No. 6; December, 1996; 603-621; #3386.

[Martinelli, César]; Duggan, John; "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 37, No. 2; November, 2001; 259-294; #3956.

Martinelli, César; "Convergence Results for Unanimous Voting"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 105, No. 2; August, 2002; 278-297; #3920.

Martinelli, César; "Simple Plurality Versus Plurality Runoff with Privately Informed Voters"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 4; October, 2002; 901-919; #3986.

[Martinelli, César]; Gomberg, Andrei; Torres, Ricard; “Anonymity in Large Societies”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, No. 1; October, 2005; 187-205; #4454.

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Moulin, Hervé; "Voting With Proportional Veto Power"; Econometrica; Vol. 50, No. 1; January, 1982; 45-162; #110.

Moulin, Hervé; Peleg, Bezalel; "Cores of Effectivity Functions and Implementation Theory"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 10, No. 1; June, 1982; 115-145; #967.

Moulin, Hervé; "Non-cooperative Implementation: A Survey of Recent Results"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 3, No. 3; October, 1982; 243-257; #316.

Moulin, Hervé; The Strategy of Social Choice; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1983; #269. [See review by Dutta, review by Kim, and review by Arunava Sen]]

Moulin, Hervé; "Strategic Aspects of Voting Procedures"; Économie Appliquée; Vol. 36, No. 4; 1983; 711-719; #270.

Moulin, Hervé; "Generalized Condorcet Winners for Single-Peaked and Single-Plateau Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 2; August, 1984; 127-147; #810.

Moulin, Hervé; "From Social Welfare Orderings to Acyclic Aggregation of Preferences"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 9, No. 1; February, 1985; 1-17; #347.

Moulin, Hervé; "The Separability Axiom and Equal-Sharing Methods"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 36, No. 1; June, 1985; 120-148; #382.

Moulin, Hervé; "Choice Functions Over a Finite Set: A Summary"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 2, No. 2; September, 1985; 147-160; #809.

Moulin, Hervé; "Fairness and Strategy in Voting"; Fair Allocation; edited by Hobart Peyton Young; Providence; AMS; 1985; 109-142; #851.

Moulin, Hervé; "Choosing From a Tournament"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 3, No. 4; December, 1986; 271-291; #1375.

Moulin, Hervé; Young, Hobart Peyton; "Condorcet, Marquis de"; The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 1; Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman; London; Macmillan; 1987; 566-567; #1923.

Moulin, Hervé; "Condorcet's Principle Implies the No Show Paradox"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 45, No. 1; June, 1988; 53-64; #2056.

Moulin, Hervé; Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1988; #2033.

Moulin, Hervé; "Fair Division under Joint Ownership: Recent Results and Open Problems"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 2; April, 1990; 149-170; #2163.

Moulin, Hervé; "Welfare Bounds in the Fair Division Problem"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 54, No. 2; August 1991; 321-337; #2966.

Moulin, Hervé; "Social Choice"; Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications Vol. 2; Aumann, Robert J.; Hart, Sergiu, editors; Amsterdam; Elsevier, North-Holland; 1994; 1091-1125; #2975.

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Moulin, Hervé; Thomson, William; "Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation Problems"; Social Choice Re-Examined, Vol. 1; edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 101-120; #3155.

Moulin, Hervé; "Notes on Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions: Discussion"; Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. 2; Edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 46-49; #2779. [discussion of paper by Barberà]

Moulin, Hervé; "Incremental Cost Sharing: Characterization by Coalition Strategy-proofness"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 2; February, 1999; 279-320; #3417.

Moulin, Hervé; "The Proportional Random Allocation of Indivisible Units"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 2; April, 2002; 381-413; #3875.

Moulin, Hervé; “Axiomatic Cost and Surplus Sharing”; In Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1; Edited by K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura; North-Holland; 2002; 289-357; #4397.

Moulin, Hervé; "Auctioning or Assigning an Object: Some Remarkable VCG Mechanisms"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 2; February, 2010; 193-216; #5110.

[Moyes, Patrick]; Karcher, Thierry; Trannoy, Alain; "The Stochastic Dominance Ordering of Income Distributions Over Time: The Discounted Sum of the Expected Utilities of Incomes"; Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics; edited by Barnett, William A.; Hervé Moulin; Maurice Salles; Norman Schofield; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1995; 375-408; #2563.

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[Moyes, Patrick]; Magdalou, Brice; "Deprivation, Welfare and Inequality"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 32, No. 2; February, 2009; 253-273; #4981.

[Moyes, Patrick]; Bazen, Stephen; "Elitism and Stochastic Dominance"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 39, Number 1; June, 2012; 207-251; #5574.

[Moyouwou, Issofa]; Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel; Mbih, Boniface; “Strategic Behavior under Complete Ignorance: Approval and Condorcet-type Voting Rules”; IMHOTEP. Journal Africain de Mathématiques Pures et Appliquées. African Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics; Vol. 6, No. 1; 2005; 1-8; #4869.

[Moyouwou, Issofa]; Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel; “A Note on the Non-emptiness of the Stability Set When Individual Preferences Are Weak” Orders; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 52, No. 1; 2006; 67-76; #4754.

[Moyouwou, Issofa]; Mbih, Boniface; Picot, Jérémy; “Pareto Violations of Parliamentary Voting Systems”; Economic Theory; Vol. 34, No. 2; 2008; 331-358; #4706.

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[Moyouwou, Issofa]; Mbih, Boniface; Zhao, Xingyu; "On the Positive Association of Parliamentary Social Choice Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 1; June, 2010; 107-127; #5224.

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[Mueller, Dennis C.]; Coughlin, Peter J.; Murrell, Peter; "A Model of Electoral Competition with Interest Groups"; Economics Letters; Vol. 32, No. 4; April, 1990; 307-311; #2170.

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