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Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi; Suh, Sang-Chul; "A Characterization of the Walras Rule"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 4; November, 1995; 335-352; #2407.

Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi; "Identification of Domain Restrictions over which Acyclic, Continuous-Valued, and Positive Responsive Social Choice Rules Operate"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 4; September, 1996; 383-395; #2924.

Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi; Suga, Koichi; "Impossibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Welfare Levels: The 'Extended Sympathy Approach' Reconsidered"; Japanese Economic Review; Vol. 49, No. 2; June, 1998; 171-190; #3395.

Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi; Tanaka, Makoto; "An Axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution When the Feasible Sets Can Be Finite"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 4; October, 2002; 751-761; #3976.

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[Nagel, Rosemarie]; Cabrales, Antonio; Rodriguez Mora, Jose V.; "It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: An Experiment on Voting and Redistribution"; Experimental Economics; Vol. 15, No. 2; June, 2012; 278-308; #5596.

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[Nakai, Teruhisa]; Masuya, Satoshi; “A Generalized Deegan-Packel Index for Multialternative Voting Games in Case of Nonhomogeneous Voters”; Journal of Interdisciplinary Mathematics; Vol. 8, No. 3; 2005; 419-434; #4648.

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Nakamura, Kenjiro; "The Vetoers in a Simple Game with Ordinal Preferences"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 8, Issue 1; 1979; 55-61; #737.

[Nakamura, Kenjiro]; Kaneko, Mamoru; "The Nash Social Welfare Function"; Econometrica; Vol. 47, No. 2; March, 1979; 423-435; #739.

[Nakamura, Kenjiro]; Ishikawa, Shin; "The Strategyproof Social Welfare Functions"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 6, No. 3; December, 1979; 283-295; #174.

[Nakamura, Kenjiro]; Kaneko, Mamoru; "Cardinalization of the Nash Social Welfare Function"; Economic Studies Quarterly; Vol. 30, No. 3; December, 1979; 236-242; #2939.

[Nakamura, Kenjiro]; Ishikawa, Shin; "Representation of Characteristic Function Games by Social Choice Functions"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 9, No. 4; 1980; 191-199; #2813.

Nakamura, Kenjiro; Game Theory and Social Choice: Selected Papers of Kenjiro Nakamura; edited by Mitzuo Suzuki; Tokyo; Keiso Shobo; 1981; #367. [See review by Roush and review by Kaneko]

Nakamura, Yutaka; "SSB Preferences: Nonseparable Utilities or Nonseparable Beliefs"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 39-55; #5008.

Nakanishi, Toru; Fujiwara, Toru; Watanabe, Hajime; "A Linkable Group Signature and its Application to Secret Voting"; Information Processing Society of Japan. Transactions; Vol. 40, No. 7; 1999; 3085-3096; #3909.

[Nakano, Bunpei]; Yamazaki, Akira; Inohara, Takehiro; "On Simple Games with Permission of Voters" (Japanese); Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan; Vol. 42, No. 3; 1999; 286-301; #3931.

[Nakano, Bunpei]; Yamazaki, Akira; Inohara, Takehiro; "New Interpretation of the Core of Simple Games in Terms of Voters' Permission"; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 108, Nos. 2-3; February, 2000; 115-127; #3946. [Developed further in later paper]

[Nakano, Bunpei]; Yamazaki, Akira; Inohara, Takehiro; "Comparability of Coalitions in Committees with Permission of Voters by Using Desirability Relation with Hopefulness Relation"; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 113, Nos. 2-3; July, 2000; 219-234; #3947. [Develops earlier paper]

[Nakano, Bunpei]; Yamazaki, Akira; Inohara, Takehiro; "Symmetry of Simple Games and Permission of Voters"; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 114, No. 2-3; September, 2000; 315-327; #3968.

Nakata, Toshio; Imahayashi, Hiroshi; Yamashita, Masafumi; "Probabilistic Local Majority Voting for the Agreement Problem on Finite Graphs"; Computing and Combinatorics; Edited by Takao Asano, Hiroshi Imai, D. T. Lee, Shin-ichi Nakano and Takeshi Tokuyama; Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1627, Springer; Berlin; 1999; 330-338; #3935.

Nakata, Toshio; Imahayashi, Hiroshi; Yamashita, Masafumi; "A Probabilistic Local Majority Polling Game on Weighted Directed Graphs with an Application to the Distributed Agreement Problem"; Networks; Vol. 35, No. 4; July, 2000; 266-273; #3966.

Nakayama, Mikio; "Note on the Core and Compensation in Collective Choice"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 2, No. 3; April, 1982; 323-327; #1518.

[Nalebuff, Barry]; Caplin, Andrew; "On 64% Majority Rule"; Econometrica; Vol. 56, No. 4; July, 1988; 787-814; #2068.

[Nalebuff, Barry]; Caplin, Andrew; "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem"; Econometrica; Vol. 59, No. 1; January, 1991; 1-23; #2257.

[Nalebuff, Barry]; Levin, Jonathan; "An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes"; The Journal of Economic Perspectives; Vol. 9, No. 1; Winter, 1995; 3-26; #2539.

[Nalebuff, Barry]; Caplin, Andrew; "Competition among Institutions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 72, No. 2; February, 1997; 306-342; #3382.

[Namatame, Akira]; Iwanaga, Saori; "The Complexity of Collective Decision"; Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences; Vol. 6, No. 2; April, 2002; 137-158; #4065.

Nambiar, Shankaran; "Capabilities and Constraints"; Forum for Social Economics; Vol. 40, No. 2; July, 2011; 179-195; #5676.

Nandeibam, Shasikanta; "A Note on Randomized Social Choice and Random Dictatorships"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 66, No. 2; August, 1995; 581-589; #2585.

Nandeibam, Shasikanta; "Coalitional Power Structure in Stochastic Social Choice Functions with an Unrestricted Preference Domain"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 68, No. 1; January, 1996; 212-233; #2584.

Nandeibam, Shasikanta; "An Alternative Proof of Gibbard's Random Dictatorship Result"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 4; August, 1998; 509-519; #3289.

Nandeibam, Shasikanta; "Distribution of Coalitional Power under Probabilistic Voting Procedures"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 40, No. 1; July, 2000; 63-84; #3800.

Nandeibam, Shasikanta; "The Structure of Coalitional Power under Probabilistic Voting Procedures"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 3; July, 2002; 685-705; #3861.

Nandeibam, Shasikanta; "Sharing Rules in Teams"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 107, No. 2; December, 2002; 407-420; #4145.

Nandeibam, Shasikanta; "Distribution of Coalitional Power in Randomized Multi-valued Social Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 1; February, 2003; 3-25; #3988.

Nandeibam, Shasikanta; "Implementation in Teams"; Economic Theory; Vol. 22, No. 3; October, 2003; 569-581; #4112.

Nandeibam, Shasikanta; "A Reexamination of Additivity of Power in Randomized Social Preference"; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 8, No. 3; October, 2003; 293-299; #4160.

Nandeibam, Shasikanta; “A Note on the Structure of Stochastic Social Choice Functions”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 3; April, 2008; 447-455; #4912.

Nandeibam, Shasikanta; "On Probabilistic Rationalizability"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 32, No. 3; March, 2009; 425-437; #4990.

Nandeibam, Shasikanta; "On Randomized Rationality"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 633-641; #5518.

[Nannicini, Tommaso]; Gagliarducci, Stefano; Naticchioni, Paolo; "Electoral Rules and Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test"; American Economic Journal: Economic Policy; Vol. 3, No. 3; August, 2011; 144-174; #5654.

Nanson, E. J.; "Methods of Election"; Transactions and Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria; Vol. 18; 1882; 197-240; #954.

Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika; “The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 1; August, 2006; 129-154; #4525.

[Napel, Stefan]; Maaser, Nicola F.; “Equal Representation in Two-tier Voting Systems”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 3; April, 2007; 401-420; #4574.

Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika; "Strategic Versus Non-strategic Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers: the Consultation Procedure"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 3; September, 2011; 511-541; #5509.

[Napel, Stefan]; Maaser, Nicola F.; "A Note on the Direct Democracy Deficit in Two-Tier Voting"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 63, No. 2; March, 2012; 174-180; #5616.

[Narahari, Y.]; Garg, Dinesh; Gujar, Sujit; "Foundations of Mechanism Design: a Tutorial. I. Key Concepts and Classical Results"; Sādhanā; Vol. 33, No. 2; 2008; 83-130; #5095.

[Narahari, Y.]; Garg, Dinesh; Gujar, Sujit; "Foundations of Mechanism Design: a Tutorial. II. Advanced Concepts and Results"; Sādhanā; Vol. 33, No. 2; 2008; 131-174; #5094.

[Narasimhan, Lakshmi S.]; Bartholdi, John J. (III); Tovey, Craig A.; "Recognizing Majority-Rule Equilibrium in Spatial Voting Games"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 8, No. 3; July, 1991; 183-197; #2314.

[Narasimhan, Lakshmi S.]; Bhadury, Joyendu; Griffin, Paul M.; Griffin, Susan O.; "Finding the Majority-Rule Equilibrium Under Lexicographic Comparison of Candidates"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 4; August, 1998; 489-508; #3288.

Nascimento, Leandro; "Zhou's Aggregation Theorems with Multiple Welfare Weights"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 47, No. 4-5; August, 2011; 654-658; #5670.

Natapoff, Alan; "A Mathematical One-Man One-Vote Rationale for Madisonian Presidential Voting Based on Maximum Individual Voting Power"; Public Choice; Vol. 88, No. 3-4; September, 1996; 259-273; #2722. [see exposition by Hively]

[Naticchioni, Paolo]; Gagliarducci, Stefano; Nannicini, Tommaso; "Electoral Rules and Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test"; American Economic Journal: Economic Policy; Vol. 3, No. 3; August, 2011; 144-174; #5654.

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[Nau, Robert F.]; Keeney, Ralph L.; "A Theorem for Bayesian Group Decisions"; Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; Vol. 43, No. 1; August, 2011; 1-17; #5672.

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Nehring, Klaus; Puppe, Clemens; "On the Multi-preference Approach to Evaluating Opportunities"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 1; January, 1999; 41-63; #3314.

Nehring, Klaus; "Monotonicity Implies Generalized Strategy-proofness for Correspondences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 2; February, 2000; 367-375; #3619.

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Nehring, Klaus; “The Veil of Public Ignorance”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 119, No. 2; December, 2004; 247-270; #4350.

Nehring, Klaus; Puppe, Clemens; “Efficient and Strategy-proof Voting Rules: A Characterization”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 59, No. 1; 2007; 132-153; #4720

Nehring, Klaus; “The Impossibility of a Paretian Rational: A Bayesian Perspective”; Economic Letters; Vol. 96, No. 1; 2007; 45-50; #4809.

Puppe, Clemens; “The Structure of Strategy-Proof Social Choice--Part I: General Characterization and Possibility Results on Median Spaces”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 135, No. 1; July, 2007; 269-305; #4887.

Nehring, Klaus; Puppe, Clemens; "Consistent Judgement Aggregation: the Truth-functional Case"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 1; June, 2008; 41-57; #4929.

Nehring, Klaus; Puppe, Clemens; "Abstract Arrowian Aggregation"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 145, No. 2; March, 2010; 467-494; #5363.

Nehring, Klaus; Puppe, Clemens; "Justifiable Group Choice"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 145, No. 2; March, 2010; 583-602; #5368.

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[Neme, Alejandro]; Barberà, Salvador; Massò, Jordi; "Maximal Domains of Preferences Preserving Strategy-proofness for Generalized Median Voter Schemes"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 2; February, 1999; 321-336; #3418.

[Neme, Alejandro]; Massó, Jordi; “A Maximal Domain of Preferences for Strategy-proof, Efficient, and Simple Rules in the Division Problem”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 23, No. 2; October, 2004; 187-206; #4253.

[Neme, Alejandro]; Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; “Stability and Voting by Committees with Exit”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 23, No. 2; October, 2004; 229-247; #4255.

[Neme, Alejandro]; Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; “Voting by Committees under Constraints”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 122, No. 2; 2005; 185-205; #4296.

[Neme, Alejandro]; Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; “On Exiting after Voting”; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 34, No. 1; 2006; 33-54; #4781.

[Neme, Alejandro]; Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; “An Undominated Nash Equilibrium for Voting by Committees with Exit”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 54, No. 2; 2007; 152-175; #4710.

[Neme, Alejandro]; Massó, Jordi; “Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 61, No. 2; 2007; 331-343; #4794.

[Neme, Alejandro]; Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; "The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 3; March, 2012; 371-406; #5548.

Neubauer, Michael G.; "Apportionment and the 2000 Election"; The College Mathematics Journal; Vol. 34, Issue 1; January, 2003; 2-10; #4096.

Neugebauer, Tibor; Traub, Stefan; "Public Good and Private Good Valuation for Waiting Time Reduction: a Laboratory study"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 39, Number 1; June, 2012; 35-57; #5568.

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[Newell, Bob]; Bennett, Sandi; DeTemple, Duane; Dirks, Michael; Robertson, Jack M.; Tyus, Bob; Fair Divisions: Getting Your Fair Share; Arlington, MA; COMAP; 1987; #3679.

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[Neyman, Abraham]; Aumann, Robert J.; Kurz, Mordecai; "Voting for Public Goods"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 50(4), No. 163; October, 1983; 677-693; #225.

[Ng, Che Tat]; Luce, R. Duncan; Marley, Anthony J.; "Entropy-Related Measures of the Utility of Gambling"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 5-25; #5006.

Ng, Siang; Ng, Yew-Kwang; "Welfare-reducing Growth Despite Individual and Government Optimization"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 3; July, 2001; 497-506; #3768.

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Ng, Yew-Kwang; "The Bergson Social Welfare Function with Externality"; Economic Record; Vol. 48, No. 124; December, 1972; 517-526; #2942.

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[Ng, Yew-Kwang]; Kemp, Murray C.; "On the Existence of Social Welfare Functions, Social Orderings and Social Decision Functions"; Economica; Vol. 43, No. 169; February, 1976; 59-66; #574.

[Ng, Yew-Kwang]; Kemp, Murray C.; "More on Social Welfare Functions: The Incompatibility of Individualism and Ordinalism"; Economica; Vol. 44, No. 173; February, 1977; 89-90; #26.

Ng, Yew-Kwang; "Welfarism: A Defence Against Sen's Attack"; Economic Journal; Vol. 91, No. 362; June, 1981; 531-535; #1007. [Comment on paper by Sen; see response by Sen]

Ng, Yew-Kwang; "Bentham or Nash? On the Acceptable Forms of Social Welfare Functions"; Economic Record; Vol. 57, No. 158; September, 1981; 238-250; #162.

[Ng, Yew-Kwang]; Kemp, Murray C.; "The Incompatibility of Individualism and Ordinalism"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 3, No. 1; July, 1982; 33-37; #1526. [see comment by Mayston and reply by Kemp and Ng]

Ng, Yew-Kwang; "Beyond Pareto Optimality: The Necessity of Interpersonal Cardinal Utilities in Distributional Judgements and Social Choice"; Zeitscrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 42, No. 3; 1982; 207-233; #1658.

[Ng, Yew-Kwang]; Kemp, Murray C.; "Individualistic Social Welfare Functions Under Ordinalism: A Reply to Mayston"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 4, No. 3; July, 1983; 305-307; #239. [Reply to Mayston comment on paper by Kemp and Ng]

Ng, Yew-Kwang; "Some Broader Issues of Social Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; edited by Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Maurice Salles; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1983; 151-173; #978.

Ng, Yew-Kwang; "The Utilitarian Criterion, Finite Sensibility, and the Weak-Majority Preference Principle: A Further Analysis"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 2, No. 1; May, 1985; 37-38; #811.

Ng, Yew-Kwang; "Some Fundamental Issues in Social Welfare"; Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare; Feiwel, George R., editor; Albany; State University of New York Press; 1985; 435-469; #2941.

Ng, Yew-Kwang; "Social Criteria for Evaluating Population Change: An Alternative to the Blackorby-Donaldson Criterion"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 29, No. 3; April, 1986; 375-81; #2940.

Ng, Yew-Kwang; "Beyond Pareto Optimality! A Response to Christian Seidl"; Zeitscrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 46, No. 3; 1986; 311-315; #1654. [To comment by Seidl; see subsequent note by Seidl and rejoinder by Ng]

Ng, Yew-Kwang; "A Final Rejoinder to Seidl"; Zeitscrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 46, No. 3; 1986; 317-318; #1656. [To note by Seidl]

[Ng, Yew-Kwang]; Kemp, Murray C.; "Arrow's Independence Condition and the Bergson-Samuelson Tradition"; Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy; edited by George R. Feiwel; Basingstoke; Macmillan; 1987; 223-241; #1879.

Ng, Yew-Kwang; "Individual Irrationality and Social Welfare"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 6, No. 2; April, 1989; 87-101; #2121.

Ng, Yew-Kwang; "Should We Be Very Cautious or Extremely Cautious on Measures That May Involve Our Destruction? On The Finiteness of Our Expected Welfare"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 8, No. 1; February, 1991; 79-88; #2298.

Ng, Yew-Kwang; Wang, Jianguo; "A Case for Cardinal Utility and Non-Arbitrary Choice of Commodity Units"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 3; June, 1995; 255-266; #2390.

Ng, Yew-Kwang; "Utility, Informed Preference, or Happiness: Following Harsanyi's Argument to its Logical Conclusion"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 2; February, 1999; 197-216; #3412.

Ng, Yew-Kwang; "From Separability to Unweighted Sum: A Case for Utilitarianism"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 49, No. 4; December, 2000; 299-312; #3841.

[Ng, Yew-Kwang]; Ng, Siang; "Welfare-reducing Growth Despite Individual and Government Optimization"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 3; July, 2001; 497-506; #3768.

Ng, Yew-kwang; "From Preference to Happiness: Towards a More Complete Welfare Economics"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 2; April, 2003; 307-350; #4009.

Ng, Yew-Kwang; Sun, Guang-Zhen; "Exclusion of Self Evaluations in Peer Ratings: An Impossibility and Some Proposals"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 3; June, 2003; 443-456; #4084.

Ng, Yew-Kwang; "Appropriate Discounting of Future Utilities Need Not Be the Dictatorship of the Present: a Note on Chichilnisky"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 1; August, 2003; 113-116; #4175.

[Ng, Yew-Kwang]; Clarke, Matthew; “Population Dynamics and Animal Welfare: Issues Raised by the Culling of Kangaroos in Puckapunyal”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 2; October, 2006; 407-422; #4535.

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Niemi, Richard G.; Weisberg, Herbert F.; editors; Probability Models of Collective Decision Making; Columbus, Ohio; Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company; 1972; #1362.

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[Niemi, Richard G.]; Weisberg, Herbert F.; "Probability Calculations for Cyclical Majorities in Congressional Voting"; Probability Models of Collective Decision Making; edited by Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg; Columbus, Ohio; Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company; 1972; 204-231; #1368.

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Niemi, Richard G.; Riker, William H.; "The Choice of Voting Systems"; Scientific American; Vol. 234, No. 6; June, 1976; 21-27; #605.

[Niemi, Richard G.]; Bjurulf, Bo H.; "Strategic Voting in Scandinavian Parliaments"; Scandinavian Political Studies; Vol. 1 (New Series), No. 1; 1978; 5-22; #1154.

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[Niemi, Richard G.]; Bjurulf, Bo H.; "Order-of-Voting Effects"; Power, Voting and Voting Power; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Würzburg-Vienna; Physica Verlag; 1982; 153-178; #1413.

Niemi, Richard G.; Frank, Arthur Q.; "Sophisticated Voting Under the Plurality Procedure"; Political Equilibrium; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle; Boston; Kluwer-Nijhoff; 1982; 151-172; #1358.

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Nitzan, Shmuel I.; "Some Measures of Closeness to Unanimity and Their Implications"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 13, No. 2; June, 1981; 129-138; #1316.

[Nitzan, Shmuel I.]; Coughlin, Peter J.; "Directional and Local Electoral Equilibria with Probabilistic Voting"; Social Choice and Welfare; edited by Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Maurice Salles; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1983; 285-299; #983.

Nitzan, Shmuel I.; Paroush, Jacob; "The Significance of Independent Voting Under Certain Dichotomous Choice Situations"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 17, No. 1; July, 1984; 47-60; #933.

Nitzan, Shmuel I.; Paroush, Jacob; "Are Qualified Majority Rules Special?"; Public Choice; Vol. 42, No. 3; 1984; 257-272; #755.

Nitzan, Shmuel I.; Paroush, Jacob; "A General Theorem and Eight Corollaries in Search of Correct Decision"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 17, No. 3; November, 1984; 211-220; #402.

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Nitzan, Shmuel I.; "More on the Preservation of Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice"; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 104, No. 1; February, 1989; 187-190; #2231.

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Nitzan, Shmuel I.; "The Likelihood of Inefficiency, a Prisoner's Dilemma and Suboptimality in Games of Binary Voluntary Provision of Public Goods"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 11, No. 2; April, 1994; 157-164; #3145.

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[Nitzan, Shmuel I.]; Ben-Yashar, Ruth; "The Robustness of Optimal Organizational Architectures: A Note on Hierarchies and Polyarchies"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 1; January, 2001; 155-163; #3735.

[Nitzan, Shmuel I.]; Ben-Yashar, Ruth; "Are Referees Sufficiently Informed about the Editor's Practice?"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 51, No. 1; August, 2001; 1-11; #3958.

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[Nitzan, Shmuel I.]; Epstein, Gil S.; "Political Culture and Monopoly Price Determination"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 1; August, 2003; 1-19; #4170.

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[Nitzan, Shmuel I.]; Baharad, Eyal; “Approval Voting Reconsidered”; Economic Theory; Vol. 26, No. 3; 2005; 619-628; #4629.

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[Nitzan, Shmuel I.]; Baharad, Eyal; “On the Selection of the Same Winner by All Scoring Rules”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 3; June, 2006; 597-601; #4504.

[Nitzan, Shmuel I.]; Epstein, Gil S.; “The Politics of Randomness”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 2; October, 2006; 423-433; #4539.

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Nitzan, Shmuel I.; Kriesler, Kobi; "The Effect of Limited Search Ability on the Quality of Competitive Rent-seeking Clubs"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 1; June, 2010; 81-106; #5223.

Nitzan, Shmuel I.; Collective Preference and Choice; Cambridge and New York; Cambridge University Press; 2010; #5374.

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Nurmi, Hannu; "On Taking Preferences Seriously"; Essays in Democratic Theory; edited by Dag Anckar and E. Berndtson; Tampere; Finnpublishers; 1983; #1700.

Nurmi, Hannu; "Social Choice Theory and Democracy: A Comparison of Two Recent Views"; European Journal of Political Research; Vol. 12, No. 3; September, 1984; 325-333; #1107.

Nurmi, Hannu; "On the Strategic Properties of Some Modern Methods of Group Decision Making"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 29, No. 4; October, 1984; 248-257; #1790.

Nurmi, Hannu; "Social Choice Theory and Democracy"; Mind, Language and Society; edited by Otto Neumaier; Verband der wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaften; Vienna; 1984; 179-187; #1449. [critiques book by Lehrer and Wagner; see Nurmi's companion criticism, Wagner's response, and Nurmi's rejoinder]

Nurmi, Hannu; "Some Properties of the Lehrer-Wagner Method for Reaching Rational Consensus"; Synthese; Vol. 62, No. 1; January, 1985; 13-24; #1450. [critiques book by Lehrer and Wagner; see Nurmi's companion criticism, Wagner's response, and Nurmi's reply]

Nurmi, Hannu; "A Rejoinder to Wagner"; Conceptus; Vol. 19, No. 47; 1985; 91-92; #1442. [rejoinder to Wagner's response to 1984 paper and 1985 paper by Nurmi critiquing Lehrer and Wagner's book]

Nurmi, Hannu; "Problems of Finding Optimal Voting and Representation Systems"; European Journal of Operational Research; Vol. 24, No. 1; January, 1986; 91-98; #1699.

Nurmi, Hannu; "Review of Brams and Fishburn's Approval Voting"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 3, No. 2; July, 1986; 147-148; #1175.

Nurmi, Hannu; "Mathematical Models of Elections and Their Relevance for Institutional Design"; Electoral Studies; Vol. 5, No. 2; August, 1986; 167-181; #1791.

Nurmi, Hannu; Comparing Voting Systems; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1987; #1792.

Nurmi, Hannu; "Political Succession as Policy Succession: Why So Much Stability?"; The Process of Political Succession; edited by Peter Calvert; London; Macmillan; 1987; 203-222; #1793.

[Nurmi, Hannu]; Berg, Sven; "Making Choices in the Old-Fashioned Way"; Economia della scelte pubbliche; Vol. 2; 1988; 95-113; #3923.

Nurmi, Hannu; "Discrepancies in the Outcomes Resulting from Different Voting Schemes"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 25, No. 2; September, 1988; 193-208; #2936.

Nurmi, Hannu; "Assumptions of Individual Preferences in the Theory of Voting Procedures"; Non-Conventional Preference Relations in Decision Making; edited by Janusz Kacprzyk and M. Roubens; Berlin; Springer Verlag; 1988; 142-155; #2114.

Nurmi, Hannu; "Inferential Modes in Applying Social Choice Theory"; Compromise, Negotiation and Group Decision; edited by Betrand R. Munier and Melvin F. Shakun; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1988; 63-81; #2184.

Nurmi, Hannu; "On Nanson's Method"; in Democracy in the Modern World; Edited by J. Paastela; Acta Universitatis Tamperensis; Ser. A, Vol. 260; Tampere; 1989; #3926.

Nurmi, Hannu; Fedrizzi, Mario; Kacprzyk, Janusz; "Vague Notions in the Theory of Voting"; Multiperson Decision Making Models Using Fuzzy Sets and Possibility Theory; edited by Janusz Kacprzyk and Mario Fedrizzi; Dordrecht; Kluwer Academic Publishers; 1990; 43-52; #2934.

Nurmi, Hannu; Salomaa, Arto; "A Cryptographic Approach to the Secret Ballot"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 36, No. 1; January, 1991; 34-40; #2958.

[Nurmi, Hannu]; Kacprzyk, Janusz; Fedrizzi, Mario; "Group Decision Making and Consensus Under Fuzzy Preferences and Fuzzy Majority"; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 49, No. 1; July 10, 1992; 21-31; #2933.

Nurmi, Hannu; "An Assessment of Voting System Simulations"; Public Choice; Vol. 73, No. 4; June, 1992; 459-487; #2954.

Nurmi, Hannu; Salomaa, Arto; "Cancellation and Reassignment of Votes in Secret Ballot Elections"; European Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 9, No. 3; August, 1993; 427-435; #2953.

Nurmi, Hannu; "On the Difficulty of Making Social Choices"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 38, No. 1; January, 1995; 99-119; #2952.

[Nurmi, Hannu]; Fedrizzi, Mario; Kacprzyk, Janusz; "How Different are Social Choice Functions: A Rough Sets Approach"; Quality & Quantity; Vol. 30, No. 1; 1996; 87-99; #2957.

[Nurmi, Hannu]; Berg, Sven; "Special Issue: Group Decision Quality and Social Choice Theory"; Group Decision and Negotiation; Vol. 5, Issue 3; May, 1996; 207-209; #3449.

Nurmi, Hannu; "It's Not Just the Lack of Monotonicity"; Representation; Vol. 34, No.1; Winter, 1996/7; 48-52; #3217.

Nurmi, Hannu; "Referendum Design: An Exercise in Applied Social Choice Theory"; Scandinavian Political Studies; Vol. 20, No. 1; 1997; 33-52; #3927.

Nurmi, Hannu; "Compound Majority Paradoxes and Proportional Representation"; European Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 13, No. 3; September, 1997; 443-454; #3161.

Nurmi, Hannu; "The Representation of Voter Groups in the European Parliament: a Penrose-Banzhaf Index Analysis"; Electoral Studies; Vol. 16, No. 3; September, 1997; 317-327; #3534.

Nurmi, Hannu; Salomaa, Arto; "A Comparative Overview of Cryptographic Voting Protocols"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 84; 1998; 29-43; #3687.

Nurmi, Hannu; "Voting Paradoxes and Referenda"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 3; May, 1998; 333-350; #3250.

Nurmi, Hannu; Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them; Springer Verlag; Berlin; 1999; #3607.

Nurmi, Hannu; Kacprzyk, Janusz; "Social Choice under Fuzziness: A Perspective"; Preferences and Decisions under Incomplete Knowledge; Edited by János Fodor, Bernard De Baets and Patrice Perny; Physica; Heidelberg; 2000; 107-130; #3831.

Nurmi, Hannu; Voting Procedures under Uncertainty; Springer-Verlag; Berlin; 2002; #4000.

Nurmi, Hannu; “A Comparison of Some Distance-based Choice Rules in Ranking Environments”; Theory and Decision; Vol. 57, No. 1; 2004; 5-24; #4351.

Nurmi, Hannu; Salonen, Hannu; "More Borda Count Variations for Project Assessment"; AUCO Czech Economic Review; Vol. 2, No. 2; September, 2008; 109-122; #5053.

Nussbaum, Martha C.; “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice”; Feminist Economics; Vol. 9, Nos. 2-3; July-November, 2003; 33-5; #4422.

Nyblén, Göran; "Quelques Réflexions sur le Vieux Problème de l'Avantage Collectif a la Lumière des Développements Récents"; Économie Appliqué; Vol. 5, No. 4; October-December, 1952; 485-499; #1872.

Nzitat, Henri Patrice; "From Equality to Inequality: The Diamond-Sen Criticism of Harsanyi's Criterion of Social Justice"; Pacific Economic Review; Vol. 6, No. 2; June, 2001; 239-253; #4092.


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