A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z


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[Oak, Mandar]; Dellis, Arnaud; “Policy Convergence under Approval and Plurality Voting: the Role of Policy Commitment”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 29, No. 2; September, 2007; 229-245; #4609.

Obata, Tsuneshi; "An Experimental Research of Aggregating Methods for Ranked Voting Data"; Oita University. Faculty of Engineering. Reports No. 45; 2002; 35-41; #4031.

Obata, Tsuneshi; Ishii, Hiroaki; “A Method for Discriminating Efficient Candidates with Ranked Voting Data”; European Journal of Operations Research; Vol. 151, No. 1; 2003; 233-237; #4352.

O'Flaherty, Brendan; "Representatives and Districts"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 1; January, 2000; 157-178; #3593.

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Ohseto, Shinji; "Strategy-proof Allocation Mechanisms for Economies with an Indivisible Good"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 1; January, 1999; 121-136; #3318.

[Ohseto, Shinji]; Deb, Rajat; "Strategy-proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies: a Note"; Economic Theory; Vol. 14, No. 3; 1999; 685-689; #3701.

Ohseto, Shinji; "Strategyproof and Efficient Allocation of an Indivisible Good on Finitely Restricted Preference Domains"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 29, No. 3; December, 2000; 365-374; #3918.

[Ohseto, Shinji]; Kato, Miki; "Toward General Impossibility Theorems in Pure Exchange Economies"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 3; July, 2002; 659-664; #3858.

Ohseto, Shinji; “Characterizations of Strategy-proof and Fair Mechanisms for Allocating Indivisible Goods”; Economic Theory; Vol. 29, No. 1; 2006; 111-121; #4854.

Ohseto, Shinji; “A Characterization of the Borda Rule in Peer Ratings”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 54, No. 2; 2007; 147-151; #4802.

[Ohseto, Shinji]; Ando, Kazutoshi; Kato, Miki; “Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Allocation of an Indivisible Good”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 55, No. 1; January, 2008; 14-23; #4876.

Ohseto, Shinji; "Exclusion of Self Evaluations in Peer Ratings: Monotonicity Versus Unanimity on Finitely Restricted Domains"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 1; January, 2012; 109-119; #5534.

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[Ok, Efe A.]; Mitra, Tapan; "On the Equitability of Progressive Taxation"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 73, No. 2; April, 1997; 316-334; #3718.

Ok, Efe A.; "A Note on the Existence of the Progressive Tax Structure"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 4; October, 1997; 527-543; #2773.

Ok, Efe A.; "On Opportunity Inequality Measurement"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 77, No. 2; December, 1997; 300-329; #3717.

Ok, Efe A.; Kranich, Laurence; "The Measurement of Opportunity Inequality: A Cardinality-Based Approach"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 2; February, 1998; 263-287; #3207.

Ok, Efe A.; "Inequality Averse Collective Choice"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 30, No. 3; October, 1998; 301-321; #3716.

Ok, Efe A.; Lambert, Peter J.; "On Evaluating Social Welfare by Sequential Generalized Lorenz Dominance"; Economics Letters; Vol. 63, No. 1; April, 1999; 45-53; #3713.

Ok, Efe A.; Zhou, Lin; "Revealed Group Preferences on Non-convex Choice Problems"; Economic Theory; Vol. 13, No. 3; May, 1999; 671-687; #3715.

[Ok, Efe A.]; Foster, James E.; "Lorenz Dominance and the Variance of Logarithms"; Econometrica; Vol. 67, No. 4; July, 1999; 901-907; #3714.

[Ok, Efe A.]; Koçkesen, Levent; Sethi, Rajiv; "Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 31, No. 2; May, 2000; 303-310; #3711.

[Ok, Efe A.]; Koçkesen, Levent; "Negatively Interdependent Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 3; May, 2000; 533-558; #3629.

[Ok, Efe A.]; Koçkesen, Levent; Sethi, Rajiv; "The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 92, No. 2; June, 2000; 274-299; #3712.

[Ok, Efe A.]; Faulí-Oller, Ramon; Ortuño-Ortín, Ignacio; “Delegation and Polarization of Platforms in Political Competition”; Economic Theory; Vol. 22, No. 2; 2003; 289-309; #4321.

[Ok, Efe A.]; Benoît, Jean-Pierre; “Maskin's Theorem with Limited Veto Power”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 55, No. 2; May, 2006; 331-339; #4832.

[Ok, Efe A.]; Benoît, Jean-Pierre; Sanver, M. Remzi; “On Combining Implementable Social Choice Rules”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 60, No. 1; 2007; 20-30; #4768.

[Ok, Efe A.]; Benoît, Jean-Pierre; "Nash Implementation without No-Veto Power"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 64, No. 1; September, 2008; 51-67; #5048.

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[Olaizola, N.]; Inarra, Elena; Kuipers, Jeroen; “Absorbing and Generalized Stable Sets”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 3; June, 2005; 433-437; #4432.

[O'Leary, Michael K.]; Brams, Steven J.; "An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 64, No. 2; June, 1970; 449-470; #1212. [see note by Mayer, comment by Brams and O'Leary, and rejoinder by Mayer]

[O'Leary, Michael K.]; Brams, Steven J.; "PROVOTE: A Computer Program for the Probabilistic Analysis of Voting Bodies"; Behavioral Analysis; Vol. 16, No. 3; May-June, 1971; 261-263; #1769.

[O'Leary, Michael K.]; Brams, Steven J.; "Comment on Mayer's 'A Note on "An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies"'"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 65, No. 3; September, 1971; 766; #1213. [See rejoinder by Mayer]

[Oliveros, Santiago]; Ahn, David S.; "Combinatorial Voting"; Econometrica; Vol. 80, No. 1; January, 2012; 89-141; #5622.

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Ollár, Mariann; "Monotonicity and Robustness of Majority Rule"; Economics Letters; Vol. 107, No. 2; 2010; 288-290; #5278.

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[O’Neill, Barry]; Peleg, Bezalel; "Reconciling Power and Equality in International Organizations: a Voting Method from Rabbi Krochmal of Kremsier"; Jewish Political Studies Review; Vol. 12; 2000; 67-81; #4387.

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Ooghe, Erwin; Lauwers, Luc; “Non-dictatorial Extensive Social Choice”; Economic Theory; Vol. 25, No. 3; 2005; 721-743; #4354.

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Ooghe, Erwin; “Sequential Dominance and Weighted Utilitarianism”; Economic Letters; Vol. 94, No. 2; 2007; 208-212; #4824.

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[Ordeshook, Peter C.]; Hinich, Melvin J.; "Abstentions and Equilibrium in the Electoral Process"; Public Choice; Vol. 7; Fall, 1969; 81-106; #1263.

[Ordeshook, Peter C.]; Davis, Otto A.; Hinich, Melvin J.; "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 64, No. 2; June, 1970; 426-448; #1095.

[Ordeshook, Peter C.]; Hinich, Melvin J.; "Plurality Maximization vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 64, No. 3; September, 1970; 772-791; #2874.

[Ordeshook, Peter C.]; Hinich, Melvin J.; "Social Welfare and Electoral Competition in Democratic Societies"; Public Choice; Vol. 11; Fall, 1971; 73-88; #1264.

Ordeshook, Peter C.; "Pareto Optimality in Electoral Competition"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 65, No. 4; December, 1971; 1141-1145; #1242. [See comment by Shubik and reply by Ordeshook]

Ordeshook, Peter C.; "Rejoinder to Shubik's 'Comment'"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 65, No. 4; December, 1971; 1146; #1243. [Reply to comment by Shubik on paper by Ordeshook]

[Ordeshook, Peter C.]; Hinich, Melvin J.; Ledyard, John O.; "Nonvoting and the Existence of Equilibrium Under Majority Rule"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 4, No. 2; April, 1972; 144-153; #1009.

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[Ordeshook, Peter C.]; Hinich, Melvin J.; "The Electoral College: A Spatial Analysis"; Political Methodology; Vol. 1, No. 3; Summer, 1974; 1-29; #1098.

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[Ordeshook, Peter C.]; Colantoni, Claude S.; Levesque, Terrence J.; "Campaign Resource Allocation Under the Electoral College"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 69, No. 1; March, 1975; 141-154; #15. [Comment on paper by Brams and Davis; see response by Brams and Davis]

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[Ortuño-Ortín, Ignacio]; Faulí-Oller, Ramon; Ok, Efe A.; “Delegation and Polarization of Platforms in Political Competition”; Economic Theory; Vol. 22, No. 2; 2003; 289-309; #4321.

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[Owen, Guillermo]; Gómez, Daniel; González-Arangüena, Enrique; Manuel, Conrado; del Pozo, Mónica; Tejada, Juan; “Centrality and Power in Social Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 46, No. 1; August, 2003; 27-54; #4427.

Owen, Guillermo; Lindner, Ines; Feld, Scott L.; Grofman, Bernard; Ray, Leonard; “A Simple ‘Market Value’ Bargaining Model for Weighted Voting Games: Characterization and Limit Theorems”; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 35, No. 1; 2006; 111-128; #4734.

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[Ozdemir, Ugur]; Schofield, Norman J.; Claassen, Christopher; Zakharov, Alexei; "Application of a Theorem in Stochastic Models of Elections"; International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences; 2010; Art. ID 562813, 30 pp.; #5257.

[Ozdemir, Ugur]; Schofield, Norman; Gallego, Maria E.; Zakharov, Alexei; "Competition for Popular Support: A Valence Model of Elections in Turkey"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 3; April, 2011; 451-482; #5408.

[Ozdemir, Ugur]; Schofield, Norman; Claassen, Christopher; Zakharov, Alexei; "Estimating the Effects of Activists in Two-party and Multi-party Systems: Comparing the United States and Israel"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 3; April, 2011; 483-518; #5409.

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Özkal-Sanver, Ipek; Sanver, M. Remzi; “Efficiency in the Degree of Compromise: A New Axiom for Social Choice” Group Decision and Negotiation; Vol. 13, No. 4; July, 2004; 375-380; #4775.

Özkal-Sanver, Ipek; Sanver, M. Remzi; "A New Monotonicity Condition for Tournament Solutions"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 69, No. 3; 2010; 439-452; #5466.

Özyurt, Selçuk; Sanver, M. Remzi; “Strategy-proof Resolute Social Choice Correspondences”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 1; January, 2008; 89-101; #4694.

Özyurt, Selçuk; Sanver, M. Remzi; "A General Impossibility Result on Strategy-proof Social Choice Hyperfunctions"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 66, No. 2; 2009; 880-892; #5313.


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