A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z


Packard, Dennis Jay; "Social Choice Theory and Citizens' Intransitive Weak Preference - A Paradox"; Public Choice; Vol. 22, No. 22; Summer, 1975; 107-111; #3083.

Packard, Dennis Jay; "A Note on Wittgenstein and Cyclical Comparatives"; Analysis; Vol. 36, No. 1; October, 1975; 37-40; #2260.

Packard, Dennis Jay; "Proposed Solution to Voter's Preference Aggregation Problem"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 8, No. 3; July, 1977; 255-264; #368.

Packard, Dennis Jay; Heiner, Ronald A.; "Ranking Functions and Independence Conditions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 16, No. 1; October, 1977; 84-102; #1.

Packard, Dennis Jay; "Plausibility Orderings and Social Choice"; Synthese; Vol. 49, No. 3; December, 1981; 415-418; #342. [See extension by Heiner and Packard and critique by Panda.

Packard, Dennis Jay; Heiner, Ronald A.; "Inconsistency Resolution and Collective Choice"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 14, No. 3; September, 1982; 225-236; #1320.

Packard, Dennis Jay; "Cyclical Preference Logic"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 14, No. 4; December, 1982; 415-426; #320.

[Packard, Dennis Jay]; Heiner, Ronald A.; "More About Plausibility Orderings"; Synthese; Vol. 55, No. 3; June, 1983; 333-337; #341. [Extends earlier paper by Packard; see critique by Panda.]

[Packard, Dennis Jay]; Heiner, Ronald A.; "A Uniqueness Result for Orders: With Application to Collective Choice as Inconsistency Resolution"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 32, No. Extending1; February, 1984; 180-184; #1980.

[Packel, Edward W.]; Deegan, John (Jr.); "A New Index of Power for Simple n-Person Games"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 7, Issue 2; 1979; 113-123; #1440.

[Packel, Edward W.]; Ferejohn, John A.; Fiorina, Morris P.; "Nonequilibrium Solutions for Legislative Systems"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 25, No. 2; March, 1980; 140-148; #886.

Packel, Edward W.; "Impossibility Results in the Axiomatic Theory of Intertemporal Choice"; Public Choice; Vol. 35, No. 2; 1980; 219-227; #133.

Packel, Edward W.; "Transitive Permutation Groups and Equipotent Voting Rules"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 1, No. 1; September, 1980; 93-100; #132.

[Packel, Edward W.]; Hoffman, Elizabeth; "A Stochastic Model of Committee Voting with Exogenous Costs: Theory and Experiments" Behavioral Science; Vol. 27, No. 1; January, 1982; 43-56; #3024.

Packel, Edward W.; "Social Decision Functions and Strongly Decisive Sets"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 48(2), No. 152; April, 1981; 343-349; #131.

Packel, Edward W.; Saari, Donald G.; "Strategic Equilibria and Decisive Set Structures for Social Choice Mechanisms"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 2, No. 4; June, 1982; 373-378; #1520.

Packel, Edward W.; Deegan, J. (Jr.); "An Axiomated Family of Power Indices for Simple n-Person Games"; Power, Voting and Voting Power; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Würzburg-Vienna; Physica Verlag; 1982; 213-221; #1417.

Packel, Edward W.; Ferejohn, John A.; "Continuous Social Decision Procedures"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 6, No. 1; October, 1983; 65-73; #240.

[Packel, Edward W.]; Deegan, John (Jr.); "To The (Minimal Winning) Victors Go The (Equally Divided) Spoils: A New Power Index for Simple n-Person Games"; Modules in Applied Mathematics: Vol. 2, Political and Related Models; edited by Steven J. Brams, William F. Lucas and Philip D. Straffin (Jr.); New York; Springer Verlag; 1983; 239-255; #1762.

Packel, Edward W.; "Power Structure and Cardinality Restrictions for Paretian Social Choice Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 2; August, 1984; 105-111; #814.

[Packel, Edward W.]; Hoffman, Elizabeth; "A Stochastic Model of Coalition Formation with Exogenous Costs: Theory and Experiments"; Coalitions and Collective Action; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Vienna; Physica-Verlag; 1984; 283-294; #1469.

[Pacuit, Eric]; Chopra, Samir; Parikh, Rohit; “Knowledge-theoretic Properties of Strategic Voting”; Logics in Artificial Intelligence; Lecture Notes in Computer Science; 3229; Springer; Berlin; 2004; 18-30; #4637.

Page, Benjamin I.; "Elections and Social Choice: The State of the Evidence"; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 21, No. 3; August, 1977; 639-668; #955.

[Page, Frank H. (Jr.)]; Monteiro, Paulo K.; Wooders, Myrna H.; "Arbitrage and Global Cones: Another Counterexample"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 2; February, 1999; 337-346; #3420.

Page, Scott E.; Sander, Leonard M.; Schneider-Mizell, Casey M.; “Conformity and Dissonance in Generalized Voter Models”; Journal of Statistical Physics; Vol. 128, No. 6; September, 2007; 1279-1287; #4709.

Page, Warren; "Generating Functions and the Electoral College"; The College Mathematics Journal; Vol. 32, No. 5; November, 2001; 380; #4130.

Paine, Neil R.; "A Useful Approach to the Group Choice Problem"; Decision Sciences; Vol. 4, No. 1; January, 1973; 21-30; #2070.

Paine, Neil R.; "An Extension of Nurmi's Summary Analysis of Voting Procedures"; British Journal of Political Science; Vol. 18, No. 2; April, 1988; 281-286; #2031. [comments on a paper by Nurmi; see also Paine's further remarks]

Paine, Neil R.; "Acceptability Voting: A Modification."; British Journal of Political Science; Volume 20, Part 1; January, 1990; #3091. [extension of Paine's remarks on a paper by Nurmi]

Palfrey, Thomas R.; Rosenthal, Howard; "A Strategic Calculus of Voting"; Public Choice; Vol. 41, No. 1; 1983; 7-53; #1581.

Palfrey, Thomas R.; Rosenthal, Howard; "Participation and Provision of Discrete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysis"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 24, No. 2; July, 1984; 171-193; #1582.

Palfrey, Thomas R.; Rosenthal, Howard; "Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 79, No. 1; March, 1985; 62-78; #774.

[Palfrey, Thomas R.]; Coughlin, Peter J.; "Pareto Optimality in Spatial Voting Models"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 4; March, 1985; 307-319; #792.

Palfrey, Thomas R.; "A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law"; Models of Strategic Choice in Politics; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook; Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press; 1989; 69-91; #2512.

[Palfrey, Thomas R.]; Ledyard, John O.; "Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 61, No. 2; April, 1994; 327-355; #2994.

[Palfrey, Thomas R.]; McKelvey, Richard D.; "The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information"; Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics; edited by Barnett, William A.; Hervé Moulin; Maurice Salles; Norman Schofield; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1995; 321-349; #2561.

[Palfrey, Thomas R.]; Crémer, Jacques; "In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote"; European Economic Review; Vol. 40, No. 1; January, 1996; 43-60; #3084.

[Palfrey, Thomas R.]; Aragones, Enriqueta; “Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information”; Social Choice and Strategic Decisions; edited by David Austen-Smith and John Duggan; Springer; Berlin; 2005; 93-112; #4627.

[Palfrey, Thomas R.]; Casella, Alessandra; Gelman, Andrew; “An Experimental Study of Storable Votes”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 57, No. 1; 2006; 123-154; #4749.

[Palfrey, Thomas R.]; Battaglini, Marco; Morton, Rebecca B.; "The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 77, No. 1; 2010; 61-89; #5264.

[Palfrey, Thomas R.]; Battaglini, Marco; "The Dynamics of Distributive Politics"; Economic Theory; Vol. 49, No. 3; April, 2012; 739-777; #5608.

de Palma, Andre; Hong, Gap-Seon; Thisse, Jacques-François; "Equilibria in Multi-Party Competition under Uncertainty"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 3; July, 1990; 247-259; #2291.

Panda, Santosh C.; "On Non-binary Social Choice"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 4, No. 1; February, 1983; 73-78; #186.

Panda, Santosh C.; "Some Impossibility Theorems with Domain Restrictions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 38, No. 1; February, 1986; 21-34; #830.

[Panda, Santosh C.]; Dutta, Bhaskar; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Exact Choice and Fuzzy Preferences"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 11, No. 1; February, 1986; 53-68; #3745.

Panda, Santosh C.; "On Ranking Sets of Statements In Terms Of Plausibility"; Synthese; Vol. 67, No. 2; May, 1986; 259-271; #3746. [Disproves claims made in article by Packard and article by Heiner and Packard.]

[Pang, Jun]; Jonker, Hugo; Mauw, Sjouke; "A Formal Framework for Quantifying Voter-controlled Privacy"; J. Algorithms; Vol. 64, Nos. 2-3; 2009; 89-105; #5202.

Pang, Shu Mei; Yi, Jian Xin; "General Characterization of May Majority Rule"; Mathematics in Economics; Vol. 25, No. 4; 2008; 399-405; [Chinese]; #5327.

Pápai, Szilvia; "Strategyproof Single Unit Award Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 4; July, 2001; 785-798; #3782.

[Pápai, Szilvia]; Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina; "Strategy-Proofness and Population-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 38, No. 3; November, 2002; 329-339; #4141.

Pápai, Szilvia; "Groves Sealed Bid Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects with Fair Prices"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 3; June, 2003; 371-385; #4080.

Pardo Llorente, Leandro; "Aggregation of Fuzzy Individual Preferences"; Revista Real Academia Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales de Madrid; Vol. 76, No. 4; 1982; 903-906; #354.

Parekh, Bhikhu; "Clearing the Fog"; Politics, Philosophy and Economics; Vol. 8, No. 3; August, 2009; 289-290; #5386.

[Parikh, Rohit]; Chopra, Samir; Pacuit, Eric; “Knowledge-theoretic Properties of Strategic Voting”; Logics in Artificial Intelligence; Lecture Notes in Computer Science; 3229; Springer; Berlin; 2004; 18-30; #4637.

Paris, David C.; "Plurality Distortion and Majority Rule"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 20, No. 2; March, 1975; 125-133; #1062.

Parisi, Francesco; "The Market for Votes: Coasian Bargaining in an Arrovian Setting"; George Mason University Law Review; Vol. 6; Summer, 1998; 745-766; #3282.

Park, R. E.; "The Possibility of a Social Welfare Function: Comment"; American Economic Review; Vol. 57, No. 5; December, 1967; 1300-1304; #610. [Comment on a paper by Coleman; see Coleman's reply]

[Parker, Cameron]; Friedman, Jane; McGrath, Lynn; “Achievable Hierarchies in Voting Games”; Theory and Decision; Vol. 61, No. 4; 2006; 305-318; #4743.

[Parker, Cameron]; Bean, Dwight; Friedman, Jane; "Simple Majority Achievable Hierarchies"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 65, No. 4; December, 2008; 285-302; #5066.

[Parker, Cameron]; Friedman, Jane; "Can an Asymmetric Power Structure Always Be Achieved?"; Communicating Mathematics; edited by Timothy Y Chow and Daniel C. Isakson; American Mathematical Society; Providence, RI; 2009; 87-98; #5199.

[Parker, Cameron]; Bean, Dwight R.; Friedman, Jane; "Proportional Quota Weighted Voting System Hierarchies"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 3; March, 2010; 397-410; #5181.

[Parks, Robert P.]; Denzau, Arthur T.; "The Continuity of Majority Rule Equilibrium"; Econometrica; Vol. 43, Nos. 5-6; September-November, 1975; 853-866; #2972.

Parks, Robert P.; "Further Results on Path Independence, Quasi-Transitivity and Social Choice"; Public Choice; Vol. 26; Summer, 1976; 75-87; #612.

Parks, Robert P.; "An Impossibility Theorem for Fixed Preferences: A Dictatorial Bergson-Samuelson Welfare Function"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 43(3), No. 135; October, 1976; 447-450; #611.

[Parks, Robert P.]; Machina, Mark; "On Path-Independent Randomized Choice: Comment"; Econometrica; Vol. 49, No. 5; September, 1981; 1345-1347; #28.

[Parks, Robert P.]; Denzau, Arthur T.; "Existence of Voting-Market Equilibria"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 30, No. 2; August, 1983; 243-265; #221.

[Parks, Robert P.]; Schofield, Norman J.; "Nash Equilibrium in a Spatial Model of Coalition Bargaining"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 39, No. 2; March, 2000; 133-174; #3963.

[Paroush, Jacob]; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; Paroush, Jacob; Lampert, Shlomo I.; "Preference Expression and Misrepresentation in Point Voting Schemes"; Public Choice; Vol. 35, No. 4; 1980; 421-436; #100.

[Paroush, Jacob]; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; "The Characterization of Decisive Weighted Majority Rules"; Economics Letters; Vol. 7, No. 2; 1981; 119-124; #932.

[Paroush, Jacob]; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; "The Significance of Independent Voting Under Certain Dichotomous Choice Situations"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 17, No. 1; July, 1984; 47-60; #933.

[Paroush, Jacob]; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; "Are Qualified Majority Rules Special?"; Public Choice; Vol. 42, No. 3; 1984; 257-272; #755.

[Paroush, Jacob]; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; "A General Theorem and Eight Corollaries in Search of Correct Decision"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 17, No. 3; November, 1984; 211-220; #402.

[Paroush, Jacob]; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; Collective Decision-Making: An Economic Approach; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1985; #2472. [See review by Barrett.]

Paroush, Jacob; Karotkin, Drora; "Robustness of Optimal Majority Rules Over Teams With Changing Size"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 6, No. 2; April, 1989; 127-138; #2122.

Paroush, Jacob; "Multi-choice Problems and the Essential Order among Decision Rules"; Economic Letters; Vol. 32, No. 2; February, 1990; 121-125; #2226.

[Paroush, Jacob]; Gradstein, Mark; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; "Collective Decision Making and the Limits on the Organization's Size"; Public Choice; Vol. 66, No. 3; September, 1990; 279-291; #2947.

Paroush, Jacob; "Stay Away From Fair Coins: A Condorcet Jury Theorem"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 1; January, 1998; 15-20; #3186.

[Paroush, Jacob]; Berg, Sven; "Collective Decision Making in Hierarchies"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 35, No. 3 May, 1998; 233-244; #3328.

[Paroush, Jacob]; Berend, Daniel; "When is Condorcet's Jury Theorem Valid?"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 4; August, 1998; 481-488; #3287.

[Paroush, Jacob]; Ben-Yashar, Ruth; "A Nonasymptotic Condorcet Jury Theorem"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 2; February, 2000; 189-199; #3608.

[Paroush, Jacob]; Ben-Yashar, Ruth; "Optimal Decision Rules for Fixed-size Committees in Polychotomous Choice Situations"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 4; July, 2001; 737-746; #3779.

[Paroush, Jacob]; Karotkin, Drora; "Optimum Committee Size: Quality-versus-Quantity Dilemma"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 3; June, 2003; 429-441; #4083.

[Paroush, Jacob]; Karotkin, Drora; “Robustness of Optimal Decision Rules Where One of the Team Members Is Exceptionally Qualified”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 1; January, 2006; 131-141; #4490.

[Parrondo, Juan M. R.]; Dinís, Luis; “Inefficiency of Voting in Parrondo Games”; Physica A. Statistical Mechanics and its Applications; Vol. 343, No. 1-4; 2004; 701-711; #4312.

Pasi, Gabriella; Yager, Ronald R.; “Modeling the Concept of Majority Opinion in Group Decision Making”; Information Sciences; Vol. 176, No. 4; 2006; 390-414; #4649.

[Pasquali, Corrado]; Marengo, Luigi; "The Construction of Choice: A Computational Voting Model"; Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination; Vol. 6, No. 2; November, 2011; 139-156; #5645.

Passarelli, Francesco; Barr, Jason; “Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 1; January, 2007; 41-60; #4560.

[Paterson, Mike]; Aziz, Haris; Bachrach, Yoram; Elkind, Edith; "False-name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games"; Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research; Vol. 40; 2011; 57-93; #5690.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "A Note on Leibenstein's 'Notes on Welfare Economics and the Theory of Democracy' "; Economic Journal; Vol. 77, No. 308; December, 1967; 953-956; #1255.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "A Note on Democratic Decision and the Existence of Choice Sets"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 35(1), No. 101; January, 1968; 1-9; #1254.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Risk, Impersonality and the Social Welfare Function"; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 76, No. 6; November/December, 1968; 1152-1169; #613.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Sen, Amartya K.; "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Rational Choice under Majority Decision"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 1, No. 2; August, 1969; 178-202; #661.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of a Choice Set Under Majority Voting"; Econometrica; Vol. 38, No. 1; January, 1970; 165-170; #1256.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "On Social Choice with Quasitransitive Individual Preferences"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 2, No. 3; September, 1970; 267-275; #1257.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Batra, Raveendra; "Transitivity of Social Decisions under Some More General Group Decision Rules Than the Method of Majority Voting"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 38(3), No. 115; July, 1971; 295-306; #436.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Comments"; Frontiers in Quantitative Economics; edited by Michael D. Intriligator; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1971; 127-129; #1732. [Comments on paper by Plott]

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Voting and Collective Choice; London and New York; Cambridge University Press; 1971; #614. [See review by Frey]

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Batra, Raveendra; "On Some Suggestions for Having Non-Binary Social Choice Functions"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 3, No. 1; October, 1972; 1-11; #438.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Batra, Raveendra; "Transitive Multi-stage Majority Decisions with Quasi-Transitive Individual Preferences"; Econometrica; Vol. 40, No. 6; November, 1972; 1121-1135; #437.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Group Choice with Lexicographic Individual Ordering"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 18, No. 2; March, 1973; 118-123; #1302.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "On the Stability of Sincere Voting Situations"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 6, No. 6; December, 1973; 558-574; #615.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Stability of Sincere Voting under Some Classes of Non-Binary Group Decision Procedures"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 8, No. 2; June, 1974; 206-224; #617.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Sengupta, Manimay; "Conditions for Transitive and Quasi-Transitive Majority Decisions"; Economica; Vol. 41, No. 164; November, 1974; 414-423; #616.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Strategic Voting Without Collusion under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Rules"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 42(1), No. 129; January, 1975; 93-103; #618.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Threats, Counterthreats and Strategic Voting"; Econometrica; Vol. 44, No. 1; January, 1976; 91-103; #1303.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Counter-Threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 43(1), No. 133; February, 1976; 11-18; #619.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Collective Rationality and Strategy-Proofness of Group Decision Rules"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 7, No. 3; July, 1976; 191-203; #1304.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Dutta, Bhaskar; "On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems"; Econometrica; Vol. 46, No. 1; January, 1978; 163-170; #42.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Strategy and Group Choice; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1978; #710. [See review by Lyon]

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Sengupta, Manimay; "Restricted Preferences and Strategyproofness of a Class of Social Decision Functions"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 47(5), No. 150; October, 1980; 965-973; #44.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; MacIntyre, Ian D. A.; "The Sure-Thing Rule and Strategic Voting Under Minimally Binary Group Decision Functions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 25, No. 3; December, 1981; 338-352; #45.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Sengupta, Manimay; "Outcomes of Admissible Nash Equilibria and Sophisticated Voting When Decisions are Based on Pairwise Comparisons"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 2, No. 1; January, 1981; 39-54; #1305.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; MacIntyre, Ian D. A.; "Strategic Voting under Minimally Binary Group Decision Functions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 25, No. 3; 1981; 338-352; #3027.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; Deb, Rajat; "The Structure of Coalitional Power Under Probabilistic Group Decision Rules"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol.27, No. 2; August, 1982; 366-375; #313.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Heiner, Ronald A.; "The Structure of General Probabilistic Group Decision Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; edited by Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Maurice Salles; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1983; 37-54; #974.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Salles, Maurice; editors; Social Choice and Welfare; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1983; #409. [see review by Weymark]

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Barberà, Salvador; "Extending an Order on a Set to the Power Set: Some Remarks on Kannai and Peleg's Approach"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 32, No. 1; February, 1984; 185-191; #1306.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Barberà, Salvador; Barrett, C. Richard; "On Some Axioms for Ranking Sets of Alternatives"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 33, No. 2; August, 1984; 301-308; #376.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Peleg, Bezalel; "An Axiomatic Characterization of the Lexicographic Maximin Extension of an Ordering over a Set to the Power Set"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 2; August, 1984; 113-122; #815.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Nitzan, Shmuel I.; "Median-Based Extensions of an Ordering Over a Set to the Power Set: An Axiomatic Characterization"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 34, No. 2; December, 1984; 252-261; #1307.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Dutta, Bhaskar; "On Enforcing Socially Best Alternatives of Binary Group Decision Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 4; March, 1985; 283-293; #796.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Dutta, Bhaskar; Panda, Santosh C.; "Exact Choice and Fuzzy Preferences"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 11, No. 1; February, 1986; 53-68; #3745.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Barberà, Salvador; "Rationalizability of Stochastic Choice in Terms of Random Orderings"; Econometrica; Vol. 54, No. 3; May, 1986; 707-715; #1665.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Barrett, C. Richard; Salles, Maurice; "On the Structure of Fuzzy Social Welfare Functions"; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 19, No. 1; May, 1986; 1-10; #879.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Peleg, Bezalel; "Distribution of Power Under Stochastic Social Choice Rules"; Econometrica; Vol. 54, No. 4; July, 1986; 909-921; #1666.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Barrett, C. Richard; "Aggregation of Probability Judgements"; Econometrica; Vol. 55, No. 5; September, 1987; 1237-1241; #1911.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Gaertner, Wulf; "An Interview with Amartya Sen"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 5, No. 1; March, 1988; 69-79; #1943.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "On the Consistency of Libertarian Values"; Economica; Vol. 55, No. 220; November, 1988; 517-524; #2232.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Gaertner, Wulf; editors; Distributive Justice and Inequality; New York; Berlin; London and Tokyo; Springer; 1988; #2819.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Barrett, C. Richard; "Fuzzy Sets, Preference and Choice: Some Conceptual Issues"; Bulletin of Economic Research; Vol. 41, No. 4; October, 1989; 229-253; #2240.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Xu, Yongsheng; "On Ranking Opportunity Sets in Terms of Freedom of Choice"; Recherches Économiques de Louvain; Vol. 54, No. 3-4; 1990; 383-390; #2269.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Barrett, C. Richard; "Aggregation of Fuzzy Preferences"; Multiperson Decision Making Models using Fuzzy Sets and Possibility Theory; edited by Janusz Kacprzyk and Mario Fedrizzi; Dordrecht; Kluwer Academic Publ.; 1990; 155-162; #3026.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Barrett, C. Richard; Salles, Maurice; "Rationality and Aggregation of Preferences in an Ordinally Fuzzy Framework"; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 49, No. 1; July 10, 1992; 9-13; #3025.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Basu, Kaushik; Deb, Rajat; "Soft Sets: An Ordinal Formulation of Vagueness with Some Applications to the Theory of Choice"; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 45, No. 1; 1992; 45-58; #2970.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Gaertner, Wulf; Suzumura, Kotaro; "Individual Rights Revisited"; Economica; Vol. 59, No. 234; May, 1992; 161-177; #1981.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Review: Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time [Broome]"; The Economic Journal; Vol. 103, No 418; May, 1993; 752-752; #3092.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Rights and Freedom in Welfare Economics"; European Economic Review; Vol. 38, No. 3-4; April, 1994; 731-738; #2546.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Suzumura, Kotaro; "Rights, Welfarism, and Social Choice"; American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings; Vol. 84, No. 2; May, 1994; 435-439; #2357.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Bossert, Walter; Xu, Yongsheng; "Ranking Opportunity Sets: An Axiomatic Approach"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 63, No. 2; August, 1994; 326-345; #2724.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Basu, Kaushik; Suzumura, Kotaro; Choice, Welfare, and Development: A Festschrift in Honour of Amartya K. Sen; Oxford; Oxford University Press; 1995; #2571.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Suzumura, Kotaro; "Individual Rights and Social Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework"; Oxford Economic Papers; Vol. 48, No. 2; April, 1996; 194-212; #2557.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Banerjee, Asis Kumar; "A Note on a Property of Maximal Sets and Choice in the Absence of Universal Comparability"; Economics Letters; Vol. 51, No. 2; May, 1996; 191-195; #2623.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Deb, Rajat; Razzolini, Laura; "Game Forms, Rights, and the Efficiency of Social Outcomes"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 72, No. 1 ; January, 1997; 74-95; #2689.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "On Modelling Individual Rights: Some Conceptual Issues"; Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. 2; Edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 100-128; #2784. [see discussion by Salles (2785)]

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Some Paradoxes of Preference Aggregation"; Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook; Dennis Mueller, editor; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1997; 201-225; #3199.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Xu, Yongsheng; "On Preference and Freedom"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 44, No. 2; April, 1998; 173-198; #3406.

Pattanaik Prasanta K.; Sengupta, Kunal; "On the Structure of Simple Preference-based Choice Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 1; January, 2000; 33-43; #3584.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; “Positional Rules of Collective Decision-Making”; In Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1; Edited by K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura; North-Holland; 2002; 361-394; #4398.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Salles, Maurice; “An Interview with I. M.D. Little”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3; December, 2005; 357-368; #4464.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; “Little and Bergson on Arrow's Concept of Social Welfare”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3; December, 2005; 369-379; #4465.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Dasgupta, Indraneel; “ `Regular' Choice and the Weak Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference”; Economic Theory; Vol. 31, No. 1; 2007; 35-50; #4828.

Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Xu, Youngsheng; "Conceptions of Individual Rights and Freedom in Welfare Economics: A Re-examination"; Against Injustice: The New Economics of Amartya Sen; ed. by Reiko Gotoh and Paul Dumouchel; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 2009; 187-218; #5332.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta]; Anand, Paul; Puppe, Clemens; Handbook of Rational and Social Choice; Oxford University Press; 2009; #5439.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Dhongde, Shatakshee; "Preference, Choice, and Rationality: Amartya Sen's Critique of the Theory of Rational Choice in Economics"; Amartya Sen; ed. by Christopher W. Morris; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 2010; 13-39; #5330.

[Pattanaik, Prasanta K.]; Bhattacharyya, Aditi; Xu, Yongsheng; "Choice, Internal Consistency and Rationality"; Economics and Philosophy; Vol. 27, No. 2; July, 2011; 123-149; #5675.

Patterson, Debra Moore; "Price Reform and Welfare"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 3; June, 1995; 225-232; #2387.

[Patterson, Geoff]; Hodge, Jonathan K.; Marshall, Emily; "Gerrymandering and Convexity"; College Mathematics Journal; Vol. 41, No. 4; 2010; 312-324; #5454.

Patty, John Wiggs; “Local Equilibrium Equivalence in Probabilistic Voting Models”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 51, No. 2; 2005; 523-536; #4356.

[Patty, John Wiggs]; McKelvey, Richard D.; “A Theory of Voting in Large Elections”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 57, No. 1; 2006; 155-180; #4748.

Patty, John Wiggs; “Generic Difference of Expected Vote Share and Probability of Victory Maximization in Simple Plurality Elections with Probabilistic Voters”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 29, No. 1; July, 2007; 149-173; #4597.

[Patty, John Wiggs]; Penn, Elizabeth Maggie; “What McKelvey Taught Us”; A Positive Change in Political Science: The Legacy of Richard D. McKelvey’s Most Influential Writings; Edited by John Aldrich, James E. Alt, and Arthur Lupia; University of Michigan Press; 2007; #4719.

Patty, John Wiggs; Penn, Elizabeth Maggie; "A Social Choice Theory of Legitimacy"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 3; April, 2011; 365-382; #5405.

Pauly, Marc; “Changing the Rules of Play”; Topoi; Vol. 24, No. 2; 2005; 209-220; #4872.

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Pauly, Marc; "On the Role of Language in Social Choice Theory"; Synthese; Vol. 163, No. 2; 2008; 227-243; #5090.

Paun, Gheorghe; "An Impossibility Theorem for Indicators Aggregation"; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 9, No. 2; February, 1983; 205-210; #351.

[Paz, A.]; Evan, S.; "A Note on Cake Cutting"; Discrete Applied Mathematics; Vol. 7, No. 3; March, 1984; 285-296; #3462.

Pazner, Elisha A.; Schmeidler, David; "A Difficulty in the Concept of Fairness"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 41(3), No. 127; July, 1974; 441-443; #3791.

[Pazner, Elisha A.]; Kalai, Ehud; Schmeidler, David; "Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes"; Econometrica; Vol. 44, No. 2; March, 1976; 233-240; #560.

Pazner, Elisha A.; Wesley, Eugene; "Stability of Social Choices in Infinitely Large Societies"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 14, No. 2; April, 1977; 252-262; #620.

Pazner, Elisha A.; "Pitfalls in the Theory of Fairness"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 14, No. 2 April, 1977; 458-466; #3790.

Pazner, Elisha A.; Wesley, Eugene; "Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 45(1), No. 139; February, 1978; 85-91; #1300.

Pazner, Elisha A.; Schmeidler, David; "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity"; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 92, No. 1; November, 1978; 671-687; #3792.

Pazner, Elisha A.; "Individual Rationality and the Concept of Social Welfare"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 10, Nos. 1,2,3,4; January, 1979; 281-292; #1297.

Pazner, Elisha A.; "Equity, Nonfeasibile Alternatives and Social Choice: A Reconsideration of the Concept of Social Welfare"; Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences; edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1979; 161-173; #990.

Pazner, Elisha A.; "Comment on `The Characterization of Implementable Choice Rules'"; Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences; edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1979; 349-350; #996. [Comment on paper by K. W. S. Roberts]

Peacock, Alan T.; Rowley, Charles K.; "Pareto Optimality and the Political Economy of Liberalism"; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 80, No. 3, Part I; May-June, 1972; 476-490; #621.

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[Pech, Susanne]; Brunner, Johann K.; “Optimum Taxation of Life Annuities”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 2; February, 2008; 285-303; #4700.

Pecha, Arcenio; Villamil, Jaime; “Relaciones de preferencia y elección social en una estructura difusa”; (Preference Relations and Social Election in a Fuzzy Structure. With English summary.) Cuadernos de Economia (National University of Colombia); Vol. 21, No. 37; 2nd Semester, 2002; 33-55; #4411.

Pedrajas, Marta; “The Possibilities of Social Choice Theory”; XVIth Valencia Congress of Philosophy (Catalan); Edited by Kenneth J. Arrow and Amartya Sen; Soc. Filos. País Valencià, Valencia; 2006; 355-367; #4841. [Spanish]

Peleg, Bezalel; "On the Weights of Constant Sum Majority Games"; SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics; Vol. 16, No. 3; May, 1968; 527-532; #1953.

Peleg, Bezalel; "Consistent Voting Systems"; Econometrica; Vol. 46, No. 1; January, 1978; 153-162; #38.

Peleg, Bezalel; "Representations of Simple Games by Social Choice Functions"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 7, Issue 2; 1978; 81-94; #968.

Peleg, Bezalel; "A Note on Manipulability of Large Voting Schemes"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 11, No. 4; December, 1979; 401-412; #1299.

Peleg, Bezalel; "Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting Schemes"; Game Theory and Related Topics ; edited by Otto Moeschlin and Diethard Pallaschke; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1979; 83-89; #969.

Peleg, Bezalel; "Monotonicity Properties of Social Choice Correspondences"; Game Theory and Mathematical Economics; edited by Otto Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1981; 97-101; #970.

Peleg, Bezalel; "Theory of Coalition Formation in Committees"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 7, No. 2; 1980; 115-134; #39.

[Peleg, Bezalel]; Moulin, Hervé; "Cores of Effectivity Functions and Implementation Theory"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 10, No. 1; June, 1982; 115-145; #967.

Peleg, Bezalel; "On Simple Games and Social Choice Correspondences"; Social Choice and Welfare; edited by Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Maurice Salles; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1983; 251-268; #971.

[Peleg, Bezalel]; Kannai, Yakar; "A Note on the Extension of an Order on a Set to the Power Set"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 32, No. 1; February, 1984; 172-175; #2118. [See comment by

[Peleg, Bezalel]; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "An Axiomatic Characterization of the Lexicographic Maximin Extension of an Ordering over a Set to the Power Set"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 2; August, 1984; 113-122; #815.

Peleg, Bezalel; Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1984; #282. [See review by Holzman]

[Peleg, Bezalel]; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Distribution of Power Under Stochastic Social Choice Rules"; Econometrica; Vol. 54, No. 4; July, 1986; 909-921; #1666.

[Peleg, Bezalel]; Bernheim, B. Douglas; Whinston, Michael D.; "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria: Concepts"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 42, No. 1; June, 1987; 1-12; #1883.

Peleg, Bezalel; "Cores and Capacities of Compound Simple Games"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 4, No. 4; December, 1987; 307-316; #1839.

[Peleg, Bezalel]; d'Aspremont, Claude; "Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Representations of Committees"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 5, No. 4; November, 1988; 261-279; #2019.

[Peleg, Bezalel]; Barberà, Salvador; "Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes with Continuous Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 1; January, 1990; 31-38; #2150.

Peleg, Bezalel; "Voting by Count and Account"; Rational Interaction; Edited by Reinhard Selten; Springer Verlag; Berlin; 1992; 45-51; #3298.

[Peleg, Bezalel]; Einy, Ezra; "Coalition-Proof Communication Equilibria"; Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics; edited by Barnett, William A.; Hervé Moulin; Maurice Salles; Norman Schofield; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1995; 289-300; #2559.

Peleg, Bezalel; "A Continuous Double Implementation of the Constrained Walras Equilibrium"; Economic Design; Vol. 2; 1996; 89-97; #4384.

Peleg, Bezalel; "Double Implementation of the Lindahl Equilibrium by a Continuous Mechanism"; Economic Design; Vol. 2; 1996; 311-324; #4385.

[Peleg, Bezalel]; Majumdar, Mukul; "An Axiomatization of the Walras Correspondence in Infinite Dimensional Spaces"; International Economic Review; Vol. 38, No. 4; November, 1997; 853-864; #3351.

Peleg, Bezalel; "Reasonable Mechanisms and Nash Implementation: Discussion"; Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. 2; Edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 24-25; #2777. [discussion of paper by Dutta]

Peleg, Bezalel; "Effectivity Functions, Game Forms, Games, and Rights"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 1; January, 1998; 67-80; #3190.

[Peleg, Bezalel]; Sudhölter, Peter; "Nucleoli as Maximizers of Collective Satisfaction Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 3; May, 1998; 383-411; #3254. [See erratum, Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 2; February, 2000; 379-380.]

Peleg, Bezalel; "Effectivity Functions, Game Forms, Games and Rights"; Freedom in Economics, New Perspectives in Normative Analysis; Edited by Jean-François Laslier, Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Laslier, and Alain Trannoy; Routledge; 1998; 116-132; #3514. [See comment by Picavet.]

Peleg, Bezalel; Sudhölter, Peter; "Single-peakedness and Coalition-proofness"; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 4; 1999; 381-387; #4386.

Peleg, Bezalel; O’Neill, Barry; "Reconciling Power and Equality in International Organizations: a Voting Method from Rabbi Krochmal of Kremsier"; Jewish Political Studies Review; Vol. 12; 2000; 67-81; #4387.

[Peleg, Bezalel]; Keiding, Hans; "Stable Voting Procedures for Committees in Economic Environments"; Journal Mathematical Economics; Vol. 36, No. 2; November, 2001; 117-140; #3959.

Peleg, Bezalel; Peters, Hans; Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Nash Consistent Representation of Constitutions: A Reaction to the Gibbard Paradox"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 43, No. 2; March, 2002 267-287; #4048.

[Peleg, Bezalel]; Keiding, Hans; "Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium: A Complete Characterization"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 2; April, 2002; 241-263; #3887.

Peleg, Bezalel; Winter, Eyal; "Constitutional Implementation"; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 7, No. 2; September, 2002; 187-204; #4066.

Peleg, Bezalel; "Game-theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees"; In Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1; Edited by K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura; North-Holland; 2002; 395-423; #4388.

Peleg, Bezalel; Sudhölter, Peter; Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games; Kluwer; 2003; #4389.

Peleg, Bezalel; "Representations of Effectivity Functions by Acceptable Game Forms: A Complete Characterization"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 47; 2004; 275-287; #4390.

Peleg, Bezalel; Peters, Hans; Storcken, Antonius J. A.; “Constitutional Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences”; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 33, No. 3; 2005; 381-396; #4671.

[Peleg, Bezalel]; Keiding, Hans; “Binary Effectivity Rules”; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 10, No. 3; 2006; 167-181; #4843.

[Peleg, Bezalel]; Keiding, Hans; “On the Continuity of Representations of Effectivity Functions”; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 42, No. 7-8; November, 2006; 827-842; #4902.

[Peleg, Bezalel]; Keiding, Hans; “Binary Effectivity Rules” Review of Economic Design; Vol. 10, No. 3; December, 2006; 167-181; #4901.

Peleg, Bezalel; Peters, Hans; “Consistent Voting Systems with a Continuum of Voters”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 3; December, 2006; 477-492; #4547.  [Errata:  p. 493]

Peleg, Bezalel; Procaccia, Ariel D.; "Implementation by Mediated Equilibrium"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 39, No. 1-2; 2010; 191-207; #5282.

Peleg, Bezalel; Zamir, Shmuel; "Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a General Dependent Jury"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 39, Number 1; June, 2012; 91-125; #5570.

Peltzman, Sam; "How Efficient is the Voting Market?"; Journal of Law and Economics; Vol. 33, No. 1; April, 1990; 27-63; #2175.

[Pendakur, Krishna]; Donaldson, David; "Index-number Tests and the Common-scaling Social Cost-of-living Index"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 3; March, 2012; 407-429; #5549.

Penn, Elizabeth Maggie; “Book Review: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 3; June, 2006; 645-649; #4498. [review of book edited by Austen-Smith and Duggan]

Penn, Elizabeth Maggie; “Alternate Definitions of the Uncovered Set and Their Implications”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 1; August, 2006; 83-87; #4512.

Penn, Elizabeth Maggie; “The Banks Set in Infinite Spaces”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 3; December, 2006; 531-543; #4553.

Penn, Elizabeth Maggie; Patty, John Wiggs; “What McKelvey Taught Us”; A Positive Change in Political Science: The Legacy of Richard D. McKelvey’s Most Influential Writings; Edited by John Aldrich, James E. Alt, and Arthur Lupia; University of Michigan Press; 2007; #4719.

[Penn, Elizabeth Maggie]; Patty, John Wiggs; "A Social Choice Theory of Legitimacy"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 3; April, 2011; 365-382; #5405.

[Pennisi, Aline]; Grilli di Cortona, Pietro; Manzi, Cecilia; Ricca, Federica; Simeone, Bruno; Evaluation and Optimization of Electoral Systems; SIAM; Philadelphia, PA; 1999; #3695.

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Peragine, Vitorocco; "Measuring and Implementing Equality of Opportunity for Income"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 1; February, 2004; 187-210; #4206.

[Peragine, Vitorocco]; Bavetta, Sebastiano; “Measuring Autonomy Freedom”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 1; January, 2006; 31-45; #4489.

Peragine, Vitorocco; Romero-Medina, Antonio; “On Preference, Freedom and Diversity”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 1; August, 2006; 29-40; #4520.

[Perea, Andres]; Muller, Rudolf; Wolf, Sascha; “Weak Monotonicity and Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatibility”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 61, No. 2; November, 2007; 344-358; 4889.

[Pereira, Paulo T.]; Côrte-Real, Paulo P.; "The Voter Who Wasn't There: Referenda, Representation and Abstention"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 2; April, 2004; 349-369; #4216.

Peremans, W.; Peters, Hans; van der Stel, Hans; Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Strategy-Proofness on Euclidean Spaces"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 3; July, 1997; 379-401; #2534.

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Peress, Michael; "The Spatial Model with Non-policy Factors: A Theory of Policy-motivated Candidates"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 2; February, 2010; 265-294; #5113.

Peress, Michael; "Securing the Base: Electoral Competition under Variable Turnout"; Public Choice; Vol. 148, No. 1-2; July, 2011; 87-104; #5663.

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Pérez, Joaquín; "The Strong No Show Paradoxes Are a Common Flaw in Condorcet Voting Correspondences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 3; July, 2001; 601-616; #3774.

[Pérez, Joaquín]; Jimeno, José L.; García, Estefanía; "An Extension of the Moulin No Show Paradox for Voting Correspondences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 3; September, 2009; 343-359; #5155.

[Pérez, Joaquín]; Jimeno, José L.; García, Estefanía; "Extensions of the Young and Levenglick Result about the Inconsistency of Condorcet Voting"Correspondences; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 62, No. 1; July, 2011; 25-27; #5661.

[Peris, Josep E.]; Subiza, Begoña; "Numerical Representation for Lower Quasi-Continuous Preferences"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 33; 1997; 149-156; #4120.

[Peris, Josep E.]; Sánchez, M. Carmen; "Veto in Fixed Agenda Social Choice Correspondences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 1; January, 1999; 81-97; #3316.

Peris, Josep E.; Subiza, Begoña; "Condorcet Choice Correspondences for Weak Tournaments"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 2; February, 1999; 217-231; #3413.

Peris, Josep E.; Sánchez, M. Carmen; "An Oligarchy Theorem in Fixed Agenda without Pareto Conditions"; Economics Letters; Vol. 62, No. 2; February, 1999; 201-206; #3527.

Peris, Josep E.; Sánchez, M. Carmen; "Characterization of Social Choice Sets in Terms of Individuals' Maximal Sets: the Fixed Agenda Framework"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 1; January, 2001; 113-127; #3732.

Peris, Josep E.; Sánchez, M. Carmen; Subiza, Begoña; "Numerical Representation of Choice Functions"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 80; 1998; 1-10; #4233.

[Peris, Josep E.]; Subiza, Begoña; “Condorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 3; June, 2005; 497-508; #4436.

[Peris, Josep E.]; Sánchez, M. Carmen; “Hierarchies of Power in Non-binary Social Choice”; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 42, No. 7-8; 2006; 843-853; #4846.

Perlinger, Thommy; "Voting Power in an Ideological Spectrum: the Markov-Pólya Index"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 40, No. 2; September, 2000; 215-226; #3804. [Extends Edelman's model]

[Perlinger, Thommy]; Berg, Sven; “Single-peaked Compatible Preference Profiles: Some Combinatorial Results”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 1; August, 2006; 89-102; #4524.

[Permanyer, Iñaki]; Echávarri, Rebeca A.; "Ranking Profiles of Capability Sets"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 3; October, 2008; 521-535; #4957.

Perote-Peña, Juan; Piggins, Ashley; "Geometry and Possibility"; Economic Theory; Vol. 20, No. 4; March, 2002; 831-836; #4013.

Perote-Peña, Juan; Piggins, Ashley; "Non-manipulable Social Welfare Functions When Preferences Are Fuzzy"; Journal of Logic and Computation; Vol. 19, No. 3; 2009; 503-515; #5317.

[Perote-Peña, Juan]; Duddy, Conal; Piggins, Ashley; "Manipulating an Aggregation Rule under Ordinally Fuzzy Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 3; March, 2010; 411-428; #5182.

[Perote-Peña, Juan]; Duddy, Conal; Piggins, Ashley; "Arrow's Theorem and Max-star Transitivity"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 1; January, 2011; 25-34; #5389.

Perry, Jonathan; Powers, Robert C.; "Aggregation Rules That Satisfy Anonymity and Neutrality"; Economics Letters; Vol. 100, No. 1; July, 2008; 108-110; #5058.

Perry, Jonathan; Powers, Robert C.; "Anonymity, Monotonicity, and Quota Pair Systems"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 60, No. 1; July, 2010; 57-60; #5354.

Perry-Coste, F. H.; "The Ballot Box"; Nature; Vol. 75; 28 March 1907; 509; #117.

[Persico, Nicola]; Lizzeri, Alessandro; "The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives"; American Economic Review; Vol. 91, No. 1; March, 2001; 225-239; #4071.

[Pesendorfer, Wolfgang]; Fedderson, Timothy; "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information"; Econometrica; Vol. 65, No. 5; September, 1997; 1029-1058; #3245.

[Pesendorfer, Wolfgang]; Feddersen, Timothy; "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 92, No. 1 ; March, 1998; 23-35; #3324.

[Pesendorfer, Wolfgang]; Feddersen, Timothy J.; "Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 93, No. 2; June, 1999; 381-398; #3566.

[Pesendorfer, Wolfgang]; Feddersen, Timothy; "Elections, Information Aggregation, and Strategic Voting"; Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA ; Vol. 96, No. 19; September, 1999; 10572-10574; #3647.

[Pesendorfer, Wolfgang]; Gul, Faruk; "Partisan Politics and Election Failure with Ignorant Voters"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 144, No. 1; 2009; 146-174; #5268.

Petchey, Jeffrey; "Political Competition and Voter Mobility"; Public Choice; Vol. 105, Nos. 3-4; December, 2000; 231-243; #3835.

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Peters, Hans; van der Stel, Hans; Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Pareto Optimality, Anonymity, and Strategy-proofness in Location Problems"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 21, No. 3; 1992; 221-235; #3054.

Peters, Hans; van der Stel, Hans; Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Strategy-proofness on Economic Domains"; Game Theory and Economic Applications; edited by B. Dutta, D. Mookherjee, T. Parthasarathy; Berlin; Springer; 1992; #3052.

Peters, Hans; van der Stel, Hans; Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Generalized Median Solutions, Strategy-proofness and Strictly Convex Norms"; Zeitschrift für Operations Research; Vol. 38, No. 1; 1993; 19-53; #3053.

Peters, Hans; van der Stel, Hans; Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Range Convexity, Continuity, and Strategy-proofness of Voting Schemes"; Zeitschrift für Operations Research; Vol. 38, No. 2; 1993; 213-229; #3051.

[Peters, Hans]; Otten, Gert-Jan; Volij, Oscar; "Two Characterizations of the Uniform Rule for Division Problems with Single-Peaked Preferences"; Economic Theory; Vol. 7, No. 2; February, 1996; 291-306; #3087.

[Peters, Hans]; Peremans, W.; van der Stel, Hans; Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Strategy-Proofness on Euclidean Spaces"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 3; July, 1997; 379-401; #2534.

[Peters, Hans]; Klaus, Bettina; Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Strategy-proof Division with Single-Peaked Preferences and Initial Endowments"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 2; February, 1998; 297-311; #3209.

[Peters, Hans]; Bossert, Walter; "Multi-attribute Decision-Making in Individual and Social Choice"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 40, No. 3; November, 2000; 327-339; #3818.

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