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[Regenwetter, Michel]; Doignon, Jean-Paul; Falmagne, Jean-Claude; "Combinatoric and Geometric Aspects of Some Probabilistic Choice Models - A Review"; Beliefs, Interactions and Preferences in Decision Making; Edited by Mark J. Machina and Bertrand Munier; Kluwer Academic Publishers; Dordrecht; 1999; 179-203; #3812.

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[Regenwetter, Michel]; Tsetlin, Ilia; Grofman, Bernard; "The Impartial Culture Maximizes the Probability of Majority Cycles"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 3; December, 2003 387-398; #4190.

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[Riker, William H.]; Denzau, Arthur T.; Shepsle, Kenneth A.; "Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 79, No. 4; December, 1985; 1117-1134; #795.

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Riker, William H.; "Heresthetic and Rhetoric in the Spatial Model"; Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting; edited by James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1990; 46-65; #2804.

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Riley, Jonathan M.; Liberal Utilitarianism: Social Choice Theory and J. S. Mill's Philosophy; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1987; #1379. [See review by Cowen]

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Riley, Jonathan M.; "Rights to Liberty in Purely Private Matters: Part II"; Economics and Philosophy; Vol. 6, No. 1; April, 1990; 27-64; #3011. [Continuation of Part I]

Riley, Jonathan M.; "Review of The Limits of Rationality [Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi]"; Ethics; Vol. 102, No. 4; July, 1992; 858-859; #3021. [review of book by Cook and Levi]

Ringbom, Marten; "Rescher's Determination of a Social Preference Ranking"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 3, No. 2; December, 1972; 170-174; #639.

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[Roberts, Fred S.]; Brams, Steven J.; Gehrlein, William V.; Editors; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Springer; Berlin; 2009; #5004.

[Roberts, Fred S.]; Brams, Steven J.; Gehrlein, William V.; "Preface"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; v-x; #5005.

[Roberts, Fred S.]; Poljak, Svata; "An Application of Stahl's Conjecture About the k-Tuple Chromatic Numbers of Kneser Graphs"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 345-352; #5025.

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