A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Taagepera, Rein; "Seats and Votes: A Generalization of the Cube Law of Elections"; Social Science Research; Vol. 2, No.3; September, 1973; 257-275; #1436.

[Taagepera, Rein]; Laakso, Markku; "Proportional Representation and Effective Number of Parties in Finland"; Power, Voting and Voting Power; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Würzburg-Vienna; Physica Verlag; 1982; 107-120; #1410.

Taagepera, Rein; "The Effect of District Magnitude and Properties of Two-Seat Districts"; Choosing an Electoral System; edited by Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman; New York; Praeger; 1984; 91-101; #1592.

Taagepera, Rein; "Reformulating the Cube Law for Proportional Representation Elections"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 80, No. 2; June, 1986; 489-504; #1127.

Taagepera, Rein; Shugart, Matthew Soberg; "Predicting the Number of Parties: A Quantitative Model of Duverger's Mechanical Effect"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 87, No. 2; June, 1993; 455-464; #2895.

[Taagepera, Rein]; Shugart, Matthew Soberg; "Plurality Versus Majority Election of Presidents: A Proposal for a 'Double Complement Rule' "; Comparative Political Studies; Vol. 27, No. 3; October, 1994; 323-348; #2915.

Tadenuma, Koichi; Thomson, William; "The Fair Allocation of an Indivisible Good when Monetary Compensations are Possible"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 25, No. 2; February, 1993; 117-132; #2888.

Tadenuma, Koichi; Thomson, William; "Games of Fair Division"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 9, No. 2; May, 1995; 191-204; #2899.

Tadenuma, Koichi; "Trade-Off Between Equity and Efficiency in a General Economy with Indivisible Goods"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 4; September, 1996; 445-450; #3182.

Tadenuma, Koichi; "Efficiency First or Equity First? Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice"; Journal of Economic Theory ; Vol. 104, No. 2; June, 2002; 462-472; #4050.

[Tadenuma, Koichi]; Fleurbaey, Marc; Suzumura, Kotaro; “Arrovian Aggregation in Economic Environments: How Much Should We Know about Indifference Surfaces?”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 124, No. 1; 2005; 22-44; #4660.

[Tadenuma, Koichi]; Fleurbaey, Marc; Suzumura, Kotaro; “The Informational Basis of the Theory of Fair Allocation”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 2; April, 2005; 311-341; #4281.

Tadenuma, Koichi; “Egalitarian-equivalence and the Pareto Principle for Social Preferences”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 3; June, 2005; 455-473; #4434.

[Tagawa, Shojiro]; Toda, Mitsuhiko; Sugiyama, Kozo; "A Method for Aggregating Ordinal Assessments by a Majority Decision Rule"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 3, No. 3; October, 1982; 227-242; #1001.

[Takahara, Yasuhiko]; Kijima, Kyoichi; "Category-Theoretic Basis for Social Decision-Making Theory"; International Journal of Systems Science; Vol. 18, No. 2; February, 1987; 251-267; #1692.

Takamiya, Koji; "On Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores: a Converse Result"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 1; February, 2003; 77-83; #3993.

[Takamiya, Koji]; Shinotsuka, Tomoichi; “The Weak Core of Simple Games with Ordinal Preferences: Implementation in Nash Equilibrium”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 44, No. 2; August, 2003; 379-389; #4429.

Takamiya, Koji; ”Domains of Social Choice Functions on Which Coalition Strategy-proofness and Maskin Monotonicity Are Equivalent”; Economic Letters; Vol. 95, No. 3; 2007; 348-354; #4812.

[Talman, Dolf]; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; “The Positional Power of Nodes in Digraphs”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 3; June, 2005; 439-454; #4433.

[Tamiz, M.]; Foroughi, A. A.; Jones, D. F.; “A Selection Method for a Preferential Election”; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 163, No. 1; 2005; 107-116; #4323.

[Tan, Guofu]; Bossert, Walter; "An Arbitration Game and the Egalitarian Bargaining Solution"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 1; February, 1995; 29-41; #2379.

[Tanaka, Makoto]; Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi; "An Axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution When the Feasible Sets Can Be Finite"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 4; October, 2002; 751-761; #3976.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; “Generalized Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness: A Note”; Economics Bulletin; Vol. 4, No. 11; 2001; 1-6; #4414.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; “Generalized Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness for Non-resolute Social Choice Correspondences”; Economics Bulletin; Vol. 4, No. 12; 2001; 1-8; #4415.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; “Strategy-Proofness of Social Choice Functions and Non-negative Association Property with Continuous Preferences”; Economics Bulletin; Vol. 4, No. 8; 2002; 1-7; #4416.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; "An Alternative Direct Proof of Gibbard's Random Dictatorship Theorem"; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 8, No. 3; October, 2003; 319-328; #4161.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; “Oligarchy for Social Choice Correspondences and Strategy-proofness”; Theory and Decision; Vol. 55, No. 3; 2003; 273-287; #4373.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; “On the Equivalence of the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem”; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 172, No. 2; 2006; 1303-1314; #4676.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; “A Topological Proof of Eliaz's Unified Theorem of Social Choice Theory”; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 176, No. 1; 2006; 83-90; #4859.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; “A Topological Approach to the Arrow Impossibility Theorem When Individual Preferences Are Weak Orders”; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 174, No. 2; 2006; 961-981; #4865.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; “On the Topological Equivalence of the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and Amartya Sen's Liberal Paradox”; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 181, No. 2; 2006; 1490-1498; #4845.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; “Equivalence of the HEX Game Theorem and the Arrow Impossibility Theorem”; Appled Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 186, No. 1; 2007; 509-515; #4819.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; “A Topological Approach to Wilson's Impossibility Theorem”; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 43, No. 2; 2007; 184-191; #4826.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; "Type Two Computability of Social Choice Functions and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem in an Infinite Society"; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 192, No. 1; 2007; 168-174; #5107.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; "The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem of Social Choice Theory in an Infinite Society and LPO (Limited Principle of Omniscience)"; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 193, No. 2; 2007; 475-481; #5106.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; "The Arrow Impossibility Theorem of Social Choice Theory in an Infinite Society and Limited Principle of Omniscience"; Applied Mathematics E-Notes; Vol. 8; 2008; 82-88; #5100.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; "On the Computability of Binary Social Choice Rules in an Infinite Society and the Halting Problem"; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 197, No. 2; 2008; 598-603; #5097.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; "Undecidability of the Existence of Dictator for Strongly Candidate Stable Voting Procedures in an Infinite Society and Cantor's Diagonal Argument"; Computational and Applied Mathematics; Vol. 27, No. 3; 2008; 251-268; #5087.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; "The Hex Game Theorem and the Arrow Impossibility Theorem: The Case of Weak Orders"; Metroeconomica; Vol. 60, No. 1; February, 2009; 77-90; #5041.

Tanaka, Yasuhito; "On the Equivalence of the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem when Individual Preferences are Weak Orders"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 45, No. 3-4; March, 2009; 241-249; #5036.

Tang, Fang-Fang; "Fuzzy Preferences and Social Choice"; Bulletin of Economic Research; Vol. 46, No. 3; July, 1994; 263-269; #2669.

Tanguiane, Andranick S.; "Hierarchical Models of Group Choice"; Ekonomika i Matematicheski Metody; Vol. 16, No. 3; 1980; 519-534; #1490.

Tanguiane, Andranick S.; "Successive Aggregation in a Model of Group Choice"; Ekonomika i Matematicheski Metody; Vol. 18, No. 1; 1982; 105-114; #317.

Tanguiane, Andranick S.; "Estimation of the Intensity of Preferences by the Borda-Laplace Probability Model"; Ekonomika i Matematicheski Metody; Vol. 21, No. 1; 1985; 110-116; #405.

Tanguiane, Andranick S.; "Interpretation of a Dictator in the Arrow Model as a Representative of a Collective; I. Existence of Dictators-representatives" (Russian); Matematicheskoe Modelirovanie; Vol. 1, No. 7; 1989; 51-67; #2920.

Tanguiane, Andranick S.; "Interpretation of a Dictator in the Arrow Model as a Representative of a Collective; II. Estimation of the Representativeness of a Dictator for Independent Participants" (Russian); Matematicheskoe Modelirovanie; Vol. 1, No. 7; 1989; 68-92; #2919.

Tanguiane, Andranick S.; "A Collective Representation Model under Conditions of Democracy" (Russian); Matematicheskoe Modelirovanie; Vol. 1, No. 10; 1989; 80-125; #2918.

Tanguiane, Andranick S.; "A Model of Collective Representation of Council Type" (Russian); Matematicheskoe Modelirovanie; Vol. 2, No. 5; 1990; 60-103; #2916.

Tanguiane, Andranick S.; Aggregation and Representation of Preferences: Introduction to the Mathematical Theory of Democracy; Berlin; Springer; 1991; #2477. [see review by Armstrong]

Tanguiane, Andranick S.; "Inefficiency of Democratic Decision Making in an Unstable Society"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 10, No. 3; July, 1993; 249-300; #2737.

Tanguiane, Andranick S.; "Arrow's Paradox and Mathematical Theory of Democracy"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 11, No. 1; January, 1994; 1-82; #2354.

Tanguiane, Andranick S.; "Election of Vice-President and Adding New Members to Representative Bodies"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 1; January, 1997; 23-45; #2424.

Tanguiane, Andranick S.; "An Outline of the Mathematical Theory of Democracy and Its Applications"; Group Decision and Negotiation; Vol. 6, Issue 3; May, 1997; 205-230; #3455.

Tanguiane, Andranick S.; "Unlikelihood of Condorcet's Paradox in a Large Society"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 2; February, 2000; 337-365; #3618.

Tanguiane, Andranik S.; "A Mathematical Model of Athenian Democracy"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 4; December, 2008; 537-572; #4958.

Tanino, Tetsuzo; "Fuzzy Preference Orderings in Group Decision Making"; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 12, No. 2; February, 1984; 117-131; #285.

Tanino, Tetsuzo; "On Group Decision Making under Fuzzy Preferences"; Multiperson Decision Making Models Using Fuzzy Sets and Probability Theory; Kacprzyk, Janusz and Fedrizzi, Mario, editors; Kluwer Academic Publishers; Dordrecht; 1990; 172-185; #3169.

[Tasnádi, Attila]; Barbie, Martin; Puppe, Clemens; “Non-manipulable Domains for the Borda Count”; Economic Theory; Vol. 27, No. 2; 2006; 411-430; #4631.

[Tasnádi, Attila]; Puppe, Clemens; "Nash Implementable Domains for the Borda Count"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 3; October, 2008; 367-392; #4950.

[Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu]; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Yamato, Takehiko; "Characterizing Natural Implementability: The Fair and Walrasian Correspondences"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 28, No. 2; August, 1999; 271-293; #3906.

Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu; "Implementation by Self-Relevant Mechanisms: Applications"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 44, No. 3; December, 2002; 253-276; #4146.

Tataru, Maria M.; Merlin, Vincent; "On the Relationship of the Condorcet Winner and Positional Voting Rules"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 34, No. 1; August, 1997; 81-90; #3364.

[Tataru, Maria M.]; Saari, Donald G.; "The Likelihood of Dubious Election Outcomes"; Economic Theory; Vol. 13, No. 2; March, 1999; 345-363; #3480.[Corrigendum: Economic Theory, Vol.14, No. 3, (November, 1999), 750]

Tataru, Maria M.; "Growth Rates in Multidimensional Spatial Voting"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 37, No. 3; May, 1999; 253-263; #3496.

[Tataru, Maria M.]; Merlin, Vincent; Valognes, Fabrice; "On the Probability that All Decision Rules Select the Same Winner"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 33, No. 2; March, 2000; 183-207; #3606.

[Tataru, Monica]; Merlin, Vincent; Valognes, Fabrice; "On the Likelihood of Condorcet's Profiles"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 1; January, 2002; 193-206; #3899.

[Taub, Bart]; Chakravorti, Bhaskar; Conley, John P.; "Probabilistic Cheap Talk"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 2; April, 2002; 281-294; #3889.

Taylor, Alan D.; Zwicker, William S.; "A Characterization of Weighted Voting"; Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society; Vol. 115, No. 4; August, 1992; 1089-1094; #2857.

Taylor, Alan D.; Zwicker, William S.; "Weighted Voting, Multicameral Representation, and Power"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 5, No. 1; January, 1993; 170-181; #2647.

[Taylor, Alan D.]; Brams, Steven J.; "An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol"; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 102, No. 1; January, 1995; 9-18; #3240.

[Taylor, Alan D.]; Barbanel, Julius B.; "Preference Relations and Measures in the Context of Fair Division"; Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society; Vol. 123, No. 7; July, 1995; 2061-2070; #3464.

[Taylor, Alan D.]; Brams, Steven J.; Zwicker, William S.; "Old and New Moving-knife Schemes"; Mathematical Intelligencer; Vol. 17, No. 4; Fall, 1995; 30-35; #3400.

[Taylor, Alan D.]; Young, Stephen C.; Zwicker, William S.; "Counting Quota Systems: a Combinatorial Question from Social Choice Theory"; Mathematics Magazine; Vol. 68, No. 5; December, 1995; 331-342; #3468.

Taylor, Alan D.; Mathematics and Politics: Strategy, Voting, Power and Proof; Springer-Verlag; New York; 1995; #2460. [See review by Merrill]

[Taylor Alan D.]; Brams, Steven J.; Fair Division; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1996; #2716. [see reviews by Rubinstein and Lucas]

Taylor, Alan D.; Zwicker, William S.; "Interval Measures of Power"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 33, No. 1; February, 1997; 23-74; #2880.

Taylor, Alan D.; Zwicker, William S.; Simple Games: Desirability Relations, Trading, Pseudoweightings; Princeton University Press; Princeton, NJ; 1999; #3640.

Taylor, Alan D. ; "The Manipulability of Voting Systems"; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 109, No. 4; April, 2002; 321-337; #3862.

Taylor, Alan D.; “A Paradoxical Pareto Frontier in the Cake-Cutting Context”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 50, No. 2; September, 2005; 227-233; #4899.

Taylor, Alan D.; Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation; Cambridge University Press; Cambridge and New York; 2005; #4900.

Taylor, Lance; "Social Choice Theory and the World in Which We Live: Review Article"; Cambridge Journal of Economics; Vol. 8, No. 2; June, 1984; 189-196; #763. [Review of collected social choice papers of Sen]

Taylor, Michael J.; "Graph Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Social Choice"; Public Choice; Vol. 4; Spring, 1968; 35-48; #1006. [See comment by Lady]

Taylor, Michael J.; "Proof of a Theorem on Majority Rule"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 14, No. 3; May, 1969; 228-231; #682.

Taylor, Michael J.; "The Problem of Salience in the Theory of Collective Decision-Making"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 15, No. 5; September, 1970; 415-430; #683.

Taylor, Michael J.; "Mathematical Political Theory"; British Journal of Political Science; Vol. 1, Part 3; July, 1971; 339-382; #684.

Taylor, Michael J.; "Cooperation and Rationality: Notes on the Collective Action Problem and Its Solutions"; The Limits of Rationality; Cook, Karen Schweers and Levi, Margaret, editors; Chicago and London; University of Chicago Press; 1990; 222-240; #2897.

[Taylor, Peter G.]; Costa, Andre; Fackrell, Mark; “Two Issues Surrounding Parrondo's Paradox”; Advances in dynamic games; Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games; Vol. 7; Birkhäuser Boston; Boston, MA; 2005; 599-609; #4783.

Taylor, Peter J.; "The Case for Proportional Tenure: A Defense of the British Electoral System"; Choosing an Electoral System; edited by Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman; New York; Praeger; 1984; 52-58; #1588.

Taylor, Peter J.; Gudgin, Graham; Johnston, R. J.; "The Geography of Representation: A Review of Recent Findings"; Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences; edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart; New York; Agathon Press; 1986; 183-192; #2211.

[Tchantcho, Bertrand]; Diffo Lambo, Lawrence; Moulen, Joël; “Pouvoir mesuré et capacité d'un électeur à influencer le résultat du vote”; [“Measured Power and Capacity of an Elector to Influence Voting Results”]; Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines. Mathematics and Social Sciences; No. 166; 2004; 5-24; #4311.

Tchantcho, Bertrand; Diffo Lambo, Lawrence; "A Characterization of Social Choice Correspondences That Implement the Core of Simple Games"; Economic Theory; Vol. 37, No. 3; December, 2008; 533-542; #5065.

[Tchuente, M.]; Goles, E.; "Iterative Behavior of Generalized Majority Functions"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 4, No. 3; July, 1983; 197-204; #236.

[Tejada, Juan]; Gómez, Daniel; González-Arangüena, Enrique; Manuel, Conrado; Owen, Guillermo; del Pozo, Mónica; “Centrality and Power in Social Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 46, No. 1; August, 2003; 27-54; #4427.

Tenenhaus, Michel; Dupont-Gatelmand, Catherine; Bouroche, Jean-Marie; "L'analyse canonique des préférences"; Analyse et Agrégation des Préférences; edited by Pierre Batteau, Eric Jacquet-Lagrèze and Bernard Monjardet; Paris; Economica; 1981; 213-231; #1612.

[Teo Chung-Piaw]; Sethuraman, Jay; Vohra, Rakesh V.; “Integer Programming and Arrovian Social Welfare Functions”; Mathematics of Operations Research; Vol. 28, No. 2; 2003; 309-326; #4367.

[Teo, Chung-Piaw]; Sethuraman, Jay; Vohra, Rakesh V.; “Anonymous Monotonic Social Welfare Functions”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 128, No. 1; 2006; 232-254; #4861.

Terai, Kimiko; "Redistribution under Proportional Representation"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 2; April, 2004; 371-389; #4217.

Terai, Kimiko; “Parties with Policy Preferences and Uncertainty Over Voter Behavior”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 1; August, 2006; 155-172; #4521.

Terai, Kimiko; “Erratum: Parties with Policy Preferences and Uncertainty over Voter Behavior”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 1; August, 2006; 173; #4522.

Terao, Hiroaki; ”Chambers of Arrangements of Hyperplanes and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem”; Advances in Mathematics; Vol. 214, No. 1; 2007; 366-378; #4805.

[Térouanne, Eric]; Petit, Jean-Luc; "A Theory of Proportional Representation"; SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics; Vol. 3, No. 1; February, 1990; 116-139; #2471.

[ter Veer, Annemarie]; van der Hout, Eliora; de Swart, Harrie; “Characteristic Properties of List Proportional Representation Systems”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 3; December, 2006; 459-475; #4545.

Thatte, Bhalchandra D.; “A Correct Proof of the McMorris-Powers' Theorem on the Consensus of Phylogenies”; Discrete Applied Mathematics; Vol. 155, No. 3; 2007; 423-427; #4822.

[Thisse, Jacques-François]; Hansen, Pierre; "Outcomes of Voting and Planning: Condorcet, Weber and Rawls Locations"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 16, No. 1; August, 1981; 1-15; #1085.

[Thisse, Jacques-François]; de Palma, Andre; Hong, Gap-Seon; "Equilibria in Multi-Party Competition under Uncertainty"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 3; July, 1990; 247-259; #2291.

[Thisse, Jacques-François]; Anderson, Simon P.; Kats, Amoz; "Probabilistic Voting and Platform Selection in Multi-Party Elections"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 11, No. 4; October, 1994; 305-322; #2372.

Thistle, Paul D.; "Social Structure, Economic Performance and Pareto Optimality"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 45, No. 2; October, 1998; 161-173; #3533.

[Thomas, Paul A.]; Hammond, Thomas H.; "Invisible Decisive Coalitions in Large Hierarchies"; Public Choice; Vol. 66, No. 2; August, 1990; 101-116; #2173.

Thomson, William; Myerson, Roger B.; "Monotonicity and Independence Axioms"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 9, Issue 1; 1980; 37-49; #1080.

Thomson, William; "Problems of Fair Division and the Egalitarian Solution"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 3, No. 2; December, 1983; 211-226; #2886.

Thomson, William; Lensberg, Terje; "Guarantee Structures for Problems of Fair Division"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 4, No. 3; July, 1983; 205-218; #2887.

Thomson, William; "Monotonicity, Stability and Egalitarianism"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 8, No. 1; August, 1984; 15-28; #406.

Thomson, William; Varian, Hal R.; "Theories of Justice Based on Symmetry"; Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner; edited by Leonid Hurwicz, David Schmeidler and Hugo Sonnenschein; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1985; 107-130; #1077.

Thomson, William; "The Vulnerability to Manipulative Behavior of Resource Allocation Mechanisms Designed to Select Equitable and Efficient Outcomes"; Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms: Essays in Honor of Leonid Hurwicz; Groves, Theodore; Radner, Roy; and Reiter, Stanley, editors; Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press; 1987; 375-396; #2904.

Thomson, William; Lensberg, Terje; "Characterizing the Nash Bargaining Solution Without Pareto-Optimality"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 5, Nos. 2/3; August, 1988; 247-259; #2006.

[Thomson, William]; Diamantaras, Dimitrios; "A Refinement and Extension of the No-envy Concept"; Economic Letters; Vol. 30, No. 2; 1989; 103-107; #2884. [Incorrectly published; see their later paper]

[Thomson, William]; Diamantaras, Dimitrios; "A Refinement and Extension of the No-envy Concept"; Economic Letters; Vol. 33, No. 3; July, 1990; 217-222; #2885. [Resembles incorrectly published earlier paper, but "there are substantial differences"]

Thomson, William; "On the Nonexistence of Envy-Free and Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities"; Economics Letters; Vol. 34, No. 3; 1990; 227-229; #2889.

Thomson, William; "The Consistency Principle"; Game Theory and Applications; Ichiishi, Tatsuro; Neyman, Abraham; and Tauman, Yair, editors; New York; London; Sydney and Toronto; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Academic Press; 1990; 187-215; #2903.

[Thomson, William]; Berliant, Marcus; Dunz, Karl; "On the Fair Division of a Heterogeneous Commodity"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 21, No. 3; 1992; 201-216; #2900.

[Thomson, William]; Tadenuma, Koichi; "The Fair Allocation of an Indivisible Good when Monetary Compensations are Possible"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 25, No. 2; February, 1993; 117-132; #2888.

Thomson, William; "Consistent Extensions"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 28, No. 1; August, 1994; 35-49; #2882.

Thomson, William; "L'absence d'envie; une introduction"; Recherches Economiques de Louvain; Vol. 60, No. 1; 1994; 43-61; #2902.

Thomson, William; "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division when Preferences are Single-Peaked"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 63, No. 2; August, 1994; 219-245; #2881.

Thomson, William; "Notions of Equal, or Equivalent, Opportunities"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 11, No. 2; April, 1994; 137-156; #2740.

Thomson, William; "Resource-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences are Single-Peaked"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 11, No. 3; July, 1994; 205-223; #2397.

Thomson, William; "Population-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked"; Economic Theory; Vol. 5, No. 2; March, 1995; 229-246; #2901.

[Thomson, William]; Tadenuma, Koichi; "Games of Fair Division"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 9, No. 2; May, 1995; 191-204; #2899.

Thomson, William; "Population Monotonic Allocation Rules"; Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics; edited by Barnett, William A.; Hervé Moulin; Maurice Salles; Norman Schofield; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1995; 79-124; #2550.

[Thomson, William]; Moulin, Hervé; "Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation Problems"; Social Choice Re-Examined, Vol. 1; edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 101-120; #3155.

Thomson, William; "The Replacement Principle in Economies with Indivisible Goods"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 1; January, 1998; 57-66; #3189.

Thomson, William; "Concepts of Implementation"; Japanese Economic Review; Vol. 47, No. 2; June, 1996; 133-143; #2898.

Thomson, William; "Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Classical Utilitarian Principles: Discussion"; Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. 2; Edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 163-166; #2787. [discussion of paper by Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson]

Thomson, William; "Monotonic Extensions on Economic Domains"; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 4, No. 1; February, 1999 ; 13-33; #3498.

Thomson, William; "Welfare-Domination under Preference-Replacement: A Survey and Open Questions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 3; May, 1999; 373-394; #3439.

Thomson, William; "On the Axiomatic Method and its Recent Applications to Game Theory and Resource Allocation"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 2; April, 2001; 327-386; #3760.

[Thomson, William]; Chun, Youngsub; Schummer, James; "Constrained Egalitarianism: A New Solution for Claims Problems"; Seoul Journal of Economics; Fall, 2001; Vol. 14, No. 3; 269-297; #4053.

[Thomson, William]; Hokari, Toru; “Claims Problems and Weighted Generalizations of the Talmud Rule”; Economic Theory; Vol. 21, Nos. 2-3; March, 2003; 241-261; #4409.

Thomson, William; "On Monotonicity in Economies with Indivisible Goods"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 2; October, 2003; 195-205; #4181.

Thomson, William; "Two Families of Rules for the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 4; December, 2008; 667-692; #4963.

[Thon, Dominique]; Aboudi, Ronny; “Transfer Principles and Relative Inequality Aversion: A Majorization Approach”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 45, No. 3; 2003; 299-311; #4289.

Thon, Dominique; Wallace, Stein W.; "Dalton Transfers, Inequality and Altruism"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 3; June, 2004; 447-465; #4223.

[Thon, Dominique]; Aboudi, Ronny; “Second Degree Pareto Dominance”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 3; April, 2008; 475-493; #4914.

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