A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z


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Wagenhals, G.; "Review of A. Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement"; Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 43, No. 2; 1983; 219-221; #227.

[Wagner, Carl]; Lehrer, Keith; Rational Consensus in Science and Society: A Philosophical and Mathematical Study; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1981; #304. [see 1984 paper by Nurmi and 1985 paper by Nurmi critiquing this book; see also Wagner's response and Nurmi's rejoinder]

Wagner, Carl; "Anscombe's Paradox and the Rule of Three-Fourths"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 15, No. 3; September, 1983; 303-308; #274.

Wagner, Carl; "Avoiding Anscombe's Paradox"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 16, No. 3; May, 1984; 233-235; #1841.

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[Wakayama, Takuma]; Mizukami, Hideki; "The Relation between Non-bossiness and Monotonicity"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 58, No. 2; September, 2009; 256-264; #5383.

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Waldner, Ilmar; "The Possibility of Rational Policy Evaluation"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 4, No. 1; September, 1973; 85-90; #691.

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[Walker, Mark]; Moreno, Diego; "Nonmanipulable Voting Schemes When Participants' Interests Are Partially Decomposable"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 8, No. 3; July, 1991; 221-233; #2316.

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Walsh, Toby; "Where Are the Hard Manipulation Problems?"; Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research; Vol. 42; 2011; 1-29; #5718.

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Walsh, Vivian Charles; “Amartya Sen on Rationality and Freedom: Review Article"; Science and Society; Vol. 71, No. 1; January, 2007; 59-83; #4905.

[Wang, Jianguo]; Ng, Yew-Kwang; "A Case for Cardinal Utility and Non-Arbitrary Choice of Commodity Units"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 1; February, 1995; 255-266; #2390.

Wang, Ying-Ming; Luo, Ying; Hua, Zhongsheng; “Aggregating Preference Rankings Using OWA Operator Weights”; Information Sciences; Vol. 177, No. 16; 2007; 3356-3363; #4712.

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[Warner, Stanley L.]; Cook, Wade D.; Seiford, Lawrence M.; "Preference Ranking Models: Conditions for Equivalence"; Journal of Mathematical Sociology; Vol. 9, No. 2; 1983; 125-138; #1706.

[Watanabe, Hajime]; Nakanishi, Toru; Fujiwara, Toru; "A Linkable Group Signature and its Application to Secret Voting"; Information Processing Society of Japan. Transactions; Vol. 40, No. 7; 1999; 3085-3096; #3909.

[Watanabe, Takahiro]; Naitou, Wataru; "An Extended Formulation of Arrow's Theorem for k-Social Welfare Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 3; June, 1995; 215-224; #2386.

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[Weale, Albert]; Lambert, Peter J.; Weale, Albert; "Equality, Risk-Aversion and Contractarian Social Choice"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 13, No. 2; June, 1981; 109-127; #1055.

Weale, Albert; "Social Choice vs. Populism? An Interpretation of Riker's Political Theory"; British Journal of Political Science; Vol. 14, No. 3; July, 1984; 369-385; #374.

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[Weaver, James R.]; Stuart, Jeffrey L.; "Voting Matrices and Tie-breaking"; International Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics; Vol. 54, No. 3; 2009; 437-450; #5308.

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Weaver, Leon; "The Rise, Decline and Resurrection of Proportional Representation in Local Governments in the United States"; Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences; edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart; New York; Agathon Press; 1986; 139-153; #2208.

[Webb, William A.]; Robertson, Jack M.; "Minimal Number of Cuts for Fair Division"; Ars Combinatoria; Vol. 31; June, 1991; 191-197; #3473.

[Webb, William A.]; Robertson, Jack M.; "Approximating Fair Division With a Limited Number of Cuts"; Journal of Combinatorial Theory. Series A; Vol. 72, No. 2; November, 1995; 340-344; #3474.

[Webb, William A.]; Robertson, Jack M.; "Extensions of Cut and Choose Fair Division"; Elemente der Mathematik; Vol. 52; 1997; 23-30; #3681.

[Webb, William A.]; Robertson, Jack M.; "Near Exact and Envy-free Cake Division"; Ars Combinatoria; Vol. 45; April, 1997; 97-108; #3548.

Webb, William A.; "How to Cut a Cake Fairly Using a Minimum Number of Cuts"; Discrete Applied Mathematics; Vol. 74, No. 2; 18 April 1997; 183-190; #3546.

[Webb, William A.]; Robertson, Jack; Cake-Cutting Algorithms: Be Fair if You Can; Natick; A. K. Peters; 1998; #3308.

Webb, William A.; “A Combinatorial Algorithm to Establish a Fair Border” European Journal of Combinatorics; Vol. 11, No. 3; 1990; 301-304; [Improves algorithm in paper by Beck for problem in paper by Hill]; #3401.

Weber, James S.; "An Elementary Proof of the Conditions for a Generalized Condorcet Paradox"; Public Choice; Vol. 77, No. 2; October, 1993; 415-419; #3350.

Weber, James S.; "How Many Voters Are Needed for Paradoxes?"; Economic Theory; Vol. 20, No. 2; February, 2002; 341-355; #3938.

[Weber, Robert J.]; Myerson, Roger B.; "A Theory of Voting Equilibria"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 87, No. 1; March, 1993; 102-114; #2965.

[Weber, Robert J.]; Forsythe, Robert; Myerson, Roger B.; Rietz, Thomas A.; "An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 10, No. 3; July, 1993; 223-247; #2736.

Weber, Robert J.; "Approval Voting"; The Journal of Economic Perspectives; Vol. 9, No. 1; Winter, 1995; 39-49; #2541.

[Weber, Shlomo]; Greenberg, Joseph; "Balancedness, Nonemptiness of the Core and the Existence of a Majority Equilibrium"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 13, Issue 2; 1984; 65-68; #1084.

[Weber, Shlomo]; Greenberg, Joseph; "Consistent [delta]-Relative Majority Equilibria"; Econometrica; Vol. 53, No. 2; March, 1985; 463-464; #772.

[Weber, Shlomo]; Greenberg, Joseph; "Multiparty Equilibria under Proportional Representation"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 79, No. 3; September, 1985; 693-703; #2931.

Weber, Shlomo; "On the Existence of a Fixed-number Equilibrium in a Electoral System"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol 20, No. 2; October, 1990; 115-130; #2959.

[Weber, Shlomo]; Le Breton, Michel; "Stability of Coalition Structures and the Theory of Optimal Partitioning"; Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics; edited by Barnett, William A.; Hervé Moulin; Maurice Salles; Norman Schofield; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1995; 301-319; #2560.

[Weber, Shlomo]; Deb, Rajat; Winter, Eyal; "The Nakamura Theorem for Coalition Structures of Quota Games"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 25, No. 2; 1996; 189-198; #3476.

Weber, Shlomo; "Entry Deterrence in Electoral Spatial Competition"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 1; January, 1998; 31-56; #3188.

[Weber, Shlomo]; Rubinchik, Anna; "Existence and Uniqueness of an Equilibrium in a Model of Spatial Electoral Competition with Entry"; Advances in Mathematical Economics; Vol. 10; Springer; Tokyo; 2007; 101-119; #5129.

[Weber, Shlomo]; Le Breton, Michel; Ortuño-Ortin, Ignacio; “Gamson's Law and Hedonic Games”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 1; January, 2008; 57-67; #4692.

Webster, Michael; "Liberals and Information"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 20, No. 1; January, 1986; 41-52; #839. [See comment by Kelly]

[Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore]; Güth, Werner; "Do People Care About Democracy? An Experiment Exploring the Value of Voting Rights"; Public Choice; Vol. 91, No. 1; April, 1997; 27-47; #3378. [See comments by Frey and Schram]

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[Wei, Baodian]; Chen, Xiaofeng; Wu, Qianhong; Zhang, Fangguo; Tian, Haibo; Lee, Byoungcheon; Lee, Hyunrok; Kim, Kwangjo; "New Receipt-free Voting Scheme Using Double-trapdoor Commitment"; Information Sciences; Vol. 181, No. 8; 2011; 1493-1502; #5699.

Weikard, Hans-Peter; "On the Economics of Basic Liberties"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 1; February, 2004; 267-280; #4210.

[Weikard, Hans-Peter]; Ansink, Erik; "Sequential Sharing Rules for River Sharing Problems"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 2; February, 2012; 187-210; #5539.

[Weil, Roman L. (Jr.)]; Pomeranz, John E.; "The Cyclical Majority Problem"; Communications of the ACM; Vol. 13, No. 4; April, 1970; 251-254; #1277.

[Weiman, David]; Feldman, Allan M.; "Envy, Wealth and Class Heirarchies"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 11, No. 1; February, 1979; 81-91; #714.

Weinberger, Shmuel; “On the Topological Social Choice Model”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 115, No. 2; 2004; 377-384; #4377.

[Weingast, Barry R.]; Shepsle, Kenneth A.; "Structure Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice"; Public Choice; Vol. 37, No. 3; 1981; 221-237; #89.

[Weingast, Barry R.]; Shepsle, Kenneth A.; "Institutionalized Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory With Policy Implications"; American Economic Review; Vol. 72, No. 2; May, 1982; 367-371; #297.

[Weingast, Barry R.]; Shepsle, Kenneth A.; "Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes With Implications for Agenda Institutions"; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 28, No. 1; February, 1984; 49-74; #328.

[Weingast, Barry R.]; Riker, William H.; "Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures"; Virginia Law Review; Vol. 74, No. 2; March, 1988; 373-401; #3433.

[Weingast, Barry R.]; Shepsle, Kenneth A.; "Why So Much Stability? Majority Voting, Legislative Institutions, and Gordon Tullock"; Public Choice; Vol. 152, No. 1-2; July, 2012; 83-95; #5581.

[Weinstein, Scott]; Osherson, D. N.; Stob, Michael; "Social Learning and Collective Choice"; Synthese; Vol. 70, No. 3; March, 1987; 319-347; #1698.

Weirich, Paul; “Collective, Universal, and Joint Rationality”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 29, No. 4; December, 2007; 683-701; #4650.

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[Weisberg, Herbert F.]; Niemi, Richard G.; "The Effects of Group Size on Collective Decision Making"; Probability Models of Collective Decision Making; edited by Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg; Columbus, Ohio; Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company; 1972; 125-148; #1366.

Weisberg, Herbert F.; Niemi, Richard G.; "Probability Calculations for Cyclical Majorities in Congressional Voting"; Probability Models of Collective Decision Making; edited by Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg; Columbus, Ohio; Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company; 1972; 204-231; #1368.

[Weisberg, Herbert F.]; Niemi, Richard G.; editors; Probability Models of Collective Decision Making; Columbus, Ohio; Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company; 1972; #1362.

Weisberg, Herbert F.; Niemi, Richard G.; "A Pairwise Probability Approach to the Likelihood of the Paradox of Voting"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 18, No. 2; March, 1973; 109-117; #1279.

[Weisberg, Herbert F.]; Ferejohn, John A.; Fiorina, Morris P.; "Toward a Theory of Legislative Decision"; Game Theory and Political Science; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook; New York; New York University Press; 1978; 165-190; #1747.

[Weiss, Andrew]; Aragones, Enriqueta; Gilboa, Itzhak; "Making Statements and Approval Voting"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 71, No. 4; October, 2011; 461-472; #5648.

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Weiss, Donald D.; "Rejoinder"; Political Theory; Vol. 1, No. 3; August, 1973; 323-328; #2003. [Rejoinder to comment by Barry on paper by Weiss]

Weiss, Howard J.; Yael Assous, J.; "Reduction in Problem Size for Ranking Alternatives in Group Decision-Making"; Computer and Operations Research; Vol. 14, No. 1; 1987; 55-65; #1694.

Weiss, Jeffrey H.; "Is Vote Selling Desirable?"; Public Choice; Vol. 59, No. 2; 1988; 177-194; #2075.

[Weissengrin, Einat]; Safra, Zvi; "Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem with a Restricted Domain"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 2; April, 2003; 177-187; #3999.

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Weller, Dietrich; "Fair Division of a Measurable Space"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 14, No. 1; 1985; 5-17; #2600.

[Wen, Quan]; Suh, Sang-Chul; "Subgame Perfect Implementation of Stable Matchings in Marriage Problems"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 1; June, 2008; 163-174; #4936.

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[Wendell, Richard E.]; McKelvey, Richard D.; "Voting Equilibria in Multidimensional Choice Spaces"; Mathematics of Operations Research; Vol. 1, No. 2; May, 1976; 144-158; #894.

[Wendell, Richard E.]; Salles, Maurice; "A Further Result on the Core of Voting Games"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 6, Issue 1; 1978; 35-40; #1200.

[Wesley, Eugene]; Pazner, Elisha A.; "Stability of Social Choices in Infinitely Large Societies"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 14, No. 2; April, 1977; 252-262; #620.

[Wesley, Eugene]; Pazner, Elisha A.; "Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 45(1), No. 139; February, 1978; 85-91; #1300.

Weymark, John A.; "Review of Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations and Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation [Harsanyi]"; Kyklos; Vol. 32, No. 4; 1979; 843-845; #3139. [review of book by Harsanyi and collection of essays by Harsanyi]

Weymark, John A.; "Quasitransitive Rationalization and the Superset Property"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 6, No. 1; October, 1983; 105-108; #242.

Weymark, John A.; "Review of Political Equilibrium [Ordeshook and Shepsle]"; Kyklos; Vol. 37, No. 1; 1984; 146-147; #3102. [review of book by Ordeshook and Shepsle]

Weymark, John A.; "Majority-Rule Directions of Income Tax Reform and Second-Best Optimality"; Scandinavian Journal of Economics; Vol. 86, No. 2; 1984; 194-213; #3138.

[Weymark, John A.]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; "Social Choice with Interpersonal Utility Comparisons: A Diagrammatic Introduction"; International Economic Review; Vol. 25, No. 2; June, 1984; pp. 325-356; #293.

Weymark, John A.; "Review of Social Choice and Welfare [Pattanaik and Salles]"; Kyklos; Vol. 37, No. 3; 1984; 499-502; #3140. [review of book by Pattanaik and Salles]

Weymark, John A.; "Arrow's Theorem with Social Quasi-Orderings"; Public Choice; Vol. 42, No. 3; 1984; 235-246; #757.

[Weymark, John A.]; Gibbard, Allan F.; Hylland, Aanund; "Arrow's Theorem with a Fixed Feasible Alternative"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 4, No. 2; June, 1987; 105-115; #1532.

[Weymark, John A.]; Donaldson, David; "Social Choice in Economic Environments"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 46, No. 2; December, 1988; 291-308; #2082.

Weymark, John A.; "Review of The Standard of Living"; Journal of Economics / Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 48, No. 3; 1988; 314-317; [Review of book by Sen]; #4151.

[Weymark, John A.]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; "A Welfarist Proof of Arrow's Theorem"; Recherches Économiques de Louvain; Vol. 54, No. 3-4; 1990; 259-286; #2272.

Weymark, John A.; "A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen Debate on Utilitarianism"; Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-being; Elster, Jon; Roemer, John E., editors; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1991; 255-320; #2967.

[Weymark, John A.]; Bossert, Walter; "Generalized Median Social Welfare Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 10, No. 1; January, 1993; 17-33; #2491.

[Weymark, John A.]; Bossert, Walter; "An Alternative Characterization of Paretian Generalized Median Social Welfare Functions"; Mathematical Modelling in Economics: Essays in Honor of Wolfgang Eichhorn; Erwin Diewert, Klaus Spremann, and Frank Stehling, editors; Berlin; Springer-Verlag; 1993; 65-74; #3137.

Weymark, John A.; "Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem and the Weak Pareto Principle"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 10, No. 3; July, 1993; 209-221; #2490.

Weymark, John A.; "Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem with Alternative Pareto Principles"; Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality; Wolfgang Eichhorn, editor; Berlin; Springer-Verlag; 1994; 869-887; #3137.

Weymark, John A.; "Further Remarks on Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem and the Weak Pareto Principle"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 1; February, 1995; 87-92; #2383.

Weymark, John A.; "John Harsanyi's Contributions to Social Choice and Welfare Economics"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 4; October, 1995; 313-318; #2405.

[Weymark, John A.]; Turunen-Red, Arja H.; "Paretian Aggregation of Asymmetric Utility Functionals"; Economic Letters; Vol. 53, No. 1; 1996; 39-45; #2489.

[Weymark, John A.]; Le Breton, Michael; "An Introduction to Arrovian Social Welfare Functions on Economic and Political Domains"; Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy; edited by Norman J. Schofield; Boston/Dordrecht/London; Kluwer Academic Publishers; 1996; 25-61; #2454.

[Weymark, John A.]; Tsui, Kai-yuen; "Social Welfare Orderings for Ratio-scale Measurable Utilities"; Economic Theory; Vol. 10, No. 2; August, 1997; 241-256; #2960.

Weymark, John A.; "Aggregating Ordinal Probabilities on Finite Sets"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 75, No. 2; August, 1997; 407-432; #3136.

Weymark, John A.; "Rational Just Social Choice: Discussion"; Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. 2; Edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 197-201; #2789. [discussion of paper by Kolm]

[Weymark, John A.]; Karni, Edi; "An Informationally Parsimonius Impartial Observer Theorem"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 3; May, 1998; 321-332; #3249.

Weymark, John A.; "Welfarism on Economic Domains"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 36, No. 3; December, 1998; 251-268; #3482.

[Weymark, John A.]; Turunen-Red, Arja H.; "Linear Aggregation of SSB Utility Functionals"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 46, No. 3; June, 1999; 277-290; #3839.

[Weymark, John A.]; Le Breton, Michel; "Strategyproof Social Choice with Continuous Separable Preferences"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 32, No. 1; August, 1999; 47-85; #3824.

Weymark, John A.; "Decomposable Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions"; Japanese Economic Review; Vol. 50, No. 3; September, 1999; 343-355; #4123.

Weymark, John A.; "Sprumont's Characterization of the Uniform Rule when All Single-Peaked Preferences are Admissable"; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 4, No. 4; November, 1999; 389-393; #4124.

[Weymark, John A.]; Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; "Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem for State-Contingent Alternatives"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 32, No. 3; November, 1999; 365-387; #3646.

Weymark, John A.; "A Generalization of Moulin's Pareto Extension Theorem"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 39, No. 2; March, 2000; 235-240; #3826.

[Weymark, John A.]; Khmelnitskaya, Anna B.; "Social Choice with Independent Subgroup Utility Scales"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 4; August, 2000; 739-748; #3676.

Weymark, John A.; "Review of Arrovian Aggregation Models"; Journal of Economics / Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 73, No. 3; 2001; 348-350; [Review of book by Aleskerov]; #4152.

[Weymark, John A.]; Le Breton, Michel; "Social Choice with Analytic Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 3; July, 2002; 637-657; #3857.

[Weymark, John A.]; Serizawa, Shigehiro; “Efficient Strategy-Proof Exchange and Minimum Consumption Guarantees”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 109, No. 2; April, 2003; 246-263; #4413.

Weymark, John A.; "Review of Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected"; Journal of Economic Literature; Vol. 41, No. 2; June, 2003; 587-589; #4098.; [Review of book by Saari]

[Weymark, John A.]; Ehlers, Lars; "Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice"; Economic Theory; Vol. 22, No. 2; September, 2003; 233-243; #4127.

[Weymark, John A.]; Gajdos, Thibault; “Multidimensional Generalized Gini Indices”; Economic Theory; Vol. 26, No. 3; 2005; 471-496; #4662.

Weymark, John A.; “Measurement Theory and the Foundations of Utilitarianism”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3; December, 2005; 527-555; #4473.

Weymark, John A.; “Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property”; Journal of Public Economic Theory; Vol. 10, No. 1; February, 2008; 7-26; #4898.

Weymark, John A.; "A Unified Approach to Strategy-Proofness for Single-Peaked Preferences"; SERIEs; Vol. 2, No. 4; December, 2011; 529-550; #5664.

[Whinston, Andrew B.]; Blin, Jean-Marie; Fu, King Sun; "Application of Pattern Recognition to Some Problems in Economics"; Techniques of Optimization; edited by A. V. Balakrishnan; New York; Academic Press; 1972; 3-20; #1827.

[Whinston, Andrew B.]; Piccoli, Mary Louise; "Social Choice and Formal Language Theory"; Journal of Cybernetics; Vol. 3, No. 2; 1973; 40-50; #623.

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