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[Yi, Jian Xin]; Yao, Hai Xiang; "A Characterization of Dictatorial Social Choice Correspondences with Continuous Preferences"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 55, No. 3; May, 2008; 299-304; #5061.

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