

ECN 500/WGS 500 - HANDOUT - FALL 2009
Comments on Intrahousehold Economy Material

- Household production possibilities curve and comparative advantage
 - We return to this model when we discuss labor markets. We will look at the interaction between this model and labor markets.

- Resource allocation within the household
 - We return to consider this problem when we look at labor markets.
 - For some interesting applications and discussions, including some indicating circumstances under which “unitary” household models (such as Becker’s altruist model or the “consensus model” of household preferences presented when we talked about choice of the household given the household production possibilities curve may not be useful), see
 - * Haddad et al. (eds.), *Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Developing Countries: Models, Methods and Policy*, 1997 (on reserve).
 - * Thomas, Incomes, Expenditures, and Health Outcomes: Evidence on Intrahousehold Resource Allocation, in Haddad et al. (eds.), 142-164.
 - * Bruce and Lloyd, Finding the Ties That Bind: Beyond Headship and Household, in Haddad et al. (eds.), 194-212.
 - Applications in India: see Agarwal, Dasgupta (books on reserve).
 - This model may not apply to all families. For example, see:
 - * Burbridge, Black Women in the History of African American Thought: A Critical Essay, in Boston (ed.), *A Different Vision: African American Economic Thought*, vol. 1, 1997.
 - * Massiah, Defining Women’s Work in the Commonwealth Caribbean, in Tinker (ed.), *Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development*, 1990 (on reserve).
 - * Badgett, Gender, Sexuality, and Sexual Orientation: All in the Feminist Family? *Feminist Economics* 1 (1), 1995, 121-39.
 - * Giddings, Political Economy and the Construction of Gender: The Example of Housework within Same-Sex Households, *Feminist Economics* 4 (2), 1998, 97-106.
 - Other interesting articles:
 - * Browning et al., Collective and Unitary Models: A Clarification, *Review of Economics of the Household* 4, 2006, 5-14.
 - * Chen and Woolley, A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making, *The Economic Journal* 111 (474), 2001, 722-48.
 - * Lundberg and Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage, *American Economic Review* 84 (2), 1994, 132-37.
 - * Lundberg and Pollak, Efficiency in Marriage, *Review of Economics of the Household* 1, 2003, 153-67.

- Adding children as active participants in the family: Levison, Children as Economic Agents, *Feminist Economics* 6, 2000, 125-34.

- Other Work on Domestic Violence/Abuse
 - Work on intergenerational transmission of domestic violence
 - * Pollak, An Intergenerational Model of Domestic Violence, *Journal of Population Economics*, 17 (2), 2004, 311-29.
 - Work on child abuse
 - * Paxson and Waldfogel, Parental Resources and Child Abuse and Neglect, *American Economic Review* 89 (2), 1999, 239-44.
 - Other economics articles on domestic violence are:
 - * Tauchen and Witte, The Dynamics of Domestic Violence, *American Economic Review* 85 (2), 1995, 414-18.
 - * Farmer and Tiefenthaler, Domestic Violence: The Value of Services as Signals, *American Economic Review* 86 (2), 1996, 274-79.
 - * Farmer and Tiefenthaler, An Economic Analysis of Domestic Violence, *Review of Social Economy* 55 (3), 1997, 337-58.