

How the EU Fuels Sub-National Regionalism

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Abstract

Does the European Union encourage sub-national autonomy movements? Few scholars link these two aspects of multi-level governance, yet the EU may have created this unintended consequence precisely by making smaller states more viable within the common market. Using a dataset of all regions within the EU from 1950-1997, this article develops and tests hypotheses regarding both the incidence and success of regionalist parties competing in national elections, focusing on the role of European integration. The results demonstrate that a deeper EU has indeed encouraged more regionalist parties to compete in national elections and made them more competitive in those elections.

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1 Introduction

The contrast is striking. On one hand, European political and economic integration threatens traditional state sovereignty from above. Even if the EU does not make 80% of the decisions that affect European citizens' lives (Moravcsik 2005), few question that the EU has a tremendous influence on all aspects of European political and economic life. On the other hand, sub-national autonomy movements, such as in Scotland and Catalonia, gather momentum with referendums and public support, threatening state sovereignty from below. Are these two phenomena coincidental or interdependent?

Scholars are just beginning to understand the influence of European integration on the structure of political contestation at the national level (Marks and Steenbergen 2004), let alone the sub-national level. Yet an emerging conventional wisdom argues that a deeper European Union actually encourages sub-national autonomy movements by making small states more viable than ever before (Alesina and Spolaore 2003; Becker 2005; Hundley 2007). But what this conventional wisdom sorely lacks is a causal mechanism and systematic empirical evidence. If European economic integration fuels (sub-)nationalist movements, this article argues that regionalist political parties are likely to be the primary elite actors and electoral beneficiaries of this trend.

While a rich literature on regionalist movements in Europe exists, the effects of European integration on sub-national mobilization in general, and regionalist political parties in particular, remain under-tested and under-theorized, leaving an important empirical question unanswered: does European integration increase sub-national mobilization in Europe? More specifically, does the EU itself increase the likelihood that regionalist parties will contest national level elections and their success in those elections?

Drawing implications from the work of economists, such as Alesina and Spolaore (2003), and the comparative politics literature on new parties (Kitschelt 1995; Hug 2001; Meguid 2005), this article develops hypotheses regarding the incidence and success of regionalist political parties, such as the Scottish National Party, the Plaid Cymru, and the Basque Na-

tional Party. Similar logics theoretically explain the incidence and success of these parties. Most significantly, cultural and economic differences typically drive the decisions of regionalist political parties to compete in national-level elections as well as their success. But beyond the demand side, this article argues that increased European integration actually encourages regionalist parties to enter political competition and, by making these parties more viable, increases the likelihood of success in those elections.

This article extends both the literature on new parties in Europe and on regionalist political parties. Thus far, much of the best work on regionalist parties in Europe utilize the case study method and focus on particular regions (Lynch 1996; de Winter and Türsan 1998). While these detail rich studies provide insightful looks into individual parties, they do not readily lend themselves to generalizations. This analysis contributes to the literature on regionalist political parties as one of the first time-series-cross-section statistical analysis of the incidence and success of regionalist political parties. Further, this article argues for the importance of a previously neglected variable: European integration. Demonstrating that the EU affects the behavior of regionalist political parties adds to the multi-level governance literature by justifying the conclusion that political arenas are “interconnected rather than nested” (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 4). Finally, this article provides support for the emerging consensus on the role of the EU in enhancing the viability of small states in Europe, thereby unintentionally contributing to sub-national mobilization.

The next section develops the theory connecting European integration to the incidence and success of regionalist political parties. Using a dataset of all regions within the EU-14 from 1950-1997, the third section tests these hypotheses.¹ As the statistical models show, the demand side of the equation, in the form of preference heterogeneity, still largely explains where regionalist parties compete, proving itself a necessary though not sufficient factor. But perhaps most timely in this era of increasing interdependence, the results demonstrate that

¹Following many cross-national studies of European Union countries, the dataset excludes Luxembourg for reasons of unit homogeneity. The end point of the time-series is simply the final election collected by Caramani (2000).

a deeper EU has indeed increased the likelihood that regionalist parties will compete and be successful in national elections.

2 The EU and Sub-National Mobilization

European integration is rarely considered a factor when discussing domestic elections and regionalist parties. But, theoretically, this article contends that deeper European integration should in fact increase support for regionalist political parties. The European Union makes smaller states more viable by diminishing the advantages of larger state size (Bolton and Roland 1997; Alesina and Spolaore 2003). For regional political entrepreneurs, this increased viability increases the credibility of their party and demands for greater autonomy, thereby making the elites more likely to contest elections and citizens more likely to support them.²

Theoretically, a variety of scholars have addressed whether regions need larger state units to thrive (Birch 1978; Horowitz 1985; Hobsbawm 1990; Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003). In recent years, economists have brought their analytical tools to bear on the question of secession or the optimal size of states (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003; Bolton and Roland 1997; Wittman 2000; Goyal and Staal 2004). In particular, Alesina and Spolaore attempt to ascertain the optimal size of states based on a trade-off between economies of scale, or the advantages of size, and the ‘costs of heterogeneity.’ The theoretical result, therefore, is a smaller optimal size of states in Europe under the umbrella of the European Union and a system of free(er) trade (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003; Alesina and Wacziarg 1998; Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg 2000; Wittman 2000; Casella and Feinstein 2002).

In historical terms, several factors encouraged economically larger states, each of which

²Though this article focuses on the descriptive inference, whether the EU increases support for regionalist parties, extant evidence suggests that the viability theory is valid. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the Scottish National Party adopted a policy of independence in Europe, precisely because the EU allowed for political autonomy without fear of economic dislocation (Lynch 1996, 38). Similarly, the Plaid Cymru supported a policy of independence in the EU while encouraging the EU to evolve into a true Europe of the regions (Lynch 1996, 76). Across Europe, Kurzer found that regional politicians are generally enthusiastic about a federal Europe (1997, 43). Previous work using expert surveys finds further evidence that regionalist parties are consistently pro-European across time, space, and issue area [reference withheld].

has diminished in significance in an increasingly interdependent EU (Alesina and Spolaore 2003). First, in a world of relatively large barriers to trade, the size of the state served as the size of the economic market. Thus, the larger the market, the more successful was the economy. But in a world of (relatively) free trade, small countries may be prosperous (Alesina and Spolaore 2003, 82). Despite the continued prevalence of non-tariff barriers to trade, such as anti-dumping claims (Kramer 2004), barriers to trade have diminished in recent years. This trend is nowhere more developed than in the European Union, which is a common market for goods, services, and labor. Thus, so long as a country belongs to the EU, market size is not simply the size of state, thereby diminishing a key advantage of being part of a larger state. Or as Hooghe and Marks note: “The single European market reduces the economic penalty imposed by regional political autonomy because regional firms continue to have access to the European market” (2001, 166). By breaking the link between state size and market size, the European Union diminishes a significant advantage of larger states.

Second, larger state size is traditionally advantageous because many public goods benefit from economies of scale. But again, the EU reduces this advantage as it provides certain public goods for member states (e.g. stable monetary policy, foreign policy, trade authority). Third, larger states are more capable of protecting regions from ‘asymmetric adverse shocks,’ such as industrial decline or weather-related disasters, through redistribution transfers and insurance schemes (Bureau and Champsaur 1992; Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003). Increasingly, the EU seems capable of serving in this capacity via structural or regional funds (Bureau and Champsaur 1992, 90; Allen 1996, 22), albeit in a smaller role than traditional states.

Finally, security concerns often encourage larger state size. But with NATO and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fears of invasion by a foreign country are much diminished. As Anthony Birch argues, the interdependent international system removed one of the main advantages of larger ‘multipurpose’ states vis-à-vis smaller states (1978, 335). As he notes,

Scottish and Welsh states would be just as protected by NATO and the superpowers if they became independent as they would if they remained part of the United Kingdom. Plus, they may gain by reducing expenditures on defense spending, a relatively low priority among Scottish citizens (Birch 1978, 33).

Again, the optimal size of a state “emerges from a trade-off between the benefits of scale and the costs of heterogeneity in the population” (Alesina and Spolaore 2003, 175). As discussed above, membership in the European Union diminishes the advantages of large states vis-à-vis small states are diminished. But the key cost of a larger state, namely heterogeneity of preferences, remains. Political economists find that economic growth and public policies suffer with greater ethnic heterogeneity (Easterly and Levine 1997). A government of a homogeneous population tends to be more successful at public policies because the day-to-day lives of the people are more similar (Tilly 1975, 79), while larger states are less efficient at public good provision (Bolton, Roland and Spolaore 1996, 701). Due to this comparative advantage, European regions may see themselves as more capable of providing sustained economic growth than the traditional nation-states (Newhouse 1997, 69), yielding political separatism as an unintended consequence of economic integration (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 1042).

Astute regional political entrepreneurs utilize these trends to argue more convincingly that the region is less dependent on the rest of the country by “fram[ing] their demands in European terms” (Keating 1995, 7). In Scotland in the 1970s, for instance, the Scottish National Party (SNP) could not convince factory workers that seceding from the United Kingdom, which likely meant isolation from the British market, would not result in even more unemployment (Esman 1977, 266-7). In the 1980s, though, former SNP MP Jim Sillars convinced the SNP to support a pro-European position as a “mechanism to avoid economic dislocation in the event of secession from the UK” (Lynch 1996, 39). Scottish MP Gordon Wilson described the Scottish National support for the European Union as “a first class way of pushing the advantages of political independence without any threat of

economic dislocation. Within the common trading umbrella the move to independence can take place smoothly and easily” (Lynch 1996, 38). Thus, activists use the EU to negate the arguments against autonomy based on fears of economic upheaval (Gallagher 1991).

Further, as more qualitative work suggests, European integration makes the regionalist parties’ self-government goals more realistic and, therefore, more attractive to voters (de Winter 1998, 221; Dardanelli 2001, 25). Or in terms of a bargaining model, European integration makes regionalist parties more attractive both by improving the perceptions of the economic implications of independence as well as the bargaining leverage of regionalist parties (Fearon and van Houten 2002, 22; Garrett and Rodden 2003, 94). Unfortunately, except for an indirect test (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1989), this potential determinant is neglected in the quantitative models. This paper fills that gap.

3 When and Where Do Regionalist Parties Compete?

This section introduces the dataset and methods used to test the theoretical propositions regarding regionalist political party entry. After reviewing the structure of the data and the dependent variable, the explanatory variables and specific hypotheses are discussed. Then, the section introduces the model specifications and analyze the incidence of regionalist political parties in national political competition. The next section proceeds to investigating the electoral success of these same parties.

3.1 Measurement and the Dependent Variable

For this dataset, electoral data for each region in the EU-14 starting in 1950 or the earliest election after democratization were compiled.³ Following the Assembly of European Regions (1996), the region is simply the “territorial body of public law established at the level immediately below that of the state and endowed with political self-government.” The region

³District-level electoral data for these countries can be found in Caramani (2000). The district-level data are aggregated by the appropriate regional NUTS code.

was then matched with its corresponding EU designated NUTS code.⁴ This process was critical in determining the appropriate universe of regions in the fourteen countries because the ‘zeros,’ or non-events, in this case are as important to explaining regionalist political party entry as those cases where parties do exist.⁵

Drawing from the regionalist party literature (de Winter and Türsan 1998; Caramani 2000; Pereira, Villodres and Nieto 2003), Appendix A lists the regionalist parties in Western Europe that competed in national elections between 1950 and 1997 and that are included in this analysis. Parties with a regionalist agenda are included, not necessarily parties that only compete in particular regions. This coding yielded the dependent variable, which is simply a dichotomous variable across regions in all fourteen countries measuring 1 if a regionalist political party competed in the national election held that year, and 0 otherwise.

For this analysis, the observation is the region-level result of a national election, or rather, whether a regionalist political party competes in a given national election in a particular region or not. Table 1 illustrates the distribution of the dependent variable across countries. Since 1950, regionalist political parties only compete in six countries in Western Europe, including Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. The total number of cases is simply the number of regions multiplied by the number of elections in each country.⁶

[Table 1 about here.]

⁴The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) is the EU classification system for subdividing each member state (European Union 2004). As the NUTS number increases, the size of the subdivision decreases. For example, NUTS1 levels include regions with three to seven million people, while NUTS3 groups, which are sub-divisions of NUTS1 and NUTS2, include 150,000 to 800,000 citizens.

⁵While all the countries in the sample are current EU members, there is variation in depth of integration across time. Since some countries join later than others, 43% of the entire sample is actually at the ‘no EU’ level. The time-series allows variation on the key explanatory variable, level of European integration, while maintaining the cross-sectional focus on EU-14 countries. The advantages to this focus are many. First, this focus maximizes the level of unit homogeneity within the sample as much as possible. By including only the EU-15 countries, excluding Luxembourg, the dataset controls for numerous international variables. Second, the European Union collects cross-national economic data for all EU countries, making the analysis of these variables both easier and more consistent.

⁶There are a few exceptions to this simple multiplication. In Denmark, there were no elections for Roskilde until 1971 (12 total). In Germany, no elections are held in Saarland until 1957 (12 total) and 6 German regions are only included since 1990 (3 total). In Netherlands, no elections were held in Flevoland until 1986 (4 total).

For Belgium, nearly all region-election years are counted as having regionalist political parties because the party system is nearly entirely regionalized. In France, regionalist parties compete in national elections only in 1986 in Bretagne and Corsica, while in the United Kingdom, regionalist parties compete in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in nearly every election since 1950. For both Italy and Spain, regionalist political parties compete in certain regions, such as Basque Country, Catalonia, and South Tyrol, in every election, but parties begin to compete in other parts of the country as time progresses.

Table 1 demonstrates that variation occurs across space. Among the cases where regionalist political parties do compete, there is distribution over time as well. Figure 1 provides a histogram showing the percentage of regions in which regionalist political parties compete across decades.

[Figure 1 about here.]

Figure 1 shows that regionalist political parties compete in more regions as time progresses, though the trend is not linear. Table 1 and Figure 1 demonstrate that variation over time and space exists, and that generally regionalist political parties compete in more regions in more recent decades. It is this variation in time and space the next section seeks to explain.

3.2 Hypotheses

Several potential factors may drive demand. Typically, salient new issues create the ‘push’ for new parties (Rüdig 1990). For Green parties, the controversy over nuclear energy, among other issues, created a push for alternative representation in parliaments (Kitschelt 1989). For New Radical Right parties, immigration concerns and economic insecurity often fuel support (Hug 2001, 4). For regionalist political parties, it is not surprising that regional issues drive demand for new political representation (Hug 2001, 3). However, underlying these demands must be a certain level of preference heterogeneity, either in cultural or

economic terms. In other words, citizens who live in a region which is different from the rest of the country are more likely to support regionalist parties (Hearl, Budge and Pearson 1996; de Winter and Türsan 1998). And in fact, most studies include historical language of the region, a proxy for cultural difference, as an explanatory variable and conclude that language trumps political economic variables as a causal variable (Hearl, Budge and Pearson 1996; Gordin 2001; Fearon and van Houten 2002).

Language difference is highly correlated with regionalist party existence and success. As demonstrated in an analysis of nine advanced industrial countries, 91% (20 out of 22) of the regions where regionalist parties competed did have a distinct language; however, 62% (32 out of 52) of the regions with distinct languages did not have regionalist parties competing in elections (Fearon and van Houten 2002). These simple statistics highlight the near necessity of language difference as a determinant of regionalist parties but they also show that a different language is by no means sufficient for a regionalist party (Fearon and van Houten 2002, 20).⁷ In other words, while nearly all regions that have a regionalist party also have a distinct historical language, more than half of the regions with a distinct language do not support a regionalist party. Cultural difference, in the form of historical language, must be considered a significant potential explanatory variable in any empirical model of regional mobilization.

Language difference also provides some leverage on the preference issue central to the optimal size of states argument. Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003) and others generally tend to assume heterogeneous preferences based on distance from the center. Linguistic distinctiveness of the region from the country's center, as a proxy for cultural differences and heterogeneous preferences, is one way to test whether heterogeneous preferences affect support for regionalist parties (Fearon and van Houten 2002).

Rather than compare the most commonly used language in the region to that of the cap-

⁷Gordin's Boolean analysis comes to the same conclusion about language's necessary but not sufficient relationship with regionalist party success. In other words, in almost all cases where a regionalist party exists, the region has a distinct language, but the presence of a distinct language does not, by itself, guarantee a regionalist party (Gordin 2001).

ital, Fearon and Laitin (2000) introduce a variable called Language Family. Basically, they utilize the *Ethnologue's* (SIL International 2006) categorization of languages into different language families to determine how similar the region's language is to the capital's language. Using the historic language of the region rather than the current language allows the measure to serve as a proxy for cultural differences in a way that using current language does not because it may underestimate preference differences due to linguistic but not cultural assimilation (Fearon and Laitin 2000).

By following the coding guidelines, each region's Language Family from the Ethnologue database is coded.⁸ Following Fearon and van Houten (2002), the Language Family variable is converted to Language Difference by using the reciprocal. This simple conversion emphasizes the differences that are earlier in the family trees (e.g. Spanish is more different from Basque than Catalan), both because branches earlier in the family tree are more significant and because larger differences between languages are more reliably coded in the *Ethnologue*.⁹

As Language Difference between the region and the rest of the country increases, support for the regionalist political parties will increase both in terms of competing in the elections in the first place and electoral success.¹⁰

⁸Basically, the coding works as follows: Each language has a classification designated by Grimes' *Ethnologue* (SIL International 2006). The Language Family variable simply measures the level at which the region's language branches off from the capital's language. For example, English's classification is Indo-European, Germanic, West, English while Scotland's code is Indo-European, Celtic, Insular, Goidelic. The two languages branch off at the second level, so the code is two. Another example is Spanish (Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian) and Basque (Basque), which gives Basque a code of one. If two languages are identical, the Language Family code is ten, which is one level higher than the most similar yet still distinct languages. Examples of regions coded ten are Andalusian and Canaries (both utilize Spanish). For a more complete discussion of the coding guidelines, see Fearon and Laitin (2000) and Fearon and van Houten (2002).

⁹The coding of the Language Family variable is available upon request of the author with the language classifications drawn from the *Ethnologue* (SIL International 2006). Language Difference is simply the reciprocal of Language Family, or $1/\text{Language Family}$.

¹⁰Economic difference between the region and the rest of the country would be an additional useful 'push' variable, as preference heterogeneity from income differentials could also encourage regional mobilization (Bolton and Roland 1997, 1059). While demand for alternative representation increases in times of bad national economic performance, demand for regionalist political party representation may actually increase if a region becomes wealthier vis-à-vis the rest of the country (de Winter and Türsan 1998; van Houten 2000; Gordin 2001; Fearon and van Houten 2002). In the case of advanced groups in advanced countries, such as the Basques in Spain or the Northern League in Italy, their grievance tends to be that they are subsidizing poorer regions or that the center's economic policies are holding their growth down (Horowitz 1981, 184). Along these lines, the Scottish National Party attempts to garner favor among voters by demonstrating

But an overemphasis on the demand side would ignore the strategic interaction inherent in domestic party competition. As Bonnie Meguid argues, “rising party success is not a mere reflection of the institutional or sociological characteristics of a specific society. It is the result of deliberate strategic responses by actors powerful enough to shape said environment” (2002, 2). In other words, the decision of new parties to enter political competition hinges directly on the strategies of the mainstream parties. At least two strategic party environment hypotheses warrant discussion.

First, using a spatial model, Kitschelt contends that when the mainstream parties converge, there is space for new parties to enter the political marketplace (1995). In his analysis of the New Radical Right, Kitschelt argues that whether a successful New Radical Right party emerges depends on the opportunity structure of party competition (1995, 14). When mainstream parties converge, space is opened up for right-wing entrepreneurs to exploit. It is only when this space is open that political entrepreneurs can attempt to seize the opportunity with a winning strategy of their own (Kitschelt 1995, 14).

Using the Comparative Manifesto Project data (Budge et al. 2001),¹¹ the cumulative right-left ideological score for the largest party is simply subtracted from that of the second largest party [Party Divergence]. If the ideological distance between the two main parties decreases, implying convergence in the spatial model, then regionalist political parties will be more likely to enter competition.

Second, both Meguid (2002, 2005) and Hug (2001) argue that mainstream parties can subvert potential new parties by incorporating their new issue into their platform.¹² If mainstream parties accommodate the goals of the niche parties, then support will decrease.

that Scotland is subsidizing the rest of the United Kingdom (Begg and Stewart 1971, 148). Unfortunately, consistent cross-regional income distribution data are not available for the full time series (van Houten 2000, 10), so these alternative theories cannot be fully tested. But various robustness tests for the main theoretical propositions are conducted by including these variables in alternative models.

¹¹Admittedly, the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) has numerous critics. For these purposes, the most relevant criticism is that the CMP measures salience rather than position. But it does correlate with expert measures of party positions. And one advantage to the data, of course, is that it is available for the full time-series-cross-section.

¹²Meguid (2002) considers multiple mainstream party strategies, including accommodative, dismissive, and adversarial, but accommodative strategies are the focus for this paper.

In the case of regionalist parties, if the mainstream political parties incorporate a more positive position on decentralization, as coded in the Comparative Manifesto Project, then voters will express less support for regionalist political parties.¹³ To capture whether a major party accommodates the regionalist party’s issue, the decentralization score for either the largest or second largest party, whichever has the higher decentralization position, is included [Party Accommodation].

In previous studies of regionalist political party success, political decentralization is relatively neglected.¹⁴ But Michael Hechter argues that when a central government is responsive to the demands of regionalist groups vis-à-vis devolution, it reduces the incentive to support regionalist parties (2000, 122), an argument very much in line with Meguid’s accommodative strategy theory. In other words, the central government might try to undercut a burgeoning sub-national movement by providing a degree of decentralization. But the effect of decentralization is non-linear in this logic. Some degree of decentralization may subvert regionalist party supporters, but too much may simply exacerbate matters. Contrary to the goals of central elites, devolution could succeed in “whetting [regionalist party leaders’] appetites for even greater powers and privileges” (Hechter 2000, 140). For instance, devolution might provide them experience at lower levels of government that increases their likelihood of success at higher levels (Brancati 2004, 2). More significantly, greater devolution undoubtedly increases the resources available to these leaders, which could be used to lower the costs of collective action. Thus, political decentralization may decrease electoral support for regionalist political parties up to a point. Beyond this threshold, though, decentralization may actually increase electoral support for regionalist political parties.

A competing, and perhaps more straightforward, logic exists, though. At low levels of

¹³This strategic move on the part of mainstream parties can be either pre-emptive or reactive. Mainstream parties can either accommodate the issue, thereby subverting potential regionalist political parties, or they can react to regionalist political party success and undercut an existing movement by accommodating their main issue. Either way, the logic suggests the move would decrease the likelihood of regionalist political party incidence.

¹⁴One exception is Gerring (2005, 80) who finds that minor parties perform better in federal systems, at least in the plurality systems on which he focuses.

devolution, decentralization does not satiate the appetite of proponents of regional autonomy but in fact may increase opportunities for regional political entrepreneurs to gather support. But at a certain level or threshold, the regional proponents achieve their goals and demand is reduced for this particular form of political representation. Thus, a non-linear prediction remains but in the opposite direction: the relationship between decentralization and regionalist party incidence would be increasing at low levels of decentralization and decreasing at higher levels. The key difference is whether low or high levels of decentralization are sufficient for satiating regionalist demands. This is an empirical question, and one which this article can begin addressing.

To test the two competing decentralization hypotheses, both political decentralization and a squared decentralization term are included [Regional Governance Index]. Compiled by Hooghe and Marks (2001, 192), this index measures the formal regional governance structures in European countries on four criteria across four time periods: constitutional federalism, special territorial autonomy, the role of regions in central government, and whether regional assemblies use direct or indirect elections. Again, the two theories yield opposing curvilinear predictions.

In order to test the EU hypothesis, a variety of operationalizations are included. First, a simple index of different treaty stages in EU history is created. In other words, the index is coded 0 if the country is not a member of the EU, a 1 if the country is a member of the EU under the Treaty of Rome, a 2 if the country is a member of the EU under the Single European Act, and a 3 if the country is a member of the EU under the Treaty of European Union, or Maastricht. While the index is simple and intuitive (and highly correlated with other available integration measures), the characteristics of this index are certainly less than ideal. The simple European integration index is not necessarily, or even probably, interval in nature. To protect against the results being an artifact of this measure, other integration measures are also tested.

For robustness, the National and Supranational Governance scale defined in Hooghe and

Marks' *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration* (2001, Appendix 1) is included. This scale considers the level (i.e. national or EU) at which policies are made in twenty-eight issue arenas, including economic, social and legal policy as well as international relations. A policy arena receives a one if all decisions are made at the national level, a two if only some decisions are made at the EU level, a three if policy decisions are made at both levels, four if most policy decisions are made at the EU level, and a five if all decisions are made at the EU level. Evaluations were made at various points in European Union history, including 1950, 1957, 1968, 1992, and 2000.¹⁵ To aggregate the data in a useful way for this project, the scores are simply averaged for all twenty-eight issue areas and rescaled from 0 to 1 [SupraGovIndex].¹⁶ This new Supranational Governance Index is an additional operationalization of the key explanatory variable.

While neither of these measures is ideal,¹⁷ the combination should provide a robust picture of the effect of EU membership on regionalist political parties. If the theory has validity in this implication, then the effect of integration on regionalist party success should be significant, positive, and consistent across the various indicators.

Hypothesis: As European integration deepens, support for regionalist political parties will increase.

Based on these variables, a simple analysis of the group means demonstrates there are obvious differences between those regions where regionalist political parties compete and those where they do not. Table 2 provides an illustration of these group differences.

[Table 2 about here.]

¹⁵Based, as they are, on expert surveys, the measures are disputable, as Hooghe and Marks (2001, xi) readily admit; however, the additional indicator provides a robustness test for the key explanatory variable. Also, the EU index and the Supranational Governance Index are highly correlated, lending some confidence to the measures.

¹⁶The values for the rescaled and aggregated National and Supranational Governance scale are as follows: 1950 (or no EU): 0 (447 cases); 1957: 0.063 (57 cases), 1968: 0.17 (1,043 cases), 1992: 0.357 (1,078 cases).

¹⁷A potential problem for each index is that neither considers that some countries may be more integrated at the same time-point than other EU members. In other words, some countries opt out of certain treaty components and some countries simply do not enact all the legislation introduced by the EU. But this issue is not as problematic as it might be because regional political entrepreneurs are not necessarily looking at the specific integration patterns of their home country, but rather general patterns of integration. For example, there is no reason why Scotland would have to opt-out of the Euro if they joined as an independent country.

On average, regionalist political parties compete where integration is deeper and there is far more historical linguistic difference. Nevertheless, this bi-variate analysis is at best incomplete; thus, the next section develops a model to explain under what conditions regionalist political parties compete and then what explains their electoral success in those regions.

3.3 Model Specification

This section examines under what conditions regionalist political parties are more likely to compete in national-level elections. The data is a cross-sectional time-series and the dependent variable is a simple dummy variable, where a 1 means that at least one regionalist political party competed for a national Parliamentary seat in that region.¹⁸ Traditionally, analysts simply used standard logit or probit to deal with binary cross-section time-series data (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998). Unfortunately, the bias from duration dependence is potentially significant. Standard logit and probit can underestimate variability by 50% or more (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998, 1263).

Recognizing that binary time-series-cross-section data are actually grouped duration or event history data, Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998, 1261) (BKT) propose a fairly simple way to correct the temporal dependence problems, simply adding either a series of dummy variables or splines to a standard logit or probit analysis. In this data, temporal dependence seems obvious: whether a regionalist political party competes in a particular election depends on the electoral history of that party. Once a party enters competition at one election, it is easier to compete in future elections. A standard likelihood ratio test confirms the existence of temporal dependence in this data (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998, 1269).

Since adding numerous temporal dummies is not necessarily ideal due to the loss of degrees of freedom, Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998, 1721) prefer to use natural cubic splines to

¹⁸Regionalist political parties competed in 247 cases. In 73% (177 cases) of these observations, only one party competed in the election. In 22% (53), two regionalist political parties competed, and in less than 5% of cases, either 3 or 4 parties competed.

correct for duration dependence.¹⁹ This particular dataset presents an additional temporal complication. While most event history analysis has only one ‘failure’ per unit, political parties can compete in multiple elections, and in fact should be expected to do so more frequently if they have an electoral history. The model in Table 3 follows Beck, Katz and Tucker’s (1998, 1272) advice and includes a control variable which counts the number of previous events. This variable does not change the substantive results of the models.

To correct for the lack of independence within units, the model in Table 3 utilizes robust (Huber/White) standard errors, clustered at the regional level. This option in Stata changes the assumptions of probit so that independence is assumed across units—in this case, regions—but not necessarily within units. Table 3 estimates the model discussed above.²⁰

[Table 3 about here.]

The results of the model largely support the hypotheses. As European integration deepens, the likelihood that a regionalist political party competes in a national election increases. The basic model from Table 3 was respecified with four different measures of the European integration variable: EU index, the Supranational Governance Index, a simple EU membership dummy, the EU index split into separate treaty dummies, or a membership duration count variable. Table 4 provides only the EU coefficients from these regressions. In each case, European integration has a consistently significant effect in the predicted direction.²¹

¹⁹Tucker’s software, BTSCS, creates the temporal splines from the data (Tucker 1999). The use of splines and temporal dummies is explained and justified in detail in Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998). The model was also run with temporal dummies instead of splines with no difference in the significance or sign in the coefficients.

²⁰To ensure the results are not simply artifacts of this model choice, robustness tests included alternative model specifications, including a probit analysis without the BKT corrections, a conditional fixed effects logit, and a random effects probit. Each deals with and introduces statistical problems of their own, yet together yield robust results for the key explanatory variables, particularly the EU coefficient. The discussion in this section focuses on the BKT model because it is the most theoretically appropriate for this particular dataset. This decision is supported by the fit and model comparison statistics (e.g. R^2 , BIC, AIC). Further, other specifications, based on the BKT model in Table 3, controlled for GDP per capita, national unemployment, effective number of electoral parties, and the number of previous events. These control variables did not affect the significance or signs of the explanatory variables. The results from these alternative models are available upon request of the author.

²¹Complete results for these alternative specifications available upon request of the author.

The consistent robustness across measures provides a degree of confidence in the results, in particular that the result is not an artifact of the simple EU index.

[Table 4 about here.]

Using *Clarify* (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003) on the results from Table 3, this effect is demonstrated in Figure 2. Three separate curves are estimated for this figure to represent those cases in which the region has average or higher levels of language difference.

[Figure 2 about here.]

Figure 2 demonstrates that as European integration progressed from pre-Treaty of Rome to Maastricht, the likelihood of regionalist political parties competing in electoral politics increased in all three cases. Compared to higher levels of language difference, regions with average levels have very low probabilities. The mean of language difference is actually quite low on the scale—0.164 on a 0 to 1 scale—and implies a difference akin to a dialect of the national language rather than a different language or culture. Examples include Calabria or Sicily in Italy or Aragon in Spain. For these culturally similar regions, the likelihood of a regionalist political party competing in national elections is small under any circumstances and varying European from the minimum to the maximum only increases the probability from 0.2% to 0.65%. For average levels of language difference, the increase is statistically significant but of minor magnitude.

By increasing language difference to 0.5, which is the classification for Bretagne in France or Trentino Alto Adige in Italy, the probability of a regionalist party competing increases with European integration from a marginal 0.37% at no European integration to 4.2% at the highest level of integration. The third line represents the highest level of linguistic or cultural difference, representing regions such as the Basque country in Spain. Here the effect of European integration is clear and dramatic. At low levels of integration, the probability of

regionalist political parties competing in national elections is only 7.5%, even in those regions that are highly culturally different from the rest of the country. But at the highest level of integration, the likelihood is over 29%. In other words, in those regions that are culturally different, deeper European integration has a highly significant positive effect on the incidence of competition. With this increase, Figure 2 provides strong evidence in support of the main hypothesis of this paper.

Further, the effect is consistent across very different statistical model specifications. Theoretically, the EU is not expected to be the largest determinant of either the incidence or success of regionalist political parties, especially when compared to cultural difference; nonetheless, the significant and positive effect matches theoretical expectations.

As expected, the language difference variable is a robustly significant predictor of regionalist political party entry in electoral competition. Regardless of the controls included or the model specifications attempted, the effect is significant and positive. The models demonstrate that as the language difference between the region and the rest of the country increases, the probability of a regionalist political party competing increases. At average levels of language difference, the likelihood of a regionalist political party competing is less than 1%. But at the highest value on the scale, where regions such as Pais Vasco are scored, the chances of a regionalist political party competing are nearly 9.2%. These results buttress previous studies that found the significance of a cultural or language difference variable to be an extremely powerful predictor of regional mobilization in Europe (Hearl, Budge and Pearson 1996; van Houten 2000; Fearon and van Houten 2002).

For the strategic party hypotheses, though, the results are less consistent. Party Accommodation is insignificant and has the incorrect sign. The lack of robustness across model specifications prevents any strong conclusions about its effect.²² But the results support the Party Divergence hypothesis. If the top two parties diverge in their left-right positions,

²²Party attitudes towards decentralization apparently do not affect whether regionalist political parties compete, but actual decentralization, as measured by Regional Governance Index, does. Thus, actual decentralization rather than party position may be a more tangible mechanism for mainstream parties to accommodate and undercut potential regionalist political parties.

then they eliminate room for minor parties to enter the competition. Holding all else constant, the probability of a regionalist party competing drops from 0.2% to 0.04% if the Party Divergence score changes from the minimum to the maximum. Obviously, the substantive magnitude of this variable is minimal, but the effect is statistically significant and in the predicted direction. This result suggests that mainstream party strategies do indeed affect the likelihood of minor regionalist political parties entering national elections, albeit in a small way compared to other factors.

For political decentralization, Table 3 indicates that the probability of a regionalist party competing is increasing at lower levels of decentralization, and decreasing at higher levels. Rather than the Hechter logic, the simpler logic for decentralization fits these robust results. Eventually, a national government can actually meet the demands of the autonomy-oriented regional citizens. Thus, beyond a threshold, decentralization does diminish enthusiasm for regionalist political parties to enter competition.

4 What Explains Regionalist Party Success?

The previous section demonstrated how European integration and decentralization affected the incidence of regionalist parties. Whether political elites decide to contest national elections is an important observable implication of the theory; however, it is only half of the story. This section proceeds to analyze the electoral success of these same parties. By testing both observable implications, the relationship between multi-level governance and regionalist parties will be clearer.

4.1 Measurement and the Dependent Variable

As in the previous section, the first step in evaluating the determinants of regionalist party success is to identify relevant political parties. Again, these are parties, like Herri Batasuna or Plaid Cymru, that have a regionalist agenda, not necessarily parties that only compete in

particular regions of a country. Appendix A lists these parties and their respective regions, countries and elections.²³ Extending the previous incidence model, this section analyzes only those districts where there is an active regionalist political party, thereby effectively excluding the cases where the regionalist party vote share is zero. To be clear, the dependent variable is the regionalist party’s share of the district-level vote in national or Parliamentary, not regional or local, elections.

4.2 Hypotheses

For regionalist party success, many of the same variables from the incidence model have the same predicted effects. Deeper European integration should increase support, as will higher levels of Language Difference. Party Accommodation by the mainstream parties should reduce support for regionalist parties. And this data provide another testing ground for the alternative curvilinear hypotheses for decentralization.

But in addition to these now familiar variables, several other control variables may determine regionalist party success. Turnout is included to try to capture a degree of protest vote. Also included is a dummy variable for whether other regionalist parties compete in that district in that election year.²⁴ By definition, if more than one regionalist party competes in an election, then the marketplace would be crowded. Thus, other regionalist parties

²³The list of regionalist parties follows closely the work of de Winter and Türsan (1998); Pereira, Villodres and Nieto (2003); Caramani (2000). Included in the dataset are any parties on these lists for which district-level election data was collected by Caramani (2000). Several parties were later incorporated into other regionalist parties or competed as part of a coalition. These predecessor parties or alternative manifestations are also included, bringing the total to 57. See Appendix A.

²⁴In 500 or 19% of the cases, the regionalist party has at least one regionalist party competitor. For robustness, other models included the number of other regionalist parties, a simple count variable, and the effective number of other regionalist parties. The formula for effective number of other regionalist parties [ENORP] is as follows:

$$1 / \sum_{i=1}^n (v_i)^2 \tag{1}$$

or the inverse of the sum of the squared vote share of the other regionalist parties in the district election. This index has been widely used in comparative politics, for both ethnic fragmentation and effective number of political parties, since being popularized by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Not only are these measures highly correlated with the dummy variable, because most districts that have multiple parties only have two, but the regression results do not change with the different measures.

should reduce the vote share for the particular regionalist party in the observation. Age of the political party is also included as a control.²⁵ Basically, older parties are expected to be more successful based on the logic that their ability to compete in multiple elections is a reflection of previous success or at least an ability to survive in the political marketplace. Finally, the size of the region itself is included. For similar rational cost-benefit reasons as discussed above regarding the EU and the advantages of larger states, parties in larger regions should gain more support than their smaller counterparts.

4.3 Model Specification

This section examines under what conditions regionalist parties receive higher vote shares in national-level elections. The dataset is a cross-sectional time-series and the dependent variable is vote share. The Ordinary Least Squares results for Model 7, as well as the summary statistics, are reported in Table 5. As with Table 3, these results are robust to a range of alternative specifications and control variables.

[Table 5 about here.]

The various control variables behaved largely as expected, with two exceptions. As expected, the size of the region had a positive effect on the dependent variable.²⁶ Also, the dummy variable for whether other regionalist parties compete in that constituency in that year was negative, as expected. Contrary to expectations, though, turnout had a strong negative effect. Rather than proxying for protest against the mainstream parties, perhaps turnout is simply tracking the closeness or competitiveness of the national election, contributing to strategic voting behavior benefiting the mainstream parties. Surprisingly,

²⁵Rather than measure a party's age by the length of time since their founding, party age is the length of time since they first competed in an election. This decision not only greatly simplifies the coding standards, but it also eliminates the need to subjectively decide whether a party that does not compete in an election is an interest group or a party and when they make the transition.

²⁶If population is included instead of square miles, population has a positive significant effect and the other coefficients are not affected. Population is not available by region for the entire time series, so it is included only for robustness tests.

the party age variable had an insignificant coefficient in all iterations.²⁷

This model yields further evidence to support the contention that regional citizens are more supportive of regionalist parties when their preferences diverge from the rest of the country. As the literature suggests, differences in language between the center and the peripheral group encourage regionalist parties. Again, *Clarify* calculates the expected vote shares of regionalist parties at various levels of language difference. Ceteris paribus, raising language difference from the minimum to the maximum increases the expected vote share of a regionalist party from 9.8% to 21.5%. Supporting previous studies as well as the finding from the previous section, the model from Table 5 demonstrates that the more culturally distinct a region, the greater the support for regionalist parties.

The data do not provide evidence of a strategic effect of mainstream party strategies. The prediction was that when mainstream parties accommodate regional movements by adopting a more positive view on decentralization, support for regionalist parties would decrease. Neither Table 5 nor the robustness tests yielded a statistically significant coefficient. As the results from the previous section suggest, the strategic effect of mainstream parties on regionalist parties may in fact affect whether a party enters the competition in the first place rather than how well it does when it does enter. Alternatively, the real strategic effect could be captured by the governance act of decentralization itself.

The model in Table 5 yields a curvilinear result for decentralization: at low levels of decentralization, the relationship is negative between support for regionalist parties and decentralization. In other words, if a country is centralized and provides a degree of devolution, then support for regionalist parties diminishes. At higher levels, though, the sign reverses as expected and decentralization encourages support for regionalist parties.

These results suggest that a certain amount of concessions, in the form of more autonomy, do in fact subvert support for regionalist parties and their associated movements; however,

²⁷This variable was included to control for exogenous factors that made certain regionalist parties more successful. Success in multiple elections may imply that those parties found a niche in the electoral marketplace. The consistently insignificant results suggest that this hypothesis is not necessarily valid. For robustness, the same model is tested without party age, with consistent coefficients for the other variables.

beyond a certain level, further political decentralization actually increases their vote share. Significantly, though, the decentralization hypothesis yielded contradictory results at the two stages. High levels of decentralization discourage elites from entering competition while encouraging citizens to support them. But if regional elites are bought off by decentralization while citizens demand even more political representation, other, less democratic, forms of political behavior may become more attractive. This relationship demands further investigation in other work.

Regarding the main hypothesis, the statistical results demonstrate that European integration has a positive and significant effect on regionalist party electoral success. Regardless how one measures integration, the coefficients are consistently positive and significant.²⁸ In addition, the magnitude of the effect is large. In fact, the average or summary effect of the variable is nearly 6% more votes for the regionalist party, an effect that is quite substantively significant when you consider the average vote share for regionalist parties is only 14.8%.

To further evaluate the magnitude of changes in European integration, *Clarify* calculated the expected value of the dependent variable, holding all other variables at their mean values (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003). These expected values represent a more informative way to present the statistical results than simply reporting the coefficients and the standard errors (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000). If one holds all variables constant and only changes the level of integration, support for regionalist parties increases fairly dramatically. With no European Union, support for regionalist parties is approximately 9%. Steadily rising with integration, support is nearly 19% with the Maastricht Treaty. Thus, even if one incorporates the uncertainty associated with the simulations involved in *Clarify* and the regressions themselves, the upward trend is clear. Significantly, a fixed effects model, controlling for all 207 different NUTS3 levels in this dataset, provides a similar result for

²⁸This finding is consistent across different specifications of the European integration variable also. Using the EU index, the Supranational Governance Index, a simple EU membership dummy, or the EU index split into separate treaty dummies, European integration has a consistently significant effect. The consistent robustness across measures provide confidence in the results. These robustness tests are available upon request of the author.

the effect of integration. Likewise, different measures of time did not affect the key results, suggesting that the effects of integration are indeed significant and not simply artifacts of a time trend.²⁹

5 Discussion

As Fearon and Laitin (2000), among others, have found, language difference is nearly a necessary if not sufficient condition for regional mobilization in Europe. Similar to previous studies, this article demonstrates that cultural difference greatly influences whether regionalist parties compete in national elections. As one of the first truly comparative quantitative studies of when and where regionalist political parties compete in national parliamentary elections, this article confirms and extends earlier work on new or niche parties, in general, and regionalist political parties specifically.

Significantly, though, the wide range of statistical specifications provides consistent and robust results for a previously neglected factor, namely European integration. As integration proceeds from a free trade area to a monetary union, deeper European integration is associated with more incidence and electoral success for the regionalist parties. In other words, omitting or neglecting the supranational side of multi-level governance risks mis-specification and, worse, misunderstanding the incidence and success of regionalist parties.

But, one might ask whether this comparative large-N study justifies the causal inferences drawn. The two sets of regressions demonstrate the descriptive inference: European

²⁹In addition to the fixed effects models and the model variations for the full time series, robustness tests included economic variables. The availability of regional economic data reduces the observations in the sample substantially, especially limiting variation on the EU explanatory variable; however, the number of observations is sufficient to retest the model above and add the relevant economic variables. Following previous studies of regionalist parties (Hearl, Budge and Pearson 1996; Zirakzadeh 1989), the robustness tests included controls for unemployment, the percentage of the population employed by agriculture, and the relative GDP of the region (compared to the rest of the country). The hypotheses for these variables are fairly straightforward. Unemployment should serve to increase support for regionalist parties as an outlet for protest votes, if nothing else. Also, previous studies find that higher levels of agricultural employment encourage regional voting, in part because it implies a more traditional social structure (Hearl, Budge and Pearson 1996, 178). With these controls included, European integration remains positive and significant, lending additional confidence in this result.

integration affects regionalist party success at the incidence and election stages. And the qualitative research discussed in this paper lends some credibility to the causal inference. But for the viability theory—elaborated from the size of states argument (Alesina and Spolaore 2003)—to be the driving force behind this relationship, both elites and citizens must recognize and acknowledge the strategic effect of European integration on the sub-national autonomy movements.

Other work evaluates precisely these additional steps in the causal story. A recent paper [reference withheld] demonstrates that regionalist parties are in fact Europhiles. Consistent across time, space and even issue area, regionalist parties are highly supportive of European integration. And in the Scottish National Party case, in particular, the elites recognize the viability argument and utilize it to reassure and convince skeptical voters. Further, in public opinion polls, Scottish citizens also recognize the value of the European Union in the bargaining game with the central government and support it accordingly [reference withheld]. This research reinforces the cross-sectional time-series results of this paper and provides further support that the viability theory is in fact driving the relationship between regionalist party success and European integration. In the future, scholars and policy-makers alike must consider this unintended consequence of supra-national institutions.

Outside academia, attention is increasingly focused on the 'Balkanization' of Europe, led by strong culturally distinct regions like Scotland and Catalonia (Hundley 2007). Within the context of the EU, 'Great Powers' are increasingly seen as obsolete, while small states are safe from attack and in an even better economic position than ever before (Hundley 2007). But if this fiery rhetoric is to have purchase, changes in political behavior must follow. The findings in this paper demonstrate for the first time a clear and significant effect of European integration on regionalist parties. As manifested in political parties, sub-national autonomy movements have clearly benefited from this unintended consequence of integration.

Appendix A. Regionalist Political Parties in Western Europe

Region	Political Parties (English label)	Contested Elections
Belgium		
Flanders	Vlaams Blok (Flemish Bloc)	1991-95
	Volksunie (People's Union)	1954-95
Region Wallonne	Front Democratique des Francophones (Democratic Front of Francophones)	1968-91
	Rassemblement Wallon (Walloon Rally)	1968-81
Finland		
	Svenske Folkpartiet (Swedish People's Party)	1951-95
France		
Brittany	Union Democratique Bretonne (Breton Democratic Union)	1986
Corsica	Union di u populu corsu (Union of Corsican People)	1986
Italy		
Northern Italy	Lega Nord, including liga veneta and Lega Lombarda (Northern League)	1983-96
Sardinia	Partido Sardo d'Azione (Party of Sardinia)	1983-87, 1996
Trieste	Associazione per Trieste (Association for Trieste)	1979-83
Southern Italy	Lega d'azione meridionale (League for Southern Action)	1996
South Tyrol	Südtiroler Volkspartie (South Tyrol People's Party)	1953-92
Valle d'Aoste	Union Valdotaïne (Valdostian Union)	1958-63, 1972-87, 1994-96
Spain		
Andalucía	Partido Andalucista and Partido Socialista de Andalusia (Andalusian Party)	1979, 1989, 1996
Basque Country	Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party)	1977-96
	Eusko Alkartasuna and Euskal Ezkerra (People's Unity Herri Batasuna (Basque Solidarity)	1989-96 1979-96
Canaries	Coalición Canaria (Canarian Coalition)	1986-96
	Union del Pueblo Canario (Union of Canarian People)	1979
Catalonia	Convergència i Unió, including Pacte Democratic per Catalunya & Unió del Centre i la Democracia Cristiana de Cataluna (Convergence and Union)	1977-96
	Coalición electoral esquerra de Cataluna (Electoral Coalition of Left in Catalonia)	1977
	Ezquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia)	1979-82, 1993-96
Galicia	Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (Galician Nationalist Bloc)	1996
Aragon	Chunta aragonesista (Aragonese League)	1996
	Partido Aragonés Regionalista (Aragonese Regionalist Party)	1979, 1986-93

Continued on next page

Appendix A. (continued from previous page)

Region	Political Parties (English label)	Contested Elections
Spain (continued)		
Navarre	Union del pueblo navarro (Union of the Navarrese People)	1979
	Convergencia demócratas de Navarra (Democratic Convergence of Navarre)	1996
Valencia	Union valenciana (Valencian Union)	1986-96
United Kingdom		
Northern Ireland	Social Democratic and Labour Party	1974-97
Ireland	Irish Independence Party	1979
	Nationalists (and Independent nationalists)	1951, 1966
	Republican Labour	1964, 1970
	Republicans and Republican Clubs	1950, 1964-66, 1974-79
	Sinn Féin	1950, 1955-59, 1983-97
Scotland	Scottish National Party	1950-97
	Scottish Labour Party	1979
	Scottish Militant Labour	1992
	Scottish Socialist Alliance	1997
Wales	Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales)	1950-97
	Mudiad Gweriniaethol Cymru (Welsh Republican Movement)	1950

Note: The list of regionalist parties is based on de Winter and Türsan (1998), Caramani (2000), and Pereira, Villodres and Nieto (2003). Included in my dataset are any parties on these lists for which district-level election data was collected by Caramani. 1997 was the last election year included in the Caramani dataset. Several parties were later incorporated into other regionalist parties or competed as part of a coalition. These parties are also included, bringing the total to fifty-seven.

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Table 1: Observations with Regionalist Political Parties

Country	# of Regions	# of Elections	Total Observations	Observations with Regionalist Parties
Austria	9	14	126	0
Belgium	3	15	45	38
Denmark	15	20	292	0
Finland	6	13	78	39
France	22	13	286	4
Germany	16	13	147	0
Greece	13	9	117	0
Ireland	2	15	30	0
Italy	20	12	240	83
Netherlands	12	14	158	0
Portugal	7	9	63	0
Spain	17	7	119	41
Sweden	21	16	336	0
United Kingdom	12	14	168	42
EU14 total	175	184	2205	247

Table 2: Group Differences

	Regionalist Party Incidence	
	No	Yes
EU Index	0.94	1.39
Language Difference	0.14	0.38
Observations	1,958	247

Table 3: Probit (BKT) Regression of Regionalist Party Incidence

Variable	b	(S.E.)
EU Index	0.320***	(0.076)
Language Difference	2.558***	(0.628)
Party Accommodation	0.009	(0.015)
Party Divergence	-0.009*	(0.004)
Proportional Representation	0.576	(0.367)
Regional Governance Index	0.469***	(0.103)
Regional Governance Index ²	-0.064***	(0.013)
Elections Since Last Incidence	-0.995***	(0.236)
Spline 1	-0.049	(0.043)
Spline 2	-0.042	(0.030)
Spline 3	0.057*	(0.024)
Constant	-1.661***	(0.459)
N	2205	
Pseudo R^2	0.571	

Note: Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with robust Huber-White standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses. * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Table 4: Robustness Tests, By Different EU Specifications

EU Measure	Coefficient
1 EU Index	0.320***
2 EU Dummy	0.884***
3 Supranational Governance Index	2.752***
4 Treaty of Rome	0.556***
Single European Act	1.451***
Treaty of EU	0.639***

Note: Robustness tests based on same model specification as Table 3, using different measures for the EU variable. * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Table 5: OLS Regression of Regionalist Party Electoral Success

Variable	b	(S.E.)
EU Index	3.186***	(0.849)
Language Difference	11.737***	(2.113)
Party Accommodation	-0.023	(0.190)
Decentralization	-3.856**	(1.368)
Decentralization ²	0.490**	(0.185)
Other Regionalist Parties	-2.507**	(0.801)
Turnout	-0.114	(0.079)
Size (sq miles)	0.001***	(0.0003)
Party Age	-0.007	(0.017)
Fifties	6.006	(3.235)
Sixties	5.795**	(2.928)
Seventies	9.942***	(2.668)
Eighties	2.689	(2.038)
Belgium	-6.010	(3.820)
France	-16.614***	(5.074)
Italy	-0.279	(4.400)
Spain	-11.831**	(4.259)
UK	-5.375	(4.010)
Constant	18.643	(9.532)
N	2623	
Adjusted R^2	0.082	

Note: Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.




Figure 1: Observations with Regionalist Political Parties, By Decade




Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Regionalist Party Incidence, By European Integration and Language Difference