

# Strange Bedfellows: Public Support for the EU Among Regionalists

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## Abstract

Public support for independence in Scotland reached 51% in recent polls, its highest post-devolution level. Meanwhile, Scottish public support for European integration increased 25% between 1979 and 1997 while support among all Europeans dropped nearly 14% during that time period. In this paper, I evaluate whether these two trends are theoretically and empirically linked. Extending beyond the Scottish example, I test whether other western European citizens with regionalist, or sub-state nationalist, attachments perceive the European Union (EU) as an ally in their struggle with the center. Using Eurobarometer and expert surveys, I assess the views of regionalist parties and partisans and I find that regionalists are pro-EU. Then, using the Scottish devolution referenda in 1979 and 1997, I show that European integration, particularly the Scottish National Party's successful framing of the EU as a mechanism to reduce the costs of secession, contributed to the dramatic increase in support for independence in the 1997 referendum. It appears that these strange bedfellows, sub-national and supra-national regionalists, provide a convenient if unusual alliance.

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# 1 Introduction

Between 1979 and 1997, Scottish public support for European integration increased by 25% (Miller and Brand 1981; Jowell, Heath and Curtice 1998), while support for European integration among all Europeans dropped nearly 14% (Schmitt and Scholz 2005). At the same time, Scottish public support for independence also increased dramatically, from 6.9% in 1979 to 34.3% in 1997. In addition, as early as 1997, a majority of Scottish citizens thought Scotland would be completely independent within twenty years (Brown, McCrone and Patterson 1999, 147). While the European Union (EU) deepens, the United Kingdom itself seems ever more likely to fragment, or, at the very least, devolve further.

Are these two trends linked? Regionalists, resentful of centralization and threats of homogenization, could either perceive a deeper European Union as yet another threat to their culture or as an ally in their broader bargaining game with the state. If regionalists view the EU as a threat, then they should be skeptical of European integration, especially regarding political integration.<sup>1</sup> I argue that sub-state nationalists more often view the EU as an ally, in large part by diminishing the advantages of incorporation in a large, multi-national state. By this logic, sub-state nationalists should not only be supportive of the EU project, but they should also find autonomy itself, whether devolution or independence, a more viable and plausible prospect within a deeper European Union. In this paper, I first test these competing logics and find that regionalists in western Europe are Europhiles. Then, I analyze the Scottish case in more detail, and find that perceptions of Europe, and Scotland's role in it, play an important role in the evolving attitudes toward devolution and independence.

Extending from Gabel's initial work on public support for European integration (Gabel 1998*a*, *b*) to ever more intricate models (Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Ray 2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Gabel and Scheve 2007*a*, *b*), scholars find that economic interest drives public opinion on European integration. Recently, though, scholars have focused more attention on identity to explain support for the EU (Carey 2002; McLaren 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005, 2009). This literature tends to focus on conceptions of national or state identity, with little or no emphasis on sub-state, or

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<sup>1</sup>In this paper, I focus on movements within a state that seek greater autonomy, either in cultural terms, like language rights, or in constitutional terms, such as formal devolution or even independence. As a group, these movements go by many names, including sub-state nationalist, regionalist, and autonomist. For this paper, I use the regionalist term to follow the literature (See, for example, de Winter and Türsan (1998)).

regional, identity; thus, this paper's focus on sub-state identities supplements this literature.

Due to data limitations on regional identity questions in surveys, I both directly and indirectly evaluate whether regionalists are pro-European. In addition to using respondents' intention to vote for regionalist party as an explanatory variable for EU support, I take advantage of a sophisticated literature that evaluates whether elite cues drive public opinion on European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007; Gabel and Scheve 2007*a, b*; De Vries and Edwards 2009). After dealing with the obvious endogeneity issues between public and elite attitudes, these studies demonstrate that parties and elites do cue their supporters with either elite Euroskepticism or support. In earlier work (Jolly 2007), I demonstrated that, on average, the regionalist party family is pro-European and, further, regionalist parties use the EU rhetorically to strengthen their case for independence or greater autonomy. Hence, I leverage these earlier findings to evaluate the effectiveness of these cues on attitudes toward the European Union.

In many ways, this research fits neatly in Hooghe and Marks' Post-Functional Theory of Integration (2009). They argue that European integration is increasingly politicized and that political party and public attitudes toward the European Union are crucial for Europeanization. Among others, they argue that this contestation over Europe is shaped by identity, in particular whether individuals hold inclusive or exclusive conceptions of national identity (Hooghe and Marks 2009). By showing that regionalist partisans (and parties) are, on average, pro-EU, this paper bolsters their finding, suggesting that the EU may find allies precisely among those groups that are commonly seen as opponents of centralization.

Next, I use the Scottish case to test the second observable implication of the theory: regionalists should find regional autonomy, even independence, more viable in a deeper European Union than in autarky. The devolution referenda in Scotland in two distinct time periods provides a unique opportunity to compare attitudes and actions regarding devolution and independence. In the first referendum, a slight majority voted for devolution but the margin was not enough to overcome the electoral threshold set by Westminster. In 1997, though, the result was overwhelmingly pro-devolution. In the ethnic politics literature, cultural heterogeneity is the leading explanation of regionalist or autonomy movement support. But in the Scottish case, that factor is held constant over time. Supranational integration, however, is not. With public opinion surveys from each referendum available, I show that the devolution referendum succeeded in 1997 precisely because

Scots find an independent Scotland a more viable prospect. Following the logic of the size of states argument, and the elite cueing literature, I argue that deeper European integration is responsible for revised Scottish attitudes toward independence, and therefore, a positive outcome in the devolution referendum.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, I introduce the size of states theory that explains why European integration encourages support for independence among regionalist citizens, and therefore increase support for European integration among regionalists. Second, I analyze public support for European integration using the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File (Schmitt and Scholz 2005). In the final section, using data from the 1979 Scottish Election Study and the 1997 Scottish Referendum Study (Miller and Brand 1981; Jowell, Heath and Curtice 1998), I demonstrate that voters support devolution at higher rates, in terms of voting behavior, and they also have much more favorable attitudes toward independence from the United Kingdom, albeit within the European Union, in the survey data. This finding suggests that the increased viability of an independent Scotland within a deeper European Union encourages support for autonomy in Scotland.

## **2 Multi-Level Governance and Regionalist Movements**

### **2.1 European Integration and the Optimal Size of States**

Theoretically, the European Union makes smaller states more viable by diminishing the advantages of larger state size (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003; Bolton and Roland 1997). In the past, “[t]he types of arguments used against minority nationalist and regionalist demands have often centered around the impracticalities of upsetting administrative and political traditions constructed around central institutions” (Lynch 1996, 12). Thus, for regionalist political entrepreneurs, European integration increases the credibility of demands for greater autonomy and therefore individual support for self-government.

Following Alesina and Spolaore’s size of nations argument (1997, 2003), I argue that the European Union decreases sub-national dependency on the nation-state in both economic (e.g. international trade and monetary policy) and political terms (e.g. defense, foreign policy, and minority rights). In other words, the European Union system of multi-level governance increases the viability of smaller states, thereby creating additional incentive for citizens to support devolution or even

independence. For economists, the theoretical result is a smaller optimal size of states in Europe under the umbrella of the European Union and a system of free(er) trade (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Alesina and Wacziarg 1998; Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg 2000; Wittman 2000; Casella and Feinstein 2002; Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Thus far, though, many of the empirical implications of these theoretical models have remained largely untested.

According to Alesina and Spolaore, the optimal size of a state “emerges from a trade-off between the benefits of scale and the costs of heterogeneity in the population” (2003, 175). Via membership in the European Union, the advantages of large states vis-à-vis small states are diminished.<sup>2</sup> But the key cost of a larger state, namely heterogeneity of preferences, remains. Political economists find that economic growth and public policies suffer with greater ethnic heterogeneity (Easterly and Levine 1997). A government of a homogeneous population tends to be more successful at public policies because the day-to-day lives of the people are more similar (Tilly 1975, 79), while larger, more heterogeneous, states are less efficient at public good provision (Bolton, Roland and Spolaore 1996, 701). Due to this comparative advantage, European regions may see themselves as more capable of providing sustained economic growth than the traditional nation-states (Newhouse 1997, 69), yielding political separatism as an unintended consequence of economic integration (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 1079).

Though not explicitly modeled, the size of states theory hinges on rational behavior by two sets of actors, regionalist political elites and citizens. Regionalist political elites must perceive the changing political opportunity structure and support European integration, in part as an ally against the central state. Using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data for 1984-2002, Jolly (2007) showed that the regionalist party family is surprisingly and consistently pro-Europe. Drawing on the CHES data, Figure 1 replicates one of the summary findings of that study. As shown in Figure 1, regionalist parties send a positive signal to voters regarding European integration, particularly when compared with other niche party families.

Their attitudes are similar to mainstream families, such as the Socialist or Liberal party families, as opposed to the Euroskeptic attitudes common to other fringe party families, such as the Radical

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<sup>2</sup>In historical terms, several factors encouraged economically larger states (Alesina and Spolaore 2003), including economic market size, economies of scale for public goods, insurance against asymmetric regional economic shocks, and security. For each of these factors, the EU has reduced—though certainly not eliminated—the advantage of large states vis-à-vis small states. See Alesina and Spolaore (2003) or Jolly (2006) for more on this model.




Figure 1: Support for the European Union, by party family

Right or Left. Certainly, some notable exceptions exist. For instance, Liang (2007) discusses the hard Euroskepticism of the Vlaams Blok and the relatively soft Euroskepticism of the Lega Nord (i.e. not anti-Europe per se, but not supportive of the direction the EU is going). Further, the regionalist party support for the EU is not naive or inflexible, but rather tactical or even cyclical (Hepburn 2007, 2008). The Scottish National Party, for instance, held negative attitudes towards the EU in the 1970s, only shifting in the 1980s (Jolly 2007; Hepburn 2008).<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, the CHES data show the standard deviation of the family’s attitude towards Europe is smaller than nearly all other party families, implying a relatively coherent party family, at least on this issue. In comparison, the excellent volume edited by de Winter, Gómez-Reino and Lynch (2006) makes the diversity of the regionalist party family on many other issues and goals abundantly clear.

More than just pro-European attitudes, though, the regionalist parties tend to use rhetoric that supports the causal mechanism proposed in this article. In tracing the official party positions of the Scottish National Party, in particular, Jolly (2007) finds that European integration becomes

<sup>3</sup>As discussed in Hepburn (2007, 2008), regionalist attitudes toward the EU may be cyclical, and may in fact currently be in a less pro-Europe part of the cycle. However, given that the Mannheim Eurobarometer data ends in 2002, this shift does not affect the analysis in this article.

an integral component in their strategy and rhetoric for independence. Similarly, the Plaid Cymru in Wales remained hostile to the EU until party elites realized the EU could “serve as a wedge between Wales and the controlling authorities in London,” which in turn increased the viability of Plaid Cymru’s autonomist goals (Van Morgan 2006, 277).

In addition to elites, citizens must perceive that European integration changes the political opportunity structure in favor of sub-state regions. If so, then public opinion among regionalist supporters should also be in favor of European integration. In addition to the size of states argument, Hooghe and Marks’ Postfunctional Theory also predicts that individuals with non-exclusive national identities (i.e. regional identities) will be more supportive of European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005, 2009). Generally, then, I expect that respondents with regionalist identity will be pro-EU.

Unfortunately, while the Eurobarometer is a valuable resource, it does present some problems for this analysis. The Eurobarometer includes a very small number of regionalist supporters in 2000 ( $N = 388/32,145$  or 1.21%). In addition, there are few questions regarding sub-state identification available, which restricts a more direct test of the theory in the cross-sectional time-series. As an alternative observable implication, therefore, I focus on party cues. By testing for an effect of party cues on support for European integration, I can indirectly test a critical link in the theory, namely that citizens catch the pro-EU signals of regionalist elites.

## 2.2 Analysis

With evidence from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File (Schmitt and Scholz 2005), which tracks public opinion in the EU from 1970-2002, and the 1996 and 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Ray 1999; Steenbergen and Marks 2007), I begin to address this question. In this section, I focus on two questions: whether regionalists, or sub-state nationalists, are pro-EU and whether respondents’ public attitudes match their party elites’ cues.

As Matt Gabel points out, public attitudes are an ever-increasing constraint on the European integration project (Gabel 1998a, 333); thus, it is not surprising to find a large and growing literature on the subject (Gabel 1998b; McLaren 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2005). This prior literature provides a starting point for the current analysis of public attitudes toward European integration. Replicating Gabel (1998a), I extend the baseline model by adding whether

respondents are regionalist party supporters.<sup>4</sup> Based on the viability theory and the Scottish evidence, I expect to find that regionalist party supporters, *ceteris paribus*, are more likely to support the European Union.

In the first test of this hypothesis, I utilize Eurobarometer data from 2000, the most recent data in the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File for which respondents answer party affiliation and the classic EU support question: is the EU a good thing or a bad thing?<sup>5</sup> Similar to McLaren (2002), the other variables and controls simply replicate the Gabel model (1998a) and provide a starting point to analyze regionalist sentiment towards the EU.<sup>6</sup> Table 1 provides the results of this model.

Briefly, what is apparent from the replication is the robustness of the original model. Nearly every variable matches the original results in sign and significance. Of particular importance are the occupational, skill, and income variables. In short, higher skilled, better positioned citizens are more likely to support European integration in 2000, just as they were from 1973-1992 in the original model (Gabel 1998b). With new data, this replication provides further evidence in favor of the robustness of the economic interest explanation.

The two party variables warrant closer attention. First, the positive and significant party cue variable suggests that when parties are supportive of the EU, their supporters follow that cue. This variable matches a voter's party intention with the chosen party's position on the EU. In general, then, if the respondent's party supports the EU, then the variable will have a positive value. Since regionalist parties are Europhiles, and in fact, utilize the viability logic to bolster their own credibility while encouraging support of the European project, this variable indicates that regionalist party supporters are more likely to support the EU than any of the other fringe party supporters, such as Radical Right, Green, or Radical Left. Alternatively, if the regionalist parties

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<sup>4</sup>Intention to vote for a regionalist party is simply a proxy for regionalist or sub-state nationalist sentiment. Though not perfect, it provides a cross-temporal and cross-sectional measure of identification with a regionalist organization.

<sup>5</sup>See Brinegar and Jolly (2004) or Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt (2004) for further discussion of this dependent variable. Perfect, it is not. However, it is largely correlated with other systematic measures of support for European integration (Gabel 1998a). Further, it is the only measure collected consistently through the time series.

<sup>6</sup>In addition to the regionalist party variable, three other exceptions to a perfect replication stand out. The materialism/postmaterialism questions used in the Gabel model are not collected consistently after 1992, the end date of his study. Therefore, I exclude these out of necessity, but even in the original model, they are fairly weak, in terms of statistical significance and magnitude. Second, the border variable used in Gabel's original study is not available. Finally, rather than the simple, support proletariat/bourgeois/governing party dummy variables, I use a party cue variable developed in Brinegar and Jolly (2005), which matches a respondent's vote intentions with their party's EU position, drawn from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey data (Ray 1999; Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007). For this paper, this revised variable better captures the theoretical justification for party cues.

Table 1: OLS Regression of EU Support in 2000

Variable	$b$	(S.E.)
Discuss politics never	-4.722***	(0.441)
Discuss politics frequently	1.979**	(0.587)
Professional	5.974***	(1.210)
Executive	6.568***	(0.798)
Manual Laborer	-1.810**	(0.733)
Unemployed	-2.016*	(0.891)
Low education	-4.155***	(0.587)
High-mid education	2.817***	(0.650)
High education	5.664***	(0.557)
Low income	-2.631***	(0.560)
Hi-mid income	3.125***	(0.537)
Hi income	5.088***	(0.520)
Party cue	17.908***	(1.242)
Regionalist Party	4.401**	(1.746)
Female	-2.336***	(0.406)
Retired	1.635*	(0.742)
Small business owner	0.717	(0.897)
Farmer	-1.785	(1.621)
Student	7.281***	(0.755)
Housewife	1.185	(0.723)
Age	-0.078***	(0.017)
Country dummies	included	
Constant	44.506***	(1.407)
N	32,145	
Adjusted $R^2$	0.1371	

*Note:* Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

\* $p \leq 0.05$ , \*\* $p \leq 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ .




Figure 2: Party Cue Coefficient, Over Time

become more Euroskeptical, then pro-EU forces will lose an important ally.

Also included is a simply dummy variable, measuring 1 if the respondent intends to vote for a regionalist party in the next election. This variable is also statistically significant and positive, again suggesting that regionalist party supporters hold more positive attitudes about the EU than their fellow citizens. In the next section, I evaluate this conclusion more fully within the Scottish case.

Nevertheless, the number of self-identified regionalist supporters is small. Therefore, I turn to the larger time series available in the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend file, starting in 1984 to match the CHES data. As the 2000 regression suggests, I expect party cue to be significant across time in the larger dataset. I reran the model from Table 1, separately for each year of the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File. This alternative to standard time series regression was inspired by Andrew Gelman’s discussion of a secret weapon to consider the changing effect of variables over time (Gelman 2005).<sup>7</sup> In doing so, I find that the party cue coefficient is statistically significant throughout the time series, and has a powerful effect on the dependent variable. Figure 2 represents the size of the coefficient for each year’s model, with a 95% confidence interval.

Figure 2 is striking for two reasons tangential to this paper. First, despite the common per-

<sup>7</sup>Each individual regression is available upon request of the author, as are the Stata do-files.

ception that parties have lost much of their influence in western Europe during this period, their attitudes toward the EU continue to have a powerful effect on their supporter's attitudes.<sup>8</sup> Second, there is interesting variation in the magnitude of this variable, with parties have more influence over voters during the 1980s than in the 1990s. Both observations warrant more research.

But for the purposes of this article, Figure 2 demonstrates that party cues have a significant and powerful effect, throughout the period. Given the knowledge that regionalist parties are pro-EU, on average, this finding suggests that regionalists throughout western Europe are likely to be pro-EU as well. As noted above, though, where exceptions exist, or if regionalist parties change tactics to Euroskepticism, this positive effect will vanish. In the next section, I turn to the Scottish case, to test these results for validity.

### 3 Scotland

Theoretically, the revised political opportunity structure should affect attitudes toward independence within Scotland. An observable implication of the optimal size of states logic is that citizens perceive greater viability of an independent small country within the European Union than outside. In 1979, not only was European integration itself at a less developed stage, but the Scottish National Party did not yet see the EU as a potential partner in making its case for independence. By 1997, the Scottish National Party framed the EU as an integral component of its "Independence in Europe" policy (Jolly 2007). In part, Scottish National Party elites intended this strategy to demonstrate that Scotland would be a viable independent country apart from the United Kingdom. If this viability mechanism is at work, I should find evidence in multiple observable implications.

First, Scottish respondents should be more likely to support European integration. Scottish National Party elites frame the European Union as a mechanism to achieve independence without economic upheaval (Jolly 2006). In other words, European integration increases the viability of Scotland as an independent country. Thus, nationalists should perceive the European Union more positively in 1997 than in 1979. Using data from the 1979 and 1997 Scottish Referendum Surveys

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<sup>8</sup>As a discussant at the 2008 Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting pointed out, there are at least two plausible alternative explanations. First, rather than parties cueing voters, parties could simply be pandering to the public by choosing policies they support (or oppose). Second, voter preferences on European integration could drive their partisan preferences. However, recent work, using statistical tools designed to test for this type of endogeneity, suggests that there is an effect of elite cues on partisan attitudes (Gabel and Scheve 2007 *a, b*; Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007; De Vries and Edwards 2009)

(Miller and Brand 1981; Jowell, Heath and Curtice 1998), Table 2 provides some simple statistics regarding attitudes toward the EU.<sup>9</sup>

Table 2: Scottish Perceptions of European Union as a Good Thing

Year	Conservative	Labour	SNP	Liberal	All
1979	29.29%	15.97%	12.66%	25.33%	21.12%
1997	49.59%	43.75%	47.54%	50.98%	45.86%
Change	+20.30%	+27.78%	+34.88%	+25.65%	+24.74%

Across party types, Scottish citizens have far more favorable attitudes toward the EU in 1997 than 1979. In contrast, support for European integration among all Europeans dropped nearly 12% during the same timeframe (Schmitt and Scholz 2005).<sup>10</sup> In particular, regionalists are much more favorably disposed to European integration. Only 13% of Scottish National Party supporters thought the European Union was a ‘good thing’ in 1979, but 48% did so in 1997.<sup>11</sup> This trend follows the rhetoric of the Scottish National Party, which shifted from being anti-integration to supporting the European Union specifically as a lever against the United Kingdom, and suggests the citizens caught the cue sent by party elites.

Second, support for independence should be related to European integration. Dardanelli (2005*b*, 328) argues that attitudes toward the European Union actually determine perceived costs of secession. Certainly, Scottish National Party officials used the European Union to diminish fears of economic displacement associated with independence (Harvie and Jones 2000, 152; Pittock 2001, 127). In other words, deeper European integration implies lower costs of secession (i.e. increased viability of independence), thereby making both independence and devolution more attractive options.

<sup>9</sup>For 1979, 729 respondents are included. The breakdown by party is 239 Conservatives, 288 Labour, 79 SNP, and 75 Liberal. For 1997, the total *N* is 676, with 123 Conservatives, 336 Labour, 122 SNP, and 51 Liberal Democrats.

<sup>10</sup>According to the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, which compiles and standardizes the many individual Eurobarometer surveys, approximately 58% of Europeans surveyed thought the EU was a ‘good thing’ in 1979 (58.9% in Eurobarometer 11 and 57.9% in Eurobarometer 12), while 50% or fewer respondents thought it was a ‘good thing’ in 1997 (48.2% in Eurobarometer 47, 48.6% in EB 47.1, 47.2% in EB47.2, and 50.8% in EB48) (Schmitt and Scholz 2005).

<sup>11</sup>In 1997, the survey asked the standard Eurobarometer question about European integration that is commonly used in analysis of support for European integration (Gabel 1998*b*; Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt 2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2005): whether the respondent thinks the EU is a ‘good thing,’ a ‘bad thing,’ or neither. In 1979, the survey asked respondents to score the Common Market on a ten-point scale [v467]. Following Dardanelli (2005*b*), I standardized this variable to compare to the 1997 version by grouping 0-3 as bad for Scotland, 4-6 as neither good nor bad, and 7-10 as good for Scotland.

In the following pages, I will demonstrate that it is the “Independence in Europe” option that drives the increased support for independence. Many fewer respondents prefer independence outside of Europe to independence in Europe as their first or second option. The existence of the EU as an alternative political opportunity structure allows citizens to favor independence much more strongly, either as a first or second option. By convincing its supporters that the European Union was a ‘good thing,’ the Scottish National Party shifted the debate over self-government itself, making independence a more reasonable option and increasing support for devolution in the referendum in the process (Dardanelli 2001, 14).

Two related empirical implications present themselves. First, I expect to see more Scottish citizens view independence as a viable option in 1997 than in 1979. Second, the distribution of supporters should change, as well, with the middle class, or those most concerned about potential economic upheaval due to independence, more likely to support devolution in the context of a more viable Scotland.

## 4 The Scottish Referenda on Devolution

Scotland presents a unique opportunity to test the main alternative causal mechanisms. First, Scotland is a region in Western Europe with a long and rich tradition of a regional autonomy movement. Second, the referenda on devolution at two different points in time provide an opportunity to analyze both attitudes toward autonomy and how those attitudes are translated into votes on devolution, as well as their change over time. Comparing the failed referendum in 1979 to the successful 1997 vote yields variation in both the dependent variable and the explanatory variable of interest (Dardanelli 2001, 2). Finally, the questions available in the 1979 and 1997 surveys allow exploration of the European Union’s role in determining attitudes toward self-government.

In both 1979 and 1997, the Labour party introduced a referendum for Scottish citizens to decide whether to establish a Scottish Parliament. While a majority of voters supported devolution in both referenda, it failed in 1979 due to the “Cunningham amendment,” which stipulated that devolution must not only achieve a majority of support among voters but also meet at least a 40% threshold of the entire potential electorate (Harvie and Jones 2000, 115). In other words, abstention served

as a de facto ‘No’ vote.<sup>12</sup> As a result of the threshold, the referendum failed in 1979 and, after the Conservatives won that year’s general election, the government promptly removed devolution from the agenda.

During the 1997 general election campaign, Labour, under Tony Blair, promised another referendum on devolution.<sup>13</sup> The 1997 version of the devolution referendum passed by large majorities in every district in Scotland (Taylor, Curtice and Thomson 1999, xxvii). Considering that during both years Scottish citizens claimed to support devolution, the positive outcome of the devolution referendum in 1997 compared to the negative outcome in 1979 yields a puzzle. In the next section, I consider the alternative explanations for the different outcomes and then explain why the European Union is a significant factor.

## 5 Similar Preferences, Different Outcomes?

Since at least 1947, a majority of Scots have consistently supported devolution in opinion polls.<sup>14</sup> In 1979, 61% of respondents, a clear majority, in the Scottish Election Survey supported self-government, with 54.1% in favor of devolution and 6.9% supporting independence (Miller and Brand 1981). Yet, despite this consistent support of devolution in theory, a plurality of respondents in that same poll either voted ‘No’ or favored the ‘No’ position, with 44.7% against the referendum and only 38.1% in favor.

By 1997, this disconnect between attitudes and action virtually disappeared, yielding a near consensus on the devolution referendum questions (SurrIDGE and McCrone 1999, 44). What explanations might account for this disconnect in 1979? Paolo Dardanelli introduces several explana-

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<sup>12</sup>This poison pill, “a brilliant act of anti-democratic political manipulation” (Mitchell 1996, 47), influenced the outcome of the referendum as well as perceptions about the outcome. When newspapers referenced the vote, they gave the result as percentages of the electorate and not actual voters. So instead of a 52%–48% outcome in favor of devolution, it appeared that only one-third of Scots supported devolution (Pittock 2001, 123). Indeed, even Scottish voters saw the result as indicative of a negative result (Mitchell 1996, 46-47).

<sup>13</sup>Labour supported a referendum rather than simply legislating devolution for multiple reasons. Uncertain of their eventual Parliamentary majority from the 1997 general election, they feared a difficult parliamentary battle over devolution as they faced in the 1970s. Also, a referendum could secure decentralization in the face of future Tory governments. Presumably, if devolution were granted after a referendum, then only a referendum could reverse the decision (Taylor, Curtice and Thomson 1999, xxv-xxvi). Labour also used the referendum to avoid association with the potential higher taxes of a Scottish Parliament, the so-called Tartan tax. The two-part referendum asked voters to first choose whether to support a Scottish Parliament and then decide whether the Parliament should have tax-varying authority.

<sup>14</sup>In a 1947 survey, over three-quarters of Scots supported a Scottish parliament. In 1949, a Scottish Plebiscite Society poll in Kirriemuir in Angus found that 23% were in favor of an independent Parliament, 69% supported a Parliament to deal with Scottish affairs, and only 5% favored the status quo (Mitchell 1996, 149).

tions prevalent in the literature (2005, 321-3). First, the actual content of the devolution package was more contentious in 1979, with the First-Past-The-Post electoral system perceived as heavily Labour-biased (Harvie and Jones 2000, 186). The observable implications of the Labour bias logic are that non-Labour party supporters would be expected to be anti-devolution while Labour party supporters would be supportive (Dardanelli 2005*b*, 322). But in fact, apart from Tory supporters, who were strongly anti-devolution in each referendum, Liberal Democrats were just slightly less supportive of devolution than Labour supporters while SNP supporters were much more favorable. Also, Labour supporters themselves were split, with a plurality—not a majority—in favor of devolution. The evidence casts doubt on this explanation

Second, many scholars point to Scotland’s increasingly strong sense of being a perpetual political minority in the United Kingdom as the reason devolution gained support from 1979 to 1997 (McCrone and Lewis 1999, 18). Basically, Scotland voted for Labour in every general election from 1979 to 1992, but the Conservatives won in the rest of the United Kingdom and therefore governed, leaving Scottish voters feeling disenfranchised and the Conservatives increasingly unpopular in Scotland (Mitchell et al. 1998, 178; Taylor, Curtice and Thomson 1999, xxiv). These anti-Tory sentiments could potentially fuel pro-devolution sentiment. If true, then Scots, especially non-Conservatives, should be less satisfied with the United Kingdom and devolution should be a higher priority for citizens. But Scottish nationalists are actually more satisfied in 1997 than 1979 and the issue of self-government is no more or less salient, suggesting this hypothesis is not sufficient either (Dardanelli 2005*b*, 323).

The third main explanation is the incoherence and ineffectiveness of the pro-devolution campaign. In 1979, the political parties, especially Labour, sent mixed signals to the electorate, with a faction of the Labour party opposing the referendum with a “Labour Vote NO” campaign (Denver 2002, 830). Also, little cross-party coordination existed among the ‘Yes’ campaign, with as many divisions among the pro-devolution parties as between them and the anti-devolution campaign. A Labour party official disdainfully stated that Labour would not be “soiling our hands by joining any umbrella Yes group” (Mitchell et al. 1998, 167). In all, the ‘No’ campaign in 1979 was more effective in terms of funding, coordination, and campaigning than the ‘Yes’ campaign (Mitchell 1996, 163).

In 1997, on the other hand, the pro-devolution parties, Labour, Liberal Democrats, and the

Scottish National Party, supported a double ‘Yes’—for a Scottish Parliament and for tax-varying authority—and coordinated their campaign as “Scotland FORward” (McCrone and Lewis 1999, 24). In doing so, they sent clearer messages to their party supporters as to their constitutional preferences. In the 1997 campaign, 90% of Labour party and 86% of Scottish National Party supporters knew their party favored devolution (Denver 2002, 830). The pro-devolution campaign also successfully convinced businesses that devolution was not a threat to their livelihood, undercutting a major supporter of the ‘No’ campaign in 1979 (Mitchell et al. 1998, 175). This change, detailed in Dardanelli (2005*a*), is yet more evidence that business interests no longer feared an independent Scotland as they did in the late 1970s, in part due to the “Independence in Europe” option.

Finally, the ‘Think Twice’ campaign against devolution, led by the Conservative party, lacked sufficient resources or supporters to oppose the devolution referendum (Mitchell et al. 1998, 174). Thus, the strength and coordination of the campaigns clearly shifted in favor of a ‘Yes’ vote. Nonetheless, this explanation still has some difficulty explaining why so many Scots voted against devolution even though they favored the concept in surveys (Dardanelli 2005*b*, 323).

This gap between supporters of devolution in theory and practice in 1979 is stark and demands explanation. In 1979, 61% claimed to support self-government but only 39% either voted for or favored the devolution referendum. Dardanelli (2001, 2005*a*) argues that preference orderings are the key to understanding this gap between expected and actual behavior in the failed referendum vote of 1979.

Whereas attitudes about devolution, independence and the status quo can be kept conceptually distinct in surveys, the preference ordering actually affected voting behavior (Dardanelli 2005*b*, 326). For instance, if a citizen preferred devolution to the status quo, then observers would expect that citizen to vote for the referendum. But if that citizen preferred the status quo to independence, and expected independence to be a likely outcome of devolution, then the citizen would be more likely to oppose the referendum. In other words, if citizens perceive a high probability of devolution leading to independence, then the referendum vote appears to be a choice between the status quo and independence rather than status quo and devolution (Dardanelli 2001, 10). And voters in both referenda thought that independence was a likely outcome of devolution (Dardanelli 2005*b*, 326). This perception provided reason for citizens with this preference ordering to strategically oppose rather than sincerely support the referendum.

To determine the distribution of voter preferences I reconstructed the preference orderings in Table 3 using a series of questions in the 1979 survey which asks respondents to rank each constitutional option from highly unfavorable to very much in favor.<sup>15</sup>

Table 3: Preference Ordering on Devolution in 1979

1st Preference	2nd Preference				(N)
	Status Quo	Devolution	Independence	Don't Know	
Status Quo	-	78.3%	0.0%	21.7%	(189)
Devolution	59.4%	-	25.1%	15.5%	(394)
Independence	4.0%	80.0%	-	16.0%	(50)
(N)	(236)	(188)	(99)	(206)	

Not surprisingly, Scottish voters who favored the status quo preferred devolution as their second best alternative. Similarly, nationalist Scots, or those who chose independence as their first preference, much preferred devolution to the status quo. These preference orderings yield little explanatory power, though, for respondents in both categories are strongly in their respective camps regardless of their second preference.

But as Dardanelli (2001, 9) contends, for devolution supporters, the second preference may be critical in determining behavior on the referendum. Devolution supporters who consider independence their second best preference should be supportive of the referendum because even if independence is a likely outcome of devolution, it is preferable to the status quo. But Table 3 shows that only 25% of the devolution supporters share this preference ordering. By contrast, devolution supporters who fear independence and favor the status quo over independence should be more skeptical of the referendum (Dardanelli 2005a, Ch. 4). Nearly 60% of Scottish devolution supporters consider the status quo to be their second-best option.

More significantly, those devolution supporters who favored the status quo over independence were actually slightly opposed to the referendum, with 50% voting against the referendum compared

<sup>15</sup>See Appendix A for question wording. To extract a preference ordering for 1979, I used the attitude toward devolution question above to determine first preference then turned to the follow-up questions [v323-v327] (Miller and Brand 1981), which asked the respondent to say whether they were very much in favor of (or against), somewhat in favor of (or somewhat against) each constitutional option. Knowing each respondent's first preference, I evaluated which constitutional option they favored second best and created an index variable for the various preference orderings. For example, if a respondent favored the status quo, I determined whether they ranked independence or devolution higher. If the respondent ranked devolution higher, then I coded them as Status Quo > Devolution > Independence. In the case of ties, I coded the respondent as don't know. Coding is available upon request.

to 45% voting in favor. Combined with the consistent opposition of status quo supporters, the divided cohort of devolution supporters contributed to the gap between expected and actual support for the referendum.<sup>16</sup>

By 1997, preference orderings shifted to a degree that the majority of citizens either favored independence as their first or second most preferred constitutional option.<sup>17</sup> Whereas devolution supporters in 1979 preferred the status quo to independence, the majority of devolution supporters preferred independence to the status quo in 1997. Excluding the alternative devolution option, for those who favor a Scottish Parliament with tax-varying authority—which comprises 78% of the devolution cohort—independence is the preferred second option. For those who favor the weaker devolution option—22% of the devolution cohort—more prefer the status quo to independence, but there are significantly fewer respondents in this category. In the end, 86% of those who favor either type of devolution either voted for or favored the referendum.

To summarize, the success of the 1997 referendum can be linked to a diminished fear of independence. This significant shift is relevant to the size of states argument. In 1979, a majority of respondents claimed to support devolution as their most preferred constitutional option, with a sizeable group favoring the status quo and a very a small minority favoring independence. By 1997, this distribution of first preferences changed dramatically. Support for the status quo and devolution decreased 7% and 11%, respectively, while support for independence increased 28%. I present this data in Table 4.

Significantly, the increase in support for independence occurs across all party groups. Only 4% of Labour party supporters favored independence in 1979 while 36% did so in 1997. For Scottish National Party supporters, independence became the most preferred option, increasing from 35% to 72%. Even 6% more Conservatives supported independence in 1997 than in 1979. Because many respondents believe independence is a likely consequence of devolution, the increased support for

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<sup>16</sup>Because the Parliament instituted the threshold on the referendum vote in 1979, abstentions acted as de facto votes against devolution. 46% of abstentions did not know their attitude toward devolution. But 40% favored the status quo as their first (16%) or second best constitutional option (24%). Only 14% favored independence as their first (4%) or second favorite option (10%). The abstentions, therefore, provide further support that those who feared independence or at least considered it their least preferred constitutional option did not support the referendum, yielding a cumulative negative vote on devolution in 1979.

<sup>17</sup>For 1997, the preference ordering was much more straightforward than in 1979 because the survey asked a follow-up question [21b] to the attitudes toward devolution question that asked respondents to list their second most preferred constitutional option (Jowell, Heath and Curtice 1998).

Table 4: Constitutional Attitudes in 1979 &amp; 1997

	1979	1997	Change
Status Quo	25.9%	18.6%	-7.3%
Self-Government	60.9%	77.1%	16.2%
<i>Devolution</i>	54.1%	42.8%	-11.3%
<i>Independence</i>	6.9%	34.3%	27.5%
<i>in EU</i>		25.6%	25.6%
<i>from EU</i>		8.7%	8.7%
Don't Know	13.2%	4.3%	-8.9%
(N)	(729)	(676)	

*Note:* The Self-Government category includes the Devolution and Independence questions.

independence as a first option significantly affected the outcome of the 1997 referendum. But this finding only raises another question: why is independence so much more popular in 1997 than 1979? I contend that European integration, and its strategic use by the Scottish National Party, plays an important role.

First, notice the disaggregated independence options in Table 4. Very little of the increased independence support arises from an autarkic, non-EU, version of independence. In fact, independence in EU, the policy espoused by the SNP, is actually more preferred than the status quo by itself. This finding suggests that citizens recognize the significant change in the political opportunity structure that the EU created.

Further, the viability theory predicts that the distribution of supporters should change as well. If independence is a more viable option economically, then capitalists in particular will be more favorably disposed to independence. For example, traditionally in the Basque country, industrialists, fearing the economic disruption that may result from independence, have been less supportive of Basque nationalism (Linz 1973; da Silva 1975, 241). But capitalists or industrialists should be more supportive of autonomy if the European Union provides more economic security than independence without such a union. Thus, I expect a new “bourgeois regionalism” should emerge in response to the changing economic context (van Houten 2003, 10). Table 5 demonstrates that such a shift

Table 5: Referendum Positions in 1979 &amp; 1997, By Group Identity

	1979			1997			Change in Yes
	Yes	No	(N)	Yes	No	(N)	
<i>Class Identity</i>							
Middle Class	29.6%	62.5%	(152)	55.8%	41.0%	(156)	26.2%
Working Class	46.5%	44.1%	(458)	77.5%	17.3%	(457)	31.0%
Other	20.2%	24.4%	(119)	65.1%	19.0%	(63)	44.9%
All	38.7%	44.7%	(729)	71.3%	22.9%	(676)	84.3%

Note: The ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ categories include respondents who either voted for or did not vote but favored that position in the referendum.

occurred in Scotland.<sup>18</sup>

A mere 30% of the middle class supported the referendum in 1979, while over 56% favored devolution in 1997. Hence, this finding provides additional evidence for the theoretical argument regarding the optimal size of states.

## 6 Discussion

Using the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend file, I established that regionalists are pro-EU, *ceteris paribus*, and that respondents’ attitudes are linked to their preferred party’s position on the EU. Then, using the 1979 Scottish Election Survey and the 1997 Scottish Referendum Study, I evaluated why the referendum failed in 1979 but passed in 1997 despite having a majority in favor of devolution in both years. Similar to Dardanelli (2005a), I contend that the fear of independence, coupled with a preference ordering where the second choice for devolution supporters was the status quo, explained the strategic voting behavior in 1979. Between 1979 and 1997, the European Union project fundamentally altered the political opportunity structure for autonomy movements, making devolution and independence a more viable prospect for regionalists. In turn, increased support for independence, as both a first and second option for Scots, fuelled the dramatic increase in sincere voting for devolution in 1997.

I also presented evidence to support the contention that European integration, especially the

<sup>18</sup>Class identity is derived from questions 62a and 62b in 1979 and 29a and 29b in 1997. For each identity question, the respondent had an option to self-identify and then, if no choice was made, a follow-up question asked the respondent which option they would choose if forced (Miller and Brand 1981; Jowell, Heath and Curtice 1998).

Scottish National Party's successful framing of the EU as a mechanism to reduce the costs of secession, contributed to this increase in support for independence. Both in the Scottish case and in western Europe, generally, regionalist supporters perceive the EU positively. Though sub-state nationalists, who want greater autonomy in one form or another, and supra-national integration supporters seem natural opponents, this research suggests they are, in fact, yet another example of the old adage: an enemy of my enemy is my friend. Strange bedfellows? Perhaps. But they are an unusual alliance that modern multi-national states, wary of secession movements, must take into greater account.

## Appendix A: Survey Questions

For 1979, I use the following questions to determine actual voting positions:

“30a. Did you vote in the recent Referendum on Devolution for Scotland?

IF YES Did you vote ‘Yes’ or ‘No’?

IF NO Did you favour the ‘Yes’ side or the ‘No’ side?” [v315]

For 1997, I use the following questions:

“6a) The questions asked in the Referendum are set out on this card. How did you vote on the first question?” [refvote]

If the respondent did not vote, the survey followed up with this question:

“7a) The questions asked in the Referendum are set out on this card. If you had voted, how would you have voted on the first question?” [nvrefvote]

For both questions, I group spoiled ballots, would not vote, refused to answer, and don’t know into the don’t know category. In Table 1 and other tables in this chapter, actual voting numbers include those who either voted for or favored (or voted against or opposed) the referendum in the ‘Yes’ (or ‘No’) category.

To determine attitudes toward devolution, I used the following question on the 1979 survey:

“3la) Here are a number of suggestions which have been made about different ways of governing Scotland. Can you tell me which one comes closest to your own view?

1. No devolution or Scottish Assembly of any sort.
2. Have Scottish Committees of the House of Commons come up to Scotland for their meetings.
3. An elected Scottish Assembly which would handle some Scottish affairs and would be responsible to Parliament at Westminster.
4. A Scottish Parliament which would handle most Scottish affairs, including many economic affairs, leaving the Westminster Parliament responsible for defence, foreign policy and international economic policy.
5. A completely independent Scotland with a Scottish Parliament.
8. DK” [v322]

Following Dardanelli (2005b), I group “No devolution” and Scottish Committees as status quo and the Scottish Assembly and Scottish parliament options as devolution.

For 1997, I use the following survey question:

“21a) Which of these statements comes closest to your view?

1. Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK and the European Union.
2. Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK but part of the EU.

3. Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has some taxation powers.
4. Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has no taxation powers.
5. Scotland should remain part of the UK without an elected parliament.
8. (Don't know)" [srrefvw1]

For Table 1, the two independence and two devolution options are combined. All questions and survey responses are drawn from the 1979 Scottish Election Study and the 1997 Scottish Devolution Study (Miller and Brand 1981; Jowell, Heath and Curtice 1998).

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